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 This thesis examines the conflicted relationship between the Belgian army and 
society from its independence in 1830 through to the end of the First World War in 
1918. It assesses the role that the army played as a tool of nation building in what was 
a culturally, geographically, linguistically, and politically fractured country. 
Ultimately, the work argues that the army largely failed in this role as political 
interference in the institution restricted its ability to impact positively on the youth 
entrusted to its care. The machinations of the two dominant parties, the Catholics and 
the Liberals, helped reinforce local ties as opposed to fostering a wider sense of 
nationhood. The military implications were manifold. Not only was the army slow, 
within a continental context, to adopt conscription, only doing so in 1913, but the strong 
sense of anti-militarism within society equally held successive governments to account 
over necessary financial contributions towards other aspects of the military, such as the 
Civic Guard and the fortresses. When coupled with the issue of language among a 
majority Flemish rank and file commanded by a predominantly French-speaking officer 
FRUSVWKHUHZDVDUHDOIHDUDPRQJGRPHVWLFDQGIRUHLJQFRPPHQWDWRUVWKDW%HOJLXP¶V
ability to uphold its unique imposed neutrality in the event of a future war was limited. 
Notwithstanding, its performance during the First World War was surprising and 
marked a brief interlude in the contested domestic affairs of the long nineteenth century, 
as oppRVLWLRQDJDLQVWWKHµRWKHU¶UDOOLHGWKHQDWLRQEHKLQGDVLQJOHFDXVH,WGHPRQVWUDWHG
that, despite an entrenched parochialism, multiple associations with the concept of 
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The spelling of place names has been chosen on the following basis for ease of 
understanding for a work in the English language. In the event where a place name has 
an accepted English equivalent, such as Brussels, this has been used instead of Brussel 
or Bruxelles. Similarly, the common usage of Ypres among English readers lends itself 
to the use of this spelling despite being the Gallicised version of Ieper. Barring such 
exceptions, place names have been spelled in the dominant language of the region in 
which they are situated. For example, Mechelen is used as opposed to Malines due its 
linguistic orientation towards Flemish, whilst Liège is used as opposed to Luik by the 
same logic due to its location in a predominantly French-speaking area. This has been 
HQWLUHO\DWWKHDXWKRU¶VGLVFUHWLRQDQGE\QRPHDQVDWWHPSWVWRSRUWUD\DQ\WKLQJRWKHU
















 This thesis aims to assert that the Belgian army was unsuccessful in its attempts 
to foster a unified national identity in a linguistically, culturally and politically fractured 
society. The primary underlying reason for this was the unwarranted interference of 
party politics, which was too subservient to its small, but powerful electorate, who 
valued local and personal interests above those of the nation at large. A deep-rooted 
anti-militarism pervaded society at all levels, restricting the influence that the army 
could exert. In failing to overcome this aversion to a life under arms, and in many cases 
neglecting those forced to undertake service through the ballot, greater civil-military 
fissures appeared over the course of the nineteenth century. Similarly, the army found 
itself at the centre of a number of ostensibly social debates and contributed, in some 
respect, to the perpetuation of regional (linguistic), political and cultural isolationism. 
The stoic manner in which the army countered the German invasion in 1914 
demonstrated a more complicated association between individuals and the concept of 
the nation. Despite the many obstacles, the vast majority of men from across the country 
found the resolve to defend independence through parallel (and sometimes competing) 
Belgian identities that were rooted in parochialism. In assessing this evolution, a 
number of observations may be made regarding Belgium at this time, whilst also 
demonstrating how the army largely reflected the society from which it was drawn. 
  
 The establishment of Belgian nationality has proven to be a difficult task for 
historians seeking to understand the dynamics behind the 1830 Revolution. Traditional 
views have focussed on the exploits of the Middle Ages as a starting point for the 
development of a national sentiment, which ran alongside a long-established military 
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tradition.1 7KLVZDVRIFRXUVHYHU\LPSRUWDQWJLYHQWKHUHJLRQ¶VFHQWUDOLW\WRWKHZDUV
of Europe. Resistance against the foreign occupier was a simple refrain for those 
desiring to uncover the roots of a common identity. The Brabant uprising against 
Austrian rule in 1789-90 was a localised demonstration of this at the dawn of the age 
of nationalism, though it was the Revolution against Dutch rule in 1830 that historians 
have used as the genesis of the wider nation. Charles Terlinden, for example, argued 
that the Revolution of 1830 would not have succeeded without the persistence of 
national consciousness among the masses, whose use of a tricolour as a symbol of 
unification ought not to go unnoticed.2 This was corroborated by Émile Wanty in his 
seminal work on the Belgian army, in which he noted the centrifugal force of the 
Brussels barricades in drawing together the revolutionary militias being raised ad hoc 
around the country. In total eighty communes were represented in the engagements in 
and around the capital.3  
 The importance of local aspects in the Revolution, and the subsequent 
establishment of a national identity, was highlighted in a colloquium on Belgian 
military history in Brussels in 1980. A variety of contributors examined the individual 
roles of Bruges, Liège, Gent, Tournai, Brussels and Antwerp in the struggle against 
Dutch forces as well as the inter-relationship between them. It demonstrated the belief 
that the success of the Revolution was the sum of its constituent parts, which lent 
                                                     
1
 J. Stengers, Histoire du Sentiment National en Belgique des Origines à 1918, Tome 
I: Les racines de la Belgique (Racine, Brussels, 2000); and H. Pirenne, Histoire de 
Belgique des Origines à Nos Jours Vols. I-V (La Renaissance du Livre, Brussels, 1972-
1975). 
2
 C. Terlinden, Histoire Militaire des Belges (La Renaissance du Livre, Brussels, 1931), 
pp. 255-257. 
3
 É. Wanty, Le Milieu Militaire Belge de 1831 à 1914 (Palais des Académies, Brussels, 
1957), p. 10. 
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towards the concept of a wider, all-encompassing, national movement.4 Yet, whilst 
drawing out cultural and religious commonalities that were diametrically opposed to 
Dutch rule, the local approach actually demonstrated how unique responses to the 
Revolution were as well. Similar remarks can be made regarding the social groupings 
of the nation, whose motivations for participating to a greater or lesser degree varied 
according to circumstance. 
 Els Witte has recently contended that the only unifying factor among these 
disparate elements of the population was economic. By the late 1820s, the South 
Netherlands (i.e. Belgium) was being exploited as part of a protectionist policy 
defending the interests of the northern Protestants. The southern, largely Catholic, 
population contributed towards 50% of the national debt despite being responsible for 
only 20%, a situation that affected all tiers of society. Only when faced with an 
economic crisis in 1829-30, which resulted in high unemployment among artisans and 
labourers, were the conditions for revolution achieved. Other contributing factors, such 
DV:LOOLDP,¶VGHFLVLRQ WREULQJHGXFDWLRQXQGHU6WDWHFRQWURO, to the chagrin of the 
Catholic Clergy, similarly incited agitation, though not to the extent of provoking a 
wide-scale reaction.5 The concept of the nation state requires society to come together 
RQFHUWDLQSULQFLSOHVDQGDFFHSWWKH6WDWH¶VSRZHUDQGFRQWURO7KHEXLOGLQJRI%HOJLXP
was on a politico-ideological basis of liberalism that opposed despotic rule. Only 
through extensive dissemination of journalistic critiques under the specific 
                                                     
4
 59DQ(HQRRµWH%UXJJH¶SS-5'HPRXOLQµ/D5pYROXWLRQGHj
/LqJH¶SS-73; D0%DOWKD]DUµ'H2PZHQWHOLQJYDQWH*HQW¶SS-103; J. 
1D]HWµ/D5pYROXWLRQGHj7RXUQDL¶SS-DQG-/RJLHµ/D5pYROXWLRQ
GH  j %UX[HOOHV HW j 1DPXU¶ SS -¶ LQ $FWHV GX &ROORTXH G¶+LVWRLUH
Militaire Belge (1830-1980)/Akten van het Colloquium over de Belgische 
Krijgsgeschiedenis (1830-1980) (26-28 March 1980) (Musée Royal de 
O¶$UPpH.RQLQNOLMN/HJHUVPXVHXP%UXVVHOV 
5
 E. Witte, La Construction de la Belgique 1827-1847 (Éditions Complexe, Brussels, 
2005), pp. 21-24 & 36-40. 
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circumstances that were present in 1830 was a political consciousness mobilized across 
social and geographical divides. This demonstrated how nationalism was not a vital 
ingredient in the development of the liberal Belgian State, which Witte argues still 
lacked a unified identity beyond the 1830s.6 
 Theoretical works on the study of nationalism have tended to emphasize the 
fluidity in the formation of, and association with, an identity. Marnix Beyen and 
0DDUWHQ9DQ*LQGHUDFKWHUQRWHWKDWµ,GHQWLILFDWLRQLVQRWD]HUR-sum game where one 
LGHQWLW\VXSSODQWVWKHRWKHU¶UDWKHUWKDWQXPHURXVDQGRIWHQFRPSHWLQJVWUDQGVDOORZ
individuals to identify with different groups at different times depending on the specific 
circumstances. The example used is that of Galicia where the population considered 
WKHPVHOYHV µ*HUPDQV¶ LQ RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKHLU FR-inhabitant Czechs, Slovenes and 
Italians, but otherwise professed profound regional ties, which remained indifferent to 
strong nationalist pressure groups.7 Similar trends can be viewed in Belgium, where 
entrenched regionalism prevailed in spite of elite-led, State-driven attempts at 
constructing nationality through vehicles such as language. This was partly on account 
of the masses not identifying solely with these constructions, rather transforming, 
appropriating or inverting them to form their own concept of the nation.8 In many ways, 
the Flemish sub-nation that emerged reflected the model of ethno-nationalism, which 
YDOXHVµQDWXUDO¶FRPPXQLWLHVEDVHGRQUDFHELRORJ\FRPPRQGHVFHQWODQJXDJHDQG
culture. This was opposed to civic-nationalism espoused by the State that encouraged 
                                                     
6
 Ibid., pp. 42-46 & 112-114. 
7
 M. Beyen & M. Van Ginderachter, µ*HQHUDO ,QWURGXFWLRQ:ULWLQJWKH0DVVLQWRD
0DVV SKHQRPHQRQ¶ LQ 0 9DQ *LQGHUDFKWHU 	 0 %H\HQ HGV Nationhood from 
Below, Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
2012), pp. 8-9. 
8
 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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citizens to choose to be a part of a nation.9 Given the diversity of the population and its 
PRWLYDWLRQVLQ WKH5HYROXWLRQ LWFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGµHWKQLF¶DQGUHTXLUHGD
PRYHWRZDUGVµFLYLF¶IDFWRUVLQWKHDIWHUPDWKWRFRQVWUXFWDXQLILHGQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\
However, as Van Ginderachter argues, no individual falls fully into one category.10 
Therefore the mélange between the two poles can go some way to explaining why 
regional and national identities continued to clash in Belgium in the time period under 
consideration, and why the State felt continuously bound to promoWHµFLYLF¶YDOXHVWKDW
would draw the nation together. 
 In language and the army, the State believed it had a ready-made conveyance 
for nationalism. Following the idea of the French Revolutionary armies, the ability to 
inculcate a large cross-section of thHQDWLRQ¶V\RXWKZLWKVKDUHGH[SHULHQFHVHGXFDWLRQ
and values whilst under arms, and being commanded in a single language, was seen as 
the best method of breaking regional bonds in favour of a national identity.11 The idea 
that the army, through its system RI QDWLRQDO UHFUXLWPHQW ZDV D µPHOWLQJ-SRW¶ IURP
which a greater homogeneity might emanate, formed the basis of an article by Richard 
%RLMHQ,QLWKHHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWDSURFHVVRIµ)UHQFKLILFDWLRQ¶FKDUDFWHULVHGWKHHDUO\
years to the point where Flemings, in both civilian and military life, accepted the 
position as second-rate citizens.12 This was despite their proportion of the population 
                                                     
9
 09DQ*LQGHUDFKWHUµ+RZ8VHIXOLVWKH&RQFHSWRI(WKQROLQJXLVWLF1DWLRQDOLVP"
On Imagined Communities, the Ethnic-&LYLF'LFKRWRP\DQG%DQDO1DWLRQDOLVP¶LQ3
Broomans (et. al.) (eds.), The Beloved Mothertongue: Ethnolinguistic Nationalism in 
Small Nations: Inventories and Reflections (Peeters, Leuven, Paris & Dudley, MA, 
2008), p. 5. 
10
 Ibid., p. 13. 
11
 )RUWKH)UHQFKH[DPSOHVHH$)RUUHVWµLa patrie en danger: The French Revolution 
and the First Levée en Masse¶LQ'0RUDQDQG$:DOGURQHGVThe People in Arms: 
Military Myth and National Mobilisation since the French Revolution (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 25-30. 
12
 5%RLMHQµ+HW/HJHUDOV6PHOWNURHVYDQGH1DWLH"¶Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse 
Geschiedenis, (1997), no. 3, pp. 55-70. 
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out-QXPEHULQJ:DOORQLD¶VE\,WGHPRQVWUDWHGDQHDUO\GHJUHHRIVXFFHVVLQFLYLF-
nationalism, though was undermined by the awakening of the Flemish movement in the 
1850s, which took on a much more aggressive ethnolinguistic character that grew in 
prominence over the course of the nineteenth century. 
 Other countries faced similar difficulties in the relationship between their 
armies and societies. As John Gooch and Douglas Porch have pointed out in their 
studies of the Italian and French armies respectively, one way in which the authorities 
maintained the status quo in their favour during the nineteenth century was to utilise 
the citizen army as a tool to educate and transform society; even going as far as using 
it as the building block of a nation-state. For example, the countering of regional 
factionaOLVPZDV DW WKHKHDUWRI)DQWL¶VGULYH WR IRVWHU D VHQVHRI Italianità into the 
newly formed Italian nation in the 1860s. This was achieved through a form of national 
recruiting, which saw units draw men from two separate geographical regions, thus 
using tKHDUP\µSULPDULO\DVDQLQVWUXPHQWRIUHXQLILFDWLRQ¶13 However, the fact that 
only a quarter of the male population performed active service meant that the scheme 
was heavily flawed, with a large proportion of society remaining firmly out of the 
DUP\¶VHGucational reach. In France, by contrast, conscription and the idea of a nation-
in-arms largely succeeded in forging national unity, bringing together men from various 
regions and social backgrounds. This, coupled with the ritualistic call up of successive 
conscript classes, solidified the respect for civic duty and the national ideal across 
multiple generations.14  
                                                     
13
 J. Gooch, Army, State and Society in Italy, 1870±1915 (MacMillan Press, 
Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 10 & 21. 
14
 D. Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871-1914 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1981), pp. 32 & 204. 
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 Although the French may have used the army well as a vehicle for promoting 
national unity, it was a long way off from being the perfect example of state expression. 
Political intrigue amongst the uniquely socially inclusive officer corps led to a degree 
of instability, which often filtered down into the regimental system. Radical 
Governments continuously attempted to republicanise the officer corps to ensure it was 
WUXVWZRUWK\7KLVZDVGRQHWKURXJKWDNLQJSURPRWLRQRXWRIWKHPLOLWDU\¶VFRQWURODQG
into civilian hands by way of the Minister of War. Though historians have largely 
agreed that this republicanisation failed, it is a clear example of the unrest in French 
civil-military relations, which often shook the institution to its very core. Indeed, Porch 
notes that even among individual regiments, who by their regional recruiting attempted 
to create links between the army and society in their respective localities, the infiltration 
of local concerns, interests and politics were not uncommon, leading to a relaxing of 
discipline.15 
 In contrast, Hew Strachan, Edward Spiers and David French, in their studies of 
the British Army, have concluded that the social exclusivity of the officer corps, in 
particular, helped keep the army apolitical.16 Indeed, Spiers wrote of how the purchase 
V\VWHPµEXWWUHVVHGWKH6WDWHE\DWWUDFWLQJRIILFHUVIURPIDPLOLHVZKRVHVWDWXVSULYLOHJHV
and possessions were already proWHFWHG E\ WKH 6WDWH LWVHOI¶ WKXV HQVXULQJ WKHLU
allegiance.17 Whilst it can be said that the elite chose to serve, in order to confirm their 
social status, the rank and file - obtained through voluntary recruitment - were often 
driven to a career in the army through desperation.18 In many ways the army reflected 
                                                     
15
 Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
16
 H. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 
20-43. 
17
 E.M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (Longman Group Ltd, London, 1980), 
p. 12. 
18
 David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the 
British People c.1870-2000 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), p. 37. 
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the society from which it was drawn. In contrast to its French counterpart, the British 
rank and file expected to be led by its social superiors, which reinforced the class 
structure of the nation. The evolving concept of a gentleman, in turn, promoted 
Christian values, which were implicit in noblesse oblige and the realisation of their 
paternalistic duty towards the other ranks.19 In some ways, this strengthened the 
relationship between officers and men despite the inherent social gulf between them, 
whilst conscription, as Gooch notes, often increased class distinction.20 
 What this serves to highlight are some of the themes taken up by historians in 
their study of European armies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Within 
this framework, the Belgian case is all the more enlightening, having to deal with 
similar issues in a different, and quite restricted context. Both the state and the army 
struggled to seamlessly unite the two factions that dominated society and divided the 
country in almost every walk of life. Imposed neutrality, a situation which no other 
European country was forced to deal with, not only hampered recruiting due to the anti-
militarism it engendered, but also severely strained civil-military relations. Often 
caught in the middle was the monarch, who constitutionally was both the head of the 
state and army. Commercial enterprise and rapid industrialisation created pressures as 
social mobility reverberated through the Belgian aUP\¶VUHIOHFWLYHVRFLDOSROLWLFDODQG
regional orders. Whilst the army was used to forge a state in Prussia, to create a nation 
in Italy and to sustain the status quo in France and Britain, the Belgian Army was merely 
a political battleground until the preconditions of war in 1914 allowed for these to be 
temporarily overcome. 
                                                     
19
 E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1992), p. 113. 
20
 J. Gooch, Armies in Europe (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1980), pp. 127-
128. 
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:LWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI(PLOH:DQW\¶VDQG/XF'H9RV¶RYHUYLHZVRIWKH%HOJLDQ
army as an institution, few other works have successfully examined the convoluted 
relationship between the army and society.21 Old military histories, focusing primarily 
on the laws governing the structural changes or the exploits of campaigns, have tended 
to dominate the historiography of the nineteenth century. From the earliest writings of 
De Ryckel, and Terlinden, through to the more recent general studies of Lecleir, Grisard 
and Gerrard, the predominant focus of attentions has been on the organisational failings 
that led to the shambolic mobilisation of 1870 and on the delayed reforms thereafter 
that compromised the army in 1914.22 With scant reference to the social and political 
reasons behind these military developments, little in the way of understanding the 
DUP\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKVRFLHW\FDQWUXO\EHVDLGWRHPHUJH 
By contrast, Wanty assesses the impact of politics on the army and demonstrates 
how social considerations affected important military considerations. For example, a 
major consideration of his work concerning the development of the officer corps in the 
immediate decades following the Revolution was the influence of language. This 
inhibited the development of an homogenous corps due to the advantages received by 
the French-speaking Walloon candidates over their Flemish counterparts.23 However, 
due to his chronological approach, he fails to continue the exploration of this important 
theme beyond the 1840s, due to its secondary importance in the second half of the 
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nineteenth century compared to the conscription debate. Similar accusations can be 
made with regards to his interesting ideas concerning the development of a national 
identity through national recruitment, and the strategic role of the Civic Guard within 
the military establishment that are only briefly considered within a restrictive temporal 
framework.24 :DQW\¶V DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH UDQN and file only stretches to the 
conscription crisis, the wastage in terms of recalls and illness, and a brief description 
of the regional recruiting adopted by the army after 1913. However, one interesting 
point, regarding discipline was raised. Wanty demonstrates quite clearly through his 
figures that a far higher proportion of military offenders were actually paid substitutes 
rather than the annual balloted man.25 Into this, one can read a condemnation of 
substitution, though the political dimensions surrounding the debate might have been 
H[SDQGHGXSRQ:DQW\¶VRYHUDOOFRQFOXVLRQVLWVDORQJVLGHWKRVHRIPDQ\RWKHUVZKR
bemoaned Belgian apathy towards the military establishment until it was too late.26  
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWFRPSOHWHZRUNRQ%HOJLXP¶VDUPHGIRUFHV to date is Luc De 
9RV¶Het Effectief van de Belgische Krijgsmacht en de Militiewetgeving, 1830-1914. 
Among the key ideas expressed in this study is the urban/rural conflict, which filtered 
into politics and subsequently influenced decisions regarding the army. For instance, 
WKH  G¶2XOWUHPRQW FRQVFULSWLRQ %LOO EHFDPH D EDWWOH EHWZHHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW
backed by the urban middle classes, who wished to defend their interests following a 
series of riots challenging their social position, and the rural population backed by the 
city of Antwerp who saw it as a blight on commerce and a waste of good labour. 27 
Indeed, political wrangling, and the growing socialist party and electorate, played a 
                                                     
24
 Ibid., pp. 46-47 & 171. 
25
 Wanty, Milieu, p. 126. 
26
 Gerrard, /¶$UPpH%HOJH, p. 14; and Grisard, +LVWRLUHGHO¶$UPpH%HOJH, p. 280. 
27
 De Vos, Het Effectief, pp. 230-252. 
 21 
significant role in military reform throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Not only were successive Catholic governments increasingly wary of allowing Flemish 
youths to mix with socialist Walloons on account of growing fears of declining 
religious faith instigated by a heightened sense of atheism amongst the urban 
population, but they held the King to ransom over it by refusing to endorse his foreign 
adventures if he backed the call for the introduction of conscription. Indeed, impetus 
from the Catholic lower-middle classes managed to see the introduction of a voluntary 
scheme of recruiting from 1902 until 1909 following the change in the electoral system 
to one of proportional representation. Although voluntary recruitment largely failed and 
ironically produced the circumstances under which conscription was finally adopted, it 
demonstrated the influence of the electorate and the political parties upon military 
reform. Linked to this, De Vos shows how successive Governments throughout the 
nineteenth century were torn between regional and national recruitment as they 
attempted to balance military requirements with social demands. By 1914, the Flemish 
proportion of the army was 59.28%, 2% over their share of the population.28 De Vos 
demonstrates that, in this sense at least, the army generally reflected society. 
Unfortunately, however, the political angle and focus on reform mean that, like Wanty, 
De Vos rejects DV\VWHPDWLFVWXG\RIWKHDUP\¶VVRFLDOFRPSRVLWLRQRYHUWKHSHULRGWKH
DX[LOLDU\ IRUFHV DQG WKH DUP\¶V ZDUWLPH SHUIRUPDQFH DUH QHJOHFWHG $V VXFK QR
conclusions can be drawn from how these reforms and social issues reacted to the 
testing environment of 1914-1918. 
 Despite its disregard in many general histories of the army, some good work 
has been carried out of the auxiliary forces with regards to their relationship with 
VRFLHW\ ,Q SDUWLFXODU 5 &RHQHQ¶V VWXG\ RI WKH $QWZHUS &LYLF *XDUG UHYHDOHG WKH
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politicisation of the largely middle-class force. In his rejection of Wanty and F. Van 
.DONHQ¶VZRUNVDVVXSHUILFLDO&RHQHQSURFHHGVWRH[SORUHLQGHWDLOWKe political and 
VRFLDOFRQWH[WLQZKLFK$QWZHUS¶VFLYLOLDQIRUFHHVWDEOLVKHGLWVHOIDVDPLUURULPDJHRI
the class structure of the city.29 Indeed, some 75% of the force was comprised of 
tradesmen or those in industry, and the officers were largely of a higher social standing 
than those in the ranks.30 Over time though, this division became less pronounced as 
the officer corps and the rank and file evolved into a more commercial-employee 
dominated force at the expense of the retailers and artisans of the early years. Despite 
providing a considered insight into the relationship between the auxiliary forces and the 
city of Antwerp, this work is rather narrow in its approach.  
 2WKHU QRWDEOH ZRUNV RQ WKH DX[LOLDU\ IRUFHV VXFK DV ($ -DFREV¶ VHULHV RI
articles oQWKHIRUPDWLRQRILWVLQGLYLGXDOXQLWVDQGKLVRYHUYLHZRIWKH&LYLF*XDUG¶V
association with the British Rifle Volunteers through shooting contests in the 1860s, 
KDYHIDLOHGWRVLJQLILFDQWO\DOWHUWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHIRUFH¶VRYHUDOOVRFLDOSROLWLFal 
and strategic position in Belgium.31 Indeed, only Patrick LefqYUH¶VZRUNRQWKHLUXVHLQ
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the maintenance of public order lends any further insights to the debate.32 The 
GLIILFXOWLHV LQ LQWHJUDWLQJ WKH DX[LOLDULHV LQWR WKH FRXQWU\¶V PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ ZHUH
compounded by their role as an aid to the civil power. This was also the case for the 
small mounted police force of the Gendarmerie who, in their penny-packets, were to 
maintain law and order in the countryside whilst also to be prepared to swell the ranks 
of the cavalry should the necessity arise.33 Issues stemmed from an unknown source of 
authority, especially when used as an aid to the civil power. Both the civil and military 
commanders of the districts believed that it was their prerogative to call out the Civic 
Guard to aid the authorities, but this often led to misuses of the auxiliaries.34 The legal 
aspect of these incidents have been well documented, but the social, political and 
strategic ramifications have scope for further study. 
 Despite the Civic *XDUG¶V SURSRVHG UROH LQ QDWLRQDO GHIHQFH WKHUH LV D
surprisingly limited amount of work regarding this particular issue or even strategic 
policy in general. TKH FRXQWU\¶V LQKHULWDQFH RI D QXPEHU RI IRUWUHVVHV IROORZLQJ LWV
independence, coupled with the general apathy towards the army as a result of an 
uncompromising belief in the power of neutrality, meant fixed positions became the 
basis of defence. Despite it being pivotal to the Belgian army, fortifications have 
remained largely untouched by historicaODQDO\VLV-DFN\0DUFKDO¶VZRUNRQWKH1DPXU
IRUWUHVVDQG5REHUW*LOVDQG6LPRQ6WHYLQVWLFKWLQJ¶VRQWKHQDWLRQDOUHGRXEWDW$QWZHUS
appear to stand alone in the field concerning nineteenth century fortress policy.35 The 
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main points of interest to come out of these works are not concerned with their role in 
strategy and the subsequent influence on the army, but rather the relationship between 
the authorities and the populations of the respective towns who fought over the rights 
of the land and the compensation to be paid in order to offset the inconvenience. Other 
histories of the Belgian army, and particularly the First World War, have also made 
PHQWLRQRI%HOJLXP¶VIRUWLILFDWLRQVEXWRQO\ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVWUXFWXUDOZHDNQHVVHV
exposed by German heavy artillery in 1914.36  By and large the general consensus 
appears to be that for all the faith put into their defensive system of fixed positions, the 
army was not strong enough to complement them and as such it must be seen as a failure 
of military policy.  
As previously stated, the First World War has been well documented by Belgian 
historians, though not without some nationalist overtones. Some have even gone as far 
as to say that the delay caused by the Belgian forces at Liège in August 1914 caused 
the Schlieffen plan to be thrown so out of kilter as to have altered the course of the war 
LQWKH$OOLHV¶IDYRXU37 Added to this, Tasnier and Van Overstraeten suggest that every 
KRXUFRXQWHG LQ%HOJLXP¶VGHIHQFHRI$QWZHUSZKLFKKHOSHGUHGUHVV WKHEDODQFHRI
forces on the Marne and ensured that Dunkirk, Calais and Cherbourg remained in Allied 
hands.38 Reading much of the immediate post-war literature would have one believe 
that the Belgian army was both glorious in retreat and in victory, encountering few, if 
any problems. The effect of Flamenpolitk on the army was a particularly glaring 
omission in most survey works. Henri Pirenne has discussed the somewhat limited 
                                                     
Reduit van Belgie (1859-¶5HYXHEHOJHG¶KLVWRLUHPLOLWDLUH, vol. 29, no. 7 (1992), 
pp. 465-488 & vol. 29, no. 8 (1992) pp. 537-560. 
36
 L. De Vos, La Première Guerre Mondiale (J.M. Collet, Braine-O¶$OOHXGS
30. 
37
 Terlinden, Histoire Militaire, p. 332 
38
 M. Tasnier & R. Van Overstraeten, /¶$UPpHEHOJHGDQV OD*XHUUH0RQGLDOH (H. 
Bertels, Brussels, 1931), p. 170. 
 25 
effects of the separatist movement on the occupied civilian population but, generally 
speaking, the topic appeared to be somewhat of a taboo.39  
More recent studies have acknowledged the effects of social, linguistic and 
political divisions within the army, particularly regarding the maintenance of discipline 
and morale. While the likes of Siegfried Debaeke and Jacques Maes have attempted to 
show the army as particularly heavy handed ± particularly towards its Flemish soldiers 
± Sophie De Schaepdrijver, Stanislas Horvat and Tom Simoens have countered this 
assertion and argued that comparatively Belgian discipline was well-maintained.40 
Indeed, it has been shown that with regard to the March 1918 strikes, Flamingantism ± 
in the derogatory sense of Flemish separatism ± was not the primary motivating factor, 
rather a combination of war-weariness and a quest for linguistic parity contributed to a 
breakdown in officer-man relations.  
More specialised works concerning the regional breakdown of Belgian 
casualties, however, have unearthed a related historiographical debate. In 1917, the 
Flamenpolitik-inspired Flemish journalist, Raf Verhulst, published figures from the 
monthly casualty lists that suggested 80% of fatalities were sustained by troops of 
Flemish origin. The idea behind it was to create unrest in Flanders and increase support 
for the German-supported separatist movement by demonstrating that Flemish soldiers 
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were doing more for the war-effort than their Walloon counterparts and being sacrificed 
in the process. With no official post-war inquiry into this, despite strong Flemish led 
movements that saw the introduction of language equality laws, the 80% myth 
remained ingrained in public consciousness. By the mid-1970s, however, two authors 
had attempted to question its validity.  
The first of these was F.E. Stevens whose article about the 9th Infantry Regiment 
suggested that the ratio between Flemish and Walloon casualties was approximately 
equal and that, as such, the entirety of the population contributed to the struggle.41 
However, this must be qualified to an extent, as his figures demonstrate that 53.28% 
were Flemish, 30.66% were Walloon, and 16.06% were of uncertain origin (most 
probably from the bilingual Brussels region). This rather large margin of uncertainty is 
unsatisfactory, as is the methodology behind his figures. Using regimental registers, 
which Stevens himself admits are unreliable, place of birth is used as the determining 
factor of regional origin, though Brussels is curiously set aside as a distinct entity 
creating this vacuum of unknowns. Equally, families of mixed origin and Flemish 
families embedded in Wallonia and vice versa are simply miscategorised for ease of 
use. The most galling of all inaccuracies, however, is that such general conclusions are 
derived from such a narrow and specific sample as a single regiment whose recruiting 
base was in the bilingual capital. 
 Indeed, in 1978 Luc Schepens published figures in the Standaard that 
FRPSOHWHO\ FRQWUDGLFWHG 6WHYHQV¶ UHDSSUDLVDO RI WKH  P\WK 8VLQJ DQ HQWLUHO\
different approach of measuring the regional breakdown of casualties by examining the 
death registers of ten Belgian cemeteries, Schepens comes to the conclusion that 67.9% 
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were of Flemish origin. Although this still disproves the 80% figure, it is still a 
politically controversial statement to make, as it would suggest that Flanders was forced 
to spill more blood in the fight for continued independence than Wallonia. However, as 
H. Keymuelen and L. De Vos point out in their series of articles on the issue in the late 
1980s, the methodology behind these figures is possibly even more flawed than 
6WHYHQV¶42 The cemeteries selected were all in Flanders and contained bodies of those 
men who had only fought on the stabilised Yser front from 1915-1918. This not only 
failed to take into account those men who had died in the early phases of the war whilst 
the fighting was in Wallonia (the Meuse), but equally ignored the fact that many 
Walloon corpses were exhumed and reinterred in their own localities after the war. 
Added to this, the fact that the Yser army was largely reinforced by Flemish recruits 
from the only unoccupied sliver of territory left, meant that the army was, during this 
phase of the war, a significantly more Flemish-GRPLQDWHGLQVWLWXWLRQ6FKHSHQV¶VDPSOH
and results appear equally skewed and, as such, remain unconvincing. 
 Keymeulen and De Vos, in their rejection of the aforementioned works, set 
about in their series of articles to be more comprehensive in their research in an attempt 
to put an end to the debate. Using a much larger sample base (some 33,180, which 
translates to the 94% of Belgian casualties attributable to specific years of the war), 
they were able to include a larger spectrum of the army and war into their study.43 
Culling information from a number of sources for the names of those soldiers found in 
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the published fatality lists in the Moniteur Belge, the pair devised three tests with 
differing criteria against which to measure the 80% figure. The first included their entire 
sample over the entirety of the war without taking into account place of death: this gave 
a result of 64.31% Flemish casualties. The second solely included casualties from the 
fighting army who died in Belgium, France or Britain and offered up the figure of 
54.9%. The third, which only used the Army of the Yser and 1915-1918 campaign as 
its sample, concluded that 68.81% were Flemish. What this seems to demonstrate is the 
UHODWLYHUHJLRQDOHTXDOLW\LQWKHFDVXDOWLHVRIWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶VILJKWLQJDUPVRYHUWKH
course of the war, but a much higher proportion of Flemish deaths during the fighting 
after the majority of the country was under German occupation. This was due to the 
almost exclusively Flemish intake of new recruits after 1915 from the unoccupied 
section of territory. Indeed, when looking exclusively at the mortality rates of the 1914-
1918 classes of recruits, a staggering 72.07% were shown to originate from Flanders, 
reinforcing the point of a Flemishisation of the army during the war itself. Despite all 
this, and even reducing the sample to cover what was known to be a Flemish-dominated 
army, Keymeulen and De Vos can safely say that the 80% figure was indeed a myth, 
and that over the course of the war both sides of the population contributed to the 
QDWLRQ¶VFDXVH 
 
In terms of Anglophone historiography concerning the Belgian army directly, 
one would be forgiven for thinking that it did not exist prior to 1914. Of the few 
historians who have attempted to offer an insight into the nineteenth century institution, 
none can truly be said to have produced a definitive account of it. Indeed, the closest 
and most complete work is that of Jonathan E. Helmreich, whose diplomatic history of 
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%HOJLXPGRHVFRQFHUQLWVHOILQWHUPLWWHQWO\ZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VDUPHGIRUFHV44 With such 
a broad topic at his disposal, Helmreich was able to broach certain social, economic, 
cultural and, naturally, diplomatic conditions that affected the army, which perhaps the 
likes of Gooch did not. Armies in Europe, clearly had a different purpose and as such 
could not afford to devote the time and space to the small, particular case of Belgium 
at the expense of the major European powers. A mere two paragraphs are the sum total 
of the analysis. Nonetheless, some interesting points are raised, regarding politics and 
regionalism, particularly when concerned with the conscription debate, which 
dominated the Belgian political agenda from 1870 until its adoption in 1913. For 
instance, reference is made to the succession of Catholic governments who blocked 
conscription for fear that Flemish youths would be corrupted by mixing with the 
socialist Walloons.45 'DYLG 6WHYHQVRQ¶V DUWLFOH RQ %HOJLDQ SUH-war preparation also 
WDFNOHV WKLV YHU\ LVVXH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH DUP\¶V  UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ46  Despite 
DGGLQJVRPHH[WUDGHWDLOWR*RRFK¶VUDWKHUOLPLWHGH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶V
UHFUXLWLQJGLIILFXOWLHVLWPXVWEHVDLGWKDWPXFKRIWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶VSUH-war history 
remains largely unknown to British readers. This deficit in knowledge is partly a result 
RIDODQJXDJHEDUULHUEXWDOVRSHUKDSVDUHVXOWRI%HOJLXP¶VVLWXation as a neutral, which 
kept its army out of continental conflicts ± and as such, consciousness ± until it was 
thrust into the limelight in August 1914. 
 Studies of the First World War in British historiography, though largely 
overviews or examinations of the major belligerents, do take a noticeably greater 
interest in Belgium and its army. Politics and regionalism suddenly become more 
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important factors, as their effects are wider reaching and impact directly on the course 
of the war. Indeed, the Flemish question is taken up by the likes of David Englander in 
KLVZRUNRQGLVFLSOLQHDQGPRUDOH+HQRWHVWKDWDVHULHVRIµVWULNHV¶DQGLQFUHDVHGUDWHV
of desertion in the Belgian army on the Yser in 1917 and 1918 were a result of social, 
cultural and material deprivations experienced by the majority-Flemish speaking rank 
and file in the predominantly francophone dominated state and armed forces.47 What 
he neglects, as a result of his work not being exclusively concerned with the Belgians, 
is the effect of Flamenpolitik on Flemish soldiers. Ian Beckett, on the other hand, does 
touch upon the German-inspired Flemish independence movement in occupied 
Belgium, and discusses the importance of propaganda in the sustenance of a national 
identity.48 In the context of the First World War, the consequences of such serious 
LVVXHVWR%HOJLXP¶VDOOLHVJLYHVDGGHGYDOXHWRWKHLUVWXG\ 
 Among the other key themes highlighted by historians in their appraisal of 
%HOJLXPGXULQJWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DULVWKHDUP\¶VZDUWLPHSHUIRUPDQFH. Inherent in 
this is a study of the major campaigns in which it fought and, as such, the co-operation 
afforded to its allies. This latter point is of particular interest due to the unique situation 
whereby the Belgian constitution dictated that the monarch assumed control of the army 
as its active Commander in Chief during war. The dichotomy, which emanated from 
his dual role as civilian figurehead on the one hand, and military leader on the other, is 
central to understanding King $OEHUW¶VGLUHFWLRQRIWKH war and his relationship with 
the British and French. Unfortunately, British historiography has largely by-passed this 
in its haste to explore the strained relationship over contradicting strategy with Joffre. 
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As both William Philpott and Hew Strachan demonstrate, the tension arose from 
differing priorities. For King Albert, the defence of Belgian territory was paramount, 
whilst the French general, under the impression that his allies had little military value, 
believed that the Belgians ought to have voluntarily become an adjunct to his 
conception of a grand allied strategy orchestrated by himself.49 Indeed, communication 
often broke down entirely between the two armies with each expecting the other to fall 
into line with their respective designs. As a result, the Belgian army found itself fighting 
alone against a superior force, which seriously crippled its fighting capabilities for the 
rest of the war, leading to its uncompromising defensive attitude. Though often 
described as valiant and brave, the over-riding perception among British historians 
UHJDUGLQJ WKH %HOJLDQ DUP\¶V PLOLWDU\ SHUIRUPDQFH ZDV WKDW LW ZDV SRRU (YHQ
6WUDFKDQ¶VFRPPHQW WKDW WKHDUP\ µDFTXLWWHG LWVHOIZLWKPXFKPRUHGLVWLQFWLRQ >«@
than it had a right to exSHFW¶LVWLQJHGZLWKDQRWHRIDFNQRZOHGJHGIDLOXUH50 
 
 In carrying out this study, a variety of sources have been consulted in archives 
across Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, a number of databases 
have been assembled in order to carry out work on the composition of the officer corps, 
the rank and file, and the auxiliary foUFHV7KHRIILFHUV¶ consists of 2,375 entries spread 
across five regiments at ten-year intervals, with data extracted from the matriculation 
sheets held at the Musée 5R\DOGHO¶$UPpH05$%UXVVHOV7KHVHLQFOXGHGWKHQG
Chasseurs à Pied, 12th Line Infantry Regiment, 1st Lancers, 4th Artillery Regiment, and 
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the Regiment of Engineers. The selection was based on the premise of providing as 
wide-ranging a sample possible across all arms, whilst also ensuring the representation 
of Revolutionary remnants that were formally incorporated into the former in 1832. 
These were used in conjunction with demographic data taken from the Ministry of the 
,QWHULRU¶VStatistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général and Statistique 
Générale de la Belgique: Exposé de la Situation du Royaume from 1846 to 1910 in 
order to draw further figures and conclusions for both the officer corps and the rank 
and file. The Schollaert-Helleputte Papers, held at the Archives du Royaume Général, 
furnished an enrolment list of approximately 1,000 Civic Guardsmen that was used in 
analysing the age and social composition of this corps. Another 150 entries were added 
from records found in the Algemeen Rijksarchief Kortrijk and the MRA. For the officer 
corps of both the Civic Guard and Gendarmerie, data was computed from the 
ELRJUDSKLFDOGHWDLOVSXEOLVKHG/XF.HXQLQJ¶VZRUNRQWKHIRUFHVRIRUGHULQ%UXVVHOV51 
 
This thesis has been undertaken using the µDUP\DQGVRFLHW\¶DSSURDFKWKDWKDV
extensively revised the study of military history in recent decades. Notable examples 
by the likes of Ian Beckett, David French, Edward Spiers, John Gooch, Douglas Porch, 
Hew Strachan and more recently Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly have provided 
a structural framework to follow.52 Thus, the work has been divided in six chapters, 
discussing a number of interrelated themes to form an appreciation of the Belgian army 
as an institution, and its role as a tool of nation building. 
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Chapter one discusses the professionalisation of the officer corps from its 
establishment in 1830 until the outbreak of the First World War. This process was 
affected by a number of external factors, including a large influx of foreign officers, 
political interference, and institutional failings that all contributed towards undermining 
efficiency and morale. Obstacles for Flemish-speakers, in a predominantly 
Francophone officer corps, resulted in an alteration of the linguistic profile towards 
bilinJXDOLVPWKDWUHIOHFWHGWKHWUHQGDPRQJ)ODQGHUV¶PLGGOHFODVVVRFLHW\7KLVZDV
UHLQIRUFHG E\ WKH DUP\¶V HGXFDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV WKH École Militaire and École de 
Guerre, which sought to produce an homogenous group of officers through a 
standardised curriculum taught in French. While the influence of these establishments 
became increasingly prominent, the military values and professionalism they inculcated 
eroded over time as slow promotion rates in a neutral army forced many ambitious 
officers to seek alternative careers. Thus, by 1914, the officer corps lacked the martial 
spirit and identity it had fought to create since the Revolution. 
The second chapter analyses the politics behind the recruitment of the rank and 
file, and its attempts to act as a unifying force among a divided population. In spite of 
national recruitment and a form of conscription through the ballot, a deep-rooted anti-
militarism within society coupled with the injustices of replacement actually drove the 
army and society further apart. The power of local interests and of the electorate can 
clearly be seen to hold successive governments (both Catholic and Liberals) to account 
over the extension of military service; much to the detriment of military efficiency. This 
was to be a recurring theme until a series of reforms between 1902 and 1913 saw the 
system altered to include periods of volunteerism (1902), partial conscription (1909) 
and full, general service (1913). These changes occurred too late to have an impact on 
WKH DUP\¶V FDSDELOLWLes, and demonstrated the damaging effects of regionalism on 
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military affairs through politics, that undermined any attempts to forge a shared national 
identity. 
Parochialisms were to be supplanted by national ideals whilst under arms in the 
µVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶ a discussion of which forms the basis of chapter three. However, 
the army neglected its task of providing physical, moral and educational supports for 
the youth of the nation entrusted to its care. This was seen to be the corollary of military 
service, eventually leading to greater rights as citizens, but the army and State defaulted 
on its side of the unwritten social contract. Deplorable conditions, religious and 
linguistic discrimination did nothing to endear the idea of nationhood to the majority 
of recruits forced into military service. As the majority of soldiers hailed from the pious, 
rural heartlands of Flanders, the seemingly unjust institution, which propagated the use 
of corporal punishment, further alienated the increasingly anti-militaristic society. It 
explains the reasons why the Catholic Party, with its electoral base in these regions, 
came to dominate politics in the latter nineteenth century with policies specifically 
aimed at reducing the military charge. 
 Chapter four examines the changing nature of bourgeois militarism in the 
auxiliary forces between 1830 and 1914. The exclusivity of the Civic Guard, the 
theoretical guardians of the Revolution, engaged the middle-classes in the military 
establishment that they had so tirelessly sought to avoid. With the exception of the 
threat posed to their position in 1848, participation was marred with a similar apathy 
that initiated its decline. By the time internal order was threatened by the rise of 
socialism in the 1880s, and for the battle to extend the franchise in the 1900s, the 
composition of the Civic Guard had been reduced to urban centres, with the effect of 
undermining its military efficiency and its political reliability. Shared Liberal values 
and anti-clerical sentiment among the urban bourgeoisie XQGHUPLQHGWKHIRUFH¶VDELOLW\
 35 
to be used effectively as an aid to the civil power or as a military auxiliary. This role 
was subsequently adopted by the Gendarmerie, whose professionalism, apolitical 
nature, and military performance in policing internal unrest saw it usurp the Civic 
Guard as the primary State bulwark against the International. 
 The manner in which the entire military establishment was to come together in 
%HOJLDQ VWUDWHJ\ KDG WR EH DVVLPLODWHG ZLWK WKH QDWLRQ¶V IRUWUHVV SROLFy, which is 
analysed in chapter five. The primary consideration of how best to adhere to 
international obligations as a neutral saw the military authorities agree on a show of 
arms through a concentration of force. In order to achieve this, many peripheral 
fortifications were dismantled while those of Antwerp were converted into a national 
redoubt from 1859, upon which the army would fall in the event of invasion to await 
succour from a guarantor power. However, developments in artillery and European 
geo-politics soon reduced its significance, and forced a redevelopment of the Meuse 
fortresses of Liège and Namur along a more likely future invasion route. Societal 
concerns over increases in military expenditure, once again, saw the issue of national 
defence take on a local character with a resulting political storm. Anti-militarism forced 
the government to delay vital additions to the defensive system, as well as promise not 
to increase the annual contingent despite its obvious necessity. Similarly, given the 
money spent on Antwerp (1859 and 1906) and the Meuse (1887), it was impossible not 
to adhere to the principles of a concentration of force in front of Antwerp despite an 
evolution in strategic ideas in the decade preceding the outbreak of war. 
 The final chapter examines how the issues in the previous five chapters played 
out in a wartime context. Operationally, the First World War exposed many of the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDLOLQJVRI%HOJLXP¶VQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\PLOLWDU\V\VWHPWKDWKDGWDNHQ
too long to reform. Nevertheless, the stoic defence of the Meuse, Antwerp and the Yser 
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in 1914 demonstrated a unity of action among its divided composite parts that revealed 
something akin to nationalism. Parallel concepts of what it meant to be Belgian 
emerged that allowed an under-resourced and badly beaten army to endure the travails 
RIDZDUWKDWQRWRQO\RYHUUDQWKHLUKHDUWKVDQGKRPHVEXWDOVRWKUHDWHQHGWKHQDWLRQ¶V
continued independence. This was exemplified in the March 1918 strikes by Flemish 
soldiers, in which they campaigned for linguistic parity within the concept of a wider 
%HOJLDQQDWLRQ5DWKHUWKDQPXWLQ\WKH\FRQWLQXHGWRVROGLHUWRULGWKHFRXQWU\RIµWKH
RWKHU¶ DJDLQVW ZKLFK WKH\ DQG WKH UHVW RI WKH DUP\ FDPH WR GHILQH WKHPVHOYHV
demonstrating that the crisis of 1914-18 allowed concurrent affiliations to the concept 

















The Officer Corps 
 
During the formative years of the Belgian Army, the creation of a homogenous 
body of men reflecting the values of, and with the capabilities to defend, the newly 
formed nation-state was of paramount importance. The 10 Days Campaign (2nd -12th 
August 1831) against William I and his Dutch forces, from whom they had gained 
independence only a \HDUSUHYLRXVO\KDGGHPRQVWUDWHG%HOJLXP¶VSUHFDULRXVVLWXDWLRQ
The officer corps, as an embodiment of new social ideals, and a haven of early 
nineteenth century European liberalism, was to become the home of what Josephine 
+RHJDHUWVWHUPVµWKHIDWKHUV¶ of the nation.53 A military culture of professionalism was 
sought by King Leopold I upon accession to his new throne in an attempt to preserve 
what the Revolutionaries of 1830 had won. An influx of largely French, and a 
smattering of Polish officers, who had lost their own battle for liberalism and 
independence against the Russians, helped solidify the army in its transitional period 
from an assortment of revolutionary bands into an organised and disciplined force. This 
included the establishment of the École Militaire in 1834, which was modelled on St 
Cyr to better instruct aspiring Belgian officers who took over from the foreigners who 
gradually became naturalised or returned to their native countries.  
As the shadow of imposed neutrality lengthened and peacetime soldiering 
became the seemingly endless norm after 1839, the officer corps needed a stimulus to 
sustain its early attempts at professionalism. Some officers obtained experience in 
foreign armies, though the majority were either not afforded the opportunity, or chose 
not to take it.  Others merely lapsed into despair as the drudgery of garrison life matured 
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into a simmering discontent. Promotion rates slowed significantly, inducing many 
RIILFHUVWRµVHOO-RXW¶WRWKHFRPPHUFLDORSSRUWXQLWLHVLQWKH&Rngo during the 1880s and 
1890s. The duel, outlawed in 1841, became one of the few traditions, which perpetuated 
a fast declining sense of military esprit de corps, separating soldiers from civilian life. 
The lack of efficiently enforced repressive measures outraged large sections of society 
ZKREHJDQWRWKURZLQFUHDVLQJO\KHDY\FULWLFLVPLQWKHDUP\¶VGirection as it moved 
into the twentieth century. Unpopular initiatives such as the prospective introduction of 
conscription only galvanised regional tensions fought out in linguistic and political 
terms. The army, its officer corps included, became somewhat of a crucible for many 
RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VVRFLDOSUREOHPVPHDQLQJWKDWWKHHDUO\FRQILGHQFHLQSURIHVVLRQDOLVDWLRQ
was, by the eve of the First World War, replaced with a mixture of disgust, fear and 
anxiety of what the future may hold. 
,QWKH3URYLVLRQDO*RYHUQPHQWGHFLGHGWRUHFUHDWHWKH'XWFKµAfdelingen¶
± regiments ± that had been recruited in Belgium, and called on all Belgian officers to 
UHWXUQ µKRPH¶ WRFRPPDQG WKHP$SURPLVHRI LQFUHDVHG UDQNVDZ UHWXUQ IURP
Dutch service and a further twenty-one from abroad by 1834. They were supported by 
some 1,088 volunteer officers elected during the Revolution and 1,107 men promoted 
from the ranks since 1830.54 As a body it lacked experience, as even many returning 
from Dutch service were only junior officers, creating a void at the top of the command 
structure. This was a result of a calculated Dutch policy which limited the number of 
Belgians from attaining positions of influence within the army. The Military School at 
Breda only allocated three or four places per hundred annually to Belgian officers. This 
led to a particular shortage of trained, knowledgeable officers in the technical arms as 
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well as the cavalry. Indeed, such policies meant that only a little over ten per cent of 
artillery officers were of Belgian origin.55  
With the threat of war still looming large, the King was authorised to counteract 
this lack of experience by commissioning as many foreign officers into the army as he 
deemed fit, for the duration of the war. The results of this initiative are clear to see. In 
RQO\RIWKHDUP\¶VRIILFHUFRUSVZDVRI%HOJLDQRULJLQ56 Yet, it was not 
the cavalry that boasted the greatest number of foreigners, but the infantry (17.2% 
compared to 32.9%). In large part, this was due to the 58 French officers found in the 
infantry, many of whom had been detached from the Army of the North that had helped 
rid Belgium of Dutch presence. In total, this avenue of expertise furnished some 49 of 
the 77 French officers serving in 1835.57 Additionally, the number of foreign officers 
HQWHULQJ WKH DUP\ DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH LQIDQWU\ FDPH WKURXJK WKH 5HYROXWLRQ¶V
volunteer corps. These ad hoc forces numbered many foreigners among their ranks, 
particularly in the foreign-raised units such as the London and Paris Legions. Whereas 
the infantry comprised of 66.3% of volunteers, the cavalry counted a mere 9.1%. Seeing 
as these corps were mostly foot units and later amalgamated to form the basis of the 
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Chasseurs à Pied regiments, with their officers allowed to retain their rank and station 
within them, the above average proportion of non-nationals in the infantry is not wholly 
surprising. By 1845, however, the army had begun to stabilise and the proportion of 
Belgian officers had jumped from 70.2% in 1835 to 83.9%. Over time, the officer corps 
continued to discard its foreigners to the point where by 1905 it was comprised of 
96.8% Belgians. 
:KLOVWODUJHQXPEHUVRI)UHQFKRIILFHUVILOOHGWKHJDSVLQWKHLQIDQWU\¶VFDGUHV
a number of high-profile Poles were entrusted with the reorganisation of the cavalry 
and artillery. Generals Ignacy Marceli Kruszewski and Prot Feliks Prószynski were two 
VXFKILJXUHVERWKRIZKLFKKDGIRXJKWIRU3RODQG¶VRZQLQGHSHQGHQFHDJDLQVWWKH7VDU
during the winter of 1830-1831. Due largely to these men, some forty-eight other Polish 
officers were recommended and accepted into Belgian service between 1832 and 1839. 
Part of their desire to travel across Europe to take up service in a foreign army was their 
belief that Belgium was fighting for a similar cause against the Dutch as they were 
DJDLQVWWKH5XVVLDQV7KHLURZQXSULVLQJFRLQFLGHGZLWKWKH7VDU¶VLntentions to march 
WR+ROODQG¶VDLGDJDLQVW WKH%HOJLDQUHYROXWLRQDULHVZKLFKKDG WKH\EHHQIRUFHG WR
SDUWLFLSDWHZRXOGKDYHEHHQWDQWDPRXQWWRµSROLWLFDODQGPRUDOVXLFLGH¶58 This, they 
managed to avoid despite losing their own bid for independence. However, it did not 
mean defeat of the liberal ideals for which they were fighting. In Belgium they found a 
nation built on the very principles the Poles cherished so dearly, empowering them with 
a renewed vigour to fight for their cause, albeit on a different battlefield. Major 
Armande von Brochowski expressed his motivation for joining the Belgian army in the 
following terms:  
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what could our goal have been, in taking to foreign service, if not to aid 
a struggle that might broaden, conquer or die if need be, in the hope that 
one day, other happier brothers than us, would be able to revisit the sacred 
homes of the nation; it was changing location without changing flag nor 
dreams.59 
3UyV]\QVNLLPSORUHGWKH0LQLVWHURI:DUWRDFFHSWKLPDQGKLVIHOORZRIILFHUV¶Kumble 
request to join the Belgian army.60 They had begun to come under pressure whilst 
staying in Paris to move across the border as the French authorities attempted to placate 
Russian discontent at the apparent aid being afforded them. The Belgians readily 
accepted, despite concerns surrounding the growing number of revolutionaries 
beginning to congregate in Brussels. Their incorporation demonstrates how, whether 
by chance or design, the Belgian army became a refuge for foreign liberals. 
 Despite being a nation founded on liberal principles, many Belgian officers 
were less than welcoming towards their Polish comrades.61 Indeed, the harmonisation 
of national against personal interest proved to be a difficult balancing act as many 
officers felt that they were being denied their rightful opportunities as a result of 
preferential treatment towards non-nationals. This resulted in a series of discriminatory 
actions directed against foreign officers, French and Polish alike. Von Brochowski, for 
example, was convinced that his stagnation in the army was a result of harmful rumours 
spread by his fellow officers following his decision to serve in Spain in 1837.62 Equally, 
other Poles were known to have had heated disagreements with Belgian officers over 
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relatively petty issues, such as accusations of dishonourable pasts or the unlawful sale 
of horses.63 Two of the more high-profile cases, however, concerned Prószynski and 
Kruszewski themselves. The former found himself being undermined and humiliated 
at every opportunity whilst working as a staff officer in the 3rd Division under General 
O¶2OLYLHUSURPSWLQJKLPWRMXGJHKLVSRVLWLRQXQWHQDEOHDQGUHTXHVWLQJDQLPPHGLDWH
transfer.64 Similarly, Kruszewski was the subject of ill feeling when poised to take 
command of the 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval in 1832, following the decision to abandon 
the idea of a Polish Legion and disperse the officers among the various Belgian units. 
Many officers in the regiment were known to be openly hostile to the prospect of 
serving under a foreigner and stated that they would hound him from the regiment.65 
 Additionally, issues regarding seniority, ranks and pensions only added to the 
difficulties faced by the contingent of Polish officers. Many left the service upon the 
signing of peace with Holland in 1839, seeking further active service in pursuit of their 
ultimate goal rather than resigning themselves to the monotony of barrack life. Those 
who remained were given a two-year extension to their terms of service in which time 
they could decide to become naturalised Belgian citizens. By 1842 O¶,QGpSHQGHQFH
Belge reported that fourteen Polish officers had been, or were in the process of being, 
naturalised.66 However, diplomatic tensions between Belgium and Russia over this 
issue dictated that all naturalised Poles remaining in Belgian service were to be 
pensioned-off a decade later. Despite a hard-fought case to be allowed to remain in the 
army, led by von Brochowski, a law passed on 13 March 1853 terminated their 
                                                     
63
 MRA Officer File Gordaszewski 3999/13, Proposition of Corps Transfer, September 
1841; and MRA Officer File Grabowski 2587, Letter to Minister of War, 5 May 1837 
& Letter to Commandant of the Brigade of Cuirassiers, 28 July 1837. 
64
 MRA, Proszynski 2545/20, Proszynski to Minister of War, March 1841. 
65
 MRA Officer File Kruszewski 2586/10, Inquiry concerning the placement of 
Kruszewski in the 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval. Hostility of Officers, 11 May 1832. 
66
 O¶,QGpSHQGHQFH%HOJH, 6 June 1842. 
 43 
engagements. Annual pensions of between 1,800 francs and 4,125 francs were awarded 
to thirteen officers based on rank and length of service.67 This act saw Russia finally 
recognise Belgian independence and agree to establish communications through 
respective legations. Nevertheless, a veritable Polish military tradition within the 
Belgian Army had been established, as a number of sons of naturalised officers would 
later obtain commissions as nationalised Belgians.68 
Criticism of French influence in the army was equally as prevalent but much 
more firmly rooted in the scepticism behind their motives. Although Holland was the 
LPPHGLDWHHQHP\DQGWKH)UHQFKKDGVXSSRUWHG%HOJLXP¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHPRYHPHQW
with the deployment of considerable forces, it was no secret that France had always 
coveted the region since they had ceded it in 1814. Indeed, despite channelling part of 
their discontent towards French officers in general - so much so that they were advised 
to exchange their own uniforms for Belgian ones ± many Belgian officers targeted the 
senior officers whom they believed were ideally placed to pursue a pro-French 
agenda.69 General Louis Evain, who held the portfolio of Minister of War from 1832 
to 1836, and General Jean Chapelié who established the École Militaire in 1834 
through which successive generations of future Belgian officers would be instructed, 
were two such cases. The general feeling was summed up by Le Messager de Gand 
ZKHQ LWDWWDFNHG WKH0LQLVWHURI:DU¶VDGPLVVLRQFULWHULD IRU WKHÉcole Militaire in 
 µ7KLV LVKRZ OLWWOHE\ OLWWOH WKH French emissaries are exploiting the Belgian 
nation for its own profit, moulding it for Louis-3KLOLSSH¶VXVH¶70 Opponents in the 
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press were similarly found in the Chamber. The Liberal Joseph Lebeau, later Prime 
Minister from 1840-1841, attempted to replace Evain with Gérard Buzen but was 
WKZDUWHGE\5R\DOLQWHUYHQWLRQ7KLVOHGWR/HEHDX¶VUHVLJQDWLRQDORQJZLWKWKRVHRI
many of his colleagues.  However, the discontented Belgians soon got their wish, as 
many French officers returned home following the peace of 1839. Only a handful, 
including Evain and Chapelié, became naturalised and remained in the service. This 
mass departure, albeit after the general reorganisation of the army had been largely 
completed, left the officer corps relatively short of experience once again; something 
requiring different means to remedy. 
 One way in which this was done was by allowing periods of extended leave 
to a certain number of officers to either be detached to a foreign army on campaign, or 
to take part in one of the Belgian overseas expeditions undertaken at various intervals 
during the nineteenth century. The law did not permit Belgians to serve in other armies 
without the penalty of losing nationality, but it did provide leeway in the shape of 
allowing officers to serve RQ µPLVVLRQV DQGVSHFLDO VHUYLFHV¶ZKLOVW VWLOO WHFKQLFDOO\
UHPDLQLQJRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW7KLVHQVXUHGWKDWRIILFHUVRQµPLVVLRQ¶ZRXOGQHLWKHU
lose their rank nor seniority.  Through this loophole, and whilst carefully balancing the 
mantle of a perpetually neutral state which did not have the right to directly intervene 
in conflicts, a number of officers saw service in Portugal, Spain, and Algeria to name 
but a few in the twenty-year period following independence. 
The Algerian experience was granted to twenty-four Belgian officers detached 
to the French Army between 1840 and 1851. These officers, although sent to learn the 
art of campaigning at close quarters, were often charged with a dual mission of also 
assessing the suitability for the eventual establishment of a Belgian commercial costal 
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enclave to aid the national economy.71 Early reports back to Belgium contained 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHµPRUWDO¶FOLPDWHWDFWLFVVXSSOLHVDQG)UHQFKEUXWDOLWLHVWRNHHSWKH
local tribes in check.72 Many took part in action too, and with great distinction. The 
Moniteur Belge UHSRUWHGWKDWWKH'XF'¶2UOHDQVVDLGRIWKHPµThe Belgian officers 
have worthily represented their country. They were seen at the head of cavalry charges, 
leading the infantry attack up the Teniah hill, whilst also in advanced positions engaged 
in fire-fights and grappling with the Arabs.¶73 Even greater praise was attributed by 
*HQHUDO'DPSLHUUHZKHQDGGUHVVLQJWKH%HOJLDQ0DMRU/DKXUHµ,I,ZDVSHUPLWWHGWR
remove my &URL[G¶+RQQHXU and attach it to your breast, I would do it instantly as it 
FRXOG QRW EH ZRUQ PRUH ZRUWKLO\¶74 The /HJLRQ G¶+RQQHXU was subsequently 
conferred upon four Belgian officers; Lahure, Vandervreken, Gillain and Nalinne. 
Upon their return to Belgium, it was not uncommon for these officers to be greeted 
with regimental banquets to celebrate their exploits but possibly also to revere the few 
men in the officer corps with recent campaigning experience.75 
 Only a limited number of officers managed to gain experience through service 
abroad and it was clear that a successful army would need a more consistent influx of 
similarly-trained men imbued with a martial esprit de corps to command its regiments. 
As previously mentioned, the answer was to be found in the creation of the École 
Militaire. Initially, the institution was designed to furnish qualified artillery, engineer 
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and staff officers, through a heavily scientific and mathematical based curriculum that 
mirrored courses given at the French institutions of St Cyr and Metz. Admission criteria 
included: 1) Be born or naturalised Belgians; 2) Aged between 16 and 20; 3) Speak 
French; 4) Have a general knowledge of history and geography and an intimate 
NQRZOHGJHRI%HOJLDQKLVWRU\DQGJHRJUDSK\'UDZZHOOHQRXJKWRFRS\DILJXUH¶s 
head; and 6) Have good handwriting. Once enrolled, students underwent two years of 
general study before specialising in one of the three branches offered; the brightest 
tending to opt for the General Staff. Notwithstanding its attempt at creating a 
professionalised corps of staff officers, the École Militaire only managed to produce 
an average of between two and three per year prior to the creation of the staff college 
(École de Guerre) in 1869.76 The weakest students often passed straight into the 
infantry and cavalry, though a steady stream of officers to the less technical arms was 
not established until 1841. Attempts had been made in 1837 and 1838 to introduce 
infantry and cavalry specific courses, though mobilisation to face the Dutch threat had 
delayed its implementation. After running rather irregularly during the 1840s, these 
courses became more regular additions, which, in conjunction with the annual artillery, 
engineer and staff cohorts, formed a wider base of qualified officers to disperse 
throughout the army. 
 ,QGHHG LI D VWXG\ RI WKH DUP\¶V SURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQ RYHU WKH FRXUVH RI WKH
nineteenth century is undertaken, the increasing importance of a military education 
becomes evident. From just 3.3% in 1835, the percentage of officers with École 
                                                     
76
 W. Simons (ed.), /¶,QVWLWXW5R\DO6XSHULHXUGH'HIHQFHXQH/RQJXHHW0DJQLILTXH
Histoire 1830-1995 (Koninklijk Hoger Instituut voor Defensie. Defensie 
Studiecentrum, Brussels, 1995), pp. 20-21. For further reading regarding the École 
Militaire see V. Deguise, +LVWRLUH GH O¶(FROH 0LOLWDLUH GH OD %HOJLTXH (Polleunis et 
Ceuterick, Brussels, 1895); and +LVWRLUHGHO¶(FROH0LOLWDLUH± 1934 (Brussels, 
1935). 
 47 
Militaire qualifications, or foreign equivalent, rose to 39.1% by 1865. Following the 
expansion of military education facilities to include the École de Guerre, these figures 
soared to 60% by 1895.77 A significant jump between 1885 and 1895 can be explained 
iQ WHUPVRID µFKDQJLQJRI WKHJXDUG¶ZLWKLQ WKHRIILFHUFRUSVZKHUHPDQ\RIILFHUV
whose careers had begun in the 1840s and 1850s, largely without a military education, 
were replaced at the top by the cohorts of École Militaire graduates. These men were 
being joined by increasing numbers of sub-lieutenants passing through the 
establishments to create a far more homogenous group of officers by the start of the 
twentieth century. This was particularly the case for the artillery and the engineers, in 
which professional training became almost a pre-requisite to a commission. This can 
EHVHHQZKHQFRPSDULQJWKHDUP\¶VRYHUDOOSHUFHQWDJHRIPHQZLWKPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQV
to those of the technical arms alone (see Figure 1.1). By 1905, 95.2% of artillery  
Figure 1.1. Percentage of officers with a military education 1845-1905.  
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contrast, the infantry and cavalry constantly struggled to keep up with the overall 
average, largeO\GLVSURYLQJ*X\9DQ*RUS¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWRIILFHUVHPDQDWLQJIURPWKH
École Militaire showed strong preferences to join these arms between 1855 and 1924.78 
 The proportion of officers who joined the artillery is hardly surprising, when it 
is remembered that mathematics formed the basis of the entrance examinations through 
which applicants were admitted. Indeed, the weighting of the various subjects tested 
demonstrates the need for candidates to already have a sound knowledge of arithmetic, 
algebra, geometry and trigonometry in order to follow the scientific nature of the 
curriculum. Despite this, of the twenty-six students in the sixteenth Infantry and  
Figure. 1.2. 1867 Entrance examination criteria for admission. 79 
Subject Weighting Pass Mark out of 20 
Mathematics 20 10* 




Latin 6 5 
German 5 5 
English 4 6 
Flemish 3 7 
Drawing 1 - 





 MRA Fonds Moscou 818, Nerenburger to Goethals, 7 January 1867. * Taken as 
written and oral examinations and split into two sections: arithmetic and algebra, 
and geometry and trigonometry. Both required an average pass mark of ten which 
equated to five marks for each of the two sections. 
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Cavalry cohort (promotion) who asserted a desire to be admitted to the section spéciale 
to study and qualify for the artillery in their final year, only the top sixteen were deemed 
WRKDYHWKHµFDSDFLW\LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGNQRZOHGJH¶WRIROORZLW80 This came only ten 
weeks after General Nerenburger, Commander of the École Militaire, had written to 
the Minister of War saying that this group of students would provide excellent officers 
for the army following an average examination mark of 13.81 out of twenty. This 
HTXDWHGWRRQHµYHU\JRRG¶VWXGHQWREWDLQLQJWKHKLJKHVWPDUNRIWZHQW\-one 
µJRRG¶DQGWKLUWHHQµJRRGHQRXJK¶81 The sixteen students authorised to move onto the 
artillery and engineers course still represented some 45.7% of their cohort, a fair 
percentage considering that they had initially enrolled for the infantry and cavalry. This 
only increased as time went on and goes some of the way to explaining the reason why 
the artillery became so well represented with École Militaire graduates as the century 
wore on. Indeed, so competitive was it to join the artillery by 1891, that even students 
who had qualified for the artillery were told that there were not enough places available, 
and that they would have to take a post in a different branch of the service.82 This left 
the artillery in the enviable position by the turn of the century of being able to select 
the most accomplished cadets emanating from the École Militaire. 
The École de Guerre similarly placed a heavy emphasis upon the scientific 
aspects of military education. A quick glance at the breakdown of subjects by number 
RI OHVVRQV WDXJKW GXULQJ D VWXGHQW¶V ILUVW \ear in 1874 shows that 182 hours were 
devoted to the arts, and 298 to maths and science (See Figure. 1.3.). Naturally, the 
establishment of this course in 1869 saw the staff course at the École Militaire 
abandoned. From this point onwards, all staff officers would have to pass through the 
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Figure. 1.3. Course for first year students at the École de Guerre in 1874.83  
 
École de Guerre, whose admission process was deemed far more in touch with current 
military affairs than its predecessor. The new specialised institution, in contrast to the 
École Militaire, only selected candidates who had already spent a minimum of three 
years with a regiment and had learnt the ropes of military life. Criticism had previously 
been levelled at the old system whereby officers were admitted to the staff course before 
they had spent any time in the army and would subsequently pass straight into the staff 
corps without any regimental experience. This, it was feared, had created a distant and 
detached group of officers at the head of the military establishment.  
 Indeed, the idea of exclusivity within the officer corps, and particularly those 
graduating from the miliWDU\¶VHGXFDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVEHFDPHLQFUHDVLQJO\SUHYDOHQW
as the nineteenth century wore on. It was suggested that a military caste was in the 
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process of detaching itself from civil society and the value of equality of opportunity 
that was so pivotal to the concept of Belgian nationality. This manifested itself in the 
debate surrounding the roles of the École des Cadets and the Écoles des Pupilles, 
%HOJLXP¶V HTXLYDOHQW WR WKH 'XNH RI <RUN¶V 5R\DO 0LOLWDU\ 6FKRRO 7KH IRUPHU
established in 1897 admitted children of officers with the sole purpose of preparing 
them for entrance to the École Militaire. The latter, formed in 1838, accepted children 
from families with any military or civil service background, and attempted to provide 
the army with trained NCOs. A number did manage to obtain commissions as officers, 
with some, such as Jean J.A. Wendelen, of the 12th Line Infantry Regiment, achieving 
notable success by rising to the rank of Lieutenant General, albeit with the aid of having 
passed through the École Miltaire en route.84 This difference in eligibility proved 
unpopular in the Chamber of Representatives, with many vocal critics condemning the 
École des Cadets DVDQµDQWL-GHPRFUDWLF¶LQVWLWXWLRQFUHDWLQJDQLVRODWHGSRRORIRIILFHUV
from which the army would draw.85 Indeed, the radical representative for Liège, 
Charles Magnette, proclaimed his disgust at the FRXUVFHQWUDOH¶V decision in 1897 to 
JLYHSUHFHGHQFH WRVRQVZLWKPLOLWDU\EDFNJURXQGVE\VWDWLQJ µ:HDUHVWRSSLQJ WKH
democratic recruitment of officers to the army. We are aiming, it would seem, to create 
DQHZFDVWHWRKDQGRYHUWKHJROGHQHSDXOHWVKHUHGLWDULO\¶86 A decade later, members 
ZHUHVWLOOFODLPLQJWKHVDPHLQMXVWLFHVZLWKRQHVD\LQJµ,VWUXJJOHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKLV
distinction between castes in a democratic country such as Belgium, where the most 
modest of means ought to be able, through their own merit, to attain the highest 
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SRVLWLRQVDYDLODEOH¶87 This would seem to infer two things. Firstly, that by the turn of 
the century, the officer corps was becoming an insular institution in its own right, 
formed around the military establishments and the practices and values taught within 
them. Secondly, that social barriers were preventing a number of talented men from 
working their way to the highest ranks of the army, which itself was becoming an 
increasingly detached enclave from society itself. 
 However, an examination of the military experience of the officer corps would 
suggest in fact, that the majority of officers had spent time in, and been promoted 
through, the ranks. As such, the argument put forward for exclusivity within the officer 
corps is somewhat tenuous, especially when it is considered that a number of NCOs 
were admitted alongside other candidates into the École Militaire. Clearly, the army 
was heavily laden with remnants of the Revolution during its formative years. Some 
51.4% of officers in 1835 could lay claim to involvement as a volunteer or as an officer 
in one of the many corps francs of 1830, and 62% as rankers in a regular force. 
Meanwhile only 19.9% had previous experience as regular officers.88 Therefore, the 
EDVLVRIWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶VRIILFHUFRUSVFDQEHVHHQDVEHLQJYHU\LQFOXVLYH:KLOHWKH
numbers of volunteers and men who had held commissions in other armies naturally 
fell away with the passing of time, the proportion of Belgian officers being promoted 
from the ranks remained remarkably high throughout the century. Indeed, in 1905, 
58.7% of officers had come from the ranks, leaving only the remaining 41.3% as the 
so-called military caste that passed straight through the École Militaire without any 
previous experience.89 The majority of this latter category hailed from the technical 
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arms, too, leaving the infantry and cavalry heavily reliant on the ranks to fill their officer 
cadres.  
 There is scant information regarding the occupations of officers or their fathers 
in the available records, which makes an accurate social composition difficult to 
calculate. However, the figures produced by Kris Quanten point to dominance of the 
bourgeoisie (specifically the petit bourgeoisie) alongside men of lower social 
standing.90 This corresponds with the consistently high number of promotions from the 
ranks that set the Belgian officer corps apart from most of its European contemporaries. 
While there certainly was a smattering of nobility present in the Belgian officer corps, 
it was not comparable to those of other European armies of the same period in either 
numbers or standing. For example, the British army raised no more than 5% from the 
ranks but retained upwards of 30% from the landed aristocracy and gentry.91 The 
Prussian officer corps was 65% aristocrat in 1860 and, despite societal changes 
influencing its composition, retained 30% by 1913.92 If anything, the Belgian army 
resembled the French Revolutionary armies to a far greater extent, whose willingness 
to promote local elites and professional men of good standing alongside NCOs 
(recruited through the same ballot system) had been fuelled by a similar sense of 
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equality of opportunity as reigned in Belgium.93 This demonstrates that, in some ways, 
the revolutionary spirit persisted in Belgium into the latter nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, or at least that a sense of military entitlement and obligation was 
not as pronounced among its nobility as elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, even the notion 
of an officer caste, from any social background, was not entirely being established 
through successive generations of École Militaire graduates. 
 This was not to say that some of its practices did not portray the officer corps 
as out of touch or insular. The continued use of the duel to propagate a military esprit 
de corps was one such example. Despite being outlawed in 1841, the duel was a means 
through which the army could distance itself from civilian life and promote its own 
ideals of honour that were inexorably linked with military performance. Perhaps in this 
way, a distinct, all-encompassing officer caste, ex-rankers or not, that played by its own 
rules, did manifest itself to the chagrin of the nation. Indeed, the École Militaire had 
published a directive in the early 1880s regarding duelling, stating that although it ought 
to be used within reason, it was sometimes necessary.94 This was supported by an 
officer writing in La Chronique who claimed that it was an evil, but a necessary evil in 
order to guarantee the continued courteous relations between officers without resorting 
to verbal insults or brawls.95 Both the press and the increasingly agitated politicians 
rubbished these arguments, along with the concept that it produced military 
effectiveness. They often pointed to Britain as an example of an army whose military 
prowess was beyond question but yet had dispensed with the archaic brutality of the 
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duel.96 Two issues were particularly galling; firstly that it was a practice imposed upon 
officers and NCOs alike under the banner of a military code of conduct, and secondly 
that reprisals were never properly enforced, thus implying that the army could act above 
the law. On every occasion that a new report of a death or injury was circulated, these 
two parallel issues emanating from a barbaric military culture became hot topics for 
public debate. 
 7KHILUVWRIWKHVHLVVXHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHDUP\¶VVWDQFHRQGXHOOLQJWRPDLQWDLQ
an esprit de corps, which separated them from their civilian counterparts, engendered 
a heightened sense of humanitarianism among large sections of society. The case of 
NCO Léon Edouard Vinchant, who was reminded by his superiors that he was duty-
bound to defend his honour or risk the ridicule and stigma of being branded a coward, 
highlights the pressures often imposed upon men within the army. Vinchant sustained 
significant injuries that forced him to quit the service, leaving him unable to work in 
civilian life. Critics condemned the fact that upon a request for a pension compensating 
his injuries, the Minister of War denied him the right as a result of his wounds not being 
contracted due to his service in the army. This prompted one deputy to exclaim in the 
ChamEHU RI 5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV WKDW 9LQFKDQW ZDV D µYLFWLP RI DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ ZKLFK
FRPPRQ ODZ FRQGHPQV >«@ EXW WKDW LV JORULILHG H[DOWHG DQG LPSRVHG E\ PLOLWDU\
FXOWXUH¶+HDGGHGWKDWDQ\RWKHUVROGLHULQWKHVDPHSRVLWLRQUHIXVLQJWRILJKWµZRXOG
be ostracised from the army, and under the weight of general disapproval would soon 
IHHOIRUFHGWROHDYH¶97 This type of incident created a strong humanitarian backlash on 
moral grounds and highlighted the gulf between accepted values in the army and 
society. 
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 Despite this, however, the army continued to take the law into its own hands. 
Sanctions for being involved in a duel could see an officer land a nominal fine of 25 
francs when brought before a military tribunal; though more often than not, the penalty 
for not participating was far higher. A case brought up in the Chamber reflected this 
point perfectly. A captain in the mid-1880s had dined well one night and proceeded to 
a café to round off his evening. Whilst there, he was confronted by a man who jokingly 
ridiculed the officer in a more or less offensive manner, which the latter promptly 
laughed off, taking it all in good humour. However, upon hearing that he had not 
demanded to uphold his honour by duelling with the civilian, a military council called 
the officer of 27 years service in front of them and summarily forced him to leave the 
service, all because he had respected the civil law by which he was also bound.98 It was 
this sort of contempt for the law that prompted many quarters to call for clarification as 
to where the army stood in relation to it.  
The question was put to the Minister of War as to whether duelling ought to be 
allowed in the army. If not, then calls to unequivocally and uncompromisingly enforce 
the law would be made to ensure that the army was not a law unto itself. When 
politicians were questioned on the matter in 1903, it became abundantly clear that the 
Socialists, spoken for by Émile Vandervelde and Georges Lorand, were outraged and 
disgusted by the recurring issue, though the Minister of War at the time was a bit 
evasive and suggested that duelling in the army had largely ceased with the introduction 
RI µKRQRXUFRXQFLOV¶ WR VROYHGLVSXWHV LQ99 Indeed, the general feeling against 
GXHOOLQJ UDQ VR VWURQJO\ LQ PRVW TXDUWHUV DURXQG WKH WXUQ RI WKH FHQWXU\ WKDW µ7KH
%HOJLDQ /HDJXH $JDLQVW WKH 'XHO¶ ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ %UXVVHOV LQ  It aimed to 
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reduce the frequency of duelling, not only in Belgium but also across Europe in both 
PLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQPLOLHXV,WZDVXQGHQLDEO\WKHHYLGHQWIUXVWUDWLRQRIWKHODWWHU¶V
opinion in Belgium, however, that concerned politicians. Public opinion was well 
expressed by the -RXUQDO G¶<SUHV ZKHQ LW SULQWHG µ7KH DUP\ LQ ZKLFK DOO RI RXU
children serve, is a part of a greater national family, and our primary interest, like our 
SULPDU\ZLVKLVWKDWZHWHDFKWKHPWRUHVSHFWWKHODZRI*RG¶100 
 This was not a one off instance where army and society collided, far from it. 
Additionally, it was not the only École Militaire-influenced directive to highlight wider 
divisions within the nation. As early as 1835 Flemish newspapers were castigating the 
school for the already seemingly pro-French and pro-Walloon stance it took with regard 
WRHQWUDQFHFULWHULDGLVDIIHFWLQJODUJHVZDWKHVRI)ODQGHUV¶FRPPXQLW\Le Messager 
de Gand wrote:  
We note the imposed obligation upon candidates to know the French 
language, and even take examinations in this tongue. Notwithstanding, it is 
noticeable that Flemish, the language of three quarters of the Belgian 
SRSXODWLRQLVQRWHYHQPHQWLRQHGLQWKH0LQLVWHU¶VRUGHUV7KHUHIRUHVWXGHQWV
who have completed their primary education in establishments based in the 
Two Flanders, Antwerp, Limburg and Brabant, where studies are conducted in 
Flemish, will not be able to apply for entry to the Military School.101 
Far from being reactionary in its approach, this article was formed on the basis of hard 
facts, which even three decades later had not significantly changed. Indeed, as noted 
before in Figure. 1.2. the importance weighting attributed to French over Flemish in 
the entrance examinations in 1867 was eight to three. Meanwhile, Figure. 1.3. 
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demonstrates the pre-requisite of already being proficient in French upon commencing 
the course at the École de Guerre, as French Literature was taught as opposed to French 
Language, though Flemish Language was a course unto itself. Tellingly, Flemish 
Language was taught for thirty hours during the entire year, the same as German and 
only ten hours more than English. 
Language in the Belgian army is a sensitive and extremely complicated issue, 
and not without its methodological problems. Quite apart from anything else, regional 
dialects were not formalised into either a standardised Flemish or Walloon-French 
language until well into the nineteenth century, making it difficult to talk about 
language as a defined entity. Equally, there are few, if any traces RIDQRIILFHU¶VSULPDU\
language of use left in either the service records or matriculation forms. This has made 
evaluations of language in the Belgian army particularly difficult for historians, who 
have been forced to accept the limitations of the available sources or explore the 
legislative aspects, which are better documented.102 While some studies have been 
known to simply state the place of birth as an indicator of linguistic leaning, this study 
has attempted to compute a more exact composition of the officer corps through the 
added use of statistical data taken from the census records of the nineteenth century. 
These records give an accurate breakdown by town and province of languages spoken 
by the male population, including bilingualism among the three national languages as 
of 1866 (Flemish and French, Flemish and German, and French and German). This 
allows for a more accurate assessment of the primary languages in use, taking into 
account, not only regional variations, but even differences within towns. In recognising 
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that this method retains some limitations, it offers a better grasp of the proportion of 
likely primarily French, Flemish, German and bilingual speakers within each regiment 
sampled.  
 Although regional tensions and the language issue simmered throughout the 
course of the nineteenth century, it was not until the mid-1880s that strong calls for 
language equality in the army truly took root. The debate in the public domain was 
largely fought out in the press and the Chamber of Representatives in the three decades 
preceding the First World War, where claims of Flemish subjugation at the hands of a 
Walloon minority were aired.103 This can be explained by a number of reasons, both 
social and military. Firstly, a codified language for Flanders was not agreed upon until 
1864 (the Matthias de Vries-Jan te Winkel system), which made the Flamingant 
movement¶VDLP WRUDLVHWKH'XWFKODQJXDJH¶VSURILOHDPRRWSRLQWEHIRUHKDQG$VWKH
franchise extended, the need for political parties to present Flemish-speaking 
candidates offered opportunities for linguistic settlements that finally resulted in the 
HTXDOLW\ODZRI$VVXFKLWZDVQRWXQWLOWKLVSRLQWWKDWDWUXHµ)OHPLVKTXHVWLRQ¶
appeared; the only one concerning the authorities in the mid-nineteenth century was 
how to reverse the socio-economic disaster that had left Flanders destitute.104 
Militarily, too, the battle for general service that would see a greater number of Flemish 
soldiers join the colours under the stewardship of a majority French-speaking officer 
corps, only reached its nadir between 1909 and 1913, further demonstrating the tardy 
nature of the debate. 
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Perhaps, less widely appreciated however, is the continuous decline in 
Flemish-speaking officers towards the turn of the century from what had previously 
been, if not an equal footing, at least a healthy proportion of commissions in all 
branches of the service. Indeed, an examination of the overall linguistic breakdown in 
Figure. 1.4. Percentages of languages spoken by Belgian-born officers 1845-
1905.105 
 Figure. 1.4, demonstrates this point quite clearly. Whereas the percentage of French-
speaking officers was constantly higher than their proportion of the population, which 
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largely stood at between 35% and 40%, it was only accentuated by the sharp decline 
of Flemish officers come the last quarter of the century. This was partly due to an 
increase in bilingualism in the two main languages, though at the expense of native 
Flemish, as opposed to native French speakers, and partly due to the increasing 
domination of French in the army. Admittedly, the Flemish had consistently been 
under-represented, especially when considering that, prior to the 1850s, French 
officers made up a large majority of the deficit in numbers. However, it is no surprise 
that the language issues in the army entered both military and public consciousness as 
of the 1880s, with the proportion of primarily Flemish-speaking officers falling over a 
period of time to a low of 21.2% by 1905. 
When considering a breakdown by arm, a similar pattern naturally emerges, 
though with some notable differences. Despite some fluctuations, it is interesting to 
note that Flemish officers kept up a relatively steady flow of officers into the technical 
arms, despite accusations that they were being deprived of suitable opportunities to 
enter the École Militaire, which, as mentioned previously, became increasingly 
important in acquiring a commission to the artillery and engineers. Flemish 
representation in the technical arms generally mirrored or outpaced its overall average 
in the army (see Figures. 1.5 and 1.6). This meant that the overall decline in Flemish-
speaking officers stemmed from an increasingly severe under-representation in the 
infantry and cavalry as the century wore on. Infantry percentages of primarily Flemish-
speakers fell from a high of 37.1% in 1865 to an incredibly low 15.5% in 1905. 
6LPLODUO\WKHFDYDOU\¶VSURSRUWLRQGURSSHGIURPWRRYHUWKHVDPHSHULRG
What this demonstrates is that the perceived obstacles barring the progression of non- 
native French speakers from studying at the École Militaire were perhaps not as 
important as many have argued to date. A knowledge of French was, nevertheless  
 62 
 
Figure. 1.5. Percentage values of primarily Flemish-speaking officers in the army 
overall and the technical arms 1845 to 1905.106 
Arm 1845 1865 1885 1905 
Overall 40.2% 35.1% 22.4% 21.2% 
Technical Arms 49.0% 32.6% 24.3% 27.8% 
 
Figure. 1.6. Cumulative percentage values of Flemish-speaking and naturally 
bilingual officers in the army overall and the technical arms 1865 to 1905.107 
Arm 1845 1865 1885 1905 
Overall - 46.8% 41.4% 43.3% 
Technical Arms - 44.4% 47.2% 54.76% 
 
required, and this high proportion of Flemish officers entering the technical arms can 
be seen as a testament to the ambitious few who sought to advance their careers in the 
more prestigious corps. An acceptance of French as the language of mobility for a small 
minority, at least, can indeed go some way to explaining the significant increase in 
bilingual officers by the start of twentieth century. It reflects the civil situation of the 
Flemish petit-bourgeoisie in middle-management jobs who were confronted with 
similar obstacles.108 As previously mentioned, the figures suggest that a significant 
proportion of these were actually Flemish men learning French as opposed to Walloons 








learning Flemish, a telling fact that was not missed by an ever-growing disaffected 
public and their elected representatives. 
 7KLVGHVLUHWROHDUQWKHRSSRVLWHUHJLRQ¶VODQJXDJH however, was, according to 
many pro-Flemish politicians, not shared by the Walloon community. It was argued 
that, with the proposed introduction of general service in 1913, likely to increase 
)ODQGHUV¶ SURSRUWLRQ RI WKH UDQN DQG ILOH WR -65%, there was no good excuse for 
Walloon officers to remain ignorant of the importance of Flemish. The point was made 
WKDWµLQDFRXQWU\RIPLOOLRQSHRSOHZKRRQO\VSHDN)OHPLVKDELJQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQ
like the army, cannot ignore this language¶.109 A complete overhaul of the officer corps, 
was naturally out of the question, as the imbalance of the Flemish/Walloon ratio could 
not be brought into line with their respective proportions of the population without 
significant consequences. As a result, Flemish representatives pushed for their language 
to feature more prominently in military education, mirroring their civilian policies. 
Indeed, Jean-Baptiste Coomans, the Catholic Representative for Turnhout, had 
H[SUHVVHGDVHDUO\DVµ7KHUHLVQRWDFRPSDQ\QRWDVTXadron where there are no 
Flemish soldiers, sometimes in vast numbers. Is it not their natural and constitutional 
right to be commanded in Flemish, I do not say by Flemish, but in intelligible 
)OHPLVK"¶110 These views caused particular concern within the Liberal ranks. The 
prospect of obligatory, or at the very least, expected knowledge of Flemish among 
officers was a concept, which made them extremely uncomfortable. One such man was 
Jules Bara who articulated the view during the parliamentary sessions of 1887 and 1888 
that these policies would significantly limit the opportunities of young Walloon men 
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seeking to make a career in the army.111 Though, this could equally have been said 
about Flemish-born officers up to this point. 
 Notwithstanding, there were suggestions that the officer corps was not as 
ignorant of Flemish, nor categorically opposed to its increased use. The former of these 
points was raised in 1913 when the assertion that three-quarters of senior officers did 
not know a word of Flemish was contested. Of sixty-three senior officers ± generals not 
included ± a mere eighteen claimed knowledge of the language. Interestingly, however, 
the proportion was largely inversed among subalterns, where 334 out of 496 stated the 
same. This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, that the lower down the chain of 
command an officer was, the more likely he would be required to communicate with 
his NCOs and men, the majority of whom knew only Flemish dialects. Secondly, and 
perhaps more significantly, however, was the hypothesis that suggested a convenient 
loss of memory occurred when officers reached their majority. Purposefully 
µIRUJHWWLQJ¶ )OHPLVK ZDV QRW XQFRPPRQ LW ZDV SRVWXODWHG DV VHQLRU RIILFHUV ZKR
claimed to be able to speak it, often found themselves burdened with extra work, 
presiding over Flemish military councils and the like.112 Although it is difficult to 
quantify the number of officers who used this excuse to their advantage, it appears 
plausible when comparing the stark contrast in figures between junior and senior 
officers who admitted to knowing the language. This is not to say that all officers, 
Walloon and Flemish alike, shied away from the increasing pressure placed upon them 
to become more accessible to their men. In their paternalistic role as the µIDWKHUV¶RIWKH
nation, it was deemed by some that it was only right to be bilingual in order to fairly 
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dole out military justice and be a good influence on all recruits, regardless of the 
linguistic issue.113 Officers of both regions and languages openly supported this view, 
though proposed changes to promote Flemish in the army were not projected to be in 
place before 1917, and with the coming of war were delayed even further. 
 As much as the social issue of language plagued the army, it was only 
exacerbated by party politics, which often manifested itself within the officer corps as 
well. Many pro-Flemish officers and politicians were associated with the conservative 
Catholic Party whose roots were firmly imbedded in rural Flanders. Recognised as 
military-VFHSWLFVWKH&DWKROLFVZHUHRIWHQGHSLFWHGDVWKHDUP\¶VELJJHVWHQHP\ZKLFK
unsurprisingly bred a certain degree of animosity amongst Liberal officers. This was 
often expressed through the creation of exclusive political societies to which officers 
becDPH DWWDFKHG IRVWHULQJ D VHQVH RI µWKHP DQG XV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH HYHU GLVVROYing 
peacetime army. Membership of societies such as the Association Libérale de Bruxelles 
were often questioned by Catholics on the grounds of legality which ought to have been 
subject to an 1810 law prohibiting such affiliations. These remarks were made in the 
wake of accusations that the Liberal Governments were treating Catholic officers 
unfairly by allowing their Liberal counterparts to join such guilds but preventing the 
creation of, and admission to, their conservative counterparts.114 A definitive ruling as 
to the legality of these societies was less than forthcoming and allowed them and others, 
such as association to the Freemasons, to continue unabated. The result was that officers 
were often in direct confrontation with one another over their politics at the expense of 
PLOLWDU\ GLVFLSOLQH HIILFLHQF\ DQG LPDJH 7KLV ZHQW FRQWUDU\ WR *HQHUDO 3ULVVH¶V
FLUFXODU VWDWLQJ µ, GHVLUH WKDW \RX GR QRW QHJOHFW WKH QHHG WR SURWHFW IURP DQG to 
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however, led to increasingly public expressions of divisions, which saw newspapers 
begin to print stories about Liberal Sub-Lieutenants being barred from cafés with 
strictly Catholic clientele.115  
 In the Chamber of Representatives, the civil-military battle intensified even 
further when religion was brought into the fold. The obligation imposed upon officers 
to participate in Te Deum, a public ceremony recognising the importance of religion in 
VRFLHW\GHHSO\RIIHQGHGWKH/LEHUDOV'HVSLWHWKHDUP\¶VOLQNWRWKHFHUHPRQ\GDWLQJ
back to 1850 and the implicit demonstration of loyalty to the King, under whose orders 
they were traditionally obliged to participate, the Liberals felt that in an age and country 
where faith was rapidly declining, an obligatory presence went against the FRXQWU\¶V 
rhetoric of defending liberties.  The laWWHU¶VEHOLHIWKDWXSRQMRLQLQJWKHDUP\RIILFHUV
gave up a portion of their freedom and owed an added sense of loyalty to the monarch 
as both head of state and the army, went little way to convincing their political 
opponents that religion had a place in the military establishment. Indeed, they feared 
that a continuation of this practice could soon filter down into society and force many 
non-believers to submit to Church authority.116 In this way the army was caught in a 
crossfire of social, political and military interests on a public stage, unable to keep all 
parties happy without displeasing others. 
 Public infighting did nothing to promote the solid façade that the army desired 
and ought to have projected. Indeed, politics within the officer corps ran deeper, 
creating even greater divides when it began influencing promotion. For example, Lt. 
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Gen. De Selliers de Moranville was convinced that the Government was purposefully 
inhibiting Catholics to the profit of those officers known to be Freemasons.117 This was, 
however, coming from a man who felt destined for important positions but whose 
abilities, when being considered for the role of Minister of War, were described by his 
SHHUVUDWKHUGLIIHUHQWO\µ,WZRXOGEHOLNHMXPSLQJIURPWKHVLJKWOHVVWRWKHEOLQG His 
QRPLQDWLRQZRXOGEHDFDWDVWURSKH¶118 Notwithstanding what might be considered de 
6HOOLHUV¶ RZQ ELDVHG YLHZ RI KLV RZQ DIIDLUV RWKHU QRWDEOH H[DPSOHV RI SROLWLFDO
prejudice were apparent, particularly in the selection process of officers for high-
ranking positions. During the search for suitable candidates to take over the portfolio 
of Minister of War in 1912, a number of officers were considered, and subsequently 
rejected based on their political views alone. Others were categorised by their politics 
before being dismissed on various unrelated grounds, though the initial separation is 
telling in itself. The Premier, Charles de Broqueville, a Catholic himself, believed 
General Dufour to be an ideal nomination, though doubted that he would accept a 
position in a Catholic cabinet, demonstrating that political prejudice ran both ways.119 
$V VXFK WKH LVVXH RI SROLWLFV ZDV DV PXFK D GHWHUPLQLQJ IDFWRU LQ DQ RIILFHU¶V
progression as language in the peacetime army, though other factors similarly played a 
part. 
 Peacetime soldiering, although the norm in the army of a perpetually neutral 
state, produced both a stage for social problems to be expressed as well as engendering 
purely military issues that contributed to strike at the foundations of the professionalism 
and excellence implemented during its formative years. Boredom, apathy, and in 
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particular ever slowing promotion rates soon disillusioned a number within the officer 
corps. The standard procedure for peacetime promotion saw commissions to sub-
lieutenant awarded solely to men with two years experience as an NCO or who had 
completed a course at the École Militaire. This created a comparatively wide spread of 
social backgrounds in the officer corps to most other European armies. Promotion to 
lieutenant and subsequently to captain required two years of service in each rank, after 
which it became four years to attain a majority. A minimum of three years as a major 
would allow for promotion to lieutenant-colonel, and two more years would pave the 
way to a colonelcy. During times of war, these timeframes were to be halved. 
Promotion, aside from the limitations imposed upon each rank, was carried out on a 
part-seniority and part-merit system, which saw two thirds of infantry and cavalry 
commissions to sub-lieutenant awarded nominally by the King, and a third to NCOs; 
whereas two thirds were allocated to École Militaire graduates in the technical arms. 
Nominations to the ranks of lieutenant and captain were half by seniority in the entirety 
of the arm in question, and half at the behest of the King, whilst the Monarch also 
claimed complete control of the promotions to senior ranks. This system had a number 
of flaws despite conceptually retaining a degree of fairness while encouraging talent. 
However, the mere fact that some nineteen modifications had been implemented in the 
forty years between 1872 and 1912 demonstrates the frustrating realities of an imperfect 
marriage of ideals. The attempt at this delicate balancing act soon bred discontent as 
talented officers did not always get their just rewards as the weight of seniority in an 
ever-growing officer corps created a bottle-neck which slowed promotion rates and 
dampened prospects to the point of disillusionment and precarious morale. 
 The debate was broken down into two main sections; that concerning promotion 
to senior commands, and those of more junior officers. The former, nominally selected 
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on merit by appointed military committees, proved to be a particular problem with 
regards to a perceived penchant for patronage and favouritism, which often saw one 
EUDQFKRI WKHVHUYLFHGRPLQDWHRYHURWKHUV7KLVZDVD UHVXOWRI µVWDFNHG¶SDQHOVRI
senior officers selecting men for divisional or territorial commands from their branch 
of the service rather than those who merited the position or were next on the seniority 
list. This was often seen to favour the artillery, especially over the infantry, which had 
notoriously slow promotion rates anyway. Simply passing over the most senior infantry 
officer, for example, in favour of a preferred artillery candidate, could seriously 
GLVORFDWHWKHIRUPHU¶VDGYDQFHPHQWG\QDPLFVE\FUHDWLQJD blockage at the top of the 
order. With senior positions appearing infrequently and not being evenly distributed 
amongst the various arms, certain ones, such as the infantry, became undesirable as the 
prospects of rapid promotion lower down the chain were quashed by the immobility of 
its senior ranks. This blatant display of favouritism was not always the norm, as quite 
often committees were known to appoint officers to senior commands based entirely 
on seniority across all arms, but its occasional occurrence still irritated the authorities 
and the meritorious.  
 Following the Brassine report of 1895, brigade commands were to be handed to 
officers from within that branch of the service, though mixed units considerably 
complicated matters. Appointments tended to still be made on seniority for the former, 
but greater emphasis was placed on true merit, intelligence and ability to fill the posts 
of the latter. Once again, however, this subjective issue raised a number of questions 
with regard to equality of opportunity. Rather unhelpfully, a 1912 report stated that it 
would be ideal if all colonels had the capabilities to be promoted to general and 
command brigades irrespective of their composition, as it would permit the simple 
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application of the seniority list.120 This was clearly just wishful thinking, though it did 
highlight the need for changes to be made to the system of bogus selection committees, 
which had been running on the same lines since the Royal Decree of 15 April 1890. 
New suggestions were put forward to replace the High Committee of Generals, with a 
more balanced panel lower down the chain of command. Divisional commanders of 
both the infantry and cavalry would preside over panels composed of their brigade 
commanders to decide on promotions and retirements up to, and including, the rank of 
colonel and submit their proposals to the Minister of War. Similarly, the Governor-
General of fortified positions would preside over a panel composed of the infantry, 
artillery and engineer commanders at his disposal to carry out the same duties. The idea 
behind this initiative was that these committees would be more aware of the capabilities 
of officers in their immediate surroundings, resulting in the weeding out of incapables, 
and the recommendation of those with merit. Additionally, with the divisional 
commander being held responsible for all propositions made, it was hoped that 
patronage and favour would be much reduced, as their own career prospects would be 
subject to review. This, it was hoped, would provide a more suitable pool of senior 
officers from which divisional and territorial generals could be selected in the future. 
 Lower down the chain of command, however, the prospects of a military career 
remained under severe scrutiny throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 
a speech concerning an amendment to the 1886 Promotion Bill, Count Adrien 
G¶2XOWUHPRQWYRLFHGWKHFRQFHUQVRIDOORIILFHUVZKHQKHVWDWHGµ7KHH[SHULHQFHRIWKH
last fifty years has proved that the principal factor influencing the progression of careers 
                                                     
120
 $(5  QR  GH %URTXHYLOOH 3DSHUV 5HSRUW HQWLWOHG µ5HYLVLRQ RI WKH
6WDWXVRIWKH2IILFHU&RUSV¶ 
 71 
>«@LVQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQSXUHFKDQFH¶121 What he meant by this was that a number of 
anomalies and vices had crept into the half and half system, which satisfied neither 
promotion by merit nor seniority. Favouritism was once again the root of the issue, and 
had bred a certain degree of apathy within the corps as officers often felt that verve, 
talent and application went little way to guaranteeing promotion by merit. This loss of 
dedication to the professional standards inculcated from the formative years was 
concerning and prompted a series of proposed modifications. Among them were 
suggestions to abolish promotion by merit in its current form and introduce a system of 
supplements to seniority that would establish good service. These might include 
recommendations, General Staff brevets, or other relevant experience. However, 
opponents argued that achievements did not necessarily translate into talent or merit.122 
Additionally, this system would not benefit the average officer who, by chance or 
design, would not find himself in the position to obtain recognition as other more 
ambitious or fortunate colleagues. While it was clearly a justifiable concern, it did 
nothing to inspire confidence in the assiduous who felt their careers were stagnating 
before them. 
 Compounding matters was the gradual slowing of promotion rates across the 
army over the course of the nineteenth century. Variations between branches made for 
lean and prosperous periods at given junctures, but this served only to heighten 
discontent and rivalry among the embittered. This was exemplified in 1868 when a 
cavalry officer, Colonel Wolff, attempted to improve his promotion prospect by 
transferring into the Gendarmerie. In a note to the King, the Minister of War, Auguste 
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Goetahls, explained that this had proven successful previously due to the experience of 
cavalry officers being highly valued. However, its pitfall was the small size of the 
Gendarmerie which lent itself to blockages if a more senior cavalry officer transferred, 
ZKLFKZDVZKDWRFFXUUHG LQ:ROII¶VFDVH ,WZDVQRWHG WKDWKDGKHSHUVLVWHG LQ WKH
cavalry (which had the benefit of not allowing Gendarmerie officers to transfer into it), 
he would have benefited from swifter promotion.123  
This seeming disillusionment with the rate of promotion in the cavalry is 
interesting however as, at this time, it boasted the quickest promotion rates of any 
branch of the army. On average, a cavalry officer in 1875 would attain their majority 
Figure. 1.7. Years of service for Lieutenants to attain a majority, 1845-1875.124 
 
 
after 25 and a quarter years service, compared to the 27 years in the infantry. Similarly, 
whereas the rate of promotion had remained relatively stable for junior officers in the 
FDYDOU\VLQFHWKHLQIDQWU\¶VKDGVORZHGE\WKUHH\HDUVRYHUWKHVDPHSHULRG7KLV
was on account of the expansion in the numbers of junior officers entering the infantry, 
which was not exponential to the number of senior posts created. This was not the case 
for the cavalry, which benefitted from a more controlled re-organisation over time. 
Conversely, the expansion of the technical arms, coupled with the higher prospects of 
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 Infantry Cavalry Artillery Engineers Average 
1845 24.2 25.3 30.9 29.7 29.8 
1875 27.1 25.2 26.9 27.2 27.1 
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the increasing proportion of École Militaire graduates, saw the rate of promotion in 
these arms accelerate significantly over the same three decades. This was particularly 
the case in the engineers to the ranks of lieutenant and captain, which were twice as 
quick as those in the cavalry and infantry respectively. This meant that in comparison 
to the technical arms of the British army (which were the only ones not controlled by 
purchase before 1871), Belgian artillery and engineer regiments could expect their 
senior lieutenant to have served almost five years fewer, but their senior major two and 
half years more.125 
By the turn of the century, promotion rates across all arms had slowed even 
further as the lack of wastage among a peacetime force became increasingly apparent. 
Officers could expect to have to wait a further 18 months to reach their first captaincy 
than in the 1870s, which was now just one of up to five rungs on the promotion ladder 
before attaining a majority. The lack of decent career prospects prompted a number of 
good officers to get out of the army, spurring the outspoken Major Auguste Collon of 
the artillery to note in 1912,  
All that it [the infantry] had in terms of men of valour have 
GLVDSSHDUHG GLVJXVWHG E\ WKH µDUULYLVWHV¶ ZKR KDYH SURILWHG from the last 
regime to decapitate this arm to the point that we were forced to promote to 
General an entire group of incapables, who ordinarily ought not to have 
exceeded the rank of Captain.126 
This had been an on-going trend, which not only reduced the standard of officer within 
the army, but projected a poor image to society, which induced negative repercussions 
for prospective candidates. Indeed, La Belgique Militaire, an official internal military 
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publication, wrote as early as 1871 that the officer corps was becoming an appealing 
career for the uninterested sons of great families, sons of a military background, and 
those with no particular career in mind.127 Why would the qualified son of bourgeois 
family choose a potentially stunted career in the army when he could make his fortune 
in business with half as much hassle? In its inability to satisfactorily promote the 
prospects of a military career, the officer corps risked losing the elements it desired the 
most to retain the standards of professionalism inculcated in its formative years. 
Part of the problem stemmed from insufficient, or poorly applied, means to rid 
the corps of unwanted elements. This had two effects; firstly, retaining a group of 
incapable officers within the service, and secondly, creating unwanted congestion, 
which stifled and disaffected the more talented elements. A Royal Decree in 1855 had 
fixed the maximum age limits of officers by rank, beyond which they would be 
pensioned off. Junior officers could serve until the age of 55, majors and lieutenant-
colonels until 58, colonels until 60, major-generals until 63 and lieutenant-generals 
until 65, though a degree of latitude was applied in a number of cases.128 It was hoped, 
that the correct application would see officers being pensioned off not only for 
µSK\VLFDOLQFDSDFLWLHVEXWPRUDORQHVDVZHOO¶129 However, in an increasingly unusual 
demonstration of solidarity, it was found that this option had been very sparingly used 
DVDUHVXOWRIDXQDQLPRXVRSLQLRQWKDWRIILFHUV¶SHQVLRQVZHUH too low to justify this 
act. Not until the pension situation in the army had been resolved on the eve of the First 
World War and brought up to parity with other sections of the civil service did this 
action increase in frequency.  
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This delay in proceedings, however, was too late to significantly alter the general 
situation of disgruntlement that had firmly taken root over the preceding decades. This 
can clearly be seen through a rather alarming encounter that De Selliers had with an 
officer in 1911, in which the latter asked not to be nominated for promotion. This 
caused the former to write to de Broqueville in order to make him aware of what he 
perceived to be a crisis of morale. After receiving confirmation from other sources of 
similar attitudes across a number of garrisons, particularly Gent and Antwerp, he made 
clear his anxiety concerning the state of the officer corps as a whole.130 Many of the 
early principles upon which the army was founded, especially its professionalism, had 
all but disappeared through the inertia of peacetime soldiering. This forced many 
ambitious young men to make a decision regarding their futures as career officers, 
leaving many with no choice but to leave the service altogether or explore other 
avenues in order to avoid stagnation. 
One of the most appealing options was service in the Congo Free State on special 
detachment from the line. Laurent A. Six, in his work on the subject, claims that some 
589 officers took to service in the Congo between 1877 and 1908 for a multitude of 
reasons. These included, boredom of barrack life, a desire for adventure and conquering 
the unknown, a certain notion of humanitarianism, but above all the quest for more 
rapid advancement. 131 This was especially the case among the young and those who 
had come through the ranks who felt their chances of promotion were somewhat limited 
in the current circumstances. Indeed, higher rates of pay and bonuses, paid for by the 
Belgian Government it must be added, and a temporary step in rank, were enough to 
convince many ambitious officers to take a chance in the severe climate. Despite 
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reverting back to their metropolitan rank upon their return, the frequency with which it 
was restored by royal patronage made the gamble worth taking.132 Indeed, with the right 
connections and a great deal of vigour, it was possible for officers to at least regain their 
old positions if not better them by making a case for their added experience gained in 
Africa.133 According to some, the authorities were eager to accede to the requests of 
returning officers, simply to keep them in the army. There had been an alarming 
increase in the number of resigned commissions in order to take up posts in the 
financially lucrative commercial companies with which they had had close dealings 
whilst in Africa.134 The Liberal representative for Brussels, Émile Féron, was 
particularly concerned with the apparent preferentialism accorded to Congo returnees, 
stating in 1893 that:  
there will inevitably be inequality between those officers who take 
service in the Congo and those who remain in Belgium. It follows that the 
former will have opportunities to distinguish themselves that will not be 
afforded to the others. The latter will evidently suffer from this state of affairs, 
and, consequently, will make the military careers of these young men who do 
QRWZLVKWRVHUYHDEURDGLQVXIIHUDEOH>«@,,VKDOOUHSHDWDJDLQDVVHUWWKDW
for those officers who do not serve in the Congo, promotion will become more 
and more difficult, and that is already a serious fact.135 
  
Ironically, the attempt to retain the services of one group of disgruntled officers, albeit 
with newly acquired campaign experience, only served to irk another group who stayed 
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home. Yet, if attempts to keep the former had not been taken, it is plausible that a great 
deal more officers would have resigned their commissions and returned to the Congo 
to make their fortunes. In this way, the authorities found themselves in an unwinnable 
position concerning the maintenance of morale within the officer corps, though the 
resulting political battle only intensified with time. 
 7KH LVVXH DW KDQG ZDV ODUJHO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V FRQWLQXHG
obligation to pay the salaries of officers serving in the Congo, despite them nominally 
being under the authority of the Free State. Belgium did not annex their colony until 
1908. More galling still was that none of the 1,612 NCOs who served alongside their 
officers in the Force Publique obtained the same support nor were allowed to retain 
their metropolitan ranks. Abuses of the system were once again the crux of the 
argument, with officers often being paid supplements for horses and other effects that 
they either did not need or did not have. Despite this, the interim Minister of War in 
1897, Jules Vandenpeereboom, was adamant that the Government would not alter the 
state of affairs, given that it could only be beneficial to the army to have men of 
experience return to its cadres.136 Eight years later, the then Minister of War, Alexandre 
&RXVHEDQWG¶$ONHPDGHKDGWRGHIHQGKLPVHOIDJDLQVWUHSHDWHGRQVODXJKWVUHJDUGLQJ
the payment of officers who were supposed to be attached to the Institut 
Cartographique Militaire at La Cambre in the service of the home army, but were in 
IDFWLQ$IULFDVXSSRUWLQJDQGSURPRWLQJWKHFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVRIWKH)UHH6WDWH¶V
entrepreneurs. In his mind, whether the officers were physically in the Congo or not 
made little difference as they were still nominally on active service with full rights to 
pay and supplements accorded to other officers on mission or detachment to foreign 
armies. This appears to contradict reports in the press that quoted the Minister of War 
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LQ  VD\LQJ WKDW WKH KRPH DUP\¶V FDGUHV ZRXOG QRW VXIIHU IURP WKH FRntinuous 
exodus of officers as they were all on the list of Reserves.137 Whatever their true status, 
it is evident that their presence in the Congo was both a qualitative and quantitative 
drain on an officer corps whose drive to retain early standards of professionalism was 
waning. 
 Following the shambolic Belgian mobilisation during the Franco-Prussian War 
in 1870-71, the authorities became increasingly pre-occupied with the reorganisation 
of the army to counter any future threat. Part of the unsolved questions concerned the 
officer corps, and particularly that of the Officer Reserve to fill the cadres of expanded 
units when placed on a war footing. Numbers had been a persistent thorn in the side of 
this corps, which, according to one correspondent, was some 800 infantry officers short 
by 1897.138 Although it allowed loyal officers the opportunity to continue offering their 
services to the army and the nation (providing that they were below the maximum age 
limits of 58 for junior officer, 63 for majors, 65 for colonels and 68 for generals) 
surprisingly few opted to take this route. This lack of enthusiasm can partly be 
attributed to the questionable legality of the status of reserve officers and the subsequent 
dual role they were asked to perform. The Royal Decree of 22 December 1887 creating 
and nominating reserve officers was found to be at odds with, as well as legally inferior 
to, the Law of 16 June 1856, which established four categories of officer that did not 
include a reserve. Despite being appointed for eight years by Royal Decree under the 
guise of officers on unpaid leave ± a position which could actually only be maintained 
for one year ± they were all subject to service in the Civic Guard as well, due to their 
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official classification as civilians.139 Such an uncertain situation was uncomfortable 
enough without the added insult of being excluded from annual training camps and 
manoeuvres prior to 1903. Naturally this proved unpopular with those on the reserve 
lists and drew some piercing remarks from French observers in 1897 who questioned: 
µ,VLWQRWDFULPHWRVWRSWKHVHGHYRWHGPHQWRSUHSDUHWKHPVHOYHVGXULQJSHDFHWLPHIRU
GXWLHVZKLFKZHZLOOH[SHFWRIWKHPGXULQJZDU"¶140 It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
numbers remained low until the outbreak of war, when the true effects of discordant 
policy truly materialised. 
Attempts to resolve the numerical deficiencies led to the decision to admit one-
year volunteers and men from the newly established University Companies to fill the 
reserve cadres. Both were to first learn the responsibilities of corporals and serve in this 
rank for six months (eight for the cavalry and artillery) before sitting an examination to 
attain the brevet rank of sergeant. Following two years as sergeants, during which time 
the University Companies were subject to two annual recalls of fifteen days training, 
manoeuvres and shooting drills, they were permitted to take the examination to become 
reserve brevet sub-lieutenants, with the full rank being accorded following further 
appearances at annual recalls.141 Whereas in France, the creation of one-year volunteers 
was introduced after the abolition of replacement in the ranks in 1872 to allow the 
ZHDOWK\WRHVFDSHFRQVFULSWLRQ%HOJLXP¶VV\VWHPUDQFRQFXUUHQWO\ZLWKWKHEDOORWXQWLO
1909. This offered yet another route of escape from military service for those destined 
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for the liberal professions, albeit harnessing their capacities in the reserve rather than 
losing out entirely.142  
To seemingly be filling the numerical void with the right class of man, who 
contributed towards the training costs, was a favourable outcome for the Catholics in 
their battle to avoid general service. Nevertheless, there were a number of problems, 
both qualitative and legal that proved difficult to overcome. This was especially the 
case for the University Companies who found themselves at the centre of a press storm 
questioning their utility. The editor of the Gazette de Liège examined the need to 
perhaps adopt the French system of maintaining a gap between the classroom and the 
barracks so as to avoid the current situation, which was providing neither a profound 
education, nor suitably trained soldiers.143 Catholic policy had always been to protect 
the interests of students (particularly those in theology) from the corruptive distractions 
of the barracks, but pressure from the military authorities to ensure that the army was 
not being deprived of its best elements through this system eventually forced change. 
A law, set for 1913, obliged students to put their military duties first by allowing them 
a mere fifteen days leave prior to their exams to attend to their scholarly needs.144 This 
ensured that training was not curtailed and that these men shared at least some of the 
burden enforced on the average balloted man before retreating into the shadow of the 
officer reserve. It equally reinforced a shared European-wide desire to concentrate on 
the physical growth of the individual to counter a perceived social degeneration in the 
late nineteenth century.145 
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 The Belgian officer corps clearly underwent a number of substantial changes 
over the course of the nineteenth century as it sought to establish and maintain the 
principles upon which good leadership was based. From the outset, professionalism 
was highly valued as the nascent army grappled with the realities, and future prospect, 
of war. This led to the enlistment of experienced foreign officers from France and 
Poland who helped place the army on a sound footing before gradually returning to the 
native countries or becoming naturalised Belgians. This process began the 
homogenisation of the corps, whose composition became increasingly Belgian and 
increasingly educated at the military institutions of the École Militiare and École de 
Guerre. A military esprit de corps, promoted through misplaced faith in the noble 
virtues of the duel, succeeded in solidifying bonds within the emerging officer caste but 
at the expense of marginalising the sympathies and understanding of society. Certainly, 
the retention of high numbers of officers promoted from the ranks slowed the complete 
overhaul of the officer corps into a detached enclave from society by upholding the last 
vestiges of a revolutionary spirit through retaining the influence of the petit 
bourgeoisie, but even this could not prevent the decline of standards that accompanied 
decades of peacetime soldiering.  
Linguistic, religious and political issues, which mirrored societal trends, 
exemplified the complications that came to undermine the preparedness of the army to 
satisfactorily manage the trials that would accompany the twentieth century. 
Disaffection of primary Flemish-speakers reached its nadir in the decades preceding 
WKHRXWEUHDNRIZDUDV)ODQGHUV¶SRSXODWLRQPRYHGWRZDUGVELOLQJXDOLVPWRFRPSHWH
with the disproportionate number of native French speakers in middle-ranking 
professions, including the officer corps. Overt discrimination, such as the decision not 
to appoint Lieutenant-General Clooten to the rank of Minister of War as a result of his 
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µGHSORUDEOH )OHPLVK DFFHQW¶ GLG QRthing to instil confidence in an increasingly 
disaffected body of men.146 Slowing promotion rates on account of peacetime 
soldiering and a lack of wastage, further eroded the morale of all concerned, which 
inevitably detracted from the qualitative standards of the early days. Significant 
numbers chanced their arm in the Congo where the financial reward in heading up 
EXUJHRQLQJFRPPHUFLDO HQWHUSULVHV IDU H[FHHGHG WKHSURVSHFWV RIGHFDGHV¶ZRUWKRI
garrison duty in provincial Belgian towns. This not only siphoned off the most 
ambitious and energetic elements of the officer corps, but also dissuaded future 
generations of middle-class prospects from a military career. By the outbreak of war in 
1914, therefore, the officer corps lacked the requisite professionalism and unity that it 
had sought upon its establishment in the 1830s as a result of a combination of social, 
political and military problems that, despite being acknowledged, proved too 
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Chapter 2 - Recruiting the Rank and File 
 
Recruitment for the Belgian army was a perennial problem during the 
nineteenth century, not so much in acquiring the quantity of men necessary to maintain 
its 80,000 ± 100,000 wartime establishment, but more so in terms of the socio-political 
problems that surrounded the social injustices of the ballot system through which it was 
obtained. Annual levies of between 10,000 and 13,300 men were voted by the 
Parliament each year as a supplement to volunteers; though the latter being so few in 
number meant that the ballot, operating on a regional basis across the country, was the 
dominant source of manpower. Faculty for replacement and substitution provided an 
escape from the burden of military service for an extortionate price and, as such, 
became VHHQDVWKHULFKPDQ¶VSULYLOHJHOHDYLQJWKHUHVWRIVRFLHW\WRVXIIHUWKHµEORRG
WD[¶LQWKHLUVWHDG7KLVVRFLDOLQMXVWLFHVDWXQHDVLO\LQDOLEHUDOFRXQWU\DQGIRXQGLWVHOI
at the heart of a fierce civil-military debate until the twentieth century when a string of 
Ministers of War introduced voluntary enlistment, partial conscription and full 
conscription successively in little over a decade. Pressure from the military authorities 
to introduce personal and obligatory service earlier, particularly following Prussian 
military successes in 1866 and 1870, fell on deaf ears in government who, whether 
Liberal or Catholic, were wary of disaffecting the 1.1% of the population who formed 
the electorate and were the major beneficiaries of the ballot and replacement system.147 
The commercial centre of the country, Antwerp, was a case in point, where businesses 
relied on keeping working hands free from the grasp of the army. Here, a separate 
pressure group known as the Meetingers was established to defend the interests of the 
FLW\¶V HFRQRP\ E\ EORFNLQJ DOO DWWHPSWV DW LQFUHDVLQJ WKH PLOLWDU\ EXUGHQ 7KHLU
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increasing influence, particularly within the Catholic Party, reflected the strong sense 
of anti-militarism that pervaded large swathes of the country. This went on to 
characterise the nature of opposition towards military reform for the remainder of the 
century. 
International tensions, coupled with the rise of socialism in the 1880s, and the 
emergence of Flemish consciousness, all contributed to the disorganised nature of the 
army in the decades preceding the First World War. Not only did it lack numbers, 
training, and equipment but was also sorely in need of an identity, which as a tool of 
nation building, the army failed to successfully muster. As a result, regional recruitment 
under the 1913 general service laws did much to form the basis of separate regional 
interpretations of Belgian identity within the framework of the national institution that 
was the armed forces, though remained undeveloped by the outbreak of war the 
following year. The army that mobilised in the face of European aggression in August 
1914 encapsulated eighty years-worth of a stubborn civil-military debate that had its 
roots in competing ideologies over the fabric of nationhood between the country¶V
foremost two political parties.  
 
 The ballot system, upon which the army was recruited, was simply a 
continuation of the French 1798 and Dutch 1815 and 1817 laws already in use in the 
Belgian provinces. This was more to do with the urgency of establishing an organised 
army in the face of unremitting Dutch aggression until the peace of 1839 than a 
calculated method to best suit the country. Indeed, a standing army was preferably to 
be avoided. The inheritors of national defence were initially to be the constitutionally-
raised Civic Guard, which had embodied the revolutionary spirit of the petit 
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bourgeoisie and played an important role in the fight for independence.148 This force 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4. However, the situation requiring the retention of 
the army on a war footing for the first decade of its existence made the voting of the 
annual levies by Parliament an act of course beyond the Treaty of London. It cemented 
the ballot system in place for the remainder of the century, despite the many socio-
military problems that came with it.  
Initially, annual contingents of 12,000 men were called up to supplement the 
small number of voluntary enlistments before the 1840 class was reduced to 10,000 
men as the army returned to a peacetime footing. The burden was shared proportionally 
by head of population across all nine provinces, where every registered twenty-year-
old male, who had not already obtained a form of exemption, physical or otherwise, 
was called up alphabetically in a public event to draw his lot from the ballot box. The 
lowest numbers - XQWLOWKHSURYLQFH¶VTXRWDZDVFRPSOHWHG- were to form, along with 
the other provinces, the annual levy for that year. However, exemptions, replacements 
and substitutions, which will all be expanded upon in due course, often significantly 
changed the composition of the initial draw.149 Those finally incorporated would then 
be dispersed across various regiments throughout the country on an eight-year active 
engagement to be followed up with five years in the reserve. This distribution was an 
attempt to inculcate a sense of national unity based, as much as possible, on the 
principles of liberalism as well as a counter-measure to the strong local and regional 
affiliations that dominated concepts of ethno-cultural identity in parts of the Low 
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Countries at this time.150 Men who were not called up were still liable for any 
subsequent levy that was found to be deficient in numbers until they had reached their 
twenty-third birthday, whilst they were all compelled to serve in the Garde Civique 
until the age of 50.  
The implementation of national recruitment coupled with the retention of a form 
RIFRQVFULSWLRQLQWKHVKDSHRIWKHEDOORWWKHUHIRUHDLPHGWRPDNHWKHDUP\WKHµVFKRRO
RIWKHQDWLRQ¶LQWKHVDPHPDQQHUDV the French Revolutionary army had done in the 
late eighteenth century.151 This should come as little surprise given the extent of French 
influence in the army during its formative years, both in terms of the physical presence 
of officers as well as those of Belgian origin smitten with the early ideas of nationalism 
ZKLOVWXQGHU)UHQFKUXOH*LYHQ(OVH:LWWH¶VSUHPLVHWKDWWKH5HYROXWLRQKDGQRW
been fought on nationalistic grounds, it is not difficult to see why such a process was 
deemed useful. Indeed, other studies have contended that individual identity barely 
attained recognition beyond a local level, particularly among the peasantry, and that, 
even among the elites, competing notions prevented the emergence of a clear definition 
of what it meant to be Belgian.152 In contrast to other institutions, such as national 
schooling or the Church, which possessed equal access to, and influence on, a large 
proportion of the population, the army was considered to be more suited to the role of 
nation building due to its perceived divorce from party politics. Of course this was far 
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from the case in reality, though the lack of overt politicisation made the army a more 
attractive option. 
Yet, if the army was the road along which a national identity was forged, then 
language was certainly to be the vehicle. With such a disparate range of dialects from 
both Flanders and Wallonia forming the linguistic profile of the country, the decision 
to implement French was not a malicious attempt by the ruling elite to dominate the 
Flemish masses. It was anything but. Indeed, it was equally as unlikely for a Walloon 
peasant to understand standardised French as his Flemish counterpart, therefore all but 
GLVPLVVLQJWKHFRPPRQPLVFRQFHSWLRQVXUURXQGLQJWKHODQJXDJHGHEDWH7KHDUP\¶V
linguistic policy only became a divisive issue with the awakening of a wider Flemish 
consciousness after the 1850s, which later associated itself with Catholic conservatism. 
Prior to this it was to be a unifying force behind which the system of recruitment was 
to operate. It was on this basis that the Belgian army was to attempt to recruit a large 
enough army to act as a deterrent to external threat, whilst simultaneously fighting 
against the internal forces of social unrest and deep-seated anti-militarism.153 
Once the army returned to a peacetime footing, voluntary recruitment accounted 
IRU D OLWWOH RYHU  RI WKH DUP\¶V RYHUDOO HVWDEOLVKPHQW ,QGHHG WKH 
5HFUXLWPHQW&RPPLWWHHSXEOLVKHGDWDEOHEDVHGRQWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶VVWDWLVWLFVZKLFK
demonstrated how the 80,000 strong force boasted, rather modestly, 9,224 men who 
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antimilitarisme in België, 1830-1914, (Brussel, 1958). More recent historiography 
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had contracted a voluntary engagement over the last eight years.154 This was only made 
slightly better by the additional 5,946 re-engagements from balloted men over the same 
time period, which brought the total proportion to roughly 19%. Despite seemingly 
poor from the outset, these figures were at the highest point that they were to attain for 
the remainder of the century. Thereafter, they began a slow, constant decline to the 
point where, by 1875, voluntary engagements accounted for no more than 5.4% of the 
establishment at a point when the army was nearing its reorganised size of 120,000 men 
(See Fig. 2.1). By 1860, the number of volunteers was only 81%  
Figure. 2.1. Number of voluntary engagements by arm per year, 1851-1875.155 
 
 
of what it had been a decade previously, with the losses being disproportionately 
incurred by the various arms. Whereas the infantry was down by 12% and the engineers 
15%, the artillery and cavalry had suffered some 28% and 35% losses in this area. This 
was probably on account of the longer engagements associated with these specialised 
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branches as well as the more limited promotion prospects afforded to NCOs in the 
smaller corps. Nor did this state of affairs improve by the turn of the century either, 
with one of the main reasons behind the low numbers of re-engagements throughout 
the army as whole being attributed to a few old NCOs blocking the system.156 
 A combination of poor pay and conditions often disheartened those with a drive 
to carve a career out of the army, with the result being that the NCO cadres ± which in 
theory ought to have emanated solely from volunteers ± were well under establishment. 
$OH[LV %ULDOPRQW %HOJLXP¶V SUH-eminent officer and military engineer of the 
nineteenth century, anonymously wrote in 1866 that the army suffered from having few 
old soldiers and few NCOs as a result of the conditions of service, which made it 
extremely difficult to retain those who had been successfully moulded by the 
completion of their first term of engagement.157 Voluntary re-engagement was made all 
the more unappealing with the laws forbidding marriage without ministerial consent. 
Conversely, those men who were balloted could do so once in their sixth year of service. 
Had the general conditions, importance of the role, and the laws governing marriage 
been altered to mirror that of the French Army, Brialmont was in no doubt that cadres 
of good NCOs could have been formed from volunteers in Belgium as well.158 As it 
was, convincing enough men to re-engage proved exceedingly difficult and forced the 
authorities to relax their policy of recruiting NCOs solely among volunteers. 
 One of the main problems with the re-engagement system was that men were 
not obliged to serve for a full eight years. In terms of offsetting wastage, the numbers 
obtained created a false impression. For example, the number of re-engagements among 
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volunteers between 1851 and 1860 numbered 5,751. However, if one were to calculate 
the total number of years taken up by voluntary re-engagements and then divide them 
E\HLJKWWRJHWDURXJKILJXUHRIKRZPDQ\µIXOO¶WHUPVZRXOGKDYHEHHQVHUYHGRYHU
the ensuing decade, the number falls dramatically from the 5,751 to a mere 2,255.159 
Similarly, between 1861 and 1870 there were 5,733 re-engagements, which boiled 
down to an effective strength of 2,021men serving for eight years.160 The same could 
be done for re-engagements from the other categories of recruit, but unfortunately the 
data was unavailable for this purpose. Nevertheless, it can safely be assumed that this 
figure would also be misleading and, together with the voluntary re-engagements, 
added only a fraction of the real value to the army than the bare numbers would suggest. 
In any case, it is plain to see that there was a clear deficit in volunteers over the decade, 
which is replicated in the data shown in Figure 2.1. Notwithstanding the loss in 
manpower itself, the spine of the army, in terms of the manpower pool from which to 
draw experienced NCOs, was consistently being drained as a result of a lack of 
legislation demanding a minimum re-engagement length in tune with the terms of 
service for the rest of the army. As such it was no wonder that re-engagements were 
unable to keep pace with promotions, pensions, death, desertion and discharge that 
consistently hacked away at the already small voluntary section of the army. 
 Following Prussian successes in 1866 and 1870, the debate surrounding 
volunteers in Belgium shifted towards whether or not to introduce them on a one-year 
basis with the sole purpose of filling the NCO and officer cadres of the now much 
sought after national reserve. These opinions were aired in the continuing wake of 
weakening voluntary enlistments, which barely averaged above 2,000 each year.161  The 
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1866 Commission hoped to raise the annual contingent to 14,500 of which 2,000 men 
would be specifically destined for the national reserve, receiving only seven months 
training in the process.162 While it was supported from within the military 
establishment, certain politicians were worried about the social impact that their 
introduction might have. The Catholic Representative for Hasselt, Jean-Joseph 
Thonissen, actually an advocate of the system, claimed that the aristocratic nature that 
VXFKDFRUSVZRXOGDWWUDFWZRXOGEHµUHSXJQDQW¶WRWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ163 
From a military point of view, this was precisely the class of intelligent recruit that 
would form the best cadre of NCOs. Indeed, the prerequisite to educate, clothe and 
HTXLSRQHVHOIDWRQH¶VRZQH[SHQVHZRXOGJXDUDQWHHWKHVRFLDOVWDQGLQJRIWKHFRUSV
Despite concerns over elitism, and others regarding whether or not they should count 
in the annual contingent or simply be recruited separately to fill in the gaps, the 1873 
Commission voted in favour of the principle seventeen votes to one, with two 
abstentions.164  
 
While relying on volunteerism to provide the rank and file with a cadre of 
SURIHVVLRQDO VROGLHUV %HOJLXP¶V SULPDU\ V\VWHP RI UHFUXLWPHQW was by ballot. The 
system had been brought to the area during the French occupation but had not been well 
adapted after independence to suit the requirements of the newly independent nation. 
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The authorities had failed to observe the industrial and demographic changes that were 
sweeping Belgium in the 1830s and 1840s and transforming it into one of the leading 
economically developed countries on a per capita basis in the world.165 This led to the 
somewhat unfair and out-dated assignment of recruitment quotas ± based on the total 
population of the entire province - for certain communities who no longer had the same 
PDQSRZHU GHPRJUDSKLF DV WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V GDWD LQGLFDWHG 6RPH FRPPXQHV ZLWK
small active male populations found themselves heavily penalised and could see their 
HQWLUHZRUNIRUFHWDNHQIURPWKHPLQRQHIHOOVZRRSZKLOVWRWKHUFRPPXQHV¶LQGXVWU\
and agriculture would remain largely unaffected. This was remedied in 1847 when the 
levy was to be based on new statistics and the proportion of the active male population 
instead. 
 Further changes over the century were made in an attempt to iron out some of 
the inequalities, such as redesigning quotas to be met at communal rather than 
provincial level as well as redefining the parameters of the registration lists for the draw 
to only include eligible men. This was done to prevent a skewing of the figures through 
failing to take into account the number of men eligible for exemptions, which 
significantly altered the proportions of the active male population made available to the 
army. It had not been unheard of for municipal authorities to deliberately undercount 
their population statistics in an attempt to soften the burden on their communities.166 
Endeavours by individuals to have their names illegally struck from the registration 
lists through feigning personal circumstances or injury in order to obtain an exemption, 
similarly undermined the workings of the system.  
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 Exemptions took two forms; provisional and definitive. The former provided a 
\HDU¶V UHVSLWH IRU WKHPDQ Lnvolved and was usually accorded for height deficiency, 
illness, status as DIDPLO\¶VVROHILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWRUDEURWKHURIVRPHRQHDOUHDG\LQ
active service, as well as a host of other minor categories, including its contentious 
extension to theology students. Definitive exemptions, on the other hand, were 
accorded largely to those with incurable illnesses or deformities that would clearly 
prevent them from ever carrying out their military duties to a sufficient standard. A 
reasonable number were also given to brothers of men who had completed their service, 
the caveat being that if they were discharged for ill conduct or desertion, for instance, 
their sibling, who had been granted a provisional exemption, would become liable to 
serve in the following yeaU¶VFRQWLQJHQW167 In this respect, the law was able to provide 
the army with the requisite number of troops while still providing societal reprieves to 
those in greatest need. However, the ease with which the system could be abused, along 
with the first signs of party-political preferentialism towards certain categories of men, 
were just some of the reasons why the ballot became increasingly viewed as unjust.   
 When the 1852 Recruitment Committee sat to discuss changes to the 
recruitment system, nothing was deemed particularly alarming. The only significant 
discussions concerned a few minor alterations to the provisional exemptions criteria 
that would provide the army with a greater manpower pool from which to draw. Beyond 
those of a military nature, only scant attention was paid to related social 
inconveniences. The laws of exemption were deemed satisfactory and continued to be 
used throughout the century. Total figures ebbed and flowed over the years, decreasing 
from a high of 17,391 in 1854 to an approximate average value of between 11,000 and 
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12,000 come the end of the century.168 This was largely due to the significant decrease 
in provisional exemptions as a result of a series of attempts to carry out more strict 
physical examinations so as not to allow men to shirk their national duty as citizens. 
This was of paramount importance when the annual contingent was raised in 1869 to 
12,000 men and then to 13,300 in 1883. With the population continually increasing, 
and as such the number of men registered as eligible for service along with it, it is clear 
that many of these measures put in place worked given that the overall number of 
exemptions decreased over the same period. 
 Whilst exemptions did not have a direct influence on the effective strength of 
the army, replacement and substitution certainly did. These two forms of monetary 
escape were a far greater problem, to the military authorities on disciplinary grounds, 
and the government on social grounds, than anything else. The difference between the 
two terms revolved around the status of the man coming in as a replacement. The fee 
SD\HUDIWHUKDYLQJGUDZQDµEDG¶QXPEHUZRXOGKDYHDSHULRGRIWLPHUDQJLQJEHWZHHQ
three and six months to find a man aged 20 to 35 to take his place in the contingent for 
a sum of money, amounting in some cases, to an extraordinary 5,000 francs. After his 
replacement had completed eighteen months of service, the replaced could pay a further 
150 florins (317 francs, 47 centimes) to absolve himself of any further responsibility 
for him.169 Not paying this sum would see the replaced liable to find another 
replacement should his original desert or be discharged for any reason, or face the 
consequences of serving the remainder of the engagement himself. A replacement could 
also be a soldier in his eighth and final year of service.  A substitution, on the other 
KDQGLQYROYHGRQHRIWZRSURFHVVHVHLWKHUVZDSSLQJRQH¶VORZQXPEHUZLWKDKLJK
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chance of being called up with someone who had a higher number and a lower chance, 
or simply swapping positions for a sum of money, generally much lower than that for 
a replacement, with a soldier in the 6th, 7th or 8th class (or year of service). This second 
option would see the newly incorporated man take the position of the soldier in the 
active reserve on indefinite leave for the remainder of the engagement, whilst the 
substitute would take up a new engagement of eight years, usually with a view to 
pursuing a career as an NCO. This was providing that the substitute was no older than 
forty-two and had taken up no more than one other re-engagement.170 
 On the face of it, each transaction of this sort appeared to be a simple one-for-
one transfer of status. However, it proved to be a real drain on the effective strength of 
the annual contingents (see Figure. 2.2). This was a result of a duplication of manpower 
stemming from the replacements furnished by the 8th class. Not only did they count in 
their original 8th class, which they had just left, but also in the most recent contingent 
into which they were incorporated as a substitute. Meanwhile, the man who had paid 
for this replacement returned home and did not count in either contingent, constituting 
a loss in manpower. Equally, though not in real figures, substitutions had the same 
effect, as the substitute passed from his 6th, 7th or 8th class into the new levy whilst the 
VXEVWLWXWHG WRRN XS WKH VROGLHU¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH UHVHUYH ZLWKRXW DQ\ WUDLQLQJ RU
experience, rendering him useless to the army. These problems contributed to the 
unprecedented 29% shortfall in the wartime establishment that emerged upon 
mobilising the army in 1870.171 While it must be noted that some of the numbers 
presented in Figure. 2.2. were also a result of death, desertion and 
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discharge (to be discussed in Chapter 3), it is evident that the replacement system 
accounted for a significant portion of the deficit, ranging from an annual low of 569 to 
a high of 1,668 during this period.173 Naturally, returning deserters and latecomers 
offset some of these losses, but the effect of replacement on the establishment remains 
plain to see.  
From a social point of view, the system of substitution and replacement was 
seen by many as despicable and a breach of the liberal ideals that formed the bedrock 
of the country. Certainly, as some in favour of retaining the status quo argued, all men 
were equal before the draw, each with the same chance, whether rich or poor, to be 
handed D µEDG¶ QXPEHU WKRXJK WKH RSWLRQV DYDLODEOH WR ERWK DIWHUZDUGV GLIIHUHG
significantly. The average price for replacements furnished by independent agents 
varied between provinces but often amounted to well over 800 francs, which already 
outstripped the average annual salary (see Fig. 2.3.). This was even before the agents 
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themselves took their cut of proceedings, which at least doubled the initial price and 
did not take into 
Figure. 2.3. Average up-front price of replacement by independent agents by 
province, 1861-1866.174 
Province 1861 1863 1865 
Antwerp 691.76 682.18 694.05 
Brabant 743.42 717.31 740.76 
West Flanders 736.29 735.06 716.23 
East Flanders 790.81 739.85 654.14 
Hainaut 803.70 757.43 802.03 
Liège 774.34 761.80 793.59 
Limbourg 856.54 765.71 821.97 
Luxembourg 899.00 795.45 857.36 
Namur 819.66 766.87 796.62 
 
account the often poor quality of man supplied.  If rejected by the army, the replaced 
would have to pay for another replacement, or serve himself having lost a large sum of 
money in the process. Being unofficial, the agents and consortiums involved in this 
business could not be held accountable and were exclusively interested in monetary 
with a period of no more than four or five weeks to find a replacement before the 
contingent was officially incorporated. This very situation was summed up in 
3DUOLDPHQWLQZKHQLWZDVQRWHGWKDWµWKHDJHQWVRIUHSODFHPHQWVHHLQJWKHVZRUG
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of Damocles suspended over the heads of these men called up late, profit through 
IRUPXODWLQJH[FHVVLYHFODLPV¶175  
 From 1871, the Government, in its attempts to standardise replacement prices, 
sought to monopolise the market through legislation and by providing good quality men 
themselves, known later as volontaires avec primes (volunteers with bounty). This, it 
was hoped, would lead people away from the pitfalls of the unsavoury private sector 
and into the more regularised clutches of the authorities for the benefits of the 
purchaser. However, this smacked of governmental profiteering rather than the 
rectification of a social injustice. By instituting stringent medical committees designed 
to reject direct (private) replacements, the Government was forcing people to go to their 
officially backed Societé for a fixed price of 1,700 francs. Indeed, the Liberal Frère-
Orban, raised similar concerns during the militia law debate in 1873, with Brialmont 
noting,  
He is [?] all unhappy at the new law, which will fatally lead to the abolition 
of replacement, because all of the proposed replacements will have to be 
examined and received by a commission, sitting in Brussels, composed of three 
soldiers and three civilians nominated by the King; a commission which will 
show itself to be, without a doubt, very severe.176 
By monopolising the market, the Government only succeeded in inflating the prices of 
the private sector, particularly during times of high unemployment, whilst 
simultaneously taking on the responsibility of furnishing a large number of 
replacements themselves. However, this task often proved too great for them to handle. 
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Whilst appearing under varying guises beforehand, the 1873 Law became the 
accepted ruling by which officially furnished replacements could be obtained. This saw 
a change, whereby an initial 200-franc deposit, which would increase to no more than 
1,800 francs upon being supplied with a man, became the basis upon which the system 
was run. No one was permitted to supply his own replacement through a private agency 
unless they had previously paid the deposit but had been unsuccessful in obtaining an 
official replacement by 1 October of each year. 1874 and 1875, for example, saw some 
PHQVXEVFULEHWRWKH0LQLVWU\RI:DU¶VSROLF\WKRXJKRQO\UHSODFHPHQWV
were found. The rest had until the 1 January to find their own replacement or forfeit 
their deposit, which was put towards the administrative expenses of supplying men for 
this purpose. Only 1,023 of the remainder were successful in this attempt.177 This was 
not a one off occurrence; the Ministry of War had a reputation of failing to generate a 
large enough pool to satisfy demand, though as Figure 2.4 shows, a significant 
improvement was made in this respect come the 
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mid-1880s. The deficits experienced were mostly due to the fact that there simply were 
not enough volunteers willing to take the bounty offered to them by the retired officers 
employed by the state, working on a commission of 200 francs for each suitable recruit 
they obtained. 
Despite the best intentions, this new regulated system did nothing to curb the 
abuses and social injustices that riled the public and politicians alike. Firstly, it did not 
eradicate the private sector agencies, which took great delight in inflating their prices 
to between 3,000 and 5,000 francs during the chaotic three-month scramble at the end 
of the year. Secondly, it created an uncomfortable situation whereby the lottery could 
once again be exceedingly cruel to the labouring and artisanal classes. As pointed out 
in the Chamber, hypothetically, a rich man could still escape service by paying a 
maximum of 1,800 francs if he was fortunate enough to be provided with a replacement. 
Were he not, it would mean paying what remained an affordable sum to an independent 
agent. However, a less wealthy man could find himself, not only without a replacement, 
but also without the means to obtain one through the private sector, resulting in the loss 
of his 200-franc deposit for no benefit whatsoever. 179 This is just one example of how 
the state fell short in its attempts to maintain an equitable and amenable relationship 
with the public over the question of military service. 
 Substitution, although initially only permitted between men of the same 
province, was a cheaper way of avoiding military service. Swapping numbers at the 
draw with another man from the same contingent could absolve someone completely 
of the burden. Although, even replacing a soldier in the 6th, 7th or 8th classes did not 
impinge too much on their time as they were only subject to a maximum of two one-
month recalls. As a result of nominally having to serve for a few years, prices were 
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reduced by up to half in some provinces, though in others remained similar to that of 
replacement. Antwerp and the two Flanders boasted the lowest prices in 1865, for 
example, averaging 446 francs (Antwerp), 453 francs (East Flanders), and 529 francs 
(West Flanders) respectively.180 It is no surprise therefore, to find that these three 
provinces headed the list of the highest rates of substitution during this time. Contrarily, 
they boasted the lowest figures for replacement. This was probably a result of financial 
difficulties often experienced by rural families in the two Flanders, especially following 
the famine of 1846, which decimated the region, as well as what can be called a 
provincial culture of replacement and substitution.  
This culture was primarily a financial phenomenon, as with the two Flanders, 
which led to a majority of families affording and preferring one type of military escape 
over the other. This started a cycle that proved difficult to break, as replacements, for 
example, could not be substituted, or vice versa. Therefore, in a province such as 
Hainaut where replacement was particularly prevalent - forming up to 14.3% of their 
quota between 1842-1850 and rising to 21.6% in the ensuing decade ± there were fewer 
soldiers in the 6th, 7th and 8th classes with the option to substitute with a member of the 
newest intake (Figure. 2.5).181 This subsequently meant that more men who wished to 
escape military service were forced to find a  replacement instead, generating the next 
cycle of events. Over time, this also became embedded in the lives and customs of the 
villages, towns and communes where it was heavily practised, leading to the conclusion 
that this phenomenon became a genuine provincial military culture.  
With replacement and substitution statistics demonstrating an increase in the 
decades leading up to the mid-1860s, it is little wonder that the 1866 Commission  
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Figure. 2.5. Percentage of replacements and substitutes by province, 1851-1860.182 
 
 
predicted the situation would escalate even more rapidly in years to come. In their 
opinion, the growth in public wealth, coupled with the introduction and expansion of 
insurance companies, made replacement all the more accessible to the previously out 
of touch middle and lower classes. For a mere annual charge of 50 francs for a period 
of six years, a family could insure their son at the Compagnie des Rentiers, for example, 
and be given a sum of between 1,500 and 1,800 francs to buy a replacement if and when 
the time came. This facilitation, the Commission felt, could create a situation where, by 
KDOIWKHDUP\ZRXOGEHFRPSRVHGRIWKHVHµPHUFHQDULHV¶WKHPajority of whom 
RULJLQDWHG IURP DQ µLPSXUH¶ VRXUFH RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ 183 7KH DUP\¶V 'LYLVLRQDO
Commanders left the Commission in no doubt as to how they felt about this state of 
affairs either. Lieut-Gen. Désart of the 2nd ,QIDQWU\'LYLVLRQFRPPHQWHGWKDWµ7KHVH
men who, with but a few exceptions, hail from the lowest classes, constituting the 
OHSURV\RIWKHDUP\>«@DUHDYHULWDEOHGDQJHUWKURXJKWKHEDGH[DPSOHWKDWWKH\VHW¶
Equally, General Jambers of the 3rd Infantry 'LYLVLRQ IHDUHG WKDW µUHSODFHPHQW DQG
substitution is depriving the army of elite soldiers who are replaced by vagabonds, taken 
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IURP WKH GHSWKV RI VRFLHW\ >«@ LW FRXOG FRPSURPLVH WKH YHU\ H[LVWHQFH RI WKH
country¶184 Not only would the predicted increase in their number create an 
unprecedented problem for the maintenance of public order through an added influx of 
untrustworthy men (an increase of some 43% since the 1830s) but also in terms of 
general military discipline, which was sorely lacking among this category of recruit. 
,QGHHGDV$QGUp*ULVDUGSXWLWLQKLVZRUNRQWKH%HOJLDQ$UP\µVRFLHW\ZDV
EHLQJGHIHQGHGE\ WKRVHZKRKDGQRWKLQJ WRGHIHQG¶ OHDGLQJ WR WKHFRQFOXVLRQ WKDW
UHSODFHPHQWDQGVXEVWLWXWLRQZHUH WKHURRWRI WKHDUP\¶VGLVFLSOLQDU\ LVsues.185 This 
topic will be broadened in the following chapter, but it is nevertheless worthwhile 
examining the effects of the ballot system on military discipline briefly here. Figures 
IURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V6XE-Committee would certainly support Grisard¶VYLHZ
which was held by many contemporary commentators of the time. They suggested that 
out of every hundred men who deserted, sixty-three were replacements and substitutes, 
nineteen were balloted conscripts, and eighteen were volunteers.186 Equally, for every 
hundred men sent to the Disciplinary Companies, seventy-one were replacements and 
substitutes, fifteen were balloted conscripts, and fourteen were volunteers. Given that 
proportionally there were fewer replacements and substitutes in the army than balloted 
conscripts, it is clear to see that there is truth behind the assertion that they were among 
the primary causes of indiscipline in the army.    
 
Given the general consensus that the recruiting system was both a social 
injustice as well as a reliable method of qualitatively weakening what was an already 
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small army by European standards, it is unsurprising to find a number of attempts to 
institute significant military reform from the 1850s onwards. What is more surprising 
is that replacement and substitution were not abolished before 1909 despite seemingly 
common agreement among senior officers, many politicians across all parties, and the 
general population that it bore a number of glaring deficiencies. What occurred in the 
intervening half-century that prevented significant, if not vital, military reform from 
coming into being, was a heated political debate between the two leading parties of the 
nineteenth century; the Liberals and the Catholics. The army was the crucible in which 
an intense political struggle was fought out at the expense of introducing fully-blown 
conscription in the form of personal, obligatory and general service.  
The Catholic Party, who had spent a number of years in opposition during the 
1840s and 1850s were the first to use army reform to gain a political advantage. 
Opposition coupled with the rise of the clerical, anti-militarist, anti-royalist and pro-
Flemish, Meetingers who were encroaching upon traditional Catholic voters, brought 
the party together on the military question under the leadership of Jean-Baptiste 
Coomans. By the 1860s they began advocating voluntary recruitment and the abolition 
of replacement for the first time with the aim of winning back the votes of those 
RSSRVHGWRWKHµEORRGWD[¶ZKLFKZDVIHOWSDUWLFXODUly heavily in the rural communities 
of Flanders. This attempt at introducing a measure of social equality to the recruitment 
process allowed them to make some gains on the Liberal Party but defeat in the 1864 
elections signalled a reversion to their former position on the matter as social issues 
returned to the fore.187 Another defeat in the 1868 elections saw the Catholics take up 
issues over which they could directly oppose the Liberals and fight to secure wavering 
votes. These included electoral reform and the army once again. This time, however, 




their key policies were lowering the military budget and reducing the annual levy from 
12,000 to 10,000 men, and by extension the burden on society.188 From this point on, 
the Catholics were to be seen as the embodiment of anti-militaristic sentiment, 
relegating the importance of national defence whilst promoting the values of a clerical 
society who would want little, or nothing to do with the army. By adopting such an 
approach to the military question, the Catholics not only diametrically opposed 
themselves to the Liberals on the matter, but also, as a result, gravitated towards the 
Meetingers of Antwerp. 
This rapprochement, as will be discussed further on, would see the Catholic 
Party become closely linked with the rise of Flemish-consciousness within the army, 
which further complicated questions of reform as the century drew to a close. 
Correspondingly, by opposing themselves to the Liberals over military reform, the 
&DWKROLFVLQDGYHUWHQWO\LQFUHDVHGWKHIRUPHU¶VLQIluence within military circles. As seen 
in Chapter 1, the majority of senior officers were of Liberal persuasion, which created 
significant tension in civil-military relations during the Catholic monopoly of power 
from 1884 until the outbreak of war. This was not to say that the Liberals sanctioned 
every military proposal for reform prior to losing power; far from it. They too were 
aware of anti-militaristic sentiment in the country and the fine line that they had to 
tread. This caused a situation whereby the army, intent on reforming to keep up with 
the evolution of European armies ± particularly that of Prussia ± after 1866 and 1870-
71, found itself caught in a political crossfire that delayed the introduction of vital 
reforms in the half century leading up to the First World War. The abolition of 
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replacement and the introduction of personal and obligatory service were foremost 
among these.  
As early as 1859, however, many senior officers in the army who were acutely 
aware of the international situation and the precarious nature of Belgian neutrality were 
advocating military reform. They were of the opinion that neutrality was only as strong 
as the army upholding it and that the institution that they headed was simply not up to 
the task at hand. Indeed, each rise in European diplomatic tensions signalled renewed 
LQWHUHVWLQWKHPDWWHUQRWRQO\LQWHUQDOO\EXWH[WHUQDOO\DVZHOO%HOJLXP¶VJXDUDQWRU
powers saw it as a right to know what state the army was in, given that the answer had 
a significant bearing on their own military preparations. In conjunction with the willing 
divulgence of information, observers also frequently visited the Kingdom to report on 
WKHVWDWHRILWVGHIHQFHVDQGLWVDUP\¶VFDSDELOLWLHVZKLFKZHUHRIWHQWKRXJKWWREHOHVV
than satisfactory.189 7KHUHZHUHRIWHQFOHDUDQ[LHWLHVRYHU%HOJLXP¶VLQDELOLW\WRSURYLGH
a suitable deterrent. Indeed, Napoleon III threatened to send a French force into the 
Kingdom as a pre-emptive move against possible future Prussian aggression if Belgium 
did not strengthen both its forces and its Northern frontier. 190 It was threats such as 
these that served to intensify the resolve of senior officers to push through reforms in 
spite of general reluctance in the civilian domain that questioned the gravity of the 
situation. 
In 1859, the man charged with fulfilling this brief was the Minister of War, 
General Pierre Emmanuel Félix Chazal, a naturalised Belgian of French birth with 
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GHFLGHGO\/LEHUDOYLHZV+HKDGSUHYLRXVO\VHUYHGLQWKHVDPHSRVWLQ&KDUOHV5RJLHU¶V
first Ministry between 1847 and 1852 and had acquitted himself well under the duress 
of the 1848 crisis, which had seen a Revolutionary force march on Brussels. This time, 
however, with the prospective threat being far less tangible and more hypothetical, he 
found the duties of his office increasingly challenging. His concerns over the state of 
the army were made evident in a letter to Rogier, which read; 
We cannot improvise cadres, nor materiel, nor serious means of defence at 
the last moment; we cannot instruct an army in a few days. Given the present 
situation, time is already against us and there is not an hour to lose. In the end, 
when it comes to military measures, we need all or nothing.191 
Chazal felt that the Premier could use his influence and standing within the Government 
to provoke the Council of Ministers into action regarding an increase in the military 
budget, without which there was nothing, as Minister of War, that he could do to 
improve the situation. If European tensions escalated and called for immediate Belgian 
action in which the army would prove itself inadequately prepared, he would be accused 
of not having taken the necessary measures. Conversely, if the international crisis 
passed without event, he would be reproached for over-spending, irrespective of how 
insufficient the military budget was thought to be.192 Chazal even considered 
threatening to tender his resignation were he not supported, claiming that he could and 
would not be held responsible for any consequences. As it was, he was not given the 
funds that he desired as the crisis passed by without producing the conflagration many 
were expecting. Chazal retained his office but was unhappy at the lack of opportunity 
afforded to do his job properly. The army remained in a poor state of health despite 






warnings that another threatening situation could arise at any moment. It was clearly 
the civilian politicians, afraid of increasing the military burden on society, and 
particularly on the small tax-paying electorate, who had blocked the necessary reforms. 
The whole situation was symptomatic of civil-military relations in nineteenth century 
Belgium and would be reproduced on numerous subsequent occasions. Indeed, the next 
one arose less than a decade later. 
The 1866 Commission set up to report on the state of the army published its 
findings the following year in the wake of the Austro-Prussian War, which had brought 
to light the positive effects of the Prussian military model. Among other things, the 
commission examined, and soon discarded, the mooted proposals for the introduction 
of voluntary recruitment that had been circulating on the grounds that it would not 
provide sufficient numbers for the task at hand. If anything the army needed to increase 
in size and, more to the point, the importance of a substantial reserve became 
paramount.193 In order to do this, the annual levy would need to be raised to 14,500 
men if replacement and substitution were maintained, due to their draining effect on the 
establishment. Were they to be abolished, the contingent would still require up to 
13,000 men. As previously mentioned, however, it was intended that 2,000 of these 
recruits would form an immediate reserve force of volunteers, remaining under arms 
for a mere seven months only. The rest would remain under arms for a full 27 months 
despite protestations by certain civilian members of the committee that this was too 
heavy a burden to place on the population. Defending Catholic principles, Charles 
Vermeire, suggested reducing it to just 21 months.194 The officers present rejected these 
notions. General Renard demonstrated that raising the annual contingent to just 13,000 
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would still create a proportionally lesser burden than that with which the population 
had to contend in 1840.195 As such, all that remained was to abolish replacement and 
substitution. The method proposed to do this was that of exoneration before the draw. 
Those who wished to escape military service would pay a lump sum of 1,000 francs up 
front to the Government, which would supply a replacement if they still drew a bad 
number. The equivalent price for exoneration in France was 2,300 francs, 
demonstrating the relative ease with which Belgians could escape their military and 
social duties. Notwithstanding the adoption of this system by the committee, however, 
the Government could not see to its implementation for fear of losing political ground 
on its opponents. As such another opportunity to reorganise the army for the better was 
temporarily lost. 
 Despite further insistence by Chazal in 1866 that Belgium ought to take the 
same precautionary military measures as Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, the 
government remained unmoved, preferring to be fiscally prudent and trust in the 
strength of neutrality. The Minister of War was irate, exclaiming in a letter to Rogier 
LQ0D\ WKDW µ(YHQWVDUHEHFRPLQJ LQFUHDVLQJO\JUDYH([FLWHG(XURSH LVDOUHDG\ LQ
DUPV¶196 Once again he urged the Premier to use his influence in Cabinet to provide 
WKHDUP\ZLWKIXQGVWRUHFRYHUJURXQGRQGHFDGHV¶ZRUWKRIQHJOHFWZKLFKKDGVHHQ
the army reduced to its bare minimum strength. For the second time in eight years, 
Chazal was close to tendering his resignation over the matter claiming once more that 
he would not be held responsible for the consequences.197 For a second time, he was 
ignored by the government that was content to watch the 1866 tensions pass Belgium 
by. Indeed, it would take the Franco-Prussian War to propel the military debate into the 
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public sphere with enough impetus to trigger an increased civilian appreciation of the 
FRXQWU\¶VSUHFDULRXVSRVLWLRQ 
The emphasis placed on military reform after 1870-71 leant, like the French, far 
more towards the introduction of conscription along the Prussian model, than it had 
done previously. Naturally, this coincided with renewed efforts to abolish replacement 
and substitution as well as the creation of a larger, more effective reserve. This 
demonstrated a defining shift from a Gallic influence in Belgian military affairs to a 
Germanic one. Not only did it completely transform the military, but also provided new 
LPSHWXVLQWKHDOWHUDWLRQRIRSLQLRQDPRQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VDQWL-militaristic society.198 It 
was clear to all concerned that the mobilisation of 1870 left much to be desired after 
producing a 29% deficit in the establishment. The authorities could only account for 
22.5% of these absences, with 5% stemming from a natural shortfall in the annual 
contingents, 6.6% receiving definitive leave having married in their 8th, 9th and 10th year 
RIVHUYLFHDQGDVDUHVXOWRIEHFRPLQJDIDPLO\¶VVROHVXSSRUWDVZHOODVQDWXUDO
wastage from deaths and desertions. The remaining 6.5% were unaccounted for and 
were primarily found to be men who had changed residence without informing the local 
authorities, which meant that their recall had not reached them.199 This demonstrated a 
huge organisational failing both at administrative level and within the army. Indeed, a 
large proportion of the justified absences were a result of the shortcomings in the ballot 
system and the general laws and structures governing the force. It posed questions, 
particularly given the devastating results witnessed in France, not just as to whether 
obligatory service should be introduced, but when. It became the opinion of many that 
this was the only way to rectify the obvious deficiencies in the current system whilst 
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VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ UHGXFLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶V EXUGHQ WKURXJK VKortening the period of time 
under arms. The regaining of power by the Catholics in July of 1870 proved to be bad 
timing for the army, which once again struggled in vain to abolish replacement and 
introduce personal and obligatory military service, despite the visible threat to 
QHXWUDOLW\DQGWKHVKDPEROLFPRELOLVDWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VIRUFHV 
The 1871 Commission set up to examine questions relative to the organisation 
of the army was unwavering in its opinion that Belgium should adopt the Prussian 
system of recruitment and abolish the ballot. Such transformations had occurred, or 
were in the process of happening, in the majority of European armies. As Brialmont 
ULJKWO\VWDWHGµIDUIURPOHDGLQJRWKHUFRXQWULHVZHDUHRQWKHFRQWUDU\EHLQJOHGE\
WKHP¶200 This was of course to be expected to a certain degree. Belgium was never 
going to be the leading innovator of military organisation given its status in Europe. 
However, it was the delay in the implementation of reform once it had proven 
successful in other armies that particularly irked senior officers like Brialmont. As the 
recruitment sub-committee highlighted, Belgium did possess the financial means and 
the manpower to do it. Indeed, the proposition to raise the contingent to 14,000, 
although increasing the burden on the current population from what it was used to, 
ZRXOGVWLOORQO\VHHRQHPDQSHULQKDELWDQWVSDVVWKURXJKWKHDUP\¶VUDQNV7KLV
compared favourably with the majority of Europe in 1871-72. Austria raised one per 
341 inhabitants; Italy one per 319; Denmark one per 317; the Northern Confederation 
one per 312; Wurttemberg one per 305; Bavaria one per 301; the Netherlands one per 
299; Russia one per 250; France one per 233; and Switzerland one per 205. 
Additionally, whilst under Dutch occupation, the Belgian populace had had to contend 
with supplying one recruit for every 300 inhabitants, and even after independence, was 
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required to supply one per 366, which was not far removed from the proportions now 
being advocated.201 It demonstrated to the military authorities how ruinous the 
increasing wealth of the country had been to the army in the promulgation of laxity 
among the population, its representatives, and their collective trust in the power of 
neutrality. 
The report continued to stress the feasibility of introducing personal and 
obligatory service at the expense of replacement on a financial front too. This had been 
one of the main obstacles placed in its path by the government, which had pledged to 
reduce military expenditure. Notwithstanding, the committee produced figures that 
demonstrated how its introduction would see Belgium fall in line with the rest of Europe 
in this domain. Through 1870-71 European powers had spent the following on their 
armed forces by head of their respective total populations: France 14.03 francs 
(projected to rise to 17.92 following their post war reforms of 1872-73); the Netherlands 
14.86; the German Northern Confederation 8.48; Bavaria 8.43; Russia 8.25; Austria 
8.07; and Italy 8.04. Prospectively, Belgium would pay 9.65 francs per head of 
population, which was not absurd in the context of European spending.202 Interestingly, 
the committee calculated that Britain spent as much as 20.75 francs per head of 
population to sustain its voluntarily recruited army. If ever the army had a means of 
quashing any renewed interest in adopting a similar system in Belgium, that most 
certainly was it.  
Further discussion of this proposed expenditure revealed the opinion that, given 
WKH.LQJGRP¶VUHODWLYHZHDOWKFRPSDUHGWRPRVWRWKHU European states, proportionally 
Belgium would actually still be spending less on its army despite adopting personal and 
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REOLJDWRU\ VHUYLFH µ)DU IURP FRPSODLQLQJ DERXW WKH LQFUHDVH LQ PLOLWDU\ VSHQGLQJ
Belgium, contrarily, ought to rejoice over its financial situation which all other states 
HQY\¶LWZDVVWDWHG203 This was borne out by the fact that the military budget, which 
was due to rise to 46.5 million francs, from a state budget of 196 million francs, would 
be lower in both raw figures and proportionally than the average expenditure for the 
period 1830 ± 1839 when it had been 50.5 million from an overall budget of 90.6 
million francs.204 This comparison must be treated cautiously, however, as it must be 
remembered that Belgium was on a war footing for the entire period between 1830 and 
1839, which does not make it particularly representative. Notwithstanding, the point 
being made was clear, and not without justification. There was no reason why, if the 
Prussian military model was deemed preferable from the point of view of national 
defence, Belgium could not afford to implement it. 
The arguments in favour of raising the contingent and introducing personal and 
obligatory service appeared sound and beyond contestation. Even the future Catholic 
Premier, Jules Malou, attempted to gather clerical support for the initiative despite the 
&KXUFK¶VWUDGLWLRQDORSSRVLWLRQWRPLOLWDU\LQFUHDVHVDQGWKHFRUUXSWLYHLQIOXHQFHLWKDG
RQWKHFRXQWU\¶V\RXWK1HYHUWKHOHVVKHPDQDJHGWRFRQYLQFHWKHSRZHUIXO$UFKELVKRS
of Mechelen to lend his weight to the initiative, which prompted the intractable 
members of the Right to follow suit, despite their obvious fury.205 This caused a 
veritable split in the party, but still the government of Barthélémy de Theux de 
Meylandt refused tRVDQFWLRQWKHFRPPLWWHH¶VSURSRVDOV,WDSSHDUHGLPSRVVLEOHWRGH
Theux for the party to back down from its election promises, made whilst in opposition, 
to fight any increase to the budget or size of the army. He was particularly opposed to 
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the idea of personal and obligatory service. This provoked an unsavoury atmosphere 
within the Cabinet, which was only made worse by the determined nature of the 
0LQLVWHURI:DU+HQUL*XLOODXPHWRSXVKWKURXJKWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VSURSRVDOV$
known Liberal sympathiser and staunch ally of the King, to whom he owed appointment 
to this office, Guillaume was resolute on the matter in the face of overwhelming 
adversity from his Cabinet colleagues. Indeed the Government went as far as 
threatening to resign over the issue if its hand were forced in accepting the introduction 
of conscription.206 Naturally, the King could not allow the Government to fall over an 
issue that he personally had supported. As such, it fell to Guillaume to take the decision 
to stand by his convictions and tender his own resignation in November 1872. 
Guillaume was by no means made a scapegoat for the failure of the 
conscriptionist lobby to force through reform, far from it. If anything it galvanised its 
resolve in the wake of years of hard work and instilled a renewed drive in its cause. 
,QGHHGWKHDUP\¶VVHQLRURIILFHUVZKRZHUHGHWHUPLQHGWRVWDQGE\WKHLUFROOHDJXH
effectively went on strike through refusing to take up the portfolio of Minister of War. 
They were not prepared to see the qualified opinions of the commission cast aside 
merely as a ploy to save political face, whilst the army and national defence continued 
to suffer. This created an unprecedented situation whereby a civilian took up the post 
of Minister of War for the first time in the cRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\)RXUPRQWKVSDVVHGEHIRUH
General Séraphin Thiebault agreed to step in on 25 March 1873. He was willing to 
temporarily drop the issue of personal service but was intent on instituting other 
military reforms. His main focus was to be a more regulated form of state replacement 
to curb the abuses of the system that had served the army so poorly over the past four 
decades, whilst also increasing the time under arms to thirty months. The latter was 
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naturally opposed, but the former made some progress given its compliance with 
Catholic military policy. In all, the 1872-73 reform debate boiled down to a messy, 
though successful, defence of the replacement system by the government. In the furore 
surrounding the entire situation, the question of introducing conscription was actually 
somewhat relegated to the background and would not resurface, apart from a brief foray 
by General Auguste Goethals in 1878, in any significant fashion until 1886.207 For the 
time being, the Catholics had held the line. 
This interregnum in the military debate was largely a result of the Liberal 
victory in the 1878 elections, which saw the political agendas of both parties shift 
dramatically towards education and social reform. By the time the Catholic Party 
regained power in 1884 under Jules Malou (for the second time), the lull in the military 
debate had ensured that their base of anti-militaristic voters was still in place. However, 
this political support was added to from the emerging middle-classes of the increasingly 
industrialised urban centres of the country. Typically, it had been the wealthy who had 
EHHQDEOHWRDYRLGWKHEXUGHQRIWKHµEORRGWD[¶\HWLQFUHDVLQJLQGLYLGXDOZHDOWKKDG
propelled the bourgeoisie to a similar level of financial power to buy their way out as 
well. It was precisely this group of money-driven businessmen, content with nominally 
being enrolled in the Civic Guard as a demonstration of their patriotic service, whom 
the Catholics were able to rely on most against renewed proposals to abolish the ballot. 
)LJXUHVIURP'H9RV¶DQDO\VLVRI7LHOWZRXOGHYHQZLGHQWKHVRFLDOFRPSRVLWLRQRI
those able to benefit from replacement further, suggesting that 43% of those replaced 
were in industry (69% of these weavers), while the rest were made up of coopers, 
carpenters, smiths, butchers, tailors, and cobblers. On top of this, 35% were agricultural 
workers, 7% shopkeepers and merchants, and 15% in the services such as students and 
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FOHUNV:KHQH[DPLQLQJKLVVDPSOHRIIDWKHUV¶RFFXSDWLRQVLWWUDQVSLUHGWKDW% were 
agricultural workers and 24% came from industry. The rest were made up by other 
occupations.208 As a result of such a large industrial and artisanal representation in the 
replacement marketplace, the importance of public opinion in urban areas became 
increasingly important. Whilst the Catholics had traditionally monopolised the support 
of the rural electorate, it is unsurprising to see them extend their influence in the 
commercial centre of Antwerp and gradually align themselves with the Meetingers 
whose anti-PLOLWDULVPZDVH[HPSOLILHGLQWKHLUVORJDQµQRWRQHPDQQRWRQHFDQQRQ
PRUH¶209  
A series of workers¶ strikes in 1886 created an unexpected jolt within the 
Catholic ranks as well as the bourgeoisie. The dangers of having riotous masses 
supported by what was becoming an increasingly proletarian army almost propelled the 
middle classes to voluntarily send their sons into the army to defend their threatened 
interests. Previously unthinkable support for obligatory service now became, amongst 
some at least, almost a necessity to maintain trustworthy elements in the army. This 
shift in attitude saw the political situation surrounding compulsion become a veritable 
battle between the urban middle-classes and the anti-militaristic Flemish rural 
population supported by the city of Antwerp. 210 This fear of socialism was in fact the 
catalyst needed for some in the Catholic Party to take heed of the arguments put forward 
in the 1870s by the military advisors of the time. The Premier, Auguste Beernaert, was 
a known advocate of conscription after having been convinced by General Van der 
Smissen, who had amplified his reputation by personally leading the army to a 
successful quelling of the uprisings.  It was reasoned that the army would not only 
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benefit from being a more accurate incarnation of the nation by expanding its 
composition to include all classes but, that in doing so, it would provide a buffer against 
the spread of socialism through an institutionalised common education amongst the 
youth of the nation to honour and respect the virtues of discipline, morality and duty. 
211
 7KLVIHOOLQOLQHZLWKWKHSDUW\¶VFRQVHUYDWLYHYLHZVEXWWKHVXGGHQVKLIWLQSROLF\
was certainly a fear-induced reactionary move. Nevertheless, opinion was not 
unanimous.  
Some of the more extreme Catholics, as John Gooch rightly notes, did not wish 
to see the youth of Flanders become corrupted through any more interaction with their 
socialist Walloon counterparts than was strictly necessary and therefore consistently 
stalled its progress.212 This triggered a schism within the party which threatened the 
future of the Government. A number of local associations such as those of; Brussels, 
Roulers, Kortrijk, Tielt and Hasselt were proclaiming themselves as anti-conscriptionist 
and pressuring their representatives in parliament to follow suit. Indeed, they threatened 
to no longer elect anyone who did not share the same opinion and would not fight for 
the cause.213 Beernaert called a meeting of the Catholic Party at the Hotel Mérode to 
discuss the division within the party. He had taken power on the back of promises to be 
supported in his endeavours as Prime Minister, which had now been broken. He 
particularly resented being dictated to by the associations, which resulted in a threat to 
resign. For the good of the party Beernaert was convinced to remain and lead the 
government but at the expense of temporarily dropping his personal designs to 
introduce conscription until at least after the next elections to avoid damaging support 
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in the rural heartlands.214 The defeat significantly undermined Beernaert who, it was 
widely considered, had lost control of the party. His influence and standing had 
certainly fallen but inadvertently led to the acceptance of an increased military budget 
for the creation of the Meuse fortresses, as the Prime Minister could not be seen to 
suffer multiple defeats from within his own party.215 This was yet another 
demonstration of how political pressure, this time from within a single party, proved 
detrimental to the implementation personal and obligatory service. 
Despite this setback for the conscriptionists, the circumstances still appeared 
favourable for a renewed onslaught. The King turned to an independent, in the shape 
RI&RXQW$GULHQG¶2XOWUHPRQWWRWDNHXSWKHPDQWOHLQWKHZDNHRI%HHUQDHUW¶VIDLOXUH
to garner enough governmental support. Founder of the National Independence Party 
and ex-Lieutenant-*HQHUDORIWKH&LYLF*XDUGG¶2XOWUHPRQWZDVDQDUGHQWEHOLHYHULQ
the need to raise the effective strength of the army through obligatory service to cope 
with the modern age of mass armies. His appointment to the project was seen as the 
best way to bring both the divided Catholic Party and the Liberals together to discuss 
this question. There was a certain degree of cross-party agreement on the issue, though 
the question of what form conscription took and how best to implement it remained a 
source of debate. Indeed, Frère-Orban, for example, who had actually been a fierce 
critic of personal, obligatory and general service prior to the 18ZRUNHUV¶VWULNHVZDV
in favour of its introduction but wished to retain some form of replacement. This 
QDWXUDOO\HQFRXQWHUHGVRPHRSSRVLWLRQIURPG¶2XOWUHPRQWDQGVHQLRURIILFHUVZKRKDG
been at pains to rid the army of the pernicious system for decades.  
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In the end the proposal centred on the introduction of personal service during 
peacetime, which would see every fit male take up arms at the age of twenty as part of 
one of two categories of men. The first would be a group of conscripts called up for an 
active engagement of three years and would consist of 18,000 men annually to form the 
basis of the regular army. The second category would involve men being trained for 
three months to a sufficient standard of military proficiency after which they too would 
be released back into civilian life to tend to the economical needs of the country. They 
would form a reserve corps to bring the peacetime regiments up to full war 
establishment upon mobilisation. It was thought that this method could succeed in both 
a military sense and be amenable to the general public by providing a means through 
which they could return to their civilian careers without a great inconvenience. In order 
to be agreeable to the Catholic sceptics, officials, magistrates and the clergy would be 
exempt from mobilisation. The military authorities were naturally supportive of the 
proposal and found increasingly strong allies in the recently converted Liberal ranks as 
the process wore on. Politically, it had offered a favourable opportunity to push forward 
a policy over which the Catholics were clearly divided, possibly enabling them to 
exploit the situation to their advantage. This was especially the case given that the 
Liberals had no real military policy of their own.216 However, upon going to a vote in 
the Chamber it was defeated 69 (66 Catholic and 3 Independent) votes to 62. The 
majority of the opposition voters were representatives from the rural and Antwerp 
heartlands, demonstrating that they either believed more strongly in their political 
                                                     
216
 For more on this and the influence of the socialist movement in the form of the 
%HOJLDQ:RUNHUV3DUW\¶VLQIOXHQFHRQSROLWLFVDQGWKHPLOLWDU\TXHVWLRQVHH09DQ
Ginderachter, Het rode vaderland: De vergeten geschiedenis van de communautaire 
spanningen in het Belgische socialisme voor WOI (Lannoo, Tielt, 2005); and J. 
*RGGHULVµ2RUORJDDQGHRRUORJ"De houding van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij ten 
aanzien van het leger 1885 ± 1914 (Ph.D Thesis, University of Gent, 2004). 
 120 
principles than in the danger of the International, or would rather take the risk of 
allowing the latter to go unchecked in order to protect their own from its perceived 
influences in the army. Either way, it demonstrates the power of regionalism in Belgian 
politics; an issue that would become an even more important element in the military 
debate as the century drew to a close. 
Certainly, the deliberations on conscription in the 1880s stimulated a parallel 
discussion about the introduction of regional recruitment. Given that the proportion of 
Flemish soldiers was likely to increase to its national average of a two-thirds majority 
in the ranks, it seemed only right to the Flemish representatives to push for linguistically 
exclusive regiments to accommodate the influx. Yet, while it promised to improve the 
speed and efficiency of mobilisation, which was a desirable military outcome, it was 
TXLFNO\ UHFRJQLVHG WR EH µLQDGPLVVLEOH¶ RQ QDWLRQDO JURXQGV217 The lengthier 
concentration time of assembling men from across the country at regimental depots was 
considered worthwhile if it prevented unwarranted divisions between the Walloon and 
Flemish provinces. Linguistically segregated regiments would have undermined the 
DUP\¶VDWWHPSWVDWVROLGLI\LQJDXQLILHGQDWLRQDO identity it purported to uphold. 
Indeed, much like the Italians under Fanti in the 1860s, the Belgian army of the 
1830s attempted to foster a sense of patriotism through national recruiting, drawing 
together men from different provinces and backgrounds into a large melting pot to 
counter the strong regional loyalties that had been visibly present in the Low Countries 
for centuries.218 According to Richard Boijen, the early years were characterised by an 
air of acceptance from the Flemish population who saw the language laws of the army 
PLUURUWKRVHH[SHULHQFHGLQWKHLUHYHU\GD\OLYHV$SURFHVVRIµ)UHQFKLILFDWLRQ¶DOPRVW
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had them accept a position of second-rate citizens until the rise in prominence of the 
Flemish movement after the 1850s.219 The Catholic Ministry of Pierre De Decker led 
one of the first public forays into idea of an awakening Flemish sentiment in 1856 when 
it instituted the Flemish Commission, which furnished a series of damning reports on 
the state of the nation and the army. Alexander. B. Murphy has argued that the report 
was not all that radical a document as it did not seek or even acknowledge separate 
geographical-linguistic regions, but rather promoted freedom of choice and 
bilingualism.220 This is true to a degree but conveniently overlooks the proposed 
introduction of regional recruitment for the first time in the history of the country. This 
is not insignificant. It was a proposal that was bidding to completely alter the 
organisation of the army and, more fundamentally, the role it had been asked to play as 
an instrument of nation building in what actually was recognised as a culturally, 
linguistically and geographically fractured country. This premise is supported by the 
likes of S. B. Clough in his study of Belgian nationalism, who argued that Flemish 
propaganda, between 1830 and 1870, although small in scale, took on the appearance 
of large nationalist movements with flags, songs and even a national anthem. The 
emergence of the symbolic Flemish Lion is indicative of this. Even the first 
Netherlandish Language and Literacy Congress held in Gent in 1849, the same year as 
the first Pan-Slav Congress in Prague, is suggestive of the progress that the concept of 
ethno-linguistic nationalism was making in Belgium as part of a wider European 
movement.221 As such, there is evidence to suggest that the propositions made had a 
wider geo-political agenda, which both forged links between the Catholic Party and the 
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subsequent struggle for Flemish linguistic recognition, as well as the first public 
admission of the ascendancy of regionalism over nationalism in the quest for identity 
within Belgium. 
Language was the key issue at stake and the simplest differentiator between the 
two regions. Despite neither region possessing a uniformity of language, the use of 
standardised French by the ruling classes, Government and the army was a severe point 
of contention amongst Flemings. However, the grievances they expressed were not 
necessarily directed towards Wallonia as one might be tempted to suggest, but in fact 
against the French speaking bourgeoisie of Flanders, who themselves were seen as the 
oppressors.222  Previously, there had been an acceptance for the need of a unifying 
language in the process of nation-building, demonstrating just how fundamental J. 
Lottrand¶V SURSRVDO DV WKH )OHPLVK &RPPLVVLRQ¶V VXE-FRPPLWWHH¶V FKDLUPDQ WR
institute unilingual regiments for both the Flemish and Walloon regions actually was. 
Notwithstanding, this was dismissed on two accounts. Firstly, Wellington had won the 
Battle of Waterloo with an army composed of four languages, and secondly it would 
undermine the attempts at forming the unified nation that was so desired. With the 
Liberals regaining power the following year under Charles Rogier, the Flemish question 
was almost entirely swept aside. The final report that was issued discarded all attempts 
at reform as a result of the wider national agenda, which it was felt that the country 
ought to pursue. Nevertheless, with the Flemish unity of language coming to fruition in 
the 1880s and the rise in power of the Catholics as the dominant political force 
supported by the extremist Meetingers, it is unsurprising the Flamingatism (a term used 
to denote Flemish linguistic recognition) became inexorably linked with military 
reorganisation. 
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Whilst regional differences were occupying the Catholics and Liberals in their 
struggle over personal service, a more serious threat to the established order was 
beginning to take root, which significantly influenced the military debate. The rise of 
socialiVP WKURXJK WKH %HOJLDQ :RUNHUV¶ 3DUW\ DV RI  EXLOW RQ IHDUV FXOWLYDWHG
through a number of incidents that had threatened to undermine discipline in the army 
and derail plans for the introduction of personal, obligatory and general military service. 
Indeed, as early as the 1870s the authorities were wary of the influence of the 
International within the ranks of the armed forces, which was a particular concern for 
the Catholics. For example, Brialmont had reported to the 1871 Commission that the 
actions oIVHYHUDOPHQDWWKHWUDLQLQJFDPSRI%HYHUORRKDGWREHJUHHWHGZLWKµVHYHUH
PHDVXUHV¶ DIWHU LW ZDV IRXQG WKDW WKH\ KDG VWDJHG SROLWLFDO PHHWLQJV DQG ZHUH DOVR
known to have attended some held by an association in the town. Added to this, two 
soldiers from a battalion recently moved to Verviers as an aid to the civil power in the 
IDFHRIDZRUNHUV¶VWULNHKDGRSHQO\VWDWHGWKDWWKH\ZRXOGQRWXVHWKHLUZHDSRQVRQ
the crowd if ordered to do so by their officers.223 Furthermore in 1886, more than sixty 
men of the 3rd Line Regiment stationed in Gent were known to have participated in 
meetings in the Vooruit WKH FXOWXUDO FHQWUH RI WKH FLW\¶V ODERXU PRYHPHQt. This 
prompted the Mayor of Gent, Mr Lippens, to call into question the loyalty of the 
regiment were it to be called upon in aid of the civil power. By considering it 
untrustworthy he would only have the cit\¶V&LYLF*XDUGDWKLVGLVSRVDO which, with its 
more bourgeois composition, was seen as more trustworthy.224 On the one hand, 
incidents such as these reinforced concerns over the compulsory extension of military 
service within conservative Catholic circles fearful of the corruptive effects they might 
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have. Conversely, it revealed an emergence of a mass consciousness among men of 
military age whose service to the State, it was felt, ought to be rewarded with a political 
voice.  
Many socialists were advocating the nation in arms as a viable alternative to 
recruitment by ballot. Georges Lorand was perhaps the most prominent supporter of 
the system, writing what he claimed to be a propaganda leaflet for it in 1889 entitled: 
Nation Armée: Le Système Suisse.225 As the title would suggest, Lorand was heavily 
inspired by the Swiss cantonal militia, which he personally observed at their 
manoeuvres in conducting the research for this work. He felt that the lack of knowledge, 
a result of an odd decision by the Belgian Government to never send an official military 
observer, had subsequently rendered the country unsympathetic to, and unappreciative 
of, the nation in arms as a possible solution to the problem of military organisation. It 
KDGWKHSRWHQWLDOWRDQVZHUWRWKHQDWLRQ¶VGHPDQGVIRUVKRUWHUVHUYLFHDPXFK-reduced 
standing army, and abolition of the corruptive barracks, whilst arming a larger number 
of men than was currently the case. Detractors, such as Frère-Orban ± who saw little 
difference between a conscript army and the nation in arms ± as well as the majority of 
the Catholic Party and press, pointed to the way in which it went against Belgian 
traditions, morals and character, let alone the social, religious, industrial and 
agricultural requirements of the country.226 Yet it was precisely these latter elements 
that Lorand was convinced could be safeguarded through creating a national militia. 
From the age of 16, his system would see boys learn the fundamentals of 
military life through education, gymnastics, marches, dress code, and shooting. This 
early exposure to discipline and routine would instil the basics into the male population 
                                                     
225
 G. Lorand, Nation Armée: le Système Suisse (Brussels, 1889). 
226
 Plenum.be, Chamber of Representatives Debates, 23 March 1893; and Le Bien 
Public, 22 February 1884. 
 125 
who, at the age of twenty, would go on to form the first band of the army proper. Each 
year approximately 27,000 men would be expected to undertake a three-month training 
course, with those deemed to be inept returning for further instruction until proving 
satisfactory knowledge and capacity. A small group of full time officers and NCOs, 
who would form the spine of the army during peace, would undertake the task of 
H[HUFLVLQJHDFK\HDU¶VUHFUXLWVDVZHOODVWKHSHULRGVRIGD\UHFDOOVHYHU\WZR\HDUV
Men between WKHDJHVRIDQGZRXOGIRUPWKHµUHJXODUDUP\¶ZLWKWR-year-
olds acting as a reserve. Once over this age threshold, it was expected that all men 
would nominally serve in the Civic Guard until the age of 50. This would allow the 
population to retain their civilian roles and prospects whilst equally having received 
EDVLFPLOLWDU\WUDLQLQJ,Q/RUDQG¶VRZQZRUGVµ7KHDUP\ZRXOGEHWKHQDWLRQLWVHOI
and we will see develop in the public, for all things military, that same sympathy, that 
same enthusLDVP WKDW ZH ILQG LQ 6ZLW]HUODQG¶227 For those who shared the same 
political outlook, it was almost incomprehensible that the system was not put in place 
immediately. Not only did it keep the active male population in work and out of the 
corruptive clutches of the barracks but called for a defence of the country through a 
national collaboration of all men, regardless of social standing. By additionally 
eradicating the inequalities and anachronisms associated with the ballot system - 
ostensibly a relic of foreign domination - and simultaneously reducing to a minimum 
the time spent under arms, the entire principle married up with the political evolution 
of the time. 
,W LV SHUKDSV XQVXUSULVLQJ WKDW /RUDQG¶V SURSRVDOV FRLQFLGHG ZLWK ERWK WKH
growing socialist movement in Belgium as well as the simultaneous debate on electoral 
reform and the extension of the franchise. Unequivocally, the nation in arms concept 
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contributed to both the military debate as well as the quest for universal suffrage. By 
asking the entire nation to embrace this new national dawn where each man with a right 
to vote would rise to defend the State in which he had a stake, it was felt that the nation 
LQDUPVZDVWKHWUXHFRUROODU\RIXQLYHUVDOVXIIUDJHµLW>ZDV@DGXW\DVZHOODVDULJKW¶228 
This was equally the view shared by the conscriptionists; to be an active citizen in the 
nation one must also be prepared to defend it as had been demonstrated in other 
European states.229 It was akin to an unwritten social contract that had its roots in the 
ballot system, but was being perfected to rid it of its vices.  
As it was, electoral reform was passed in April 1893 but in the form of tempered 
universal suffrage that worked on a plural vote system. This saw 60% of the electoral 
body receive one vote, 23% two votes, and 17% three votes based on a combination of 
wealth, social and occupational status. The number of electors jumped from 135,000 to 
1,370,687 and the number of votes to 2,111,127.  Socialist votes soared and actually 
saw the party send eight more representatives to parliament than the Liberals after the 
1894 election.230 This made their proposals of a nation in arms more authoritative and 
led to further pronouncements on the matter. Indeed, Émile Féron, the left-leaning 
Liberal from Brussels, continued extolling the virtues of the system in 1894 when he 
DVVHUWHG µ7KRVHZKRZLVK WR UHPDLQ IUHHPXVWJXDUGDJDLQVW DQ DUP\ ZKLFK LV QRW
QDWLRQDOWKHDUP\RIDIUHHSHRSOHPXVWEHWKHLQFDUQDWLRQRIWKHVDLGSHRSOH¶231  
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Notwithstanding, it was thought to be out of the realms of realistic possibility 
as its three bands of armed militia were considered too much for a small country such 
as Belgium.232 Others placed their faith in Belgian neutrality, which up until the 
twentieth century had only come under serious threat once, during the Franco-Prussian 
War. Perhaps this is the reason why it was felt that minimal training would suffice, 
though it is difficult to believe that it would have constituted an effective fighting force 
against either of its two most likely aggressors, Germany or France. This is rather 
symptomatic of the entire debate regarding military reorganisation in Belgium. The 
attempt to balance the largely anti-PLOLWDULVWLF SXEOLF¶V GHVLUH ZLWK WKDW RI PLOLWDU\
efficiency led to a situation whereby Belgium was uncertain as to how it could best 
defend itself. Great faith was placed in the development of the fortress system 
(discussed in Chapter 5), but even this relied on strong regular cadres of men capable 
of sustaining defensive action long enough for foreign aid to arrive. While the nation 
in arms promised the numbers, it could not guarantee the quality that personal and 
obligatory service would offer. It appeared, therefore, as if a militia based on the Swiss 
system would fall dramatically short of what it would be asked to do in times of war. 
$IWHU DOO 6ZLW]HUODQG¶V PDLQ EDUULHU RI GHIHQFH ZDV QRW LWV QDWLRQ LQ DUPV EXW LWV
mountain ranges; something that the Belgian advocates ought to have more readily 
considered.  
As it was, the entire military reorganisation debate boiled down to a political 
struggle, which allowed the successive anti-militarist and anti-royalist Catholic 
Governments to dictate affairs. Despite senior officers endlessly expressing their 
professional opinions in favour of obligatory service, there was no real sense that the 
politicians seriously contemplated its implantation. In 1897, Brialmont, once again 
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spearheading the charge, felt compelled to set up a committee composed of five retired 
generals, two presidents of ex-NCOs associations, and the director of La Belgique 
Militaire to whom he proposed uniting over 250 veterans associations into one 
federation for a big propaganda campaign in favour of personal service. Writing to the 
.LQJ¶VVHFUHWDU\EHIRUHKDQG%ULDOPRQWVXJJHVWWKDWµ(YHU\WKLQJZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW
this propaganda will rouse the slumbering patriotism of the nation and will present the 
.LQJZLWKWKHPHDQVWRUHDOLVH+LVJRRGLQWHQWLRQVWRZDUGVWKHDUP\¶233 In search for 
political capital they took a petition to the King on 13 June 1897 and gained verbal 
VXSSRUW IRU WKHLU HQGHDYRXUV ZLWK /HRSROG ,, VWDWLQJ µ<RX DUH SUHDFKLQJ WR WKH
FRQYHUWHG«,DPDQGVKDOOUHPDLQWKHYDQJXDUGRIXVSDWULRWV¶234 This was naturally 
welcomed but had little effect on proceedings. IndeHGWKHHIIHFWRIWKHPRQDUFK¶VRZQ
verbal campaign, which had been in full force ostensibly since his accession to the 
throne, can be seen through its lack of success.235 A full three decades of effort 
amounted to little as a result of his Congo project being held to ransom by the Catholics 
who refused to support it if Leopold attempted to exert undue influence on military 
matters.236 With his expansionist desires over-riding those of military reorganisation, 
the King, although a known supporter of conscription, was relegated to the position of 
a bystander with only occasional indirect involvement.  
By 1901, enough pressure was being exerted on the Government to institute 
another commission to examine the question of recruitment in the army. The Premier, 
Paul de Smet de Naeyer, in his second term in office, was clearly in favour of blocking 
any renewed attempts at the introduction of personal service, which had once again 
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gathered pace in the late 1890s.237 In fact, he was a known advocate of voluntary 
recruitment WKDWZRXOGVHHWKHSDUW\¶VPDLQSROLWLFDOEDVHUHMRLFHLQDYRLGLQJPLOLWDU\
VHUYLFH +RZHYHU JLYHQ WKH PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH RQ WKH FRPPLVVLRQ¶V ERDUG LW ZDV
unlikely that any result other than a proposal for the introduction of personal service 
was going to emanate from its deliberations. In what was possibly the most overt 
attempt at political interference in the matter, de Smet de Naeyer called on three 
Catholic colleagues, Charles Woeste, Joris Helleputte, and Auguste Delbeke, to join 
the 1901 Commission in order to redress the balance. When Woeste declared his 
reservations about joining the commission for fear of experiencing a potentially 
GDPDJLQJSHUVRQDOGHIHDWWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUVLPSO\VWDWHGµ:HOOWKHQZHFDQFKRRVH
two-thirds or even three-quartHUVRISROLWLFLDQVKRVWLOHWRSHUVRQDOVHUYLFH>«@7KLVZD\
ZHZLOOJDLQD\HDU¶238 This was much more appealing to Woeste and his colleagues 
who promptly were added to the committee, which by its first session numbered twenty 
civilians amongst the military personnel, the majority of whom were known to be 
opponents of personal service. 
The Commission discussed a number of proposals from both the military and 
civilian lobbies present. Curiously, the underlying theme of these discussions 
concerned forging a national spirit, which had been sorely lacking from the passive 
obedience inherent in the aged ballot system. 239 Despite the opinion of Hymans and 
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RWKHUV WKDW µ>D@QDUP\RIYROXQWHHUV LV DQ DUP\RXWVLGH WKHQDWLRQDQ LQVWUXPHQWRI
reaction and FRXSVG¶eWDW¶ there were some who believed in the Belgian ideals of the  
liberty of vocations, which made voluntary recruitment the most amenable form of 
military service possible.240 For example, Jules de Soignie, the honorary director of the 
Hainaut Provincial Council, wrote in Le Petit Messagerµ7UXH/LEHUDOLVPFRQVLVWVRI
respecting, and to allow as much as possible, individual liberty; liberty of professions 
LVFHUWDLQO\RQHRIWKHKLJKHVWRUGHU¶241 This was precisely the view shared by Hellepute 
on the committee who stated that from now on those who enlisted would do so by 
FKRLFHWRFDUYHRXWDUHVSHFWDEOHSURIHVVLRQDOFDUHHUIURPLWµWKHVROGLHUPXVWOLYHE\
KLVJXQDVWKHRIILFHUOLYHVE\KLVVZRUG¶$QRXWUDJHG%ULDOPRQWUXEELVKHGWKLVZULWLQJ
in support of consFULSWLRQµ:URQJWKHVROGLHUDIWHUDIHZPRQWKVRIVHUYLFHSXWVGRZQ
his gun and reclaims his spade, his pickaxe, his plane; the officer parts with his sword 
only at the hour of his retirement, whence he can no longer take up a productive 
SURIHVVLRQ¶242 There was clearly an understanding amongst the conscriptionists that, 
even under the voluntary system, men would be sent on indefinite leave after a few 
months of training, rendering them no more effective than men would be under the 
system of personal service, and ensuring that there were now fewer of them too. 
A discussion of the figures ought to have given a clear indication that unless the 
Government was prepared to significantly increase the military budget, which 
traditionally it had been reluctant to do, voluntary recruitment would be an abject 
failure. There was a somewhat ambitious belief that Belgium would be able to 
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implement the system on a British financial scale without breaking the bank.243 
However, given that Britain spent an average of 27.43 francs per head of population for 
her army and Belgium spent a mere eight ± a full 2.80 francs under the national average 
spent annually by each Belgian on alcoholic beverages ± it would require a sizeable 
monetary input to bring the establishment and quality of the force up to a meaningful 
standard.244 The overall increase to the budget was supposed to be in the region of 
34,000,000 francs, though, to bring it up to the British levels, it would require an 
enormous input of 200,000,000 francs.245 The majority of the budget would naturally 
be to cover the increase in pay to attract men to the force. Some disagreed with these 
figures, stating that it would only require an increase of 7,600,000 francs but that 
5,500,000 of that could be saved through reducing the number of administrative staff 
in the army. Belgium employed one administrator for every 228 men in the army, whilst 
Germany, for example, was functioning effectively with a proportion of one 
administrator for every 598 men.246 Nonetheless, it appeared to be an incredible 
investment into a system that had served Britain well for centuries though through 
performing a completely different role to the one envisioned for Belgium. Additionally, 
on the most recent occasion when it had been called into DFWLRQ %ULWDLQ¶V PLOLWDU\
organisation had been found to be severely wanting in the form of an inadequate 
reserve. This, for a continental army seeking to move rapidly from a peace to a war-
footing and delay one of two European giants long enough to receive aid from a 
relieving force, was surely not the answer. 
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The more reasonable proposition was that put forward by the military presence 
on the committee, namely the immediate implementation of personal and obligatory 
military service. The proposal included raising the annual contingent to 18,000 men in 
a bid to achieve a wartime establishment of 180,000, which was deemed both a realistic 
and necessary target by Major Victor Ducarne.247 Even some of the Catholic members 
of the committee began to subscribe to the idea. The Count de Mérode Westerloo, for 
example, stated that he would support personal service on the condition that the law 
exempted all members of the clergy and teachers.248 Even before such declarations by 
prominent Catholic members, the current of opinion was certainly running in favour of 
the conscriptionists, which prompted the trio of Woeste, Helleputte and Delbeke to 
attempt to save face and leave the 1901 Commission before it officially endorsed a 
policy with which they could not be associated. In a letter to the Minister of War on 20 
February 1901 they stated that they would not take any responsibility for the 
FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH FRPPLWWHH¶V LPSHQGLQJ GHFLVLRQ249 Worse still, constant 
haranguing by Woeste and others meant that the Government ignored the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V ILQDO YHUGLFW DQGSURSRVDOV DQG LQVWHDGZHQW DKHDG DQG LPSOHPHQWHG
voluntary recruitment, which aimed to provide a paltry 30,000 strong peacetime force 
to be supplemented by an annual levy if necessary, whilst enrolling all 18 to 30 year 
olds in the Civic Guard. Woeste had had a heavy hand in this by personally striking a 
GHDOZLWKWKH$QWZHUSDVVRFLDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHILQHUGHWDLOVRIYROXQWDU\HQOLVWPHQW¶V
implementation, which was later codified into law and accepted by the Chamber of 
Representatives on 24 January and the Senate on 20 March 1902.250  
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This naturally prompted immediate reaction, particularly from the military 
sphere. La Belgique Militaire noted a week later, 
The Military Law voted by the Chamber of Representatives is a party-
political endeavour, an attack against the army. Four words suffice to 
FKDUDFWHULVHLW7KH$QWZHUS0HHWLQJHUV$SSURYH7KHQDWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVWVDUH
cynically being sacrificed by a party, who, to have any chance of retaining 
power, has judged it necessary to present itself en bloc before its voters ahead 
of next May.251 
7KHIDFWWKDWWKHDUWLFOHLWVHOIZDVHQWLWOHGµ7KH$UP\6DFULILFHGWRWKH,QWHUHVWVRID
3DUW\¶LVDFOHDUGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIKRZVLFNHQLQJ&DWKROLFPLOLWDU\SROLF\KDGEHFRPH
to the army who felt compelled to elucidate just how systematically their attempts at 
reform had been undermined since 1870. Civil-military relations were at their most 
strained from 1902 onwards and the army had become the Catholic and 0HHWLQJHUV¶ 
casualty. 
The modified recruiting system, no longer faced with being seen as a burden on 
society, was able to lengthen its terms of engagement without arousing public 
consternation. Eight years with the colours and five in the reserve on decent pay and 
with a promise of a pensionable job upon completion of service was, according to the 
authorities, supposed to be an irresistible draw to the armed forces. As it was, it proved 
to be an abject failure. This was partly a result of the aforementioned increase in public 
wealth, which meant that military pay rates remained uncompetitive, but also due to a 
culture of anti-militarism of seventy years in the making.252 Volunteers, as had been the 
case in the 1830-1902 period, proved difficult to come by but the implementation of 
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the new system was certainly not helped by the lack of enthusiasm shown by the army 
itself. Indeed, accusations of purposeful ill will were circulating.253 Reports were 
emanating from local districts that military authorities were doing everything in their 
power to prevent volunteers from enrolling. In Gent, for example, around eighty men 
were turned away for one reason or another, whilst those who enlisted after 10 October 
were being forced to wait an entire year to be incorporated with the next intake.254 In 
addition, wastage rates, which had been projected by some to amount to 5,507 men 
over the full 42,800-strength establishment, were proving to be correct. Generals 
0DUFKDO DQG %RsO QRWHG UHVSHFWLYHO\ WKDW µ,Q FHUWDLQ UHJLPHQWV ZH DUH XQDEOH WR
constitute a presentable company, let alone a battalion¶DQGµWKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKHFDYDOU\
LVPRVWVHULRXV¶255 Foreign commentators also noted the detrimental effects that the 
period of voluntary recruiting had on the army. Upon observing the 1909 manoeuvres, 
Captain Drury, the )UHQFK0LOLWDU\$WWDFKpWR%UXVVHOVQRWHGWKDWµ7KHDUP\LVQRWDW
the height of the role events may oblige it play...if not innocuous, it can certainly be 
VDLG WREHRI OLWWOHGDQJHU WRDQ LQYDGHU¶256 Skeletal units and growing international 
tension stimulated renewed campaigns against the voluntary system in favour of 
conscription, despite arguments that the reaction was premature. 
A large part of the expected success of the 1902 Law lay in the estimated 
desirability for the new professional soldier to re-engage beyond his first term of 
service. Given that re-engagements had already been relatively common among 
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volunteers under the ballot system, albeit with exceptionally limited numbers, it was 
not an improbable assumption that the increased number of them, who were now better 
paid, would seek to follow suit. It was quite rightly suggested, therefore, not to judge 
the system until at least 1910 in order to fairly assess how well the system matured.257 
This would allow the first batch of re-engagements to occur, which year on year would 
add strength in numbers to the annual intake of new volunteers. Yet, cracks began to 
appear beforehand that could not be ignored. Simply not enough volunteers were 
coming forward in the first instance, which all but made the debate over re-engagements 
irrelevant. It was being reported that proponents of the scheme in Parliament were well 
aware of the deficiencies emerging from early recruitment figures and were pressuring 
provincial committees to over-ULGHUHJLPHQWDOGRFWRUV¶decisions not to admit certain 
men on medical grounds in order to raise, albeit falsely, the number of volunteers 
joining the army.258 With such things happening it was plainly obvious that the 
experiment had not worked. Waiting for 1910 for the system to develop would have 
been a severe miscalculation of the threat posed by the international situation. To the 
delight of the conscriptionists, the inherently anti-militaristic society began to take note, 
as did some influential people in government. 
François Schollaert succeeded Jules de Trooz as Prime Minister and leader of 
WKH &DWKROLF 3DUW\ IROORZLQJ WKH ODWWHU¶V GHDWK LQ 'HFHPEHU  +H LPPHGLDWHO\
solicited a review of the 1902 Law under the pretext of an agreement he had made with 
de Trooz to eventually be allowed to do this, which given the circumstances, was 
brought forward immediately. As Woeste noted in his memoirs, this was a dangerous 
move as the party was largely divided over the issue and could ill afford another rift in 
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the midst of continuous erosion of their majority in the Chamber of Representatives.259 
A commission was set up in 1908 to look into the 1902 Law. All that it found was a 
slight decline in the peacetime effective strength, which had fallen from a desired 
42,000 to 35,200 men; though this was seen as easily remedied.260 Schollaert called the 
members of the right together to discuss the military question. Some were in favour of 
personal service; others merely called for the abolition of replacement. For the most 
part though, they were keeQWRPRGLI\WKH/DZ7KHSURSRVDOSXWIRUZDUGRIµRQH
PDQ RQH IDPLO\¶ LQVSLUHG E\ D IDLOHG QHZVSDSHU FDPSDLJQ UXQ E\ Le Bien Public 
appeared to grab both Schollaert and his Minister of War, Joseph Hellebaut. Both laid 
claim to the idea, which purported to rid recruitment of the injustices of replacement by 
calling on every family to contribute towards what would become an increased 
establishment on a short-service basis.261 )URP6FKROODHUW¶VSRLQWRIYLHZLWZDVDJRRG
opportunity to distance himself from the 1902 Law, which he inherently disliked, whilst 
it provided Hellebaut, as a military man, to drive forward the cause of the 
conscriptionist lobby that had been ignored for too long.  
Opposition from within the Catholic Party immediately emerged, largely as a 
result of the proposal to abolish replacement once more. How, it was argued, could 
equality be assured if families with only one son were compelled to supply the entirety 
of their working hands to the army, whilst other families with two, three or more 
children would escape with losing but a mere proportion?262 Replacement had to stay 
in order to redress this imbalance. However, Schollaert was keen to make this project 
one of general service, which by the very nature of its totality would not permit 
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replacement to occur. Indeed, he even wanted to avoid having to set an annual quota 
for the contingent, hoping instead to exponentially feed off the fluctuations in the 
FRXQWU\¶VGHPRJUDSKLFV7KLVZDVGHHPHGXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGZDVEORFNHGGHVSLWH
the obvious need to bring the army up to strength. Projections for the 1910 contingent 
demonstrated that, despite having nominally 65,000 men of military age eligible, only 
27,000 of these were eldest sons and liable to be called up under the new law. With 
exemption rates predicted to climb, the total number of men expected for incorporation 
was only 15,700, which was not significantly higher than it had been under the ballot 
system.263  
In a bid to raise the prospective number of recruits, studies were undertaken to 
determine how many men could be made eligible for service by reducing the minimum 
KHLJKWUHVWULFWLRQVIRUWKHLQIDQWU\IURPFHQWLPHWUHV´¶WR7KLVZDVLQVSLWH
of a general increase in the average height of recruits rising from 164 centimetres in the 
1850s to 166 centimetres by 1900. Interestingly, the highest number of exemptions  for 
failing to meet height requirements during this period hailed from East Flanders 
(16.28%), demonstrating the lasting effects of the 1846 famine on its youth in the 
ensuing decades. In general, though, the average weight of recruits similarly rose from 
57.95 kilograms to 59.81 kilograms during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
which correlated with the general increase in wealth among the population. With an 
increased emphasis on the physical development within the army, such increases were 
clearly welcomed. However, the pressures of obtaining a suitable wartime 
establishment to provide a strong deterrent to its neighbours, forced a minor 
compromise on standards. Even though the result of reducing the minimum height by 
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a single centimetre would produce an average gain of approximately 400 men per year, 
the necessity to swell the ranks of the army made such gains seem worthwhile.264  
With future recruitment figures demonstrating the potential difficulties at 
generating a large enough army for the requirements of the current international 
situation, general conscription without faculty for replacement was deemed a necessity 
and required Schollaert to garner support from across the political divide in order to 
JXDUDQWHHWKH%LOO¶VVDIHSDVVDJHWKURXJKWKH&KDPEHU,WZDVDSHUVRQDOYLFWRU\IRUWKH
Premier and his associates, as well as for the army, though it once again demonstrated 
the influence of politics, and particularly the extremist Catholic wing of the party, in 
military affairs that almost prevented this momentous step towards conscription proper 
to take place. 
Famously, Leopold II signed the law introducing conscription, in the form of 
one son per family, on his deathbed in December 1909. It was to be his last official 
ratification and was somewhat fitting that it should have been this particular piece of 
legislation about which he felt so strongly and had campaigned, along with his generals, 
for so long. Schollaert was hailed by a multitude of supporters from around the country 
as a courageous nationalist, patriotic in every sense of the word, for having stuck to his 
convictions in the face of such adversity and finally, through his endeavour and 
relenWOHVVHQHUJ\WRKDYHGHOLYHUHGSHUVRQDOVHUYLFHµ9LYHOHVHUYLFHSHUVRQQHO¶HQGHG
one telegram of congratulations from the NCOs Veterans Society of Namur, whilst his 
IULHQGVLQ/pDXZHUHNHHQWRH[SUHVVWKHLUJUDWLWXGHIRUWKLVYHU\µQDWLRQDO¶GHHG265 One 
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letter of congratulations came from a factory owner and elector of three votes under the 
new plural system, which read: 
You have rendered the Catholic Party a great service and as a result, 
\RXUQDPHZLOOUHPDLQLQJUDLQHGLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\IRUKDYLng dared to 
accomplish a just and necessary reform that was desired by the people and 
which will honour the Catholic Party and the entire country.266 
Reaction from within the party itself was not as sympathetic and was still 
influenced by the fear that the majority of their electoral base would not back the 
decision. A few weeks prior to its ratification, the National Catholic League for the 
Reduction of Military Charges and the Extension of Volunteerism made a plea to all 
Catholics to join together to fight this evil, which they claimed was not only unjust but 
also unconstitutional. This association, with a membership of over 12,000, believed that 
it would only increase costs as well as personal charges. Members argued that forcing 
the eldest son of each family to take the heaviest of burdens was unfair, and questioned 
ZKHWKHUWKHEDOORWZDVQRWPRUHHTXLWDEOHµ)RUXVWKHRQO\V\VWHPVKHOWHUHGIURPDOO
criticism, the only one that conforms to the Catholic programme, is the abolition of any 
military constrainW WKDW LV WR VD\ µYROXQWHHULVP¶ 1,(0$1' *(':21*(1
62/'$$7¶QR-one forced to soldier) was their call.267 This inference of a lack of 
unity within the party was also a bone of contention among extremist Catholics over 
whose heads, and against whose interests, Schollaert had acted. One irate letter sent in 
February 1910 exclaimed, 
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It is because you promised to work towards the union [of the Party] that they 
placed their confidence in you. You have betrayed this confidence completely. 
You scorned the advice of a selfless politician in order to follow that of two 
upstarts. You are responsible for the greatest misfortune that can hit a Party: 
interfering with its unity.268 
This brought into question the legitimacy of his continued leadership. Indeed, the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHLUDFWLRQVXOWLPDWHO\OHGWRERWK6FKROODHUWDQG+HOOHEDXW¶VIDOOIURP
office, albeit having rendered the country a great service in many eyes. It was left to 
the eminent Charles de Broqueville to undertake both roles and lead the Catholic Party 
beyond its divisions and the nation through the Great War. 
 Despite claims that the 1909 Law was supplying the army with enough men, 
having seen the annual contingent rise from 10,892 in 1904, to 14,892 in 1910 and even 
up to 19,083 in 1912, the situation described by serving officers in garrisons around the 
country was completely different.269 Fears that the wartime establishment would be 
severely depleted if the peacetime figure did not reach that of 45,500 men proposed by 
the 1901 Commission, were proving correct after Hellebaut contented himself with 
maintaining it at just 42,800. Projections for full-scale mobilisation revealed a large 
deficit to the tune of 44,000 men in total and would see fortress artillery companies, for 
example, reduced to a mere 500-600 men as opposed to the 1,060 nominally required.270 
Notwithstanding the numerical issues, the qualitative aspect of military efficiency was 
questionable as well, following the decision to reduce the time spent under arms to a 
mere fifteen months. Similarly, both the 1911 and 1912 grand manoeuvres were 
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cancelled, depriving the army of the all-important experience of large formation 
training.271 µ$VVXFKWKLV0LQLVWHULQQRWRSSRVLQJZLWKDOOKLVPLJKWWKHLQVFULSWLRQ
RIPHQLQWKH/DZKDVIDLOHGLQKLVGXWLHV¶ZDVWKHVHQWLPHQWHFKRHGE\WKH
majority of the army.272 A heightened sense of urgency following the Agadir crisis and 
the ensuing press campaign run by Le Soir XQGHU WKH KHDGLQJ RI µ$UH :H 5HDG\"¶
SURGXFHG D VHYHUH VFUXWLQ\ RI +HOOHEDXW¶V SROLFLHV DQG DSSDUHQW DSDWK\ WRZDUGV
building upon his 1909 project from all angles; even the clerical elements of 
government began to look towards general service as a result.273 From national hero to 
µPHGLRFUHDGPLQLVWUDWRU¶LQWKHVSDFHRIWZR\HDUVWKH0LQLVWHURI:DUVRRQEHFDPH
the conduit through which militaristic criticism flowed as a result of newly uncovered 
deficiencies in the armed forces. Had European tensions not been running as high as 
they were, and the awakening of Belgian militarism not occurred as a result of the 
perceived threat of imminent invasion, it is more than likely that Hellebaut would have 
been permitted to retain his post and allow the 1909 Law to mature. As it was, the army 
FDOOHG IRUKLVKHDGRQJURXQGVRI LQFRPSHWHQFHFODLPLQJ WKDWKHKDG µEHWUD\HG WKH
KRSHV RI WKH DUP\ HQWUXVWHG WR KLP¶274 This prompted Albert Collon to implore 
Helleputte to see to KLVFROOHDJXH¶VUHVLJQDWLRQIRUWKHJRRGRIWKHFRXQWU\DQGQDWLRQDO
defence, regardless of the close personal friendship the two had developed during their 
work in realising the 1909 recruitment system reform.275 
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 Hellebaut resigned his post in November 1912 and was succeeded by De 
Broqueville, who had taken over the Premiership from Schollaert a year and a half 
earlier. Officers throughout the army were said to have rejoiced at the news and 
expected the new Minister of War to guide the army and the nation through the next 
series of vital military reforms necessary to repair the damage caused over the past 
decade, despite previous expressions of doubt over their necessity.276 De Broqueville 
proposed to broaden conscription to general service with a view to recruiting 33,000-
35,000 men annually to create a force of 340,000 men by 1925. Although initially 
opposed by large sections of the Catholic Party, de Broqueville managed to guide the 
Bill through the Chamber of Representatives on 28 May 1913 by 103 votes to 62, and 
three weeks later through the Senate by 68 votes to 27. Much like Schollaert in 1909, 
the new Premier was hailed as a national hero for remaining strong in the face of 
adversity and delivering not only the long awaited introduction of personal, obligatory 
and general service, but also for not reducing the time spent under arms any further.277 
There had been calls to lower it from the already inadequate 15 months to 12, with the 
Socialists even proposing to raise the annual levy to 50,000 in return for just six months 
with the colours.278 Nevertheless, such support from the Chamber, and particularly from 
within the Catholic Party, did not come without some form of corollary. Indeed, the 
guaranteed safe passage of the new law required mollifying it with linguistic and 
political equalities amongst officers as well as revisiting the question of regional 
recruitment to compensate for the increased numbers and proportion of Flemish 
soldiers expected to pass through the ranks. 
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As previously noted, regional recruitment had re-appeared during the mid-
1880s under the stewardship of the Minister of War, Pontus. His proposals were 
allegedly an attempt at reorganising the army to speed up mobilisation in the event of 
war, a sound endeavour that was supported by many, and not an attempt to appease the 
mounting pressure being exerted on the Government and the army to recognise 
emerging Flemish regionalism and uniformity of language.279 It prompted a debate in 
which all political factions attempted to exploit the situation to their own advantage. 
7KH6RFLDOLVW*HRUJHV/RDUDQGZDVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJµ:HZDQWUHJLRQDOUHFUXLWPHQW
which will assure a faster mobilisation than our present system and that will have the 
DGGHGDGYDQWDJHRIKDYLQJRIILFHUVXQGHUVWRRGE\WKHLUPHQ¶280 What he really meant 
was that he supported the view of having men stationed near their homes and out of the 
barracks as much as possible, as prescribed in his failed nation in arms concept. 
Equally, the Flamingants FRQWULEXWHG E\ VWDWLQJ µ+HUH ZH ZDQW QR more Walloon 
PDJLVWUDWHVQRU:DOORRQRIILFLDOVQRU:DOORRQRIILFHUV¶281 This thrust straight at the 
heart of the issue that had become increasingly important on the political agenda of the 
extremist Catholics by the eve of the First World War. 
 It boiled down to a recognition by the State that it was losing, if not already had 
lost, the battle of regionalism over nationalism; an elongated narrative in which the 
army had largely failed in its task. National recruiting under the ballot, voluntary and 
one-son per family systems had largely failed to break familial or regional ties on a 
large enough scale to truly inculcate a wider sense of national identity into the young 
PHQWKDWSDVVHGWKURXJKWKHDUP\¶VUDQNV7KHDUP\DVWKHµVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶KDG
failed in its ploy to use language as a central pillar around which unity could be formed 
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and if anything managed to further polarise the two linguistic communities. It 
threatened to strike a crushing blow to the idea of developing nationhood in a country 
that had long struggled to form a single identity. By instituting regional recruitment, 
the Government was admitting defeat in its attempted use of the army as a tool of 
nation-building, rather contenting itself with accepting multiple strands of identity 
within a single national institution. It was, according to La Meuse, the end of the nation 
as it had been known; 
In effect, in a country where there is a veritable national unity, 
geographic unity, and moral unity, regional recruitment already presents 
certain difficulties, because there is a need for a sense of µODJUDQGHSDWULH¶ in 
the army, and regionalism makes the feeling of µODSHWLWHSDWULH¶, that is to say 
the province where each soldier has his familial roots, prevail. In Belgium, such 
a system would be even more dangerous: regional recruitment would see the 
creation of a Flemish army and a Walloon army; it would be military separation 
of Northern and Southern provinces, before the administrative and political 
separation.282 
This was, perhaps, somewhat of an exaggeration. However, the ability of the army to 
function under the pretext of parallel conceptions of what it meant to be Belgian cannot 
be discarded. Calls for absolute separation of the provinces was practically non-existent 
but recognition of a fully-fledged Flemish community within its own territory as part of 
a wider Belgian nation was apparent by 1914.283 Regional recruitment did not weaken 
the desire of all to fight for King and country, it merely recognised the emergence of 
different conceptions of Belgian nationality. 
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 When introduced, regional recruitment was not a perfectly refined system and 
still saw a number of regiments recruit from multiple regions. The cavalry for instance 
was deliberately left to recruit nationally, incorporating precisely 7.11% of each 
UHJLRQ¶V OHY\ LQRUGHU WREH DVVXUHGRIREWDLQLQJ WKHEHVW SRVVLEOH UHFUXLWV%URDGO\
defined, however, the infantry were to recruit from a single region with recourse to 
neighbouring regions of the same language. This was on account of regiments not 
having their roots in the local communities such as in Britain, for instance, rather having 
always been nomadic in their garrison duties for the best part of eight decades. As much 
as possible, regiments based in large urban centres such as Antwerp, Brussels, 
Charleroi, Liège and Namur were to recruit men from the surrounding area. This 
resulted in a number of regiments becoming entirely exclusive of some provinces. For 
example, not a single man from Limbourg, Luxembourg and Namur was furnished for 
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Line Regiments, whilst the above three provinces as well 
as Antwerp and Liège equally did not supply a single man to the three regiments of 
Chasseurs à Pied.284 Similarly, 43.2% of men from West Flanders were sent to the 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th Line Regiments, garrisoned in Gent, Oostende and Bruges and 37.1% to the 
three Chasseurs à Pied regiments, the Grenadiers and the Carabiniers. This meant that 
RI:HVW)ODQGHUV¶PDQSRZHUFRQWULEXWLRQZDVGHVWLQHGIRUWKHLQIDQWU\SXUHO\
as a result RIWKHJHRJUDSKLFDOORFDWLRQRIFHUWDLQUHJLPHQWV¶GHSRWVDWWKHWLPHRIWKH
V\VWHP¶VLQWURGXFWLRQ&RQWUDULO\1DPXUZRXOGRQO\VHHRILWVPHQGHWDLOHG
for this arm, spread across the 8th, 9th, 10th and 13th Line Regiments as well as the 
Grenadiers. 285 As such, it is evident that the rudimentary principles of regional 
recruitment were in place, though the coming of war a year after its implementation 
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would prevent it from reaching its full effect. As such, few conclusions can be drawn 
as to its long-term influence on the widening regional rift in pre-war Belgium. What it 
does demonstrate, however, is the power of the political lobby, particularly the 
Meetingers and extremist Catholics, in moulding military reform to fit their policies. 
Naturally, general service did not meet their wishes, but to have the blow softened by 
linguistic laws and regional recruitment is testament to their continued influence within 
the machinery of Government. 
  
From the moment Belgium gained its independence in 1830, the army struggled 
to balance the multi-faceted mantle of being an efficient military force, as well as an 
institution embodying the social ideals and national identity of the Kingdom. The ballot 
system upon which its recruitment was based for over 70 years was the chief reason 
behind its failure to satisfactorily achieve any of the above. Yet its prolongation 
stemmed chiefly from the political battle between the Catholics and Liberals who feared 
alienating a deeply anti-militaristic society and electorate. Initially the wealthy, but 
increasingly the petit bourgeoisie, were able to buy their way out of military service 
WKURXJKUHSODFHPHQWDQGOHDYHWKHEXUGHQRIWKHµEORRGWD[¶WRWKHOHVVIRUWXQDWH7KLV
deprived the army of its best recruits while simultaneously breeding an environment of 
hostility towards reform that might reverse the comfortable situation the minority had 
inherited. Not until mobilisation in 1870 were the deficiencies of the system truly 
exposed, thought it took until the social unrest of the mid-1880s to initiate a current of 
reform that ultimately led to the changes of the twentieth century. 
'HVSLWHSURSRVDOVIURPWKHHPHUJLQJ/HIWWRFUHDWHDµQDWLRQLQDUPV¶PLOLWLD
which would see the burden of military service spread equally across the population, 
albeit for just six months, opinion was firmly moving towards conscription without 
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faculty for replacement. In both cases, the right to vote was seen as the corollary for 
military service in an unwritten social contract between the individual and the State. 
<HWIXUWKHUSROLWLFDOLQWHUIHUHQFHUHMHFWHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUWDQGRSWHGIRU
the introduction of a less burdensome, but more militarily ineffective, voluntary 
recruitment system that left the army dangerously short of men. The fallout resulted in 
dividing the Catholic Party, whose leaders were convinced enough of the dangers of 
the European situation to solicit discussions about conscription, which went against 
decades¶ worth of military policy and electoral promises. The result was a one son per 
family system, introduced in 1909 that proved to be the stepping-stone to full 
conscription in 1913. While it finally rid the country of a heinous social injustice that 
brought the army further into line with its liberal ideals, it was arguably too late. The 
nation that was supposed to be unified through this institution had seen its linguistic, 
geographical and cultural division widen over the preceding half century. National 
recruitment, which remained in force until 1913, had not successfully broken the 
regional and familial bonds of the individual, who remained wedded to a different 
concept of identification to the nation than his fellow soldier. This admission, 
exemplified through the introduction of regional recruitment, was seen in as quarters as 
KDYLQJDµGHSORUDEOHLQIOXHQFH>«@LQDFRXQWU\LQVXFKJUHDWQHHGRIIXVLRQVXFKDV
RXU RZQ¶286 Certainly, while the army might be shown to have failed in this task, 
arguably the greater negative effect was caused by the political wrangling that delayed 
vital reforms before it was too late. Ultimately, the army that went to war in 1914 did 
so with pride, albeit in too few numbers to significantly make a difference.  
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Chapter 3 - The School of the Nation 
 
 Regardless of the debates surrounding its changeable organisation, efficiency 
and role, the army remained a constant in the lives of the population who were under 
obligation to fill its ranks on an annual basis.  Families across the country were 
compelled to give up the youth of the nation to the state whilst at the peak of 
productivity, in order to defend a concept of neutrality that was already safeguarded by 
the 1839 Treaty of London. Independence and internal law and order were only 
intermittently threatened prior to 1914 by a flurry of activity in 1848 and the rise of 
socialism in the 1880s, creating a situation whereby local interests were seemingly 
being supplanted by a non-existent national emergency. The burden of military service, 
therefore, often felt disproportionate to the impact it had on those directly and indirectly 
affected, developing - or rather, continuing ± an entrenched anti-militarism that 
pervaded Belgian society. To assimilate these conflicting views, it was imperative that 
the army play a more socially constructive role than merely provide a force for national 
defence. In essence, as an institution through which a large proportion of the population 
ZRXOGSDVV WKHDUP\ZDVWREHDµVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶287 It established a veritable 
unwritten social contract between localities and State, demanding an acceptance of 
citizenly duty from the former in return for assurances that they would be well cared 
for, and even returned better prepared to resume civilian life. More importantly for the 
State, in a similar vein to Revolutionary France, it provided an opportunity to foster a 
more uniform sense of national identity by breaking local and regional bonds among 
the youthful body that passed through the ranks.288 Whilst the population could do little 




 )RUUHVWµLa patrie¶ pp. 25-30. 
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to avoid the charge of annual levies, the State certainly defaulted on a number of its 
duties in this reciprocal relationship.   
 Despite being in the interests of the army to educate, moralise and protect the 
men entrusted to it for the sake of discipline and efficiency, insufficient care was taken 
to promote adequate facilities in which satisfactory results could be achieved. Indeed, 
barrack conditions were deplorable to the extent of incapacitating a significant 
proportion of men through disease, and in extreme cases, caused a number of deaths. 
This was made all the more probable through the interaction of the innocent with the 
malicious elements in the barracks who encouraged the defacing of moral values and 
discipline to the point of ruining many a future prospect. Spiritual guidance to counter 
this was demanded by parents as well as the Catholic Party, though opposition from the 
Liberals consistently sought to limit religious influence in the army. A perceived lack 
of education as a result of clerical schooling in Flanders initiated a debate into the root-
FDXVHVRILQGLVFLSOLQHZKLFKGUHZUHQHZHGIRFXVRQWKHDXWKRULWLHV¶IDLOLQJs. Not only 
were there accusations of linguistic discrimination, which did little to demonstrate that 
a national identity was being established, but also reports of arbitrary and often 
GHJUDGLQJSXQLVKPHQWV VDW XQHDVLO\ZLWK WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶ concept of 
GLVFLSOLQH VSUHDGLQJ DFURVV (XURSH LQ WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ ,Q %HOJLXP¶V FDVH
specifically, severe discipline in a balloted army did not endear military service to the 
SRSXODWLRQ ZKR EHFDPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLVLOOXVLRQHG ZLWK WKH 6WDWH¶V DSSDUHQt 
unwillingness to adhere to its side of the bargain, which ultimately distanced the army 
from society to detrimental effect.  
 
Prior to the Law of 27 June 1875, when the State took monetary control and 
responsibility for the lodging of its troops, the burden of billeting men was placed 
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squarely on a small number of communities around the country. At their own expense, 
towns and villages had to provide beds for soldiers passing through from garrison to 
garrison, or in the case of Beverloo, provide additional accommodation on an annual 
basis during camp. The fear of standing armies as the foundations of despotism had 
long been felt throughout Belgium and meant that the charge of providing rooms in 
private houses or communal buildings was all the more unwelcome. The people in the 
Beverloo area, for example, petitioned the Government for decades to have the 
encumbrance lifted as the army was always in search of billets during the harvest 
season, creating an inconvenience that went above and beyond what ought to have been 
expected of a community.289 There were those who argued that the populations of these 
barrack towns reaped the economic rewards of having soldiers staying in the vicinity, 
though it was pointed out that not all towns shared this burden and even if they 
renounced the benefits they could not escape the charge.290 Whilst noting that the 
contracts between the State and the municipal authorities only granted minor 
indemnities for their troubles, it is easy to see how towns lost interest in the situation 
and allowed many of their barrack buildings to fall into a deplorable state of disrepair. 
At the same time as Sidney Herbert presided over a commission examining the 
state of hygiene in British barracks in 1859-60, the results of a similar inquiry in 
Belgium by the High Council of Hygiene found that it was generally in large cities that 
the worst lodgings were found.291 In fact, two barracks, a hospital and the École 
Militaire in Brussels left so much to be desired hygienically that they were 
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recommended for demolition with a view to having them re-established elsewhere.292 
Not only would this be beneficial for the soldiers who inhabited them but it would also 
spark a partial redevelopment of the city through cleaning up residential areas and 
creating the space for improved road networks. In this way, the army could heavily 
impact upon the cultural phenomenon of urban regeneration. Further reports of 
degenerative barrack conditions from other areas of the country were also brought to 
the attention of the public. Disgust was expressed at the seeming impossibility of the 
Government taking control of the situation and instituting a large-scale modernising 
project for the benefit of the balloted men whom the nation was entrusting to the State. 
Damning indictments of the situation compared barrack conditions to civilian prisons, 
claiming that if a traveller visited any city in Belgium and looked upon a grand edifice, 
his immediate thought would be that it must be the latter when it ought to have been 
the former.293  
 These proposed regeneration projects were not always followed through or took 
PDQ\\HDUVWRFRPSOHWH(YHQIROORZLQJWKH6WDWH¶VUHFODLPLQJRIDOOORFDOEDUUDFNVLQ
1875, steps towards improving conditions were far from adequate, despite a proposed 
total investment of 50,000,000 francs. One newspaper correspondent in Namur 
GHVFULEHGWKHEDUUDFNVWKHUHDVµILOWK\DQGGLODSLGDWHG7KH\DUHEXWVPDOOURRPVZLWK
low ceilings and miniscule windows, most of them lacking roof tiles. Like us, the 
officers are indignant about the state of affairs and declare that it is an act of inhumanity 
WRFUDPLQWRWKHVHKROHVKXQGUHGVRIEUDYHPHQ¶294 Despite respecting this social duty 
WRLPSURYHFRQGLWLRQVDQGµWUHDWWKHFKLOGUHQRIWKHSHRSOHDVZHZRXOGOLNHRXr own 
FKLOGUHQWREHWUHDWHG¶DVRQHPHPEHURIWKH&KDPEHUSXW LW LQWHQVHVFUXWLQ\RIWKH
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finances was not unexpected.295 Each new building was supposed to cost 900 francs per 
infantryman, 1,200 francs per cavalryman and his horse, and 1,500 for an artilleryman, 
his horse and equipment. However, concerns were raised that these figures were being 
surpassed through extravagances, prompting a Representative to accurately note that:  
Clearly, the common soldier does not care about the artistic shaping of 
the pediments, the porticos, or the windows of the barracks; he is less than 
moderately interested by the festoons and the astragali, or the other 
architectural ornaments. When a soldier enters into the barracks, his most 
pressing concern is simply to know when he gets to leave.296 
This theory was later borne out by the fact that the Government was forced to vote 
further credits in 1895 to improve the still substandard hygienic conditions found in a 
number of military establishments. 
An examination of the Ministry RIWKH,QWHULRU¶VVWDWLVWLFVFRQFHUQLQJWKHVWDWH
of health of the army clearly reveals the difficulties faced by the authorities to gain 
control of the hygienic issues dominating barrack life. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the slow 
rise in cases admitted to military hospitals over the latter half of the century, despite 
having made improvements following demobilisation after the Franco-Prussian War. 
Notable reductions in fevers and venereal disease were counter-balanced with increases 
of almost 100% in injuries and ophthalmic infections over the same period of time. This 
resulted in a net increase in hospital admissions by 2,905 over the five decades 
examined and by 8,318 from its lowest point in 1873. However, this latter point can 
largely be explained by the increases in the annual contingent from 1869 taken to 
12,000 and then again in 1885 raised to 13,300, which took ten years to fully make their 
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Figure. 3.1. Number of annual hospital admissions in the army, 1851-1900.297 
 
 
respective marks on the overall establishment. The peak in admissions witnessed 
between 1870 and 1872 are a natural result of having the army mobilised and on 
campaign, providing an unusual set of circumstances for which it was neither used nor 
prepared. Cholera is conspicuous by its absence, barring the exceptional outbreak in 
1866/67, though an examination of correspondence between the Inspector General of 
the Medical Service and the Minister of War in the 1840s and 1850s suggests that this 
was not always the case. Between July 1848 and September 1851, for example, 1,060 
cases, resulting in 400 deaths, were reported across 19 garrisons.298 This was generally 
caused, like many other diseases, by the severe overcrowding of barracks. They were 
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regretfully unsanitary establishments that added further health risks to what was already 
seen as a deplorable occupation by most.299  
 Despite the general increase in the number of hospital admissions over this 
period, the total numbers of days in treatment declined with improvements in medical 
practice that, to some degree, masked many of the glaring hygienic problems that still 
plagued the army. The same Ministry of the Interior data demonstrated that illnesses 
were cured more rapidly by the end of the century than in the 1860s, with days lost to 
the hospital for fevers reducing by 47.13%, ophthalmia by 61.74% and venereal disease 
by 65.65%. Notwithstanding, patients were out of action for 17.44% longer when it 
came to physical injuries. However, a more accurate means of judging the effect of 
these diseases on the army is by looking at the average number of days of treatment per 
case admitted as detailed in Figure 3.2. This gives a much clearer indication of the 
initial difficulties faced by regimental doctors when tackling ophthalmia as well as the 
perennial problem of venereal disease. 
 Simply by analysing WKH0LQLVWU\RIWKH,QWHULRU¶VYROXPHVRQQDWLRQDOVWDWLVWLFV
published roughly every decade, it is clear to see that the authorities were both 
fascinated and afraid of blindness and deafness in equal measure, meticulously noting 
down figures relating to them. It is no wonder then that eye infections, specifically 
ophthalmia, were at the centre of much discussion and scientific attention in the army. 
This was a particularly pressing issue given that this disease - contracted from humid 
conditions or exposure to sudden temperature changes ± caused men to be out of action 
for the highest average number of days of any ailment present in the army. In severe 
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cases, it even led to the loss of sight in one or both eyes, forcing some to leave the 
service altogether. The contagious nature of the infection, spread through the sharing 
of linens and handtowels, often ravaged entire garrisons claiming hundreds of men at a 
time. A report from the CO of the 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval to the Minister of War in 
November 1855 noted how the garrison at Mons had witnessed an outbreak of 15 cases, 
which three days later had infected 46 men in total.300 Even more striking were the 
reports coming from the Lieutenant Colonel of the 1st Lancers in 1857 whose report 
described that, within days of the outbreak, 135 men had contracted the disease, leaving 
91 completely out of action.301 Wastage rates of this magnitude were unacceptable and 
spurred the military authorities into seeking external help to rid the army of the disease. 
 Dr Leroy-Delchef was one such physician whom the army entrusted with 
finding a cure as early as 1833 after he had written to the Minister of War claiming to 
have used an ointment on civilian sufferers to great effect. He was granted permission 
to test his treatment on four soldiers with the disease in the Liège hospital, though the 
experiment was halted after 19 days of observation due to the severe worsening of the 
SDWLHQWV¶FRQGLWLRQV302 Part of the problem lay in the fact that there was an educational 
void resulting from very few studies on the workings of the eye, save for a solitary 
volume by the German physician Dr Weller. Even this was incomplete and pending a 
second volume, which many urged the Minister of War to purchase 200 copies of if 
ever it was published.303
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Figure 3.2. Annual average number of days of treatment per admission by disease, 1851-1900.304 
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Observation, however, soon drew attention to the fact that the disease was more 
common in crowded areas with poor ventilation and as a result of men being exposed 
to extreme cold straight from a place of warmth, such as going on guard duty. The 
British Army had established these same causes of poor hygiene and worked hard 
towards remedying their own situation through constructing new facilities. However, 
declining interest and finances meant that 30% of barracks and 10% of hospitals were 
left without adequate ventilation, much like in Belgium.305 Another physician, Dr 
Jungken, prescribed isolation as the best cure for ophthalmia, sending men home upon 
the first signs of contraction to nip the disease in the bud to prevent it from spreading 
amongst the rest of the garrison.306 It had the added benefit of supporting the 1823 Law 
on ophthalmia still in use at the time, which allowed for men to receive full pay for up 
to three months pending the processing of their pension application in severe cases.307 
This method, though, had its detractors. A regimental doctor, F. Harion, wrote an article 
LQ WKH DUP\¶VPHGLFDO MRXUQDO LQGLVFUHGLWLQJ -XQJNHQ¶V DSSURDFK ZKLFKRQO\
encouraged the spread of the disease into the rest of the population. His own theory also 
centred around isolation but within the confines of the barracks, which, after having 
conducted two years of experiments, he found to be a much more hygienic environment 
when applied with a chlorine disinfectant. This achieved good results, though it was 
hampered by the poor circulation of air in most barracks, which was something that 
could not be remedied unless modern buildings were erected.308 It was partly as a result 
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of this that the serious nature of ophthalmia was not brought to manageable levels until 
well into the 1870s after which time the Government slowly rolled out its barrack 
regeneration programme. 
Apart from ophthalmia, the biggest medical problem facing the army, in terms 
of the average number of days it kept men out of action for was the long established 
one of venereal disease. This, according to the data in Figure. 3.2, showed no signs of 
improving over the four decades examined, suggesting few successful initiatives to this 
HQG,WVLPSO\VXEVWDQWLDWHGSDUHQWV¶IHDUVDVWRWKHFRUUXSWLYHHIIHFWRIWKHEDUUDFNV 
which, according to Den Denderbode, they were entitled to have given the reputation 
that had been accrued over successive generations.309 Indeed, the Catholic 
Representative, Henri Colfs pointed out the shocking practice that saw premiums paid 
to NCOs and retired soldiers by brothels to attract new recruits to these establishments 
for the purposes of renewing their customer base.310 With occurrences such as these 
going unchecked into the twentieth century, it is clear why barrack life was despised by 
many and venereal disease remained such a persistent problem for the army. 
Interestingly, however, the Belgian Army did not appear to consider itself the worst 
offender in this respect, instead handing that unenviable tag to the British. A report 
compiled on the British Army suggested that in 1897, 19.46% of hospital admissions 
were syphilitic cases, compared to 10.04% in Italy, 6.54% in Austria, 4.09% in France 
and 2.67% in Germany.311 %DVHGRQWKDW\HDU¶VVWDWLVWLFVIXUQLVKHGE\WKH0LQLVWU\RI
the Interior, the Belgian Army could boast a relatively low level of venereal disease 
comparable with that of Austria-Hungary at 6.58%. Notwithstanding, it was still more 
than double that of Germany, the leading continental force at the time, and remained a 
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cause for concern amongst politicians and the public alike, particularly those of 
Catholic faith. For them, the army was not doing enough to fully trust them with the 
PRUDO HGXFDWLRQ RI WKH QDWLRQ¶V \RXWK 7KLV ZDV MXVW RQH RI WKH UHDVRQV ZK\ WKH
Catholics shied away from the growing pressure to introduce obligatory service, as it 
was felt that the army was too corruptive an institution. 
Nevertheless, the presence of army chaplains allowed the Catholics to rest easier 
in the knowledge that agents of the faith were on hand to spiritually guide these soldiers 
WKURXJKWKHLUWLPHZLWKWKHFRORXUV-5/HFRQWH¶VZRUNSUREDEO\UHPDLQVWKHVROLWDU\
publication of note on the subject and accurately details the chronological development 
of military chaplaincy of all faiths in the army, though with a particular emphasis on 
their wartime role.312 In fact, only one chapter is devoted to the nineteenth century, 
during which time, as shall be seen, the influence of religion in the army was of 
paramount political importance and was a real demonstration of how the State could 
influence and detrimentally interfere in military matters. Initially, in 1834, the army 
employed two Catholic military chaplains, appointed by the Minister of War, to serve 
at particular garrisons upon an official request. These two men were stationed in 
Brussels, with other military outposts reliant on local parish priests to fulfil the role. 
The difference between the two, was that the former provided a measure of consistency 
and stability, whilst local ministers were forced by their position to devote more time 
to the civilian community as well as being subject to more changes. It was argued that 
this engendered a certain loss of interest, knowledge and zeal from the men, who were 
often not encouraged by their officers to go and actively pursue their faith.313 Count 
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Phillipe de Mérode was terribly concerned about this, stating shortly afterwards that 
parents had every right to be worried about the state of affairs as there were inherent 
GDQJHUV LQ UHPRYLQJ D \RXQJ PDQ¶V WUDGLWional strut of moral support. Equally, the 
*RYHUQPHQWRXJKWWRKDYHEHHQFRQFHUQHG,WZDVWKHLUREOLJDWLRQµLQFRQVFLHQFHDQG
KRQRXU¶WRSURYLGHVXFKVSLULWXDOJXLGDQFHRUULVNORVLQJWKHHOHFWRUDOVXSSRUWWRUDLVH
annual contingents from voters who were not receiving the reassurances they desired 
for their sons.314 This was among the reasons behind the increase in the number of 
military chaplains to forty-one by the 1880s. 
With the rise of Liberal political influence, however, the expanding group of 
military chaplains saw their role change significantly from the early years following 
independence. Wary of directly interfering in spiritual matters, the Liberals were the 
force behind a policy that removed all rights and power from the chaplains, who held 
no rank, were not allowed to enter the barracks, hold meetings, deliver mass, hear 
confessions, or in any way encourage men to visit them during their free time. They 
were merely permitted to be present in military hospitals and perform their caring 
services there, administering the last rights and occasionally holding services if there 
was a chapel. Even this role was laughed off by the atheists in the ranks who, according 
to the Journal de GandZRXOGUDWKHUSDVVDZD\SHDFHIXOO\WKDQEHµDQQR\HG¶E\WKH
petty drivel of the chaplains.315 Feelings such as this encouraged the Liberals to keep 
religion out of the army, or, at least, not impose it on those who did not wish to practice 
it. 
 On 9 April 1881 a more aggressive State intervention in the religious question 
in the army took root in the form of relieving six chaplains of their duties and restricting 




 Journal de Gand, 7 February 1888. 
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the capacities of the remainder to a bare minimum. On the pretext of reducing the 
0LQLVWU\RI:DU¶VEXGJHWFKDSODLQV¶VDODULHVZHUHWUDQVIHUUHd to the Ministry of Justice 
which granted payments solely to those attached to a garrison with a military hospital. 
The overall cost of their upkeep was reduced by a mere 16,000 francs, but this was 
beside the point.316  It resulted in fewer chaplains being allowed to tend to the spiritual 
needs of the same number of soldiers on a more infrequent basis, directly reducing 
religious influence in the army. This clearly concerned Catholic parents of prospective 
recruits who wanted certain assurances that spiritual provisions were in place for their 
sons once they left their traditional sphere of influence. Father Dethy replied to one 
such enquiry:  
Soldiers are free to go to Church on Sundays, I am their priest like the 
other inhabitants of Mariembourg, but not being a chaplain, the authorisation 
to enter into the barracks is never granted, and never is such an invitation 
extended to me. There does exist a ministerial decree that provides for the case 
where I could be called to give extraordinary services to these young men, but 
neither confessions, nor the administration of the sacrament in the barracks, nor 
even the healing of the sick are considered as extraordinary circumstances.317 
Without authorisation, it was down to the individual to be self-disciplined and come to 
him in the town during their free time. It was a clear attempt to supplant local ties to 
region, community or home with a more institutionalised and acceptable concept of the 
wider nation. As much as it was State-driven by the Liberal Party, it was equally 
supported from within the army as well. Large sections of the predominantly Liberal 
officer corps were known to have systematically prevented men from observing their 
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religious duties by organising exercises and chores that confined them to the barracks 
whilst services or ceremonies were being held. This went contrary to the Ministerial 
Circular of 3 December 1835, which sought to protect the right to practise faith whilst 
under arms, and actually prompted the Minister of War to remind COs across the 
country to respect this fact in 1857.318 Constrained on two fronts, Catholic soldiers 
found it increasingly difficult to regularly access the spiritual guidance to which they 
had grown accustomed in their local communities. This both alienated them from the 
values and customs of their homes whilst simultaneously steering them into the clutches 
of the perceived evils of the barracks and its corruptive elements. 
 Following the CathoOLFV¶ UHJDLQLQJ RI SRZHU LQ , an election heavily 
influenced by Socialist gains in the Liberal heartlands, the situation regarding military 
chaplains changed once again in their favour. They were keen to repair the damage of 
the Liberal policy, which in their mind was anti-national and undermined the 
µIRXQGDWLRQVRIRQHRIWKHILUPHVWVXSSRUWVRIRXUQDWLRQDOLW\¶319 The Law of 25 June 
1889 was the defining moment of change, with the monetary charge reverting back to 
the Ministry of War. The Minister of War, General Charles Pontus, had already 
introduced some measures three weeks earlier. These included giving chaplains the 
honours granted to officers, allowing them to converse with soldiers within the 
garrisons, as well as with their parents. They were equally allowed to institute military 
masses, and recreate circles or groups of men for instruction, though only if they were 
present to oversee to prevent the infiltration of anti-militarist propaganda. These 
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gatherings had previously been reproached for indoctrinating men with religious and 
political content but were officially reintroduced by Royal Decree on 13 September 
1889 to the vexation of the Liberal Party.320 It led to heavy criticism being levelled at 
the Government over their apparent clericalisation of the army. This demonstrates the 
level of fear within Liberal circles of the dangers of allowing politics and religion to 
have a place in the national institution that was the army. The State, it was felt, ought 
not to interfere in these matters. However, this simply tended to be the rhetoric of 
opposition. Whenever Liberal policies were introduced during their periods of 
government, the roles would be inversed, with their attempting to convince the 
Catholics that the army and the State were remaining distinctly separate. 
Nevertheless, moral guidance was still seen as an important issue to many, both 
in the population at large as well as in the army. Whereas much of the former and their 
political representatives, in the shape of the Catholic Party, wished to see it through the 
presence of the Church, the military authorities were more in favour of its promulgation 
through education. Regimental schools, established in June 1870, sought to achieve a 
number of simultaneous results, namely: the improvement of literacy among its ranks; 
the technical development of men for the good of society; and lastly to develop the best 
candidates for the role of NCOs. Attendance was made compulsory for the illiterates in 
each regiment to improve their basic levels of education and prepare them for what was 
becoming an increasingly technical profession. More broadly, the µVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶
began offering a variety of different courses in an attempt to be a positive influence in 
the formation of good citizens who would be a benefit to society once released from 
military duty. They included things such as forestry and agronomy to keep men in tune 
with the professions that they had left behind, as well as expanding upon their 
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knowledge, which it was hoped they would take back with them to their local 
communes. It was through systems such as these, as well as a respect for military 
discipline, that officers believed the army was doing society a favour, often removing 
its undesirable elements and transforming them into clean, literate, moralised and 
professionally capable men. The results were questionable, but one Justice of the Peace 
noted:  
Military service exerts a favourable influence on the youth; an 
individual leaves his village largely unrefined, but sometimes returns quite well 
LQVWUXFWHG DQG DOZD\V ZLWK D GHYHORSHG LQWHOOLJHQFH >«@ 7KHUH DUH DOVR
without doubt, and sadly, others who return with vicious habits, but they are 
the exception: the vast majority are bettered physically and morally.321 
Despite this relatively positive endorsement of military education, there were many 
who felt that the army was still more corruptive than anything else. Attendance at many 
of these classes was regularly poor, with men often finding their spare time better spent 
indulging in the excesses of taverns and brothels. 
Georges Lorand was particularly of this opinion. In his propaganda pamphlet 
advocating the nation in arms, he spoke for a large portion of the public against the 
YLFHVDQGLGOHQHVVOHDUQHGLQWKHEDUUDFNVZKLFKLQKLVYLHZPDGHµVODYHVRIWKHP>WKH
PHQ@DQGQRWFLWL]HQV>«@RIWHQUXLQLQJWKHLUHQWLUHFLYLOLDQIXWXUHIRU this mirage of 
esprit militaireZKLFKGRHVQHLWKHUJRRGIRUWKHDUP\QRUWKHP¶322 Indeed, it was well 
publicised that men, particularly those new to urban life, could often be turned from 
innocent boys into corrupted men during their time with the colours GHVSLWHWKHDUP\¶V
best efforts. A combination of the vagabonds and low-life that they encountered, as 
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well as the conditions of the barracks themselves, was enough to skew many a moral 
compass. The -RXUQDOG¶<SUHVcorroborated this view in an article, which stated that 
WKHPXFKIUHTXHQWHGµFDEDUHWV¶DQGµGHQVRIWKHORZHVWVRUW¶QRWRQO\GHSULYHGUHFUXLWV
of their time and money but their morality as well.323 To some extent, this disproved 
WKHPLOLWDU\DXWKRULWLHV¶WKHRU\WKDWWKHEHWWHUFODVVRIUHFUXLWwould raise the moral and 
intellectual level of those from a lower social standing; if anything it had a reverse 
effect. 
The belief that military efficiency was being undermined by the low class of 
man being furnished for its ranks through the ballot system brought the question of 
national education into increasingly sharp focus. It was felt that the intellectual and 
moral standard of recruit was well below the required mark. An inverse relationship 
between moral education and discipline was believed to have existed, which 
HQFRPSDVVHGDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOLGHDOV7KHµVFKRRORI
WKHQDWLRQ¶FRXOGRQO\GRVRPXFKZLWKZKDW LWZDVJLYHQDQGPDQ\IHOW WKDW LWZDV
spending too much time undoing the damage of anti-militarism by inculcating the 
patriotic principles that ought to have been extolled from birth, rather than focussing 
on essential military training. This was all the more pertinent around the turn of the 
century when the time spent under arms was reduced to a mere fifteen months. It was 
QRWHGLQWKDWµ7KHPRUDOHGXFDWLRQRIRXUFLWL]HQVPXVWWKHUHIRUHE\DOOQHFHVVLW\
start in our schools and be closely supervised by the public authorities, because this 
national education at a young age is the most powerful lever to elevate and exalt the 
EUDYHU\DQGSDWULRWLVPRIWKHVROGLHU¶324 However, this call for a standardised approach 
to schooling was unrealistic to say the least. Among the top issues on the national 
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political agenda behind electoral reform in the final quarter of the nineteenth century 
ZDVZKDWEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµVFKRROZDUV¶DEDWWOHRYHUHGXFDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHVWKDW
divided the Liberals and Catholics more than any other matter. This was at the heart of 
the problem and directly concerned the army due to the latteU¶V XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR
VDQFWLRQDQDWLRQDOFRPSXOVRU\HGXFDWLRQVFKHPHIRUIHDURIXQGHUPLQLQJWKH&KXUFK¶V
position in independent institutions that had traditionally formed the scholarly edifice 
of the Flemish provinces.  
For the Socialist leader, Emile Vandevelde, who joined forces with the Liberals 
WRILJKW WKLVSDUWLFXODUEDWWOH WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VµOLEHUW\RIHGXFDWLRQ¶ZDVPRUHRID
social right to be exercised by the State, much like justice, as a counter-weight to 
arbitrary governance, not, as the Catholics saw it, as a free-market approach through 
which private education could flourish. However, as early as 1842, clerical schooling 
began to dominate through this more literal interpretation of the law. The Church itself 
wanted a monopoly and fought hard to keep the State from interfering in education.325 
This gave them the latitude to construct the curriculum around religious morality at the 
expense of a more rounded education that included languages, arts and sciences. The 
results, from an intellectual point of view, were far from satisfactory. In 1882 men from 
WKDW\HDU¶VOHY\ERWKOLWHUDWHDQGQRWZHUHDVNHGDVHULHVRIVLPSOHTXHVWLRQVWRWHVW
their degree of education. When asked where London could be found, 89% did not 
know that it was the capital of England. When asked who lost the Battle of Waterloo, 
16% did not know. When asked about the electoral system, 76% were unaware what 
system Belgium operated under. Curiously, as well, there were five different answers 
given to the question; did Moses live before or after Jesus Christ?326 For its opponents, 
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this was vindication that clerical schooling had failed and the time was right to push 
once more for compulsory education. It had, unfortunately also led to the unenviable 
situation whereby foreign commeQWDWRUVVDZ%HOJLXP¶VSULPDU\HGXFDWLRQDVRQHRI
the worst in Europe. 
Similar opinions were articulated in the public sphere, this time in the press. 
The editor of La Lutte ± De Strijd, for example, expressed genuine concern regarding 
the literacy rates iQ%HOJLXPFRPSDUHG WRRWKHU µFLYLOLVHG¶FRXQWULHV+HZDVRI WKH
opinion that the Catholics had systematically undermined scholarly practice despite it 
being clear that morality, as preached in the clerical system, was evidently not 
producing sufficiently educated men for a modern army. The newspaper claimed that 
in 1881 Belgium had 207 illiterates per 1,000 soldiers under arms. This compared 
poorly to other countries of a similar size, which boasted a mere 23 in Switzerland, 4 
in Sweden, and 3 in Denmark. $GHFDGHODWHU%HOJLXPKDGWR)UDQFH¶VDQG
*HUPDQ\¶V 327 A further fourteen years after that, Le Progres printed a similar 
DUWLFOHHQWLWOHGµ7KHLOOLWHUDWHVLQWKH*HUPDQDQG%HOJLDQ$UPLHV¶ZKLFKWRRNQRWHRI
the disparity in the figures as well. It placed Belgium a long way behind Germany, 
Britain and France whose respective proportions of illiterates per 10,000 men were just 
two, 109, and 350, whilst Belgium stood at a less than impressive 1,137. This was still 
better than the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which reportedly had 2,800, Italy some 3,100 
and Russia an astonishing 6,208.328 These figures tally up quite well with those 
published by the Ministry of the Interior, which demonstrated a steady progression in 
literacy rates among the annual contingents raised (See Fig. 3.3.). What is striking about 
these articles is the direct comparisons made to other European countries, both 
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neighbouring and of a similar size. Education had become all the more important 
following 1870 and Belgium was keen to foOORZ3UXVVLD¶VH[DPSOHLQDVPDQ\DVSHFWV 




of military organisation as possible. The former Liberal Premier, Jean-Baptiste 
Nothomb, was quoted as saying in 1873 WKDW µWKH EHVW HGXFDWHG DUPLHV ZLOO EH WKH
EHVW¶330 This shows the acceptance within Belgium that times had changed, that armies, 
to be successful, had to be educated despite the fear that with it also came the knowledge 
with which to call for ± and exercise ± the right to vote. Indeed, even Russia, firmly set 
in its monarchical despotism, introduced reforms with the primary aim of educating its 
illiterate peasant masses in 1874.331 
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The main problem emanating from the education question in a military sense 
was its effect on discipline. Not only were poorly educated men more susceptible to 
finding the rigours of military life difficult to cope with but the ever-present and 
inextricable issue of language added a further layer of complication. During a 1913 
debate in the Chamber of Representatives, Henrik Borginon claimed that Flemish-
speaking soldiers were being disciplined more severely than their French-speaking 
counterparts as a result of the language barrier between themselves and their officers. 
Not only were orders difficult to follow but difficulties for soldiers to form a coherent 
verbal defence of their actions also proved problematic. Between 1907 and 1909 some 
261 men categorised as disciplinaires were shown to be 20.3% Walloon (53) and 79.7% 
Flemish (208), whilst the 952 categorised as correctionaires were split 26% and 74% 
respectively. Additionally, Borginon quoted figures that suggested of the 3,595 
deserters during this period, 1,068 (29.7%) were native French-speakers and 2,527 
(70.3%) were Flemish.332 When looking at these figures, he questioned why, when 
these country folk ± as most of them were of rural stock ± µKDYHEHHQUDLVHGZLWKWKH
LGHD WKDWREH\LQJRQH¶VSDUHQWV LVREH\LQJ*RGREH\LQJ WKHDXWKRULWLHV LVREH\LQJ
RQH¶VSDUHQWVWKDWDOOVHULous disobedience, if it is not punished by man, will certainly 
EHSXQLVKHGE\*RGZKRNQRZVDOOZKRVHHVDOODQGZKRFDQGRDOO¶, do they find 
themselves punished more frequently?333 The answer, it appeared, had to be in a degree 
of linguistic discrimination. This often saw young Flemish soldiers misunderstood at 
the first instance and punished unjustly accordingly, creating a demoralising effect that 
began a cycle of repeat offences in an attempt to strike back at the establishment. 
                                                     
332




Indeed, a senior officer told Borginon just that, claiming that three-quarters of men 
faced with a primary case of injustice fell into this trap. 
During the presentation of his argument, Liberal members of the Chamber 
heckled Borginon, claiming that it was his own party, the Catholics, who had brought 
this situation on the Flemish people through their persistence in maintaining clerical 
HGXFDWLRQ$GROSKH%X\OVKRXWHGµ,Q)ODQGHUVPDQ\FOHULFDOVFKRROVPDQ\LOOLWHUDWHV
In Wallonia, few clerical schools; few illiterates. ThHUHLV\RXUSURRI¶334 The education 
debate was the easiest way for the largely French-speaking Liberals to discard the 
ILJXUHVEHLQJWKURZQWKHLUZD\DVIRUWKHPWKHEODPHOD\LQWKH&DWKROLFV¶GHILDQFH
towards encouraging intellectual education in Flanders. Indeed, regimental school 
examination results for the Engineers appeared to be a case in point, with 100% pass 
rate for Walloons but only 41% for Flemish candidates. Nevertheless, this was in fact 
a reflection of the long-standing education laws that forced Flemish children to study 
the sciences in French, rather than evidence to hold up against clerical schooling. Only 
17% of Flemish students received a nomination for excellent results in the sciences 
compared to 55% of Walloons. However, the proportions were ever so slightly reversed 
LQ WKH DUWV WDXJKW LQ HDFK UHJLRQ¶V PRWKHU WRQJXH ZLWK  RI )OHPLVK VWXGHQWV
obtaining nominations, whilst Wallonia only produced 27%.335 Borginon finished his 
argument by claiming that the army was a school in itself and its pupils deserved equal 
treatment and opportunity in it, something that the current state of affairs was severely 
restricting. Despite demonstrating that clerical schooling was not necessarily at fault 
for the perceived lack of instruction amongst Flemish soldiers, it is clear to see that 
education and discipline were thought of as being wedded together to a great extent. 






There is certainly an element of truth in the matter, with the proportion of illiterate 
offenders out-weighing their proportion of the population throughout the century. 
Whilst this was not a direct result of clerical schooling per-se, the obstacles placed in 
the way of compulsory education by the Catholics, which had already taken root in 
much of Europe, was partly to blame. 
Linguistic discrimination with regard to discipline was certainly not a new 
phenomenon. It plagued the courts-martial process for a number of years to the severe 
chagrin of the Flemish-speaking community. A law governing the use of languages in 
military courts was not passed until 1873 but most lawyers and juries ± ostensibly 
Walloon by birth ± generally ignored this until another one was passed in 1901, which 
unequivocally placed Flemish and French on an equal footing. By this time, however, 
an unquantifiable, though undoubtedly large, number of disciplinary cases had seen 
Flemish soldiers unjustly tried for crimes which they either had not committed or were 
incapable of formulating a satisfactory defence for in French. An interesting case that 
shook the very foundations of the court-martial process occurred in Bruges in 1887. A 
lawyer named Devisschere, believing it to be his professional duty to give his clients 
the fairest trial possible, took up the defence of one Walloon and four Flemish soldiers 
and proceeded to PDNHWKHFDVHIRUWKHODWWHULQWKHLUQDWLYHODQJXDJH7KLVFDXVHGµD
JUHDWFRPPRWLRQ¶DPRQJWKHRIILFHUVSUHVLGLQJRYHUWKHFRXUWZKRH[FODLPHGWKDWWKH\
either only knew literary Flemish (Flamand Académique), which differed significantly 
from the regional dialects of common soldiers, had limited knowledge of the language 
or absolutely none at all. The lawyer, sticking to a very strict application of the 1873 
Law, continued on, forcing the panel of officers to enlist the aid of an interpreter to 
carry on with proceedings. The cases of all four Flemish soldiers were heard in this 
fashion but when it came to the remaining Walloon soldier, Devisschere, reverted to 
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the use of French in order that his client would understand. This was, according to the 
newspaper that reported it, the first ever instance of such a stand for Flemish rights in 
a military court in the province, and possibly even the country ± though rumours of a 
similar case in Antwerp were being circulated.336 It helped spark a lively campaign in 
the local press whose editors flocked to the colours of Flemish linguistic rights. Het 
Lan van Aelst, for example, ZURWH LQ WKDW µ)OHPLVKVROGLHUV LQ)UHQFKFRXUWV-
PDUWLDOLVVRPHWKLQJERWKVWXSLGDQGEDUEDURXV>«@KRZHYHULWZLOOQRWEHORQJWKH
Flemish Lion roars about it, there are petitions made, that must be made, so that in short, 
WKH)OHPLVKODQJXDJH0867EHJLYHQLWVIXOOULJKWV¶337 The court-martial system was 
deemed so archaic that it would even have been mocked in the Middle Ages, 
particularly instances in which arbitrary judgement were being passed on Flemish 
soldiers whose trials were a decade in arrears of their Walloon counterparts on account 
of the linguistic barrier.338 Opinions such as these both summed up the problem at hand 
whilst simultaneously uncovering another. Illustrations of linguistic discrimination 
ZHUH QRW RQO\ SRRU IRU WKH DUP\¶V LPDJH DQG PRUDOH EXW PRUH IXQGDPHQWDOO\
XQGHUPLQHGLWVYHU\IDEULFDVWKHµVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶ZKRVHUROHwas to be a unifying 
force, not a divisive one as it had become. 
Although language was a contentious issue in the debate surrounding military 
discipline, it was in fact the humanitarian aspect that really gave it some impetus in the 
political milieu. It was bad enough that in some cases Flemish soldiers were treated 
unjustly let alone that the army as a whole was doling out seemingly arbitrary and often 
degrading punishments. The feeling that disciplinary measures were too harsh in the 
army took root amongst the social reactionaries who were disgusted by the inequalities 
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witnessed when comparing civilian and military sentences for comparable crimes. 
Often, minor infringements in the army could land a soldier in the cachots, similar to 
WKHµEODFNKROHV¶XVHGLQWKH%ULWLVK$UP\DWWKLVWLPH339 These small, dark individual 
FHOOVZHUHGHVFULEHGDVµYHULWDEOHKRYHOVZKHUHWKHODZVRIK\JLHQHDQGPRUDOLW\DUH
QRWREVHUYHG¶DQGZHUHRIWHQFRQVLGHUDEO\PRUHXQSDODWDEOHWKDQZKDWPDQ\FLYLOLDQ
murderers could expect in the relative comforts of the philanthropically supported state 
of the art prisons.340 This was particularly galling when it was revealed that the majority 
RIRIIHQGHUVZHUH \RXQJPHQ DJHG WRZLWKXQGHU WKUHH \HDUV¶ H[SHULHQFH341 
What this shows is that men committed the majority of crimes during their adjustment 
period between civilian and military life. This transition was often difficult to cope 
with, especially for the uneducated who could not draw on their experience of 
regimented discipline in the classroom to transfer to the army. With the national average 
at this time indicating that 42% of the male population did not possess an elementary 
ability to write, the fact that 48% of offenders were unable to sign their own name, 
somewhat corroborates this theory.342 Equally, young men from rural backgrounds 
could easily have their heads turned by the manipulative elements in the barracks who 
opened their eyes to the vibrancy of city life. Understanding was called for by some 
elements of society who felt that the army was not being responsive enough to the 
extenuating circumstances involved in many of these petty crimes. Georges Lorand, 
DGYRFDWHGDFKDQJHLQWKHDUP\¶VSRVLWLRQVWDWLQJ 
What is needed today, is that the spirit of the army merges increasingly 
with the spirit of the nation; since the entire nation must necessarily be called 
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to be part of the army, it is necessary that the army penetrates the rules of 
civilian life and that any exceptions are kept to a strict minimum for the 
maintenance of discipline, and discipline will maintain itself all the more 
readily if the rules imposed on the army conform better with rules of morality 
and honour adopted by the rest of the nation.343 
It was a plea that echoed the sentiments of the population with regard to barrack 
conditions, which, in no uncertain terms, demanded that the authorities undertake a 
degree of responsibility towards the well-EHLQJRI WKHQDWLRQ¶V\RXWK WKDWZDVEHLQJ
entrusted to it. Unfortunately for those on the receiving end, it was a duty that they were 
slow to act upon. 
   Reports of arbitrary punishments of a degrading nature caused uproar in the 
press. One such example occurred in Mons at a shooting exercise in 1846 when the 
Sergeant-Instructor violently struck a soldier of the 8th Line Regiment in the stomach 
for some misdemeanour that forced him to leave the exercise field with blood coming 
from his mouth and nose, the visible effects of internal wounds that saw the man die 
WKUHHGD\VODWHU7KLVµDFWRIUHYROWLQJEUXWDOLW\¶DVLe Propagateur UHSRUWHGµSURYRNHG
indignatLRQDPRQJDOOWKRVHZKRZLWQHVVHGLW¶OHDYLQJWKHHGLWRULQQRGRXEWWKDWVXFK
forms of punishment should be forbidden as it was degrading to the soldier to the point 
of removing all personal dignity.344 Another instance saw men arbitrarily punished with 
µIRUFHGODERXURIWKHZRUVWNLQG¶E\WKHLU1&2ZKRDSSHDUHGWRWDNHJUHDWSOHDVXUHLQ
making the accused march, fully equipped, from dawn until dusk for fifty consecutive 
days in the heat of summer, with only the discomfort of the cachots awaiting them each 
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night.345 Acts such as these, it was argued, made men commit more crimes in an attempt 
either to strike back at the establishment or simply to escape. This appeared neither to 
resemble military discipline nor moral re-education. 
 There were some striking similarities between reactions to degrading 
punishments in Belgium in the mid-nineteenth century to those surrounding the 
campaign to abolish corporal punishment in Britain. The anti-flogging campaign, 
which rose to prominence following the Napoleonic Wars, though whose origins date 
back to the late eighteenth century, aroused unprecedented consternation from a number 
of different pressure groups.346 Brutal and degrading as it might have been, the lash had 
been the mainstay of British military discipline for centuries and represented the 
institutional conservatism of the army in their somewhat dated view by the 1820s that 
SXQLVKPHQWGLUHFWHGDWWKHERG\ZDVPRUHHIIHFWLYHWKDQWKHµPDUFKRIWKHPLQG¶ZKLFK
had begun to make headway in the civilian penal system.347 A similar disparity 
manifested itself in Belgium, as has already been alluded to, in which an increasingly 
prominent philanthropic and moral undertone governed the execution of civil law, 
whilst the army continued to promote the standardised use of cachots; reclusion, 
another form of incarceration; and the brouette, which involved excessive hard labour 
for a determined period of time, often years, whilst being physically chained to a 
wheelbarrow. Although not as outwardly degrading as flogging, these punishments still 
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divided opinion over their use and effectiveness, leading to the eventual suspension of 
the cachot in 1883 in favour of a policy of persuasion.348 :LWKWKHµVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶
promoting moral values and education, it appeared contradictory to oversee such 
instruction by strict and humiliating means. Indeed, for those families who surrendered 
their sons to the army, the prospect of seeing them imprisoned, harmed, shamed and 
ultimately disaffected with authority undermined the entire principle upon which their 
unwritten social contract with the State was based. 
An examination of the available data would suggest that, much like the British 
system, discipline in its frequency and severity varied between regiments depending on 
the attitude of the CO. At higher levels, conservative militarists, such as General Vander 
Linden, extolled the virtues of rigorous discipline, whilst others took an increasingly 
moderate approach that was more in tune with changing attitudes of society.349 They 
cited examples of various regiments with higher numbers of disciplinary charges 
against them as proof. Indeed, among the twelve Line Regiments between 1850 and 
1859, the average number of offences for the period was just below 470 apiece, and 
whereas some units, such as the 4th Line Regiment, could boast an exemplary record of 
330 offences, others, like the 7th and 8th Line Regiments, recorded much higher figures 
of 580 and 573 respectively.350 This demonstrates the extent to which circumstances 
and individual attitudes could play a role in determining the application of discipline, 
though the claim that arbitrary punishments were being passed by perverse COs was 
somewhat misleading. Firstly, the figures quoted by politicians to prove their point 
were, as General Chazal noted, often wrong and stemmed largely from a 
misunderstanding of military organisation. For example, the elite Grenadier Regiment 
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always appeared to have more disciplinary cases than other units but this was a direct 
result of it being composed of five active battalions instead of four, considerations often 
overlooked by politicians pushing an agenda of social reform.351 Secondly, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, severe punishments such as the brouette could only be enforced 
through the official and regimented process of a court-martial. Additionally, it took a 
minimum of three minor infringements at regimental level for a man to be brought 
before a military tribunal in any case ± except for serious breaches of discipline ± all of 
which had to be reviewed by the assembled jury and subsequently by the Minister of 
War before a sentence could be passed.352 This is not to say that COs could not make 
life uncomfortable for their men, or that discrimination of one sort or another did not 
occur, but the process was designed to guard against such abuses.  
Most offences were dealt with at regimental level without recourse to courts-
martial. The most common transgressions were desertion, the selling of effects, and 
theft, respectively accounting for 33.13%, 31.44%, and 22.42% of the 10,153 recorded 
cases between 1850 and 1859.353 Peter Burroughs suggested that desertion and absence 
without leave in the British army, which rose from a comparable 37% of all offences 
committed in the home force in the 1830s to a staggering 63% by the mid-1850s, was 
a mark of protest against conditions of army life.354 If this was indeed the case, then the 
Belgian figures for the same period would suggest that they were comparatively happier 
with their lot or lived in better conditions. However, this would be somewhat 
misleading. Certainly, Belgian desertion rates did not match those of the British but it 
still represented an annual loss of around 336 men in the 1850s and 310 men between 
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1876 and 1900. In addition, the annual death toll amounted to 714 men: an astonishing 
figure for a neutral force.355 This proves that living conditions were anything but 
adequate, whilst also advancing an explanation as to why desertion rates were not 
comparable with Britain¶V; namely a number of men died before they had the chance. 
Equally, the average annual figure of 310 men lost to desertion between 1876 and 1900 
is slightly lower than it should be. This is due to two amnesties granted in 1880 and 
1890 for the fiftieth anniversary of independence and the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
/HRSROG,,¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKHWKURQH7KHVH\HDUVVDZDQHWLQFUHDVHWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of 735 and 1,852 respectively, which somewhat distorts the desertion average for this 
period. A similar period of grace was granted in 1866 as well, though this was seen as 
being destructive to military discipline as it, to all intents and purposes, incentivised 
GHVHUWLRQDQGWKHIRUHJRLQJRIDPDQ¶VFLWL]HQO\GXWLHV356 This mirrored the situation 
in the French army, whose own amnesties failed to establish a humanitarian concept of 
discipline and all but dissolved some regiments into chaos.357 
More serious offences, such as insubordination, murder and mutiny, were 
naturally taken to a district court-martial for trial.358 These tribunals had the power to 
impose heavy punishments on offenders including: lengthy periods in prison; the 
brouette; time with the Corps de Correction; and even public derision in the stocks. 
But none were more infamous than the death penalty, which although passed on 
multiple occasions was seldom enforced. With the nascent army in the field and under 
conditions of war, only one of the first ten death sentences passed was carried out 
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between 1832 and 1834, with the authorities believing that this would suffice as a 
deterrent.359 The available evidence suggests that only two more sentences were carried 
out in the army, in both cases to NCOs, in 1852 and 1856. These figures appear 
H[FHSWLRQDOO\ORZFRPSDUHGWR(GZDUG6SLHUV¶IRUWKH%ULWLVK$UP\LQWKHQLQHWHHQWK
century, which state that 41 out of 76 death sentences between 1826 and 1835, and 33 
out of 44 between 1865 and 1898 were carried out.360 The disparity between the two 
ZDVPRVWO\DUHVXOWRIWKH%ULWLVKDUP\¶VDFWLYHVHUYLFHDEURDGEXWDOVRSDUWO\GXHWR
the different recruiting systems creating opposing prisms through which to view the 
LQGLYLGXDO $ YROXQWDU\ DUP\ UHFUXLWHG IURP VRFLHW\¶V ORZHVW FODVVes afforded more 
liberty to exert powerful State control on all aspects of their existence, whereas the 
ballot system that begrudgingly drew in a wider cross-section of the population, in 
theory at least, limited the force that could be used against them. This was one of the 
few instances where the population could hold the State to a degree of accountability 
over conditions in the army. 
Nevertheless, a host of different crimes could see a soldier sentenced with the 
death penalty. Examples in the press can be found for those sentenced to it for desertion 
and insubordination during times of war, others for causing harm to individuals and 
damage to civilian property.361 The most common misdemeanour, however, was 
murder. Yet, despite the severity of the crime, the vast majority of cases were 
commuted to a lesser penalty. Mitigating circumstances often counted for a lot, as in 
the case of four men tried by district court-martial in East Flanders in 1865. Their 
premeditated murder of a civilian was deemed more understandable given the evidence 
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presented that the deceased had previously subjected his attackers to extreme violence. 
The two main suspects had their sentences reduced to five years detention, whilst the 
other two had theirs reduced further to just three years.362 More surprisingly, a 
Chasseur-Carabinier was acquitted for the murder of a foreign national, a Frenchman, 
during the 1848 Risquons Tout affair near the frontier. The reason behind the decision 
of the West Flanders district court-martial that presided over the case was that this 
victim had been heard insulting Belgium and had maltreated a number of local 
inhabitants, thus justifying the action taken against him. Le Propagateur DGGHGµ7KLV
acquittal has engendered a general satisfaction in our town, and we do not doubt that 
this news will be received with the same feeling of joy by the rest of the country as 
ZHOO¶363 More sinister cases in the early twentieth century, including the murder of a 
landlady with a pair of secateurs, as well as a nurse made to look like she had committed 
suicide, likewise saw the soldiers have their death sentences commuted.364  
Exonerations such as these were equally a result of the changing attitude 
towards the death penalty in civil law in Belgium, which was itself following a wider 
European trend of using rehabilitative methods over capital punishment. Indeed, by the 
early 1860s, Belgian civil executions were coming to an end, with the last recorded case 
occurring in 1863. This was followed by a motion to remove it from the civil penal 
code in 1867 but it was rejected by 35 votes to 15. Although by no means the last 
country to tackle the issue, other European states of a similar stature had stolen a march 
on Belgium. Indeed, the last civic executions to take place in European countries apart 
from Germany, France and United Kingdom before the turbulence of the twentieth 
century were; Romania 1828; Portugal 1846; Moldova 1849; Holland 1860; Saxony 
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1868; the Swiss Cantons 1873; and Italy in 1874. On the other hand, Belgium appeared 
to be among the leaders in attempting to strike the death penalty from the law, despite 
failing to do so on a number of occasions from as early as 1832. Only a handful of 
German principalities managed to successfully abolish the death penalty as early as 
1818, with the majority of European states lagging at least half a century behind. 
Romania and Portugal did so in 1866 and 1867 respectively, with Saxony following 
suit in 1868. In 1870 there was a movement to abolish it in the Northern Confederation 
but Bismarck intervened and it was maintained after a close vote. The campaign in The 
Netherlands was so successful in 1870 that upon a complete overhaul of their penal 
code in 1881, its reestablishment was not seriously considered. Italy, trailing a few 
years behind finally abolished capital punishment in 1889.365 It remained nominally on 
the statute books in Belgium until 1996, though no executions took place between 1863 
and GXHWR/HRSROG,,¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ- except in Africa.366 In total, 
there were fifty-five executions carried out in Belgium prior to the First World War, 
ZLWKDOOWKRVHFRQGHPQHGWRGHDWKGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIJUDFHRI/HRSROG,,¶VUHLJQJLYHQ
an automatic commutation. As a result, other penalties such as incarceration or various 
forms of hard labour became increasingly common. If executions were not an option to 
keep a degenerating society in check, then hard-line discipline through unsavoury 
punishments was naturally the corollary. 
It was that early nineteenth century awareness of moral degeneracy in society 
that largely vindicated these severe actions. The increasing intervention of the State in 
public affairs and the reconceptualization of crime and punishment naturally fed its way 
into European armies which tended to recruit from among the lower tiers of the 
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H[DFWO\DFULPLQDOFODVVLQWKHDUP\WKHUHZDVDµFULPLQDO¶HOHPHQW¶367 This was equally 
the case in Belgium, particularly with regard to replacements. However, in a strange 
turn of events, it was actually volunteers who, proportionate to their number, boasted 
the worst disciplinary record in the army. Discharge figures showed that fifty-six men 
out of every hundred were volunteers, whilst replacements and substitutes accounted 
for thirty-three, and conscripts a mere eleven. At first glance it would suggest that 
replacements did not live up to the poor reputation that they had acquired. However, as 
Lieutenant General Désart explained to the 1866 Commission, the number of volunteers 
discharged outweighed the other categories of men by a significant proportion as a 
result of State versus family interests. What he meant by this was that volunteers were 
expendable to the army if found to be inept or corrupt without facing any consequences, 
except perhaps the loss in manpower. Contrarily, if a replacement was discharged for 
similar offences, it would place a far greater burden on society by forcing the families, 
who had paid for these men, to find further replacements or be forced to send their sons 
for whom they had paid extortionate amounts of money to protect them from this fate 
already.368 As such, greater clemency was granted to the worst and most despised class 
of recruit, who despite their perversions found a second chance in the Corps de 
Discipline or Corps de Correction set up to moralise and correct men for both the good 
of the army as well as society.  
The Corps de Discipline were established as early as 1831 and provided a means 
through which the army could rid its regiments of bad elements without incurring the 
equivalent loss in manpower. It was reserved for troublesome men, who had not 
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committed crimes serious enough to merit a court-martial, but whose conduct was 
repeatedly poor and could not be curbed by standard regimental punishments. This was 
subject to abuse by a number of COs who would sometimes rather wash their hands of 
an individual prematurely than exhaust the full repertoire of disciplinary measures at 
their disposal.369 The regime of harsh discipline was created to knock men into shape 
with a view to returning them to their units to complete their engagement as quickly as 
possible. In some instances, however, these corps provided a useful resource of 
PDQSRZHUZKLOVW VWLOO µXQUHIRUPHG¶7KLVZDVSDUWLFXODUO\ WKHFDVHZKHQ LW FDPH WR
raising and sending expeditionary forces abroad, such as to Portugal in 1832-1834, with 
one list of 974 names suggesting that 27.6% were taken from the these companies.370  
More serious military crimes saw men sent to the sister Corps de Correction 
following a court-martial, whose regime was similarly much tougher than that practised 
in the army proper. It operated under a three-tiered system of rights, akin to that used 
in British disciplinary facilities in the nineteenth century.371 It was designed to foster 
good conduct and a desire to progress up the ladder of reform to enjoy the sparse 
privileges allotted whilst with the company. New entrants and those with poor 
disciplinary records formed the third, and lowest, group called the Classe de Punition 
who were forbidden to receive visitors, correspondence, use the library, or attend any 
of the lessons provided. Following the same principles of WKH µVFKRRORI WKHQDWLRQ¶
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concept, these included scholarly instruction (taught in both French and Flemish), 
fencing, gymnastics and singing. Their existence merely consisted of drill, exercises 
and labour. The second group, named the &ODVVHG¶eSUHXYH, consisted of men who had 
spent at least three months with the Classe de Punition but had shown themselves to be 
submissive to the strict discipline of the regime and were making progress in their moral 
re-education. They were permitted to attend the above-mentioned lessons, use the 
library, and receive a degree of correspondence and visitors as their reward. The first 
group, the Classe de Récompense, was reserved for men who had served over half their 
sentence and had shown exemplary conduct whilst with the Corps de Correction. This 
group was allowed to undertake work outside the confines of the establishment in which 
they were based and were the only ones who could be granted grace or a shortening of 
their sentence.372 Despite outwardly projecting an image of reformative capabilities, the 
extent to which either corps was successful was a cause of much debate. Indeed it was 
often claimed that men were either dismissed from the army altogether whilst with the 
Corps de Discipline and the Corps de Correction, or within weeks of re-joining their 
regiments.373   
With inconclusive results, the obvious questions relating to the severity of the 
regime began to emerge more frequently and with increased urgency. In France, a 
µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶ FRQFHSW RIGLVFLSOLQH WRRN URRW LQ Government, and latterly military, 
circles in the early twentieth century that all but dissolved their military justice system, 
including their Compagnies de Discipline. With reformers keen to repair much of the 
damage caused by overly harsh discipline, men in these companies who showed even 
WKH VOLJKWHVW VLJQV RI µUHKDELOLWDWLRQ¶ ZHUH LPPHGLDWHO\ UHOHDVHG EDFN LQWR WKHLU
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regiments as of May 1902.374 Belgian activists, already forcefully campaigning for 
improvements in all facets of military life, took much the same approach as their 
neighbours with regard to the Corps de Correction that was permanently established at 
Vilvoorde. It was written as late as 1910, at which time the continued existence of the 
IDFLOLW\ZDVEURXJKWLQWRTXHVWLRQWKDWµ>W@KHHVWDEOLVhment at Vilvoorde is, in effect, a 
vestige of the past. The system employed there would not stand up to one minute of 
VSHFLDOLVWH[DPLQDWLRQ¶375 Punishments inflicted there were double the length of those 
applied for the same crime at regimental level and ZHUHFRQVLGHUHGWREHµIURPDQRWKHU
HUD¶376 Such infringements could no longer be tolerated by a population that was 
UDSLGO\ORVLQJIDLWKLQWKHVXSSRVHGFRQVWUXFWLYHPRUDOLVLQJPHWKRGVRIWKHµVFKRRORI
WKHQDWLRQ¶$QWL-militarism was on the rise and contradictions such as those witnessed 
in Vilvoorde were doing nothing to endear the army to its population. 
,Q  WKH 0LQLVWHU RI :DU &RXVHEDQGW G¶$ONHPDGH KDG KDG WR UHDVVXUH
PHPEHUVRIWKH&KDPEHUWKDWSXQLVKPHQWVZHUHµLQIOLFWHGLQDZD\WRDYRLGDQ\Whing 
WKDWFRXOGJLYHWKHPDKXPLOLDWLQJFKDUDFWHU¶DQGWKDWLWZDVQHYHUORVWVLJKWRIWKDWµWKH
institution of the Corps de Correction has as its goal to return these misguided men, 
PRUHZRUWK\EDFNLQWRWKHDUP\¶VUDQNV¶377 There were even claims that men were 
deliberately trying to cause crime in a bid to be dismissed from the army altogether and 
escape the abhorrent conditions. Yet there were those who took a decidedly different 
view of the institution claiming that it was not as bad as its reputation suggested. If 
DQ\WKLQJ LW ZDV SURYLGLQJ D VHUYLFH E\ ULGGLQJ UHJLPHQWV RI WKH µDEQRUPDOV¶ DQG
µGHJHQHUDWHV¶ZKRRXJKWQRWWRKDYHHYHQEHHQLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKHDUP\LQWKHILUVW
                                                     
374
 Porch, March to the Marne, p. 129. 
375
 Journal de Charleroi, 28 September 1910. 
376
 Ibid., 8 June 1911. 
377
 Plenum.be. Chamber of Representatives Debates, 31 January 1905. 
 186 
place.378 Notwithstanding, public opinion was with the former view and pushed for its 
closure, especially following claims that there was no proper system in place to guard 
against abuses. Indeed, reports constantly circulated that despite annual inspections, 
during which inmates were allowed to speak freely about their experiences, it was a 
known fact that military culture did not allow this and any man brave enough to speak 
out against the establishment would be severely punished as soon as the officials had 
left.379 Eventually, however, the humanitarian movement succeeded and Vilvoorde was 
finally confined to history in 1913 but not without its own measure of controversy. 
A new wave of criticism was directed at the Government for the timing of this 
decision, which happened to coincide with the introduction of general service later that 
year. A number of socialist writers penned cynical remarks on this subject, claiming 
that it was only as a result of the inevitably increased bourgeois presence in the ranks 
that such an abominable institution was being done away with so as to protect them 
from its horrors.380 One such example by a socialist officer, writing in the Journal de 
Charleroi, brought the class struggle to the fore. A number of laws had been passed in 
recent years in an apparent attempt to improve conditions for the incoming bourgeois 
recruits that would never have been contemplated prior to universal conscription. 
Reduced periods of service, a new system for university companies, regional 
recruitment, increased leave, a paternalistic movement among officers, and above all 
the reorganisation of the disciplinary and correctional companies with the closure of 
Vilvoorde, were but a few implementations to support this claim.381 Nevertheless, there 
is no evidence to suggest that there was a co-ordinated governmental initiative to this 
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end, though it certainly created a platform for critics to voice their opinions. Leaving 
the wider political agenda aside, what this pointed towards, in military terms, was 
simply another failure by the State to fulfil its role in sufficiently protecting the men 
entrusted to it.  
 Paternalism in command, and by extension in the application of discipline, was 
a concept that was establishing itself in many European armies as a result of changing 
social ideals as the nineteenth century drew to a close. With the army being the veritable 
µVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶LWDSSHDUHGHVVHQWLDOWKDW%HOJLDQRIILFHUVHPEUDFHWKLVUROH<HW
the prolongation of poor conditions and mistreatment of soldiers, particularly in 
institutions such as Vilvoorde beyond the turn of the century, overshadowed attempts 
by some conscientious officers to institute this new style of command. Even the 
FHOHEUDWHG3UXVVLDQ*HQHUDO&ROPDUYRQGHU*ROW]ZDVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJµWRGD\PRUH
than ever before [officers must] be an elite, an aristocracy in the nation, not an 
DULVWRFUDF\RIELUWKDQ\PRUHEXWDQLQWHOOHFWXDODQGPRUDODULVWRFUDF\¶LQRUGHUWRPRUH
UHDGLO\H[WROWKHYLUWXHVRIVRIWHUGLVFLSOLQHWKDWZRXOGFDOOWRWKHµKHDUWV¶DQGµUHDVRQ¶
of soldiers entering the ranks.382 Similarly, the Adjutant-Major of the 10th Line Infantry 
Regiment suggested that modern discipline had to consist of men wanting to do their 
RIILFHUV¶ZLOO7RDFKLHYHWKLVKHEHOLHYHGWKDW 
We must get to know the parents of our soldiers, show them that we 
love their sons, that their well-being is our greatest concern, and that we will 
push ourselves to keep them as good, and as attached to their paternal homes, 
as when they were conferred to us; and in return we will have the affection of 
the entire family and the devotion RIRXUPHQ¶383  
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7KLVZDVWKHYHU\HVVHQFHRIZKDWZDVPHDQWE\WKHµVFKRRORIWKHQDWLRQ¶DQGIROORZHG
the evolving values of Belgian society. If anything, these beliefs of how the youth of 
the nation ought to have been treated whilst under arms was much longer standing, and 
the fact that it took until the turn of the century for these ideas to permeate the army at 
large is indicative of its underlying failings. If armies were a reflection of the nation, 
then Belgium was far less progressive in its civil attitude than it cared to portray. 
 
 The nineteenth century was a transformative period of social ideals that created 
demands on the State at various levels of civilian and military life. Belgium was no 
exception and perhaps expected even more as a result of a long-established, ingrained 
anti-militarism that caused parents of successive generations to pressure the authorities 
to make time spent with the colours both physically bearable and morally sound for 
their sons. A belief that standing armies were a despotic tool did little to commend the 
idea of the barracks to the wider population. Knowledge of their unsanitary conditions 
and the despicable antics that occurred in them created unequivocal hostility. Severe 
health risks, particularly of contracting ophthalmia or venereal disease, were not 
adequately dealt with by the State until the 1870s, by which time countless men had 
been incapacitated to the point where they were all but unemployable upon their 
discharge and were only in receipt of a meagre pension that did not begin to compensate 
them for their loss. Poor conditions, coupled with corruptive elements, led to a degree 
of moral degeneration that caused particular concern among the Catholic population. 
Spiritual guidance was seen as essential, but the political battle between the Catholics 
and Liberals created vacuums in its application whilst under arms when the latter were 
in power. Not only did this go against the much cherished liberty of thought preached 
in Belgium, but it also deprived many men of their traditional source of sustenance. The 
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school debates brought this particular issue into sharp focus as it was believed that 
clerical education was not producing good enough results and was providing the army 
with men that were incapable of understanding what was demanded of them. 
Disciplinary issues were a persistent problem and opinion was divided over the root 
cause. Liberals tended to blame clerical education, Catholics emphasised linguistic 
prejudices. Flemish discrimination was a common narrative in nineteenth century 
Belgium, particularly in the army. Whether it was the determining factor in the higher 
number of Flemish disciplinary cases is difficult to categorically establish but certainly 
conditions were made more difficult for them in the courts-martial process that only 
recognised the use of French until the beginning of the twentieth century. Language 
was only part of the issue. The severity of punishments that the youth of the nation was 
subjected to became increasingly detached from the social ideals of a modern society 
that was following a wider European trend of humanitarianism. Various forms of 
incarceration, coupled with extensive periods of hard labour in poor conditions, brought 
the debate full circle and once again demonstrated the inDGHTXDFLHV RI WKH DUP\¶V
DWWHPSW WR EH WKH PRUDOLVLQJ µVFKRRO RI WKH QDWLRQ¶ ,WV RXW-dated practices failed to 
establish an enduring tradition of paternalism in its officers and meant that by the 
outbreak of the First World War, the Belgian Army was somewhat detached from the 








Chapter 4 - The Auxiliary Forces 
 
Despite the regular army assuming primacy in the role of defending Belgian 
LQWHJULW\ IURP'XWFKDJJUHVVLRQGXULQJ WKHV LWZDV WKHQDVFHQW6WDWH¶VFLWL]HQ
militias that had taken the initiative during the September Revolution and upon whose 
basis the armed forces were nominally established. Article 122 of the Constitution 
provided for the continued existence of a Civic Guard, whereas the army required 
parliamentary consent, albeit a formality, to raise its annual levies. Inspired and 
partially borne out of the French National Guard and Dutch Schutterij as a 
counterweight to anarchy and despotism, this amateur force, which safeguarded its 
principles through the election of officers up to the rank of captain inclusive, formed a 
recognisable backbone to national security and internal law and order.384 Nevertheless, 
its popularity as an institution proved more theoretical than practical. Much like the 
army, the Civic Guard conscripted all able-bodied men, with a few exemptions, 
between the ages of 21 and 50 ± latterly 21 and 40 - with the financial means to equip 
WKHPVHOYHVHVWDEOLVKLQJZKDW)UDQV9DQ.DONHQKDVUHIHUUHGWRDVDQµLQVWUXPHQWRI
FODVV¶385 Despite predominantly engaging the urban bourgeoisie with an ideal motive 
for service, as a group, they were no more inspired by a Rousseauian ideal of social 
duty through their participation in the Civic Guard, than they had been through their 
H[RUELWDQWHIIRUWVWRHVFDSHWKHDUP\¶VDQQXDOEDOORW386  
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 It has been argued that the very existence of the French National Guard expressed a 
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This decline in enthusiasm and participation gradually translated into 
unpreparedness for their dual role as an aid to the civil power and as a support to the 
regular army. In maintaining its largely bourgeois composition, the Civic Guard was 
nominally well poised to deal with the proletarian threat of the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Yet, its political orientation towards Liberalism, which was to be 
expected from a predominantly urban force, made it more prone to support the socialist 
movement against the Catholic Government after 1884. This resulted in les bleus ± the 
infantry formations of the Civic Guard ± and les vertes ± the mounted and artillery 
volunteer units known as the Corps Spéciaux, being considered increasingly unreliable. 
The Constitution, which protected the few remaining aspects of the foUFH¶V
revolutionary essence, prevented the necessary organisational reform required to 
establish it as an effective military support for both State and army. Consequently, its 
presence waned with time as local authorities turned increasingly to the regular army 
and the Gendarmerie ± itself an institution reconstituted from the Dutch Maréchaussées 
± to provide unconditional support in times of crisis.387 When faced with the prospect 
of an external threat, the Civic Guard was perceived as being even less effective, despite 
repeated attempts to militarise it. Similar obstacles were placed in the way of reformers, 
who were combatting both a deep-rooted anti-militarism as well as Constitutional 
safeguards in their battle to emulate the Prussian system. While many Civic Guardsmen 
welcomed the proposed changes that would reinvigorate the institution, the 1897 Law 
achieved little in the way of establishing it as a suitable reserve for the army either. 
Ultimately, it meandered into the twentieth century as a force that had been 
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marginalised by the State, army and society over successive generations and was now 
recognisable only for its distinctive hats and with a reputation for military 
ineffectiveness.  
 
'XULQJ WKH EORRG\ GD\V RI $XJXVW DQG 6HSWHPEHU  WKH FDSLWDO¶V 
bourgeoisie took measures to arm itself in order to protect individual and property 
rights. By the time of its formal recognition, the 864 volunteers present constituted the 
only recognisable, armed force in the city prepared to retain order.388 Across the 
country, sporadic corps were being established for similar purposes as well as to aid the 
revolutionary cause. Such a movement could not be ignored and the Provisional 
Government decreed on 30 September that the Garde Urbaine Bruxelloise be organised 
into an official corps, which was later extended to encompass all such units on 26 
October under the banner of the Civic Guard. It was formalised in law on 31 December 
and, in so doing, passed from the realms of a spontaneous expression of civil will to an 
organised body under State jurisdiction. Moreover, devolved organisation to municipal 
authorities and recruitment by commune did little to reassert the spirit of the 
Revolution. The decentralisation of government was fundamental to the new regime 
but even this SHRSOH¶VDUP\VWUXJJOHGWRUHWDLQLWVOLEHUW\RIDFWLRQRXWVLGHRIWKHXUEDQ
centres in which it was solely constituted after 1848 and even here its autonomy was 
questionable.  
With the possible exception of the Corps Spéciaux, which saw wealthy 
volunteers with a martial spirit form independent mounted and artillery units, the Civic 
Guard, as an institution, relinquished an even greater proportion of its original essence 
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 -9HUVFKDHUHQ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with the introduction of conscription after 1848. Despite solidifying its bourgeois 
coPSRVLWLRQ WKURXJK DQ REOLJDWLRQ WR IXUQLVK RQH¶V RZQ XQLIRUP DW Dn expense of 
approximately 60 francs, its organisation upon military lines detracted from its appeal. 
Divided initially into three bands comprising of unmarried men without children aged 
21 to 30, unmarried men without children aged 31 to 50, and finally the rest, escaping 
service from the regulars through replacement or substitution appeared to offer little 
reward. Certainly, training was less frequent, though nonetheless onerous - reduced 
from twelve to eight days annually in 1853 following a string of complaints ± and the 
unsanitary barracks were entirely avoided. Nevertheless, the fact that both the civil and 
military authorities possessed the power to call men out to serve anywhere in the 
country gave the impression of little differentiation between auxiliary and regular 
service, resulting in a number of men concocting excuses or even moving domicile in 
order to escape the charge.389  
7KH&LYLF*XDUG¶VXWLOLW\ZDVLQFUHDVLQJO\TXHVWLRQHGGXULng the 1830s as both 
internal and external threats subsided. The burden of militarisation coupled with severe 
lack of funds for facilities and equipment did little to reignite a desire for service among 
its members. It was briefly revived in spectacular fashion as a result of its performance 
during the Risquons-Tout troubles of 1848 but once again waned with the passing of 
the immediate danger. The 1853 revision of the 1848 Law dictated that only cities and 
agglomerated communes with a population above 10,000, or towns dominated by a 
fortress, could retain an active Civic Guard. Previously, the threshold had been as low 
as 3,000 inhabitants. This resulted in a reduction in the number of units and the overall 
establishment from 1848 onwards, when thirty-two legions ± a term denoting a force 
of approximately 1,600 guards ± received their colours for services rendered, were 
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reduced to just twenty in 1860; twenty-one in 1875; and twenty-four in 1893.390 In 
numbers, this saw just 29,274 active Civic Guards in 1860, translating to 0.6% of the 
population, rising minimally to 43,311 in 1893, equivalent to 0.7%. Its non-active 
establishment was far more imposing, numbering some 200,400 men in 1860, though 
it existed principally on paper.391  
The 1897 Law altered the organisation of the Civic Guard further, creating just 
two active bands, comprising of men aged 21 to 32 and 33 to 40 respectively. This was 
a policy aimed at reducing the military burden upon society by releasing those who 
were too old to be of military value whilst increasing its military proficiency. 
Effectiveness, it was hoped, would offset the loss in numbers. Training was increased 
in the first band to thirty, two-hour training sessions for the first year of service, and 
ten such sessions for those in the second band who had not previously received any 
training. A proficiency test was required and, if passed, saw guards expected to attend 
just ten exercises per year in the first band and three in the second. Even the uniform, 
which had undergone a series of minor alterations in the preceding decades to recapture 
the bourgeois spirit, was remilitarised with the mandatory addition of the capote and 
havre-sac.392 For the government, who had been toying with the idea of introducing 
voluntary enlistment in the regular forces, a more militarily effective Civic Guard 
provided a further buffer against the introduction of obligatory service. 
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Supporting the Civic Guard in its internal policing role was the Gendarmerie. 
Its organisation and recruitment was, naturally, even more militarised and regulated 
than its auxiliary counterpart, ensuring a much more stable existence and increasingly 
prominent role. As early as 24 October 1830, the Dutch Government called upon all 
men of the Maréchausseé to return to the Netherlands to resume service against the 
Belgian revolutionaries. Only a minority did so. Significantly, 18 officers chose to 
remain in Belgium and resume service under the Provisional Government.393 Among 
them, was the iconic figure of Lieutenant Prudent-Joseph Deladière whose initiative 
had inspired this realignment of allegiance after he rode at the head of 140 horsemen 
from Mons to Brussels on the 1 October to demonstrably lend a hand to the 
revolutionary effort.394 After providing useful service to the 3rd Heavy Cavalry Brigade 
in 1831 and 1832, the military squadrons were disbanded and the force assumed its dual 
peacetime role of maintaining internal law and order as well as acting as military 
provosts. 
Administratively, the Gendarmerie was divided into three territorial divisions 
(subsequently four and then five Groups in 1908 and 1913 respectively) of three 
companies each. The 1st Division covered the regions of Brabant, Hainaut and Namur, 
the 2nd Division, oversaw Antwerp and the two Flanders, and the 3rd Division covered 
Liège, Limbourg and Luxembourg. These were then subsequently broken down into a 
further twenty-seven Lieutenancies ± usually the large cities ± and then into 191 
Brigades, establishing a wide geographical distribution of State force across the 
country. By 1875 this had been increased to 211 Brigades and by the turn of the century 
to a comprehensive 329. In 1860, it could boast an establishment of 40 officers and 
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1,327 men (909 mounted and 418 on foot). By 1875 this had risen to 46 officers and 
1,551 men (1,086 mounted and 486 on foot) and by 1900 there were 65 officers and 
2,843 men under arms (1,727 mounted and 1,116 on foot).395 This increase of 214% in 
under half a century was symptomatic of its value in aiding the civil power during the 
turbulent years that accompanied the rise of socialist agitation in many urban centres. 
By the outbreak of war it totalled an incredible 3,696.396 
Recruitment for the Gendarmerie was very different from the Civic Guard and 
was based on the French and Dutch systems out of which it had spawned. Engagements 
were for six years, reduced to four or two for those who had completed a Regular 
engagement. Ideally, only ex-VHUYLFHPHQ RI ILYH \HDUV¶ H[SHULHQFH ZLWK H[HPSODU\
conduct records were to be admitted, in addition to the general criteria of being 
unmarried, under forty years of age, literate and above the height threshold of 170 
FHQWLPHWUHV¶´IRUIRRWVROGLHUVDQGFHQWLPHWUHV¶´IRUPRXQWHGWURRSV,Q
times of poor recruitment, these parameters were naturally bent to a certain degree, and 
civilians were even enrolled providing they met the majority of them. For example, 
between 1849 and 1852, out of 373 men recruited into the Gendarmerie, 82 had been 
NCOs in the regular army, 202 had been private soldiers and 89 had had no previous 
military experience.397 The proportion of NCOs was indicative of the nature and role 
of the force, which was required to remain detached from the civilian population in the 
performance of its duty, which quite often was carried out by small groups of three or 
four men alone. The necessity for good characters to maintain discipline was 
paramount. 
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From its inception, the bourgeois character of the Civic Guard was never in 
doubt. The obligation to furnish their own uniforms, coupled with a desire to protect 
their stake in the establishment, provided both a physical and abstract restriction to the 
more undesirable elements of society from taking part. Complete, or even sufficiently 
informative, roll books for the Civic Guard are rare and make a consistent temporal and 
geographical analysis of its social composition difficult to accurately determine, though 
a general impression can still be obtained from the isolated study of a number of 
individual units oYHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHFHQWXU\)RUH[DPSOH5LFKDUG&RHQHQ¶VVWXG\
of 367 Antwerp guards in 1838 underscored the perception of the Civic Guard as a 
bourgeois institution by asserting that 75.4% of them belonged to some form of trade 
or industry.398 By the end of the century, this appears to have altered little in the 
FRXQWU\¶VXUEDQFHQWUHV$VDPSOHRIJXDUGVIURP%UXVVHOVLQVXJJHVWVWKDW
69.73% belonged to a similar demographic of shop men, clerks, mechanics and 
artisans.399 In contrast, however, an examination of an active rural unit in West Flanders 
in 1848 revealed an altogether different, though not entirely unsurprising, social 
composition. Of the 140 listed occupations, 99 were farmers which, with the addition 
of a single shepherd, accounted for 71.43% of the establishment, compared to just 
26.44% employed in trade or industry.400 Whilst this clearly reflects the occupational 




 AER Schollaert-Helleputte Papers, Pos.2515/372, Enrolment lists of the Brussels 
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complexion of the urban-rural divide, it equally demonstrates the popularity and 
extension of the force in response to the upheaval of 1848. Notwithstanding, once the 
immediate danger had passed and service was again burdensome, many of these units 
were disbanded under the revised Law of 1853. 
Indeed, by the time that the 1867 Recruiting Commission discussed the 
proposition of recasting the Civic Guard into a reserve force similar to the Prussian 
Landwehr, the urban dominance had once again been re-established. In seeking to raise 
30,000 men for this task, the committee suggested that there were approximately 
150,000 untapped campagnards who were eligible for service but for the law restricting 
active Civic Guard units to the major towns and cities.401 This was deemed too large a 
number and the matter was dropped. However, with the passing of time, a simmering 
discontent began to be expressed regarding the obvious injustice of the system. A 
proposed article in the 1897 Law allowing the Government to decide which rural areas 
to agglomerate for the purposes of raising a Civic Guard battalion appeared arbitrary to 
say the least. Residents of Antwerp, for example, became agitated when it was 
discovered that the city dwellers would be compelled to serve in the force whilst the 
inhabitants of the neighbouring suburbs of Berchem and Borgerhout were likely to 
escape the charge. Moreover, this was not a new phenomenon. It transpired that 
politicians seeking election had, for some time, been garnering votes on the basis of 
promises to use their influence in Parliament to avoid the extension of the Civic Guard 
into their localities.402 It very much reflected the sentiment expressed in La Belgique 
Militaire in 1871, which stated that the respectable elements of society would not wish 
to fight at the critical hour if other social groups ± particularly labourers ± were not 
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equally compelled to. Yet they, along with the authorities, would be similarly 
disinclined to constitute it on an egalitarian basis for fear of exposing it to the influence 
of the International and, in so doing, creating an instrument of revolution.403 This was 
just one of the many dichotomies of the Civic Guard that persisted beyond the 1897 
reform. 
As part of an attempt to re-militarise the force, the age parameters of the two 
DFWLYHEDQGVZHUHDOWHUHGDQGWKHXSSHUDJHOLPLWZDVUHGXFHGIURPWR&RHQHQ¶V
analysis of the Antwerp Civic Guard in 1838 revealed that 56.4% of men were under 
the age of 35, with the majority falling between 30 and 35.404 By contrast, the Deerlijk 
companies only counted 24.48% of their recruits between the same ages. Their 
proportion of younger men was higher by 12% whilst there was only one man above 
the age of 40 in its ranks.405 This was partly a result of its occupational composition, 
which VDZPDQ\PRUHODERXUHUVIDUPHUVLQ'HHUOLMN¶V case) among its ranks, whose 
average age was between one and two years lower than men in trade or industry. An 
examination of the Brussels Civic Guard both before and after the introduction of the 
1897 Law bears out this correlation even further. As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, the 
overall average age of an urban unit dominated by typically bourgeois occupations was 
as high as 36.48 before the reform and 31.33 after it. Unsurprisingly it was the Second 
Band whose average age fell dramatically by six years as opposed to WKH)LUVW%DQG¶V
This was largely a result of the higher ages associated with the trading classes who 
accounted for 41.52% of all departures on account of age. 406 The effect on the social 
composition was only minor, with the professional and labouring classes slightly 
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 Figure. 4.1. Occupational profile of the Brussels Civic Guard either side of the 
1897 Law.407 
 
increasing their respective positions within it, but ultimately the status-quo was 
maintained albeit in a more physically able form.  
If the labouring classes were comparatively absent in the regular units of the 
Civic Guard, then their presence in the Corps Spéciaux was effectively non-existent. 
These mounted and artillery units, generally restricted to populous cities or areas of 
strategic importance, formed the pinnacle of bourgeois militarism through recourse to 
voluntary enlistment. In his study of the Liège units, Francis Balace noted the presence 
of the Liberal-bourgeoisie in the Chasseurs à Pied and an even more upper-class 
composition in the artillery and cavalry corps.408 The cost of up to 100 francs more for 
equipment and eccentric uniforms inspired by the Second Empire, the equivalent to 
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1st Band 28.15 19.09% 34.42% 7.29% 21.36% 17.84% 
2nd Band 42.89 12.96% 42.22% 9.81% 22.22% 12.78% 






1st Band 27.13 18.48% 33.64% 8.18% 21.21% 18.48% 
2nd Band 36.62 15.91% 42.42% 7.58% 18.18% 15.91% 
Overall 31.33 17.34% 37.54% 7.91% 19.87% 17.34% 
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PRUH WKDQDPRQWK¶V VDODU\ IRUDZHOO-paid worker, safeguarded their exclusivity.409 
This was precisely what happened during the 1886 riots when a number of Corps 
Spéciaux were spontaneously raised in which many workers, who had decided not to 
strike, were unable to join their local units on account of the financial requirements.410 
This was not to say that men of lower standing were completely absent from these 
corps, particularly in 1886, but their zeal and willingness to sustain the burdens of time 
and cost after the immediate danger had passed certainly reduced their numbers. 
Indeed, their social exclusivity was hardly ever in doubt under ordinary 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV HVSHFLDOO\ JLYHQ WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH QDWLRQ¶V SHHUDJH LQ WKHVH
formations. Amongst others, Count Frédéric de Mérode was killed in November 1830 
serving with the Chasseurs à Pied de Bruxelles (along with the French actor Jenneval, 
who is largely believed to have written the lyrics to the Brabançonne), whilst the 
Marquis de Chasteleer formed and led what would become the first squadron of the 
Chasseurs Éclaireurs in FebruaU\  (YHQ E\  WKH DULVWRFUDF\¶V LQIOXHQFH
UHPDLQHG XQGLPLQLVKHG DV &RXQW *DVWRQ G¶$HUVFKRW HVWDEOLVKHG WKH ILUVW RI WZR
companies of the Chasseurs Belges Volontaires.411 In the absence of enrolment lists, a 
detailed breakdown of their social composition is impossible, but it is not too 
implausible to suggest that a combination of their voluntary status, higher upkeep costs 
and aristocratic participation produced an even greater middle-class stranglehold within 
these units than in the ordinary formations. 
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 Often described as amateurs and belittled for displaying a misplaced pomposity 
and self-importance, these units ought to have been more readily commended for their 
solitary expression of a volunteering military tradition in Belgium.412 Those who 
recognised this feat often favourably compared them to the British Rifle Volunteers 
with whom they, and members of the Civic Guard in general, would come into contact 
on a number of occasions during the 1860s and 1870s for an annual shooting 
competition held alternately on Wimbledon Common and in Brussels. This coming 
together of amateur soldiery, which also included contingents from across Europe in 
the form of the Dutch Schutterij and French National Guard, was as much an exercise 
in marksmanship as it was an opportunity to share experiences and ideas. For the 
Belgian Civic Guard, it was an opportunity to observe the Rifle Volunteers whom they 
held in high esteem. It was hoped by many in Belgium that such encounters might 
inspire a similar middle-class militarism into units other than the Corps Speciaux. 
Intelligent men, as Lieutenant Verstrate noted in 1866, formed ± or could form ± a 
useful military force; the difficulty was to engage them willingly for a protracted period 
of time.413 Ironically, however, Ian Beckett argued that by 1862 the social composition 
RIWKH9ROXQWHHUVKDGEHJXQWRFKDQJHIURPµWKHRULJLQDOPLGGOHFODVVLGHDOWRDZRUNLQJ
FODVVUHDOLW\¶414 This rather left the Belgians pining after an illusionary ideal, though 
not without reason. Despite this supposed difference in social composition between the 
two, it was the British contestants who were somewhat taken aback at the lack of social 
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graces demonstrated by the exuberant Belgians in 1866. Their cries and shouts 
contrasted markedly with the tacit acceptance of the results by their British hosts.415 
 7KH&LYLF*XDUG¶VRIILFHUFRUSVUHSUHVHQWHGWKHODVWYHVWLJHRIWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\
spirit through the quinquennial election of its NCOs and officers up to the rank of 
Captain inclusive ± with the exception of the Sergeant-Major who was nominated by 
WKH FRUSV¶ &DSWDLQ 7KH PRUH VHQLRU UDQNV ZHUH DSSRLQWHG E\ WKH .LQJ XSRQ EHLQJ
SUHVHQWHGZLWKDOLVWRIFDQGLGDWHVQRPLQDWHGE\WKHXQLW¶VQHZO\HOHFWHGMXQLRURIILFHUV
This system, although to be applauded for its endeavour in adhering not only to the 
Constitution but also to the essence of the original institution, proved to be more 
problematic through its abuses and inefficiency than it was worth. It furnished neither 
qualified nor apolitical men to these influential posts, which ultimately contributed, in 
SDUWWRWKHIRUFH¶VHYHQWXDOGHPLVH 
In terms of its social composition, the senior administrative and staff roles were 
almost exclusively the preserve of the professional classes. Of the twenty-eight officers 
to have occupied roles from Inspector General down to Chief of Staff of the Brussels 
Commander of the Civic Guard between 1831 and 1914, 12 were of a military 
background, nine were from the professions, six were merchants or civil servants, and 
one was classified as an agricultural labourer ± although this individual was himself the 
son of an established Luxembourg landed family that had become impoverished during 
the French Revolution.416 Similarly, of the 32 men to have commanded one of the three 
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Brussels legions (subsequently two regiments) over the same period, two were soldiers, 
14 were from the professions and six were merchants.417 Finally, of the 40 men to have 
held the post of Commander of one of the Brussels Corps Sepciaux, a similar picture 
evolved. 13 were soldiers, 18 were from the professions, three were merchants, one was 
a plumber, two were artisans and two were not stated.418 Not only does this demonstrate 
a firm grip on the senior ranks by the traditionally reliable classes of society, but also 
the purposeful appointment of men with military experience. 
A not too dissimilar pattern can be found in the election of junior officers. Data 
from the 1894 election of the 12 non-active battalions in the province of Luxembourg 
demonstrates a degree of conscientiousness among the rank and file in appointing what 
were deemed more suitable candidates to the vacant roles (Figure. 4.2). In what was a 
rural region where the proportion of the labouring classes (i.e. farmers) was particularly 
high, it is noticeable that almost an equal number from the professions were elected to  
Figure. 4.2. Social breakdown of junior officers from 12 non-active Luxembourg 
Civic Guard units.419  






 $UFKLYHVG¶eWDWG¶$UORQ$($-168, Data computed from election rolls of 
twelve companies in the Province of Luxembourg. These were: Athies, Attert, 
Aubange, Bellefontaine, Bonnert, Etalle, Messaney, Pelrunes, Rossignal, Saint-
Vincent, Sélange, and Tintigny. 
Rank Professions 
Shop men / 
Clerks 
Mechanics Artisans Labourers 
Captains 34.62% 11.54% 7.69% 7.69% 38.46% 
Lieutenants 11.54% 19.23% 3.85% 7.69% 57.69% 
Sub-
Lieutenants 
9.62% 5.77% 7.69% 5.77% 71.14% 
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captaincies.  More striking, even, was the inverse relationship between the professions 
and labouring classes when it came to the election of Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants. 
A concerted effort appears to have been made to appoint men of education and high 
standing within the local community to ranks with a larger degree of responsibility, and 
those of the more numerous farming class as subalterns. Not only was this a prudent 
measure in terms of binding a more intelligent class of recruit to the more taxing posts, 
but similarly ensuring that the more representative social group were in a position to 
liaise more readily with a rank and file of a comparable standing. 
 Unsurprisingly, this attempted professionalization, as seen in the Civic Guard, 
was far more common in the Gendarmerie. Indeed, every Inspector General, Corps 
Commander and Commandant of the 1st Division between 1830 and 1914 could boast 
a military or Gendarme background. Indeed, whereas the senior ranks in the Civic 
Guard were almost exclusively reserved as a final post in a military career (only two 
assumed another post afterwards), ten out of 36 senior officers in the Gendarmerie went 
on to re-enter the Regular army. Similarly, of the 33 Captains Commandant and 
Captains of the Brabant Company only four could claim to have come from a non-
military career prior to entering the Gendarmerie.420 This homogeneity, experience and 
professionalism were not only imperative in the successful undertaking of its more 
strenuous tasks, but also provided local authorities with a guaranteed source of steel in 
times of social unrest, which was often found lacking in the Civic Guard. 
Professionalism and quality were not always guaranteed through the election of 
officers in the Civic Guard, however. Although there were instances such as the 
aforementioned case in Luxembourg when candidates who nominally possessed the 
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right credentials were elevated to prominent positions, the very nature of quinquennial 
elections made the composition of the officer corps fluid, and more importantly, open 
to consistent and regular abuse. As early as 1832, reports were sent back from the 
provinces to the Minister of War, which demonstrated the inherent problem in 
entrusting uninformed men with a vote, particularly given how uncustomary it was in 
FLYLOLDQ OLIH :KHUHDV WKH FRPPXQH RI 9LHOVDP UHWXUQHG µVDWLVIDFWRU\ UHVXOWV¶ WKH 
commander of Paliseul reported, µWKHFKRices, without being good, are the least bad 
SRVVLEOH¶'XUEX\FRXOGORRNIRUZDUGWREHLQJFRPPDQGHGE\µLJQRUDQWDQGLQFDSDEOH
RIILFHUV¶421 Over time, provisions were introduced to guard against incompetence, such 
as exam commissions with the power to dismiss both officers and NCOs who failed to 
meet the required standard. Nevertheless, the system remained fallible as only a 
minority of candidates were ever rejected and reports concerning the quality of 
command at all levels remained a cause for concern. Indeed, between 1861 and 1875, 
for example, 3,570 officer candidates and 4,259 NCO candidates were examined by the 
commission, of which only 75 and 72 respectively were dismissed on grounds of 
incompetence.422 
Transgressions of an altogether worse nature were not uncommon. Reports of 
cliques developing amongst officers and men intent on rigging elections began to 
surface. /H &RXULHU GH O¶(VFDXW related such a case in 1848, where senior officers 
managed to eliminate one of their peers from the list of candidates to be submitted for 
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, despite his obvious popularity among the men.423 
Likewise, Le Progrès claimed that malicious elements in Ypres had deliberately 
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committed bureaucratic infractions to prevent an election from occurring in which they 
feared a negative result.424 These misdemeanours were not isolated events. Indeed, the 
Minister of the Interior, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemans, was so appalled by the extent of 
manipulation being used that he felt compelled to write a warning to the Governor of 
Brabant.425 Lists of candidates for senior ranks had been submitted with the intention 
of making one man alone stand out as the obvious choice for the nomination. This had 
EHHQGRQHE\ZULWLQJFRPPHQWVVXFKDVµFRPSODFHQW¶µZRXOGUHIXVHWKHUDQN¶RU µLV
XQVXLWHG¶QH[WWRWKHQDPHVRIWKHDOWHUQDWLYHVZKRLQVRPHH[WUHPHFDVHVZHUHQR
more than fictitious characters who did not even appear on the enrolment registers.426 
Thankfully for the Ministry, a law was in place that allowed them to reject or 
reformulate lists if they deemed it necessary. 
Nevertheless, bias remained ever-present and, if not conducted on the grounds 
of personality, was often susceptible to political agitation. /¶(FKRGX3DUOHPHQW wrote 
on 11 February 1874 that the Civic Guard had a political character and it was decidedly 
Liberal. This had been preceded in 1873 with a report on officer elections in which the 
VDPHQHZVSDSHUVWDWHGµ2Q6XQGD\WKH&LYLF*XDUGHOHFWLRQVLQ$QWZHUSFaused a 
lively agitation. The victory belonged to the Liberals, because these elections were 
FRQGXFWHGRQSROLWLFDOJURXQGV¶427 The infiltration ± almost monopolisation ± of the 
&LYLF *XDUG¶V VHQLRU UDQNV ZDV VHHQ DV DQ DWWHPSW WR WXUQ WKH IRUFH LQWR D SDUW\
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instrument. /H &RXULHU GH O¶(VFDXW ZURWH µ(YHU\ZKHUH ZKHUH WKH\ ZHUH DEOH WR
exclude the Catholics from obtaining positions as officers they made sure to do so, 
LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH FDQGLGDWHV¶ FUHGHQWLDOV RU PLOLWDU\ FDSDFLWLHV¶428 This appears to 
have been the case across the country. In Brussels, of the 23 Legion and Regiment 
Commanders whose political leanings were recorded, 20 were Liberals, two were 
Catholics and one was an Orangist serving immediately after the Revolution. A similar 
FRPSOH[LRQZDVDOVRIRXQGLQWKHFDSLWDO¶VCorps Speciaux commanders, where 20 of 
the 25 known cases were also of a Liberal persuasion.429 On the rare occasion where a 
Catholic candidate succeeded in overcoming the political hurdles to become elected, 
such as in Tournai in 1878, there were calls to build on this minor victory to wrest back 
the momentum from the Liberals in other units as well as in the communal elections.430 
Given the political orientation of the urban bourgeoisie, typically Liberal, and the 1853 
Law restricting the establishment of Civic Guard units outside of cities with a 
population of 10,000, this proved difficult to achieve. If the Catholics managed to 
ODUJHO\ UHVWUDLQ WKHLUSROLWLFDO RSSRQHQWV¶ LQIOXHQFH LQ WKH DUP\DIWHU WKHQ WKH
Liberals certainly achieved an equivalent stranglehold within the Civic Guard, the 
unintentional consequence of which was to intensify calls for the introduction of 
obligatory service in the army due to the continued incompetence emanating from an 
uninspiring, unqualified and ultimately biased officer corps. 
 
In 1872, the then Colonel Alexis Brialmont wrote a pamphlet entitled Ce Que 
Vaut la Garde Civique, questioning the utility and continued existence of the force. In 
his opinion,  
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The principal causes of weakness in the Civic Guard are: the election 
RIRIILFHUVE\WKHLUVXERUGLQDWHV>«@WKHUHQHZDORIHOHFWLRQVDQGQRPLQDWLRQV
every five years; >«@WKHODFNRIH[HUFLVHVWKHSRRUPDLQWHQDQFHRIDUPDPHQWV
and the inefficiency of disciplinary measures, that imbues neither order, nor the 
respect of authority, nor strict and prompt obedience, without which an 
organised force does not exist.431 
The inflammatory remarks attacked not only the Constitutional guarantees protecting 
WKHHOHFWLRQRIRIILFHUVEXWTXHVWLRQHGWKHODWWHU¶VDELOLW\WRDGHTXDWHO\IXOILOWKHLUWDVN
The repercussions reverberated throughout the country, spurring many an indignant 
Civic Guardsman to pen riposts defending the institution, which, as officers, they were 
SURXGWRVHUYHµ7KH\KDYHXQDQLPRXVO\GHFLGHGWRSURWHVW>«@DQG,DJUHHZLWKDOOWKH
SRLQWVLQWKHLUSLHFH¶ZURWHWKH0DMRU-General of the Gent Civic Guard.432 Whilst this 
indignation was to be expected, it could not mask the valid points raised in the pamphlet 
regarding the organisation of the Civic Guard, which, by extension, questioned its 
ability to meaningfully undertake either of its roles as an aid to the civil power or as a 
reserve force to the army. 
 The timing of the publication ought not to be forgotten in the analysis of its 
arguments. It formed part of the extensive literature in circulation following another 
resounding victory of the Prussian military system over what many had considered to 
be the best army in the world at the time. Unsurprisingly European states began a 
sustained period of self-assessment surrounding their armed forces and sought to 
emulate, to various degrees, the all-conquering Prussian model. Belgium was no 
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different. As previously alluded to, the Recruitment Commission of 1867 was 
established in the wake of the Austro-Prussian War to discuss many of the same 
principles. Deliberation concerning the Civic Guard centred on this very debate: to what 
extent should the force act as an internal police force or, as was now the fashion, an 
equivalent to the Prussian Landwehr? 
 However, for those wishing to militarise the Civic Guard, the Constitution, 
guaranteeing its existence and elections, merely appeared archaic and a hindrance to 
the establishment of a viable role for the force in the modern world. Brialmont pointed 
out that its function as a counter-weight to a standing army may have been important 
in an age when it was comprised of mercenaries in the pay of a despotic monarch, but 
since it KDG DQG ZRXOG LQFUHDVLQJO\ EHFRPH µD UHXQLRQ RI KRQRXUDEOH FLWL]HQV
representing all classes of society, they no longer pose[d] any danger to the liberties 
WKDW WKH\ KHOSHG FRQTXHU DQG VZRUH WR GHIHQG¶433 In so doing, he brought the very 
HVVHQFH RI WKH &LYLF *XDUG¶V H[LVWHQFH LQWR TXHVWLRQ ZKLFK DJDLQ SURPSWHG VZLIW
UHWDOLDWLRQ µ7KH YLROHQW DWWDFNV RI ZKLFK RXU LQVWLWXWLRQ ZDV WKH REMHFW >«@ KDYH
profoundly affected the officer corps of the citizen militia in Antwerp and will not leave 
indifferent any good patriot attached to the Constitution, the King, public liberties and 
RXUULJKWV¶ZDVWKHUHDFWLRQQRWHGE\&RORQHO'DYLGZKRWRRNJUHDWSULGHLQWKH&LYLF
*XDUG¶VOHJDF\RISUHVHUYLQJFRPPXQDOOLEHUWLes.434 Rhetoric concerning heritage was 
a common refrain amongst defenders of the institution. In 1895 a letter from De 
Vigneron to the then Minister of the Interior, François Schollaert, read, 
The Civic Guard has traditions as respectable as they are old and uphold 
FRPPXQDO DXWRQRP\ >«@ VXERUGLQDWLQJ WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH RI WKH
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Civic Guard to the general and hierarchical rules of the army, is to collide with 
an irreducible opposition and run towards a certain defeat.435 
It merely served to exemplify the problem dividing the two schools of thought, who in 
their own ways put forward valid arguments. On the one hand, recent developments in 
warfare dictated the necessity to militarise amateur forces, but on the other the Civic 
*XDUG¶VXQLTXHSRVLWLRQLQWKH fabric of the nation made such a reform implausible. 
 The perseverance with the election process fundamentally denied the force the 
opportunity to become militarily effective. Not only did it elevate candidates to ranks 
for which they were entirely unsuited, but also undermined the ability of officers to 
exert any authority during their tenure for fear of losing their position at the ballot-box 
in five years time.436 As an article in La Belgique Militaire noted, it demonstrated a 
clear lack of prestige and standing by the citizen officers amongst their citizen men.437 
Additionally, the disciplinary machinery was completely insufficient for the task. 
Officers often complained that their powers were so restricted as to be rendered 
effectively useless. As early as 1832, reports from Luxembourg illustrated the extent of 
WKHSUREOHPµ'LVFLSOLQHLVWRVD\WKHOHDVWQLO7KHDFWLRQVRIWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\FRXQFLOV
FDQQRWPDNHWKHPVHOYHVIHOWHQRXJK2IILFHUVGRQRWKDYHHQRXJKSRZHU¶438 Little had 
changed by the end of the century, as demonstrated by an 1895 memorandum circulated 
by a group of senior officers. In it they explained how the system of reprimands were 
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dead letters as any extra duties went against the law which regulated the maximum 
amount of time that a guard could be called out for service.439 
 Such a minimal amount of control had a disastrous effect on the rank and file. 
From the earliest days, when the desire to participate in the forging of a nation made 
service more appealing, military order remained elusive. The Governor of Luxembourg 
wrote to the Minister of the Interior, and future Premier, Barthélémy de Theux de 
Meylandt, in 1832: 
I must not hide from you the sad truth concerning the situation of the Civic 
Guard in the province of Luxembourg. Here, perhaps more so than anywhere 
else, the youthful inheritors of the reputation of bravery of their ancestors, are 
full of enthusiasm for the cause of the September revolution and will not refuse 
to fight for la patrie en danger. However, in Luxembourg also, again maybe 
more so than everywhere else, the youth bends with difficulty to military 
discipline. Each wants to command, none wish to obey. Inactivity, or 
moreover, the recklessness of the majority of disciplinary councils, has 
completely demoralised the Civic Guard such as it is now organised.440   
Guards in certain Luxembourg districts, as elsewhere around the country, began to 
regularly miss exercises, which were mandatory for the 1st Band, prompting a warning 
from de Theux.441 Whereas the Governor could be expected to lay down the law to 
some who encouraged and even assisted absenteeism, such as the Mayor of Bouillon, 
there was little that could be done about the election and re-HOHFWLRQ RI µLPEHFLOHV¶
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whose popularity stemmed from consistently turning a blind eye to such 
misdemeanours.442  
This situation was comparable with that recorded by Colonel David in Antwerp 
half a century later. Having inspected the Civic Guard over four exercises in April and 
May 1879, David appeared content with the majority of the rank and file present under 
arms. However, the senior NCOs and officers left much to be desired, with the latter 
abusing their ability to grant exemptions ± Captains often doing so without the consent 
of their superiors -, arriving late, demonstrating little enthusiasm in forming up their 
FRPSDQLHV FRUUHFWO\ DQG JHQHUDOO\ H[KLELWLQJ DQ µLQFUHGLEOH ZHDNQHVV LQ WKHLU
FRPPDQGV¶443 A report on the Civic Guard of Ixelles in 1900 demonstrated a 
problematic lack of uniformity in command between officers and NCOs, neither of 
which had a sufficient theoretical or practical knowledge to exercise control over the 
men. With company commanders applying their understanding in a different manner to 
that of Adjutant-Majors or even NCOs, the ranNDQGILOHZDVOHIW WRIHHO µORVW LQ WKH
mass, without proper love, without interest and without initiative, marching against 
WKHLUZLVKHV¶444 In Ypres, Le Progrès reported the extraordinary case of Colonel Van 
+DOHQ¶V&KLHIRIWKH*HQHUDO6WDIIYLVLWWRinspect the Civic Guard only to find that a 
number had found the curiosities of the Antwerp Exposition too compelling to resist.445 
Nevertheless, this was still an improvement on the Chasseurs Éclaireurs who were due 
to undertake some exercises and manoeuvres in Antwerp in the autumn of 1879 but 
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were subsequently cancelled due to inclement weather, despite the perseverance of the 
army at the same location. Many auxiliaries later expressed their delight at the 
postponement until May as a result of having avoided contracting any sickness.446 
Occurrences such as this brought the effectiveness and resilience of the force into 
serious doubt, providing further ammunition to those who wished to either dispense 
with it entirely or reconstitute it on much tougher military lines. 
 The situation was just as poor in Brussels by the end of the century. Over an 
eight-day period in October 1894, four Legions undertook a combined total of five 
exercises, which produced an average absence rate of 27.13%.447 Over the course of the 
yHDU WKHFDSLWDO¶V'LVFLSOLQDU\&RXQFLOV ILQHGD WRWDOQXPEHURIRXWRI
cases between two and 30 francs, with 44 being additionally incarcerated for up to five 
days. In total, the City of Brussels accrued 16,026 francs through fining absenteeism, 
though failed to significantly reduce its frequency.448 Indeed, as the courts-martial 
records indicate between 1861 and 1875, indiscipline in general had been increasing at 
an alarming pace for some time throughout the country. The number of fines rose from 
2,155 cases to 7,005 over this period despite the number of men in ordinary service 
remaining fairly constant.449 Whilst it had been heard of for certain occupations, such 
as railway workers or even pawn-brokers, whose employment necessitated them to 
work on Sundays, to be granted absences, there were others who simply took 
liberties.450 Fraudulent absence certificates were still in circulation by 1909, which 
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recalcitrant individuals could obtain, signed and ready, from a neighbouring 
FRPPXQH¶VVXSSRVHGPLOLtary authorities granting them permission on the grounds of 
presence elsewhere. Successive Ministers of the Interior attempted to curb this 
exploitation of the system by introducing third party witnesses for any such meeting.451 
Notwithstanding, the disruptiRQFDXVHGWRWKH&LYLF*XDUG¶VDELOLW\WRWUDLQFRQVLVWHQWO\
and effectively had clearly been undermined for decades, stemming from the process 
RIHOHFWLQJRIILFHUVDQGFXOPLQDWLQJLQDVLJQLILFDQWFRQWULEXWLQJIDFWRUWRWKHIRUFH¶V
eventual demise. 
 The Constitutional requirements of the Civic Guard were not solely to blame 
for its lack of professionalization, however. Deficiencies in equipment and facilities, 
largely on account of financial restrictions, did little to improve the situation. Martial 
spirit, as demonstrated with the constant militarisation of the uniform, was inexorably 
linked with the materiel available. Apart from the derisory role often attributed to it, 
WKHPDLQFKDOOHQJHWRWKH&LYLF*XDUG¶VLPDJHERWKLQWHUQDOO\DQGH[WHUQDOO\FHQWUHG 
on its weaponry.452  To look the part was to be the part. Unsurprisingly, it often 
struggled to obtain adequate equipment in its embryonic form resulting in many units 
being issued with pikes as opposed to firearms.453 Reports from the 160 battalions in 
the province of Luxembourg showed that only four cantons (25 battalions) could 
FODVVLI\ WKHLU UHVRXUFHV DV µFRPSOHWH¶ WZR FDQWRQV  EDWWDOLRQV DV µJRRG¶ HLJKW
FDQWRQVEDWWDOLRQVDVµJRRGHQRXJK¶RQHFDQWRQWHQEDWWDOLRQVDVµFRQIRUPLQJWR
WKHODZ¶ RQHFDQWRQWHQEDWWDOLRQVDVµLPSHUIHFW¶DQGWKUHHFDQWRQVEDWWDOLRQVDV
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VLPSO\µQRQH¶454 Although some units were undoubtedly able to make do, the majority 
were not happy with the state of affairs. Indeed, it is evident that those battalions 
without the means to improve their situation, were liable to fold without financial 
support from the commune, as in the case of Sint-Niklaas in 1835.455  
By the time the 1848 Law was introduced, an assessment of the weaponry 
available revealed equally galling deficiencies. It appeared that the Bouillon battalions 
were equipped with the 1777 model musket, of which 15 of the 48 available required 
serious repairs, and two were unserviceable.456 More concerning, was the evaluation by 
the Mayor of Fauvillers who claimed that all 131 guns necessitated the work of an 
experienced armourer in order to return them to working order. This was accompanied 
E\DQRWH WKDWVWDWHG µ)HZRI WKHVHHIIHFWVEH LWJXQVRUHTXLSPHQW UHPDLQDSW IRU
service. Moreover, the guns are an antiquated model, which is too heavy to be handled 
E\ LQFRPSHWHQW KDQGV¶457 It reflected the opinion that amateur soldiery was less 
compatible with complicated weaponry, that despite being old, or perhaps on account 
of it, they were unable, through neglect or incompetence, to maintain it to a sufficient 
standard. It lessened their military impact as well as martial spirit, rendering them 
unsuited for the tasks at hand. 
 Civil authorities, both at governmental and local level, did attempt to alleviate 
some of the financial pressures placed on the auxiliary forces. The State naturally 
provided equipment for the Gendarmerie as a fully-fledged internal police force, in their 
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case Albini rifles and Remington-Nagant pistols, but surprisingly did not take 
responsibility for their billets until the turn of the century. Prior to that, the cost of 
Gendarme barracks had been at the expense of the commune dating back to the Law of 
30 April 1836. Under the new system, which sought to improve the conditions of 
service for the ever-expanding force, each man was, as much as possible, to have his 
own room, and married men were to be given separate family quarters. It was not 
achieved over night, as 179 Provincial barracks had to be bought back for interim use 
whilst the new lodgings were under construction. However, by the end of the year, 35 
new buildings had already been completed.458 
 Spending on the Civic Guard was also primarily a communal and ultimately 
provincial responsibility, with the State providing a supportive role. Equipment and 
facilities WRRNWKHOLRQ¶VVKDUHRIIXQGVLQHDFKSURYLQFHDQGE\DQGODUJHWKHLUWRWDO
outlay reflected the size of the Civic Guard within their geographical boundaries 
(Figure. 4.3). Until 1897 and the reform of the force, the State tended to roughly match 
the outlay of the highest spending province, Brabant, to be distributed across all nine. 
Following this, however, it quadrupled its financial support to propel its programme of 
militarisation into being.  
Part of the State budget for the Civic Guard was indeed to promote a degree of 
militarism into society, through supporting the construction, maintenance and use of 
shooting ranges. From the inaugural Grand Tir, bank-rolled by Léopold II himself, 
through to subsequent events both home and abroad, the Civic Guard received financial 
aid to participate. In 1880, for example, Guardsmen were encouraged to compete in 
Vienna and were provided with the incentive of the latest Comblain rifles on loan for a 
deposit of 90 francs and 75 centimes, which would be returned to them after the 
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competition.459 Good marksmanship was prized and improvements encouraged through 
obligatory target practice. Desire was often supplanted by necessity though, as 
GHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKHUHVXOWVRIWKH/HXYHQ&LYLF*XDUG¶V metre shoots for the period 
1906-1908. Its active first three companies averaged a paltry 54%, 52% and 59% hit 
rate of the target respectively in 1906, whilst the two companies of the demi-Battalion 
Figure. 4.3. Average annual spending in Belgian Francs on Civic Guard units by 
province, 1875-1900.460 
Province 1875-79 1880-84 1885-89 1890-94 1895-97 1898 1899 1900 
Antwerp 30190 34485 40321 42973 42647 47099 52616 92089 
Brabant 84984 99399 104883 117494 118995 131025 150609 136396 
W. Flanders 14593 15195 20467 19840 21817 20433 26211 23887 
E. Flanders 29285 32878 45731 36155 39829 30843 40215 36090 
Hainaut 14494 16206 41748 43428 47789 47120 61646 63297 
Liège 24361 28710 34426 36902 39784 37736 57569 43410 
Limbourg 852 819 876 817 660 777 3325 3225 
Luxembourg 1552 1646 1709 1753 1811 1905 2518 2228 
Namur 5877 6658 6186 6422 6195 5925 10228 10104 
Total 206188 235996 296347 305784 319527 322863 404937 410726 
State 






305728 348900 425648 420882 438079 724305 871685 885280 
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of the Second Band recorded scores of just 45% and 42%. The situation had improved 
somewhat by 1908 during which the 3rd Company of the First Band achieved a 
commendable 82% average across the three shoots in different poses, albeit against a 
low precedent.461 43,000 francs was provided by the State for target practice alone in 
1897, rising to 75,000 by 1900, but whilst it could provide for some new and improved 
facilities, Belgium had twenty-two ranges of 100m or more by 1900, it still fell short 
of what was required.462 7KH 0LQLVWU\ RI WKH ,QWHULRU¶V RIILFLDO UHSRUW IROORZLQJ WKH
General Inspection of 1911 justly appeared satisfied with the progress in the quality of 
marksmanship among the Civic Guard but lamented the continued lack of ranges 
EH\RQG WKH FRXQWU\¶V XUEDQ FHQWUHV ,W QRWHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI VXFK IDFLOLWLHV E\
UHFRJQLVLQJµ7KHFRQILGHQFHWKDWDPDQKDVLQKLVZHDSRn and in his ability to use it is, 
IRUKLPWKHEHVWJXDUDQWHHRIKLVPRUDOVWUHQJWKLQFULWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶463  
 
Barring a minor role in the Army of Observation during the Franco-Prussian 
War, the only active service that the Civic Guard had to undertake in facing up to an 
external threat following the peace with the Netherlands in 1839 was the First World 
War. Between these two events, their role lay predominantly in the sphere of internal 
policing, for which they were only marginally more suited. From the outset, one of the 
main difficulties faced by the authorities in the deployment of the Civic Guard in such 
a role was the complicated process of calling them out. The local mayor, the mayor of 
a neighbouring commune, the Provincial Governor, CommissairHVG¶$UURQGLVVHPHQW 
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and Justices of the Peace in the civilian domain, as well as the local military authority 
or the territorial commander, could nominally make this decision. Charles Dubois 
argued in the Chamber that this was a result of the haste in which territorial boundaries 
had been established for the Civic Guard in 1830 ± either by canton or justices of the 
peace ± which had then not been amended when the new district, judiciary and cantonal 
demarcations were established.464 This led to some disagreements, and subsequent 
delays, as in the Daine-Dollain affair, which sparked a debate in 1842 between the War 
and Interior Ministries as to who had ultimate control. Similarly, in response to anti-
Catholic riots in 1857, General Adolphe Alexis Capiaumont believed in his right to 
instigate pre-emptive military measures in Gent by mobilising the 600 men under his 
command without the consent of the mayor, causing a considerable political storm in 
WKHSURFHVV7KHDUP\GLGQRWFRQWHVWWKHFLYLODXWKRULWLHV¶FRQWUol during peacetime, 
but in the event of their embodiment to face a threat to the State, they felt that the 
territorial military commander held a higher rank than the provincial governor or the 
local mayor, and as such had the right to seize the initiative.465 It remained somewhat 
undetermined, although increased emphasis was placed on the mayor to assess the local 
situation before acting accordingly. 
Irrespective of where the power of command rested, the more pressing issue 
undoubtedly lay in the level of trust that could be placed in the Civic Guard when it 
was eventually called out to face an internal crisis. During disturbances in Brussels on 
6 April 1834, the citizen militia had remained conspicuously absent on account of there 
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being no military presence to be of support, leading to many guards preferring to remain 
at home to defend their own families and properties.466 The irony was that at this stage 
WKHJHQHUDOUXOHDV/pRSROG,UHWURVSHFWLYHO\H[SODLQHGWR&KD]DOLQZDVµDOOFLYLO
strife must be repressed by the local police force, supported by the citizen militia; the 
DUP\FDQQRWDQGPXVWQRWJHWLQYROYHGZKLOVWWKHVHIRUFHVKDYHQRWEHHQEHDWHQ¶467 
Similar concerns were raised in Luxembourg too, where in Marche the political 
character and martial spirit was deemed suspect as a result of a large number of Orangist 
V\PSDWKLVHUV'HVSLWHWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHSURYLQFHERDVWLQJHLWKHUDQµH[FHOOHQW¶RU
µJRRG¶ GLVSRVLWLRQ WRZDUGV WKH QHZ RUGHU LW ZDV IHDUHG WKDW LW Zould dissipate the 
further they were taken from their homes.468 In these early years, when Orangist 
agitation was relatively easily controlled, the dependability of the Civic Guard was not 
as important as it might have been. Nevertheless, it remained a concerning portent for 
things to come. 
The first real test came in the Year of Revolutions, 1848, known in Belgium as 
the Risquons Tout affair in which the Civic Guard acquitted itself relatively well. A 
group of Belgian republicans and Francophiles, together with some Frenchmen, formed 
the Légion Belge with the support of the Provisional Government in Paris. Their aim 
was to extend republicanism to Belgium but they were beaten back by a combined effort 
of Civic Guards, Gendarmerie and the army at a cost of just one dead and six 
wounded.469 ,W SURYHG WR EH WKH ]HQLWK RI WKH &LYLF *XDUG¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH
maintenance of order after 1830. Royal, and by extension, national recognition of their 
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accomplishments was shown through the awarding of colours to 34 Legions across the 
country.470 This was further corroborated by the commissioning of commemorative 
engravings to be distributed among these units to be kept as a souvenir in their 
archives.471 Its reinvigorated image, through its willingness and military capacities, also 
helped propel the 1848 Law into being. Although initially seen as a positive solidifying 
SLHFHRIOHJLVODWLRQJXDUDQWHHLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHLWVRRQEHFDPH
a double-edged sword with increased the burden that accompanied an expanded role.  
By the time of the social upheaval of the 1886 riots, the Civic Guard had already, 
as has been demonstrated, begun to decline. What were initially no more than isolated 
disturbances in the previous year in Hainaut, Brussels and Antwerp spontaneously 
erupted into a national strike. The conflagration, centred in the Meuse basin, created a 
domino effect across factories of all industries that were literally set ablaze. The influx 
of American cereals had added further pressure to the European economic crisis of 
1884, which finally reached boiling point two years later. Salaries dropped and 
unemployment rose.472 The severity of the situation had initially been lost on the 
authorities, but it soon became evident that a large-scale mobilisation of the Force 
Publique would be required to restore order. On occasion, such as in Roux where 5,000 
workers had caused one million francs-worth of damage to the glassworks factories, 
the army was called out to offer support to brutal and bloody effect. Following a failed 
charge by some 30 Lancers, the infantry opened fire killing 12 rioters, which swiftly 
broke their spirit and drew matters to a close.473 Such extreme expressions of violence 
had come to be expected from the army and Gendarmerie and reinforced the need for a 
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strong Civic Guard to take more moderate control of the situation. However, the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FDOO IRU WKH VSRQWDQHRXV FUHDWLRQ RI Corps Spéciaux to 
counter the immediate threat was a clear indication of how the institution had 
meandered its way into idleness over the preceding decades. 
Largely on account of its lack of training, the Civic Guard was often not placed 
in the direct line of fire for fear of what inexperience might produce. Indeed, in the 
Tournai area where 600 rioters were confronted by the Civic Guard, the Chasseurs 
Éclaireurs and the Gendarmerie, it was the latter two who undertook the more strenuous 
roles. Whilst the Civic Guard secured the Hôtel de Ville, the Gendarmerie charged 
twice amidst a hail of rocks, causing enough casualties in sabre and gunshot wounds to 
break the riotous group and restore order.474 The Gendarmerie took the plaudits on this 
occasion, but the Civic Guard had received its own in Charleroi the previous day for 
the steadfastness and restraint shown. Le Bien Public noted in glowing, albeit somewhat 
VXUSULVHG WHUPV µ,W ZDV WKH ILUVW HQFRXQWHU WKDW LQ WKHVH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RXU FLWL]HQ
militia has had with the disturbers of the peace, and we can confirm that it came out 
with its honour intact. Our congratulations to the commanders; they proved that they 
FRXOG FRXSOH HQHUJ\ ZLWK PRGHUDWLRQ¶475 Notwithstanding, the performance of the 
Civic Guard was not convincing to everyone. An 1886 pamphlet by an officer of the 
Civic Guard rightly pointed out that its units did not actually do very much, and what 
it did do, it did in self-defence and at higher material and manpower cost than the army 
or the Gendarmerie.476 Indeed, as Pierre Leclercq has pointed out, the perception was 
YHU\ PXFK WKDW WKH &LYLF *XDUG ZDV µWZR-SDFHG¶ with the Corps Spéciaux 
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demonstrating the virtues of a good attitude and military training in contrast to les bleus 
whose shortages in both aspects saw them relegated to a peripheral role.477 
Whilst some units were clearly proving to be of use as an aid to the civil power, 
RWKHUVEHJDQWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKHUHDVRQVZK\WKHµPD\RU¶VDUP\¶DVLWKDGFRPHWREH
known, slowly lost the trust of those with the power to call it out.478 In Chanly, a small 
town in the Province of Luxembourg situated approximately 30 miles west of Bastogne, 
the Mayor wrote with alarm to the &RPPLVVDLUHG¶$URQGLVVHPHQW concerning the turn-
out rate of the non-active units under his authority who had been called out to offer 
protection to nearby factory buildings and their owners. The letter read, µ7KHPDMRULW\
of the Civic Guard lends itself willingly to this chore, however, there are a certain 
number of recalcitrant members who, not only do not want to undertake any service 
EXWDUHDWWHPSWLQJWRGLVVXDGHWKRVHZKRDUHZHOOGLVSRVHG¶479 Despite not providing 
a reason for such an act of sedition, conclusions may still be drawn from similar protests 
seen in 1902, when guards refused to conduct repressive acts on account of conscience 
or political grounds. The changing social and political landscape of Belgium towards 
the end of the nineteenth century altered the perception of many liberal thinkers within 
the force. 
Frans Van Kalken has attempted to underplay the political issues preventing the 
Civic Guard from fulfilling its duties as an aid to the civil power by claiming that, apart 
from an incident of mass disobedience by the Brussels corps in 1834 in which some 
6,000 men refused to put down an anti-orangist demonstration, no other serious refusal 
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to soldier undermined the force.480 He notes that only three of the 35,000 guards 
mobilised during the 1902 crisis, including the eminent lawyer Paul Spaak, refused to 
load their rifles. However, reports of entire platoons revolting, offering to fund the 
strikes themselves and running amok whilst singing the Marseillaise, somewhat refute 
that assertion.481 Spaak, the father of the future Socialist Prime Minister of Belgium 
and Secretary-General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, was undoubtedly a vocal critic of 
the use of force in this matter, but certainly by no means just one of three. He expressed 
his views in an open letter in Le Peuple explaining the motivations behind his refusal 
to participate, which he believes was mirrored in other guards. It is worth quoting at 
length: 
The maintenance of order is, in effect, nothing but the defence of the 
Government, because if order reigns tomorrow, the Government will triumph. 
I refuse to defend the Catholic Government. The Defence of our institutions 
implies the defence of a political regime that I detest. I refuse to do anything 
WKDW ZLOO SURORQJ LW >«@ , GR QRW ZDQW WR ILQG P\VHOI HLWKHU REOLJHG WR
undertake such a reprehensible thing: to kill a man, however violent, however 
angry he might be momentarily. Equally, I cannot allow the officer 
commanding me believe that I will obey his orders. Having assisted the other 
night at an arms exercise, I witnessed up close the profound, sincere, ineffable 
emotion of the captain of my company, who was contemplating the measures 
that he might be forced to take and the responsibility that was weighing on him. 
I thought, that night, that it would satisfy my conscience if I simply did not 
make use of the cartridges that I had been given, or to shoot them in the air, as 




 Le Peuple, 20 April 1902. 
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certainly many other guards would do, though I understood that this would be 
betraying the confidence that this man, who would honestly be doing what he 
judged to be his duty, had in me.482 
As a result, he refused the call out so as to avoid this delicate state of affairs. The 
striking thing about this piece, apart from the political overtones, was the shift in 
perception within a guard about the ultimate role of the force from one of internal 
policing, which he could no longer condone, to that of the more morally righteous 
mission of national defence. The conflict was no longer exclusively between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie as such, despite the social upheaval, but increasingly 
between personal beliefs in the rights of the individual against the power of a 
government, which represented the old order and sat uncomfortably in the Liberal 
institution that was the Civic Guard.   
 Rare incidentsVXFKDVWKDWRXWVLGHRI)UDQ]6FKROODHUW¶VKRPHLQZKLFKWKH
Civic Guard shot eight protestors whilst helping the Gendarmerie shepherd the Minister 
of the Interior inside, only helped fuel the fire. Le Peuple, which reported the affair, 
H[FODLPHGµ7KH*RYHUQPHQWRIPXUGHUHUVPXVWJR¶UHLQIRUFLQJWKHPRUDORI6SDDN¶V
appeal.483 It placed the Civic Guard in an impossible position, attempting on the one 
hand to fulfil its Constitutional duty of securing internal order in a time when socially, 
politically and militarily it was not up to the task. The bourgeois element that for so 
long could be counted on by the State to curb dangerous social movements appeared to 
have somewhat dissipated under the Catholic dominance in government. Only twice 
ZDV LW UHSRUWHG WKDW WKH µLQVWUXPHQWRIFODVV¶ZDVXVHG LQVXFKDPDQQHUNLOOLQJVL[
miners in Mons in April 1893 and a further nine at a demonstration for universal 
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suffrage in Leuven in 1902. The latter of these cases was subsequently identified as an 
unleashing of personal passions by Catholic officers opposed to the democratic 
movement.484 The politicisation of the force deepened the concern surrounding their 
loyalties and reliability. Mayors could no longer count on them in the event of social 
unrest and looked increasingly toward the Gendarmerie as a neutral quasi-military force 
to restore order. Nevertheless, reports that the Liberal Mayors of the large cities ± 
Brussels, Antwerp and Liège ± sought an audience with the King to express their views 
that they could no longer maintain order with the tools at their disposal ought not always 
to be taken at face value. Their increasingly socialist sympathies and wish to upset the 
Catholic dominance in Parliament often prompted them to express this view in a vain 
attempt to exert undue pressure upon their political opponents.485 
 Upon their greatest test in August 1914, the Civic Guard reacted with the 
patriotic fervour expected of a nation under attack. Large numbers of non-active 
members presented themselves to the authorities to be enlisted in active units. However, 
there was a reluctance within government to accept their services for anything more 
than simple police tasks alongside the active Civic Guard, which itself had not been 
officially mobilised as was required by law.486 While this has traditionally been seen as 
an oversight resulting from the chaos of 4 August 1914, it has been suggested by Pete 
Veldeman that this was a conscious decision emanating from an 1893 report that 
TXHVWLRQHG WKH FRUSV¶ DELOLW\ WR FRQWULEXWH WR QDWLRQDO GHIHQFH LQ WKH HYHQW RI
invasion.487 A circular had been issued to all Provincial Governors on 6 August 
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outlining in strict terms the laws of war by which Civic Guard units should abide. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the wearing of uniforms with distinctive markings 
that would clearly distinguish them from Franc Tireurs, which would be all the more 
apparent if an officer or NCOs was present to lead them as a military formation.488 
Being issued by the Ministry of the Interior, however, it demonstrated the continued 
civilian nature of the force in legal terms. Although they did engage in some minor 
actions, which were later used as an excuse for German reprisals, the majority of Civic 
Guard units adhered to the advice issued by the authorities to perform policing duties 
until such time as the enemy came into view, after which they were to withdraw.489 In 
any case, they were not prepared for combat as exemplified in the writings of the 
American war correspondent, Edward Alexander Powell, in which he penned the 
following amusing account,  
The force of citizen soldiery known as the Garde civique has, so far as I am 
aware, no exact counterpart in any other country. It is composed of business 
and professional men whose chief duties, prior to the war, had been to show 
themselves on occasions of ceremony arrayed in gorgeous uniforms. Early in 
the war the Germans announced that they would not recognize the Garde 
civique as combatants, and that any of them who were captured while fighting 
would meet with the same fate as armed civilians. This drastic ruling resulted 
in many amusing episodes. When it was learned that the Germans were 
approaching Gent, sixteen hundred civil guardsmen threw their rifles into the 
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canal and, stripping off their uniforms, ran about in the pink and light-blue 
under-garments which the Belgians affect, frantically begging the townspeople 
to lend them civilian clothing.490    
This demonstrates that the force had forsaken its military role by the outbreak of war 
to the point where it was all but irrelevant. Certainly the possibility of individuals taking 
action against the invader as he approached his home was real, but action en masse was 
never seriously contemplated and the force was officially disbanded on 12 October 
1914 to avoid any further confusion. 
 
 From an expression of bourgeois militarism to a politicised ambiguity, the Civic 
Guard exemplified the fabric behind Belgian militarism (or lack thereof) during the 
nineteenth century. Its ostensibly middle-class composition nominally ensured the 
fulfilment of its roles to safeguard the Revolution from above - as a counterweight to 
despotic oppression - and from below against social upheaval. However, enshrined in 
its constitutional existence, the force encountered some of its most damaging 
inconsistencies, which when abused to the extent to which they were, ensured its slow 
decline at the expense of the more militarily established ± though less exclusive ± 
Gendarmerie. Though retaining its bourgeois character, particularly after 1853, which 
VDZ WKHPDMRULW\RIDFWLYHXQLWVFRQJUHJDWH LQ WKHFRXQWU\¶VXUEDQFHQWUHV WKHDQWL-
militarism thDWKDGFRPHWRH[HPSOLI\WKLVJURXS¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHLQ
the army became prevalent in their attitude towards the Civic Guard. Yet, in a strange 
turn of events, the prospect of widening the social composition of the institution to 
which they were unhappily wedded struck an even greater chord of discontent, fear and 
anxiety when combined with the possible threat of the International.  




 Thus, the Civic Guard ambled through the mid-nineteenth century devoid of the 
necessary inspiration and impetus to be reconstituted as a useful military force. 
Equipment was poor, facilities sparse and training often risible. Inculcating a sense of 
militarism into a social group that had traditionally sought to escape such a charge 
proved difficult, despite local, state and royal-funded initiatives ± such as the Grand 
Tir. An unwillingness amongst the majority of conscripted men capable of supplying 
their own uniform to spend more to join the more militarised and better equipped Corps 
Speciaux proved difficult enough during times of crisis, let alone during peace, whilst 
the State could not afford to spend millions of francs re-outfitting the entire force. To 
look the part was to be the part; but if the former was difficult to achieve in the first 
place, the latter proved impossible to impose in isolation without running the risk of 
disaffecting what La Belgique Militaire FDOOHGWKHµDUPHGHOHFWRUDOERG\¶491 As such it 
KDGWREHFRQFHGHGWKDWLPSURYHPHQWVLQHIIHFWLYHQHVVZHUHXQOLNHO\ZKHQµWKHVRFLDO
education is so contrary to its military education; the principles of discipline, 
abnegation, duty, sacrifice, are very difficult to inculcate in a nation that extensively 
XVHVDOORILWVOLEHUWLHVDQGDERYHDOOWKDWRIFULWLFLVLQJDXWKRULW\LQDOOLWVIRUPV¶492 
 Such fears were proved somewhat correct during the social riots of the 1880s 
and 1900s. Whereas the Civic Guard had provided useful assistance during the 
Risquons-Tout affair in 1848, its subsequent performances when tasked with 
suppressive actions were less than impressive. Certainly, the lack of adequate training, 
equipment and leadership were partly to blame, but the fundamental cause of the Civic 
*XDUG¶V PDUJLQDOLVDWLRQ E\ WKH HQG RI WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ ZDV WKH /LEHUDO
monopolisation of its ranks following the 1848 Law restricting active units to the major 
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cities and towns of the country. Whilst the predominantly bourgeois composition was, 
in theory, the surest safeguard against the rise of socialist unrest, the domination of the 
Catholic Party in government from 1884 until the outbreak of war saw a realignment 
of political associations. Common ground on issues such as universal suffrage and anti-
FOHULFDOLVP GUHZ FORVHU WKHVH XQOLNHO\ EHGIHOORZV ,Q VR GRLQJ WKH &LYLF *XDUG¶V
reliability was questioned even further. Secondary roles when called out as an aid to 
the civil power were almost inevitable, particularly for les bleus whose lack of 
discipline was an added concern to the authorities. It resulted in the army and 
Gendarmerie usurping the roles traditionally attributed to the citizen militia ± albeit to 
more bloody effect. The increase in size of the Gendarmerie was testament to the faith 
shown in its zeal and effectiveness in being the State bulwark against social upheaval 
by the dawn of the twentieth century. Its apolitical nature, professional composition and 
structured organisation made it a more appropriate tool for internal policing than the so 
FDOOHGµSHRSOH¶VDUP\¶ZKRVWUXJJOHGWRGHILQHLWVHOIDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQDQGLWVUROHZLWKLQ
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Chapter 5 - Fortress Policy and Strategy 
 
Amidst the lengthy debates concerning the organisation and role of the field 
army between 1830 and 1914, Belgium was also burdened with conflicting concepts of 
how to integrate the large numbers of forts it had inherited into its military system. The 
manner in which this was done came to dictate strategic planning, and reflected the 
extent to which the nation wished to uphold its neutrality through a show of arms. Even 
preceding WKHWLPHRI9DXEDQFRQWURORIWKHWHUULWRU\¶VYLWDOURDGVDQGZDWHUZD\VKDG
been militarily essential, leading to a tradition of fortified towns, cities and 
HPSODFHPHQWVWKDWVSDQQHGWKHOHQJWKDQGEUHDGWKRIWKHµFRFNSLWRI(XURSH¶494 Yet 
with independence came hope of a reduction in the burden that often accompanied 
them. As with other aspects of military organisation, local aspirations inhibited the 
development of sound military planning on a national scale that required the 
maintenance and expansion of some of these places. The enlargement of Antwerp into 
an entrenched camp (camp retranché), to act as a national redoubt, was delayed by 
widespread protests from the largely anti-militaristic commercial population, despite 
the risk of invasion having increased after the events of 1848. Similar objections were 
raised in the 1880s, and again after the turn of the century, when diplomatic and 
technological changes forced a redevelopment of the Meuse and Antwerp fortifications 
respectively. The significant difference this time was the political battle that 
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accompanied the works, which became embroiled in a larger, interwoven issue of 
finances and military reorganisation.495   
Although the means by which Belgian strategy was upheld altered over time, 
the theory itself remained largely unchanged from 1859 onwards. The principle of 
FRQFHQWUDWLQJ WKHDUP\¶V OLPLWHG IRUFHVXQGHU WKHSURWHFWLRQRI$QWZHUS UDWKHU WKDQ
dispersing them across a number of frontier points remained intact throughout the 
century. Notwithstanding alterations in the type of invasion likely to confront them, 
Belgian planners rarely strayed from the concept of operating outside of the central 
triangle between Namur, Liège and Antwerp, with the latter acting as its Jominian base 
of operations. Even when entering the failed staff conversations with the British in the 
decade preceding the outbreak of war, little formal evolution in strategy can truly be 
said to have occurred, despite some isolated attempts. Ultimately, in 1914, Belgium 
reverted to something akin to its established plans for want of a more defined 
alternative, opting to mobilise and concentrate within its zone of operations awaiting 
the first transgressor of its neutrality, all the while retaining the option of retreating 
upon Antwerp to welcome aid should the necessity arise. 
 
Following the Revolution, Belgium inherited a series of fortifications that 
became both irrelevant and obstructive. The Wellington Barrier, as it was called, had 
been established in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars as a defensive system against 
future French aggression, shielding the Netherlands until help arrived from either 
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Britain or Prussia.496 Its strongpoints traversed the country in four intersecting lines 
dominating positions of strategic value. The first of these, running from Oostende, 
through Nieupoort, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Gent, and Dendermonde to Antwerp, were 
designed to offer the British a safe point for continental disembarkation along the 
Belgian coast. The second series, running from Luxembourg, to Venloo, via Bouillon, 
Philippeville, Mariembourg, Dinant, Namur, Huy, Liège, and Maastricht, offered 
protection to Prussia and provided a point of entry along the Meuse and the Sambre 
were an intervention required there. A third series of forts closed the gap between the 
Meuse and the Scheldt, with Ath, Mons, and Charleroi designed to cover the 
movements of an army parallel to the French border. Finally, there was a fourth series 
of forts covering the ground between the Waal and the tributaries of the Meuse and 
Rhine, which were intended to protect the Dutch provinces further north.497  
Whilst certainly offering the expanded Netherlands protection from France, 
they offered little viable assurance for a newly independent Belgium. Firstly, the sheer 
cost of maintaining this many structures was beyond the initial capabilities of the state 
purse, while the ability of the army to provide as many as 60,000 men to cover the 
garrison that had been provided by the Great Powers before the Revolution, was 
impractical given the continued state of war against the Dutch until 1839. Herein lay 
WKHVHFRQGLVVXHIRUWKH1HWKHUODQGVDQGQRW)UDQFHZDV%HOJLXP¶VSULPDU\HQHP\
for the foreseeable future. Indeed, it was with French help that the final Dutch forces 
had been expelled from these very fortifications, the Antwerp citadel, after a protracted 
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siege in 1832.498 The redundancy of these fortifications was only further highlighted 
when Belgium accepted the status of perpetual neutrality. Not only was the Wellington 
Barrier ineffective against a probable Dutch incursion from the North, but was also no 
longer acceptable while it was directed solely against France.  
As such, at the behest of the Great Powers, five forts were to be dismantled. 
Initially, King Leopold I offered no objection, seeing this as a cost-effective way of 
securing peace, prosperity and independence for his Kingdom. However, delays in the 
ratification of the treaty, and subsequent issues emanating from it, saw a postponement 
in proceedings until 1839. Thereafter, Belgium refused to comply on account of a large 
portion of its Limburg province being restored to the Dutch upon the conclusion of the 
XXIV Articles of the Treaty of London.499 Despite seemingly in conflict with its 
obligations, the Belgian authorities were content to allow the matter to drift. With no 
immediate threat, the country appeared satisfied to develop its commercial and 
industrial capacities that had been restricted under Dutch rule. Some retained an interest 
in the fortifications, but only to the extent of arguing, as they would for decades to 
come, that their presence would allow for a reduction in the size of the field army.500 
Clearly, this made little military sense and placed too much faith in the 
conscientiousness of the guarantor powers. It ostensibly called for the reduction of the 
army to a mere garrison force, with the nominal support of the absent and ill-equipped 
Civic Guard in a country whose geographical location offered few assurances.  
Notwithstanding attempts to re-organise the army to achieve an establishment 
of 80,000 men, the realities of the recruitment system saw but a fraction of this figure 
with the colours at any one time. Training, indefinite leave, and experiments with a 
                                                     
498
 Wanty, Milieu, p. 32. 
499
 de Ryckel, Historique, Tome I, pp. 203-206. 
500
 Plenum.be, Chamber of Representatives Debates, 3 August 1858. 
 236 
reserve all contributed to lowering the numbers available for national defence. Of 
greater influence was the alarmingly high wastage rate of the early years. Deficiencies 
in the establishment of 28% in 1836 and 1837 were only marginally improved to 23% 
a decade later.501 Even at its full complement, the army could not provide enough men 
to fulfil both roles of garrisoning the remnants of the Wellington Barrier and to provide 
a suitable supporting force in the field, let alone when having to contend with such 
organisational faults. 
 
 Not until faced with the external threats of revolution in 1848, followed by 
Louis-1DSROHRQ¶V FRXS WR GLVVROYH WKH )UHQFK 1DWLRQDO $VVHPEO\ LQ  GLG WKH
question of national defence resurface with any urgency. French invasion seemed 
likely, while peace with the Netherlands was far from assured in the long-term. If 
DQ\WKLQJ%HOJLXP¶VQXPHURXVGHIHQVLYHZRUNVEHJDQWREHYLHZHGDVUHVWULFWLYHDQG
dangerous due to the necessity to disperse the army across the numerous garrisons. This 
was certainly the opinion of General Chazal, the first advocate of transforming Antwerp 
into an entrenched camp. In 1859, defending the principle that he had championed for 
a decade, he stated: 
I will repeat, that to be spread out among twenty different points, is to 
be weak everywhere: by contrast, to be united at a single point, having behind 
one a good base of operations, a solid fulcrum where all military resources will 
be concentrated, all the provisions, all the materiel, from where we can break 
out in force, to bring a compact and well organised mass to bear at the point 
where its actions will produce the greatest effect, is to be strong everywhere.502 




 Chazal, Discours, pp. 12-13. 
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'HVSLWH WKHUHYLYDORI WKH&LYLF*XDUGGXULQJ WKHFULVLV%HOJLXP¶VPDQSRZHU LVVXH
certainly indicated this. Deliberations into how Belgium might best resist a direct 
invasion from a more powerful neighbour swiftly returned a verdict in concert with 
&KD]DO¶VWKHRU\DQGE\DV\VWHPDWLFGLVPDQWOLQJRIVHYHUDOIRUWVZDVEHJXQ 
 On the frontiers and at out-dated points of strategic value, as well as around the 
smaller towns of Ypres, Menin, Ath, Boullion, Philippeville, and Mariembourg, 
fortifications were demolished. Although it proved more costly than originally 
anticipated, requiring an extra 3,500,600 francs to complete the process in 1853, the 
expense was justified by the government on two counts. Firstly, that the substantial 
long-term costs of maintenance, arming, and garrisoning would be definitively 
removed from the public purse. It was calculated that some 12,398 men might be 
released from garrison duty alone.503 Secondly, that, once started, the fortifications had 
to be demolished in their entirety in order to remove from an invading force the 
opportunity to easily capture and hold the remaining defences.504 As a move towards a 
more co-ordinated and sound scheme for national defence, the dismantling of these 
places was an appropriate measure that brought the army and its fortresses into closer 
alignment. Nevertheless, on a local level, it surprisingly engendered resentment among 
councillors and residents who felt that communal interests were being ignored. 
 On the one hand, representatives from Philippeville raised concerns that the 
removal of its defences, and as a result its garrison, would see the local economy suffer 
irreparably. In a speech on 4 March 1853, Georges de Baillet-Latour, Liberal 
representative for Philippeville, suggested that the city, whose population of just 1,400 
possessed no other commercial or industrial outlet, was entitled to financial 
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compensation from the government. It was argued that in every other case of 
expropriation for public needs, proprietors would be reimbursed and that, despite this 
case being inverted, it was no different.505  <SUHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGWKHORFDOSUHVV
were similarly concerned, and despite being allocated two cavalry regiments for the 
foreseeable future, were unsure as to whether this would fill the economic void.506 
There had also been talk of moving the eFROHG¶(QIDQWVGH7URXSH there too, but only 
on condition that the city would provide a building for it and provide the finance for its 
maintenance, calculated at a less than appealing 50,000 francs.507  
  Above all, what towns such as Philippeville and Ypres wanted were the grounds 
upon which the fortifications stood to be returned to them free of charge. The costs of 
having provided barracks and training spaces for decades seemed to entitle them to 
these concessions, although the government was unwilling to acquiesce for fear of 
setting a costly precedent.508 In some instances, it was even desirable for the city to 
retain some of the works, such as the moat around Ypres, which it was hoped might 
provide the inhabitants with a source of nearby water, or the gates around cities that 
preserved commercial taxes for goods entering the city. Such demands were in keeping 
with the tradition of upholding local interests through the system of devolved power 
that ignored the interests of the wider nation. A rather exasperated Minister of Foreign 
$IIDLUV VXPPHG XS µZKHQ ZH EXLOG IRUWLILFDWLRQV WKH WRZQV FRPSODLQ ZKen we 
demolish fortifications, the towns complain; the towns always complain when they 
KRSHWRREWDLQFRQFHVVLRQVIURPWKHWUHDVXU\¶509 
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 Conversely, although reaffirming the demanding nature of local interests that 
frustrated ministers, Namur pleaded to have its fortifications entirely demolished in 
1856 on account of the stifling effect they were having on industry. Yet ironically, 
Namur, along with other stronger installations of the Wellington Barrier had not been 
designated for decommission. The new railway link to Luxembourg had increased the 
volume of freight entering the city, and was likely to see further lines connected in the 
future. However, as the primary consideration in the development of the Belgian 
railways was to integrate them into an international system of trade, little consideration 
was given to their effect on national defence.510 Instead of providing an argument 
against further construction of the network, it was used as a reason for dismantling 
existing fortifications. François Moncheur, the Catholic representative from Namur, 
told the Chamber that these lines had actually reduced the defences of the position due 
to their traversing the approaches, and that the city might be freed from the constraints 
of its walls as a result. Expansion onto, and beyond, the 35 hectares of land occupied 
E\WKHIRUWLILFDWLRQVZDVQRWRQO\GHVLUDEOHIRU1DPXU¶VLQKDELWDQWVEXWLWZDVDUJXHG
that the money raised through its sale could be used to redevelop the citadel or be put 
to use at another strategically important location in the country.511 
 In fact, Namur, in conjunction with Liège, held a strategically important point 
on the Meuse that was recognised in the discussions concerning the role of Antwerp, 
the army and national defence. The six committees that sat between 1847 and 1856, 
which received input from 18 generals, 10 other senior officers from across all arms, 
and 15 civilians from both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, concluded 
                                                     
510
 For more on the development of Belgian railways see0/DIIXWµ%HOJLXP¶LQ3
2¶%ULHQHGRailways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 1830-1914 
(MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1983), pp. 203-226.  
511
 Plenum.be, Chamber of Representatives Debates, 16 January 1856. 
 240 
that the Meuse valley had to remain fortified to support the emerging strategic system 
of concentration around the new national redoubt of Antwerp.512 
The conversion of Antwerp into an impregnable bastion upon which to 
concentrate the forces of the nation was first conceived by General Félix Chazal in 
1847. It built on previous ideas that, in the event of invasion, the Royal Family, 
government and army might fall back on the geographically-suited commercial centre 
WR DZDLW VXFFRXU IURP %HOJLXP¶V JXDUDQWRUV513 Located at the extremities of the 
country behind the few natural defensive obstacles available, with accessible routes for 
resupply, Antwerp was a more logical choice as a final stronghold than Brussels. The 
Scheldt estuary to the north, which could be inundated by the defenders, would force 
an assailant between Herenthals and St Bernard. If attacked from the south, a force of 
60,000 would be able to hold out long enough to welcome British relief via the Scheldt, 
or through Flanders should the attack come from the north. Even if faced with the 
unthinkable situation of a British invasion of Belgium, Lt.-Col. De Lannoy, Inspector 
General of Fortifications, was confident of repelling a landing that would permit 
RSHUDWLRQVLQWKHHQHP\¶VSUHIHUUHGWKHDWUH514 
 Adhering to the policy of unifying force, Antwerp, with a few additions such as 
a ring of outlying forts to protect its walls, along with bridgeheads at Mechelen and 
Aerschot, was to provide the perfect point for the army to concentrate in safety. Given 
the uncertainty over what form an invasion might take, or where it would come from, 
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it was difficult to set down a precise strategic plan to cover all eventualities, but it was 
fairly evident from the studies undertaken that Antwerp would play a central role.515 To 
be used as a base of operations, the army would theoretically be able to operate at great 
distances from the city itself, with pivots at the retained defences on the Meuse, and 
across the country. In true Jominian style, the army would benefit from secure lines of 
operations to engage at the decisive point. In IDFWLWUHIOHFWHG-RPLQL¶VRZQDQDO\VLVRI
$XVWULD¶VIDLOHGGHIHQFHRI%HOJLXPLQ%\HVWDEOLVKLQJDGHIHQVLYHFRUGRQDORQJ
WKHIURQWLHUVWKH\KDGOHIWWKHPVHOYHVZHDNDWDOOSRLQWVZKHQWKH\VKRXOGKDYHµSODFHG
themselves well back, ready to exploit the unity of their base of operations to meet 
VHSDUDWHO\WKHFRQYHUJLQJWKUXVWVRIWKHDWWDFNHUV¶516 Although the revered theorist had 
considered Brussels suitable for this role, Antwerp provided similar, if not greater, 
benefits. It solved the issue concerning the size of the army, and promised it an active 
role in the defence of the nation that satisfied desires to uphold neutrality through a 
show of arms. While many applauded such a stance, some remained unconvinced of 
the method. 
 For the sceptics, it proved difficult to convince them that the country at large, 
and Brussels in particular, were not simply being abandoned for the benefit of the 
commercial centre alone. In the Chamber of Representatives, Barthélémi Dumortier, 
Catholic representative for Roulers, took the opportunity in 1858 to argue that Brussels 
µLVWKHKHDUWRIWKHFRXQWU\LWLVWKHUHWKDWZHPXVWSODQWWKHIODJRISDWULRWLVPKLJKDQG
strong, it is there that we must call on the entire population to the defence of our 
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territory, of our LQGHSHQGHQFH¶517 Serviced by six railway lines connecting to outlying 
FLWLHV%UXVVHOVLWZDVDUJXHGZDVPXFKEHWWHUHTXLSSHGWREHWKHQDWLRQ¶VIRFDOSRLQW
than Antwerp, which only possessed a single operational line that was likely to become 
overloaded with men, materiel and the transfer of public services during an invasion. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\$QWZHUS¶VJUHDWHVWZHDNQHVVZDVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWRKROGERWKVKRUHVRI
the Scheldt in order to secure its resupply; a less than certain situation if the Netherlands 
were the enemy, and a problem with which Brussels did not have to contend. Dumortier 
FRQWLQXHG WR GLVUHJDUG WKH FKRVHQ SROLF\ E\ SDVVLRQDWHO\ REVHUYLQJ µ>W@KH HQWLUH
country, abandoned; strangers arriving to trample the sacred soil of our territory. They 
will come and crush us and suck the blood and money from the country in order to go 
and fight our brothers in this camp at Antwerp. My heart is revolted by this parasitic 
LGHD¶518 This was both overly pessimistic and misguided in equal measure. The army 
was expected to meet an invading force in the field, delaying the advance long enough 
for a relieving guarantor force to arrive. Only in dire circumstances was the army to 
withdraw behind the walls of Antwerp, and even this was similarly until assistance was 
obtained.  
  It was one thing trying to convince sceptical politicians that the military 
strategists had settled on the correct, and most cost-effective option, but it was another 
entirely to persuade the public. On two counts, namely its commercial activities and the 
cumbersome military servitudes imposed on proprietors in the vicinity of fortifications, 
WKH ORFDOSRSXODWLRQ UDLVHGYHKHPHQWSURWHVWVDJDLQVW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSODQV6LQFH
1585, when the Dutch barred merchant vessels from entering the Scheldt in order to 
FUHDWH D FRPPHUFLDO PRQRSRO\ DW $PVWHUGDP $QWZHUS¶V LQKDELWDQWV KDG IRXJKW WR
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regain their just position at the heart of European trade. The reopening of the Scheldt 
E\WKH)UHQFKLQVORZO\FKDQJHGWKHFLW\¶VIRUWXQHVWRWKHSRLQWZKHUHEy 1815, 
prosperity had returned.  With this, however, came a significant growth in population, 
which continued to overwhelm the old defences with ever-H[SDQGLQJVXEXUEVµFKRNLQJ
XS¶WKHH[LVWLQJIRUWLILFDWLRQVZKRVHDSSURDFKHVZHUHQRORQJHUFOHDUIRUPLOLtary use. 
Reporting on the development of the defensive works, two British officers accurately 
noted the conflicting state of affairs,  
Already the city is too small for the wants of the commercial population, 
and in the course of another twenty years the disproportion will become 
unbearable. In considering therefore the future prospects of Antwerp as a 
fortress it must be borne in mind that the present line of defences cannot long 
be maintained.519  
Clearly the desires of the population did not complement the military requirements. 
This problem persisted for the remainder of the century. The shackles of limited trade 
were completely removed from the port in 1863 after the Belgians bought out their 
QHLJKERXUV¶ULJKWWROHY\WROOVRQVKLSSLQJHQWHULQJWKH6FKeldt estuary, whose mouth 
had returned to Dutch hands in 1839. From this point on, the commercial metropolis 
continued to expand exponentially.520  
 Proposals to enlarge the city by demolishing the old walls and reconstructing a 
larger enceinte, that would encompass the wider agglomeration of suburbs spreading to 
the north and east, was just one of many propositions to resolve the issue. Yet any new 
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fortified line would almost certainly impose further military servitudes on dwellers 
within the military zone, whose properties were subject to demolition without the right 
to compensation in order to facilitate military operations.521 This devalued properties 
and imposed a significant burden on a large swathe of the population who had 
emigrated to the grounds outside the walls out of necessity since 1830.522 This had been 
permitted, wrongly in the eyes of many, as a result of the confidence placed in the 
Treaty of London, which had seemingly rendered fortifications and the laws governing 
military servitudes superfluous. Those representing the affected communities naturally 
did not share this opinion, and campaigned strongly against what they considered to be 
archaic and unjust obligations unwittingly imposed on the unsuspecting.523 In a further 
demonstration of local power, violent meetings and petitions by the anti-militaristic 
population in 1862 saw them eventually win a minor victory against the servitudes 
imposed by the northern citadel. Their actions culminated in the final dismantling of 
the fortification in 1881, which had long been described as dangerous, inviting 
bombardment to a densely populated area within the old city walls.524 However, 
requests for general exemption were rejected on the grounds of setting a precedent that 
ZRXOGQHHGWREHH[WHQGHGDFURVVWKHQDWLRQ¶VRWKHUVWURQJSRLQWV 
The transformation of Antwerp into an entrenched camp, in whatever form this 
took, brought such matters into sharp focus, influencing the military plans and public 
reaction to them. In general terms there were three proposals made during the 1850s 
that attempted to satisfy all parties and the essential question of national defence. The 
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first was a rather modest, government-endorsed, expansion to the north of the city 
alone; the second a medium enlargement of the walls, and finally a general expansion 
with a large enceinte encompassing a series of outlying forts designed to place the city 
out of range of enemy bombardment. The former was rejected by the commission of 
experts in August 1858 after it was shown to not provide enough long-term commercial 
benefits, servitude reprieves, or military assurances. Indeed, it was pointed out that the 
increasing population would rapidly demand additional developments that would prove 
more costly than if the decision were undertaken to build larger fortifications from the 
outset.525 Ideas for a larger enceinte by both De Lannoy and the civilian architects 
Keller & Co were similarly discarded on account of the inconvenience it would cause 
to the suburbs of Borgerhout and Berchem through which the fortifications would 
run.526 This made the concept of general enlargement the preferred option as, despite 
its initial cost of 45,000,000 francs, it best satisfied the commercial and military 
requirements through its size and defensive capabilities.527 
:KLOH 'H /DQQR\¶V LQIOXHQFH LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI LGeas transforming 
Antwerp into a national redoubt ought not to be underestimated, the credit for its 
GHYHORSPHQW LQWR RQH RI (XURSH¶V IRUHPRVW VWURQJKROGV XQGRXEWHGO\ OD\ ZLWK
%HOJLXP¶VSUH-eminent military engineer, Henri-Alexis Brialmont.528 In 1859, he drew 
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up plans that advocated the removal of the old city walls and for the construction of 
eight polygonal forts, whose design had been inspired from observations made while 
touring Prussia. Upon their completion in 1864, many foreign observers deemed them, 
and the fortress as a whole, as among the best examples of its design.529 Spaced between 
one and two kilometres apart at a distance of approximately four kilometres from the 
city proper, these forts provided ample space in which a defensive force could 
manoeuvre. This was of vital importance in the defence of the city as there were no 
defensive works of note in these intervals. Despite recriminations, Brialmont believed 
that this was necessary in order to maintain the concentration of forces at the vital 
points.530 Infantry and mobile artillery were to be as much a part of the defensive 
structure as the fitted guns in the fortifications. Having an allocated force upwards of 
40,000 men for this task, it was clear that the 1859 commission, which settled on this 
proposal, was committed to the idea of a concentration of forces that would see the 
modest field army operate within a safe distance of its supporting bodies at Antwerp. 
The bridgeheads on the Meuse were to provide delaying actions, certainly, but 
independencH ZDV WR EH UHWDLQHG XQGHU $QWZHUS¶V QHZ GHIHQVLYH LQVWDOODWLRQV WKDW
could provide cover long enough to welcome a relieving force. 
1RW ORQJKDG%HOJLXP¶VGHIHQVLYH MHZHOEHHQFRPSOHWHG - to the acclaim of 
Europe - than advances in rifled artillery outpaced the effectiveness of its design. The 
devastating firepower of Prussian artillery during the siege of Paris in 1870-71 against 
fortifications built within the last 30 years was cause enough for concern. High calibre 
JXQVREOLWHUDWHGWKHFDSLWDO¶VRXWHUIRrts with consummate ease in a matter of hours. 
But perhaps even more worrying was the distance from which these pieces could now 
                                                     
529
 Brialmont, Réponse, pp. 23-24.  
530
 C. Faque, Henri-Alexis Brialmont: Les Forts de la Meuse 1887-1891 (Les Amis de 
la Citadelle de Namur, Namur, 1988), pp. 16 & 29. 
 247 
be deployed, firing shells beyond what had been considered the safe zone and into the 
city itself.531 Both developments brought tKH XWLOLW\ RI %ULDOPRQW¶V $QWZHUS
IRUWLILFDWLRQV LQWR VHULRXV GRXEW 4XHVWLRQV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH SRSXODWLRQ¶V VDIHW\ ZHUH
interspersed with discussions of a strategic nature that examined whether the national 
redoubt still afforded the army enough protection to concentrate, and from which to 
operate in the event of an invasion.  
After so much deliberation, expense and reorganisation, Antwerp had to remain 
WKHFUX[RI%HOJLXP¶VPLOLWDU\VWUDWHJ\ZKLFKLWVHOIUHPDLQHGZHGGHGWRWKHLGHDRI
minimizing the dispersal of forces across its territory. To do otherwise was to 
undermine the faith placed in the 1859 commission that had so painstakingly singled 
out a handful of outlying strongpoints that might serve the army as bridgeheads or 
pivots of manoeuvre in the event of an invasion. Indeed, further reductions by Charles 
5RJLHU¶V/LEHUDO*RYHUQPHQWLQKDGVHHQWKHZRUNVDW&KDUOHURLDQGWKHFLWDGHO
at Gent demolished in a bid to further concentrate forces. Even after the Franco-
Prussian War, the Catholic Government under Barthélémy de Theux de Meylandt 
decided to take this even further by decommissioning the fort at Oostende and the 
citadel at Tournai in 1873.532 Unsurprisingly, Antwerp itself required major revisions 
befitting its continued role at the heart of national defence. These took the form of 
modifications to existing works and new constructions at a distance of between eight 
and 15 kilometres from the city centre. Dendermonde, Walem, Lier, Steendorp and 
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Schoten underwent work between 1878 and 1885, while four redoubts and a series of 
smaller positions were added between 1883 and 1893.  
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKHVH DGGLWLRQV WKDW ZHQW VRPH ZD\ WR UHVWRULQJ $QWZHUS¶V
defensive capabilities, the momentous change in the geo-political situation of Europe 
following the QHZO\ XQLILHG *HUPDQ (PSLUH¶V DFTXLVLWLRQ RI $OVDFH-Lorraine, 
significantly altered the type of invasion likely to confront Belgium. The 1859 
FRPPLVVLRQV¶LGHDRIDGLUHFWLQYDVLRQVHHNLQJWRFRQTXHUKDGEHFRPHLPSUREDEOHDV
the juggernauts of France and *HUPDQ\VRXJKW WRDWWDFNRQHDQRWKHUYLD%HOJLXP¶V
lightly defended Meuse valley. It was conceivable that a transitory invasion through the 
south-eastern corner of the country might not even force either belligerent to bother 
about the Belgian army or the state of the defences at its national redoubt. This resulted 
in an immediate shift of focus away from Antwerp and towards the outlying posts at 
Liège and Namur. 
 
:LWK )UDQFH¶V ORVV RI $OVDFH-Lorraine, the prospects of a lasting peace in 
Europe appeared increasingly unlikely. The result, for Belgium, was the further 
likelihood of somehow being dragged into a Franco-German conflict in the future, 
which it had so narrowly avoided in 1870-71. Exponents of a lightly armed neutrality 
had hailed this fact as confirmation that international law would continue to guarantee 
%HOJLXP¶V LQGHSHQGHQFHZKLFK LQ WXUQZRXOGDOORZWKHJRYHUQPHQW WR UHWXUQ WR LWV
primary function of developing social and commercial prosperity rather than wasting 




as opposed to French, soil.533 The Meuse corridor offered the route of least resistance 
for attacks aimed at the Rhineland or Paris, especially given the relative lack of 
attention given to its fortifications while Antwerp was under construction. The citadels 
of Liège and Namur offered cursory protection to the cities¶ inhabitants, who came to 
see them as targets that would invite bombardment, while the fort of La Chartreuse and 
the strategically important points of Visé and Huy were far from satisfactorily 
equipped. 
It became very obvious that the Meuse would therefore play a substantial role 
in the event of a future war, and many high-ranking Belgian officers saw it as an 
obligation to strengthen its defences. Successive Ministers of War, for example, were 
very vocal on this point and attempted to highlight the strategic importance of the area. 
General Bruno Renard, Minister of War from 1868-1870 and again from 1878-1879, 
QRWHG WKDW µ7KH 0HXVH ZLOO SOD\ D JUHDW UROH LI D ZDU WDNHV SODFH LQ RXU WHUULWRU\
whether we have to defend ourselves alone against an invasion, or whether the 
belligerent powers choose our country as their battlefield, the Meuse, I repeat, will 
exercise a great influence on operations and will prove a great aid to the one who 
FRQWUROVLW¶534 General Henri Guillaume, Minister of War from 1870-1873, similarly 
expressed concerns that Alsace-Lorraine might provide a launch pad for a future 
invasion, with the key to its success, the mastery of the river Meuse.535 Finally, General 
Jean-Baptiste Liagre, Minister of War from 1879-1880, emphasised in a speech on 9 
April 1880 that,  
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7KH 0HXVH YDOOH\ >«@ KDV EHFRPH WKH OLQH RI RSHUDWLRQ IRU EHOOLJHUHQW
armies in the event of a war between Germany and France. Should Germany 
attack France, it would behove them to cross the Meuse at Liège or Namur in 
order to invade France from the north. Reciprocally, should France attack 
Germany, it would be of great strategic interest to cross the Meuse at either 
point, in its search to penetrate into Germany via the lower Rhine.536    
Yet, despite this public airing of concern, it took over a decade before the first draft 
plans for a redevelopment of the Meuse fortifications were commissioned by the 
Liberal Ministry of Walthère Frère-Orban in 1882. 
 Preliminary planning was entrusted to Brialmont, who had also been outspoken 
in his support of fortifying the Meuse. Through his numerous publications, newspaper 
DUWLFOHV DQG SXEOLF VSHHFKHV WKH DJHLQJ PLOLWDU\ HQJLQHHU VSHDUKHDGHG WKH DUP\¶V
campaign to intertwine the seemingly obvious necessity to improvH WKH QDWLRQ¶V
physical defences with the unpopular measure of introducing personal service. In one 
such publication, Brialmont wrote, 
In order for Germany to not have a great incentive to violate Belgian 
neutrality, we would need to be able to oppose an invading army with a 
resistance that would oblige it to slow its march and to make a considerable 
detachment in order to secure its line of operations. This result can be obtained 
if, after having furnished our fortresses with good troops, we are still able to 
put into the field a well organised army of 70,000 men, and if the positions of 
Liège and Namur, which the invaders will need in order to make the Meuse 
valley a line of supply and evacuation, are only able to be taken by a regular 
siege. In this situation, the German army would have to fight, independently of 
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our active forces, the French corps which, at the very moment of the invasion 
of Belgium, will have moved towards Namur via Givet and Maubeuge, as well 
as having to mask Antwerp to protect its lines of operation, we can be sure that 
Belgian neutrality will be respected.537    
Naturally, similar principles applied to a French invasion. However, the political 
climate facing the Meuse proposals of the 1880s was very different from that during 
the 1850s debates over Antwerp. Military policy had become a voting issue of the 
highest, and most contentious, order, and neither Liberals nor Catholics could lightly 
commit to such costly measures without risking political capital.  
 Even as early as 1880, before any formal examinations had been made 
concerning the fortification of the Meuse, partisan reporting was moulding public 
opinion. The clerical press, in particular, was accused of spreading rumours that 
construction of 22 forts had been sanctioned by the Liberal Government that would, in 
effect, turn Liège and Namur into entrenched camps like Antwerp.538 This was, of 
course, a complete fabrication, but it did allow them to draw focus away from the 
WURXEOHVRPHVFKRROODZVDQGRQWRWKH/LEHUDOV¶DSSDUHQWWKLUVWfor military expenditure, 
which in the run up to the elections was likely to turn voters towards Catholic frugality. 
Local interests were also at stake, with Julien Warnant, for example, questioning why 
more bridges could not be built to facilitate the local economy, even though they were 
supposedly under the guns of the Liège citadel and La Chartreuse. The response from 
Liagre was that there were already a dozen undefended bridges that compromised the 
defence of the river, but that the matter would be looked at in due course. While this 
promised to satisfy nobody, it remained important to display a façade that transcended 
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ORFDOLQWHUHVWVGHVSLWHIHHOLQJVWRWKHFRQWUDU\,WZDVRIFRXUVHµWKHVHVRUWVRIVDFULILFHV
that are not challenged when we wish to merit the title of being a QDWLRQ¶539  
In fact, there were many inhabitants of Liège and Namur who welcomed the 
idea of new fortifications, particularly those of a similar nature to Antwerp that would 
place the city out of artillery range. The old citadel of Liège and La Chartreuse, in 
particular, almost invited shelling of built-up areas in order to secure the river crossing. 
Distanced forts would have the added benefit of allowing the decommissioning of the 
existing defences and reduction in the military servitudes imposed on those living 
within the immediate surrounds.540 Nevertheless, the Frère-Orban Cabinet did not feel 
comfortable committing to such a costly and divisive endeavour, and it took a further 
five years and a change of government in order to bring about the necessary alterations. 
When the Catholic Ministry under Auguste Beernaert took the decision to invite 
Brialmont to undertake a further study of the Meuse fortifications on 31 December 
1886, it was in the hope of presenting something to the Chamber before the recess. The 
King was particularly anxious to see the plans drawn up and the process to begin as 
quickly as possible due to his shared ambitions with high-ranking officers to see 
%HOJLXP¶VPLOLWDU\FDSDFLW\LQFUHDVHG541 Having already studied the question in 1882 
and been consistently at the forefront of the wealth of publications dealing with Belgian 
strategy and military affairs, Brialmont was able to produce a report by 15 January 
1887, which was duly presented to the nation. It followed similar principles to those 
employed at Antwerp, namely two rings of independent forts at a distance of between 
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seven and nine kilometres from the city centres of Liège and Namur that would form 
the nucleus of these systems. The former was to receive twelve forts at intervals of 
approximately five kilometres (six large and six smaller fortins), while the latter was 
initially to receive seven forts and the retention of its citadel. However, by 1 February, 
it was decided to abandon the citadel and construct four large and five small forts, 
identical to those at Liège.542 
The construction of these forts was projected to cost approximately 24,000,000 
IUDQFVDOWKRXJKWKHµWRUSHGRVKHOOFULVLV¶UHTXLUHGDFKDQJHRIGHVLJQDQGDXJPHQWHG
expenditure by a further 30,000,000 francs. Interpretation of French artillery tests at 
Malmaison in the summer of 1886 had shown that delayed-action fuses in steel shells, 
carrying melinite explosive could demolish standard masonry within hours.543 To 
counter this, each fort was to be built using revolutionary methods that saw concrete 
poured into a single-cased mould, 2.5 metres thick. An additional three metres of earth-
works were to cover these structures in order to withstand the heaviest siege artillery of 
the day, namely 210mm and 220mm guns. However, difficulties with the capabilities 
of machinery and adequate illumination forced construction to be suspended at night. 
This meant that the unreinforced concrete could not be poured continuously, resulting 
in inadequately-bound layers that weakened the overall structure. The Germans, who 
used the Meuse forts as a basis for the construction at Molsheim in 1890, and the 
French, who were to use the same methods a few years later, overcame these difficulties 
with far greater success.544 Although not an issue for the Meuse forts at the time of 
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completion in 1891, these weaknesses were to be exposed in the opening weeks of the 
First World War by 305mm and 420mm howitzers. These guns were able to generate a 
force of more than 3,600 metric tons worth of energy upon impact, while the 
fortifications were built to withstand just 240 metric tons of energy dissipated by an 
1887 210mm shell.545 
In their armaments, too, the Meuse forts appeared to answer the requirements 
of the day. Between them, they housed 171 cupolas with a variety of medium and heavy 
guns. These had been fitted at a further expense of 24,210,775 francs (3,000,000 of this 
for their tests, transportation, and installation). These could have been obtained at a 
lower cost, as the German firm Gruson (later taken over by Krupp) had quoted the 
Belgians a price of 17,409,378 if granted exclusivity. However, pressure from rival 
French firms, and particularly Belgian industry, compelled the government to split the 
contract between the three nations, despite the additional costs, on the condition that 
both German and French factories associated themselves with their Belgian 
counterparts, providing them with the technology and expertise that they lacked.546 This 
ZDVDGHFLVLRQWDNHQWRDSSHDVHWKHFRPSHWLQJILUPVEXWDOVRWRVXSSRUW%HOJLXP¶VRZQ
arms industry, largely based around Liège, which had for a long time provided the army 
with small arms, ammunition and a few artillery pieces, but had been unable to expand 
on account of technical and financial limitations.547 
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For all intents and purposes, the 71,600,000 francs spent on the Meuse fortresses 
between 1887 and 1891 seemed to have created the strong defensive barrier being 
called for. It had appeared to offer this guarantee when it was first announced in 1887. 
Yet, no sooner had the Beernaert Ministry taken the decision to push ahead with the 
Liège fortifications, than seemingly the Liberal opposition changed tack and rallied 
support from local inhabitants against proposals, which they had previously 
FKDPSLRQHG7KHSROLWLFDOIDFHRI%HOJLXP¶VIRUWUHVVSROLF\KDGEODWDQWO\UHDUHGLWVXJO\
head once more. Frère-2UEDQWRRNWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRDWWDFNWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\
by suggesting that it had been forced on the nation through its late introduction to the 
Chamber, and that Beernaert had performed an incredible volte-face given his well-
documented comments under the Jules Malou Government that there would be no more 
PLOLWDU\ FKDUJHV µ+H KDV PLVOHG WKH FRXQWry and exploited, before the voters, the 
TXHVWLRQRIQDWLRQDOGHIHQFH¶ZDVWKHDFFXVDWLRQOHYHOOHGDW%HHUQDHUWE\KLVSROLWLFDO
opponent; one that in the context of Catholic policy throughout the mid-nineteenth 
century was not too much of an exaggeration.548 
Frère-2UEDQ¶V DVVDXOW FRQWLQXHG ZLWK YHKHPHQW SURWHVWDWLRQV DJDLQVW WKH
IRUWLILFDWLRQV WKHPVHOYHV WHUPLQJ WKHP µXVHOHVV LQHIIHFWXDO DQG GDQJHURXV¶ 7KH\
were useless because an invading army could cross the Meuse at Maastricht or 
Maeseyck and advance either via Hasselt or Landen, or even by Aix-la-Chapelle 
towards the lower Rhine to get to France. In other words, they could be turned. They 
were deemed ineffectual because there were not enough troops to defend them properly, 
allowing the enemy to take them easily. Finally, they were seen as dangerous because 
a ring of twelve forts, in the case of Liège, with the city at its centre, constituted a 
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retrenched camp that would draw an invading army towards it.549 The Liberal press was 
quick to seize upon this thePHDQGZURWHVXFKWKLQJVDVµ/LqJHLVDERXWWRVKDUHZLWK
$QWZHUSWKHKRQRXUDQGWKHGDQJHULQVHUYLQJDVWKHUDPSDUWRI%HOJLDQQDWLRQDOLW\¶
all the while demonstrating its geographically exposed nature that placed it well within 
range of a German coup de main.550 La Gazette de Liège published a series of 14 articles 
personally criticizing Brialmont, in which they wrongly accused him of transforming 
Namur and Liège into entrenched camps that would invite attack.551 As will be 
demonstrated below, this was not at all the case. The Meuse fortifications were merely 
to act as bridgeheads and pivots for the field army, but such a rationale became 
worryingly absent from the Liberal onslaught. Brialmont felt obliged to respond on 
numerous occasions to defend his posiWLRQFRQFOXGLQJLQRQHLQVWDQFHWKDWµ7KHIXWXUH
will avenge these reckless accusations; it will show on which side political prudence 
DQGPLOLWDU\VHQVHDFWXDOO\ZHUH¶552 
Of course, this might also be seen as an extraordinary contradiction on the part 
of Frère-Orban, given his personal involvement in asking Brialmont to draw up 
preliminary plans in 1882. However, the Liberal leader cared little and was not about 
to spurn an opportunity to sow seeds of division among the Catholic ranks. Indeed, 
Beernaert faced a wall of opposition from within his own party, that balked at the idea 
of committing to further military expenditure of this magnitude. The Church, the 
FOHULFDOSUHVVDQGWKH&DWKROLFDVVRFLDWLRQVDOOUDOOLHGDURXQGWKHSKUDVHµQRWRQHPDQ
not one SHQQ\PRUH¶7KH3UHPLHUDWWHPSWHGWRPROOLI\WKHPZLWKSURPLVHVWKDWWKH
fortifications would act as a shield against the introduction of personal service, all the 
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while seemingly unaware that the new defences would require an increase in the 
establishment to make them effective.553 Eventually, enough cross-party support was 
REWDLQHGLQWKLVµQDWLRQDOTXHVWLRQRIWKHILUVWRUGHU¶WRVHHWKH%LOOSDVVHGWKURXJKWKH
Chamber of Representatives by a majority of 40 votes in June 1887 despite Frère-
2UEDQ¶VDWWHPSW to turn it into a political issue. The Senate followed suit later that month 
with 42 votes in favour, nine against and nine abstentions. 
Strategically, it changed little, in spite of accusations to the contrary. The 1859 
plan of the concentration of forces had always envisaged the use of the Meuse as a pivot 
upon which the field army might operate, and the new fortifications at Liège and Namur 
merely reinforced this possibility. Brialmont remained adamant that these points 
remained nothing more than bridgeheads that would allow the army to control both 
banks of the river, allowing it to operate on the ground of its choosing.554 As Jomini 
KDGRQFHVDLGµµZKRHYHULVPDVWHURIWKH0HXVHLVWKHPDVWHURI%HOJLXP¶¶555 Certainly 
there was a greater emphasis on delaying an advancing army along this corridor than 
had previously been envisioned, but Antwerp had not lost its importance. The principle 
of concentrating forces was retained, and the possibility of the army retreating to the 
national redoubt after having delayed an invading force in its transitory move across 
southern Belgium similarly endured.  
While it remained a primary concern that such a retreat would be occasioned 
prematurely due to a lack of men, it was argued that the reduction in garrisons from the 
decommissioned forts since 1859 had partly made up for the increased force needed to 
hold the Meuse without interfering with the strength of the field army. Indeed, this had 
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released some 12,419 men and 584 guns to the field army that had previously not been 
taken into account. When the 8,800 men of the old Meuse garrison were added to this 
figure, it was shown that a force of approximately 21,200 men was available to hold 
the new forts, without altering the size of the army prescribed by the 1859 commission. 
Of course, the modifications to Antwerp since its completion in 1864 necessitated a 
further 5,000 men to be added to its garrison, but this was more than compensated for 
by the increase in the annual contingent from 10,000 to 13,300.556 As an article in La 
Belgique Militaire FRQFOXGHG WKLV ZDV µQRW WKH DEDQGRQPHQW RI WKH V\VWHP RI
concentration, but indeed the reinforcement of this system, not the dissemination of 
DFWLYHIRUFHVEXWUDWKHUDEHWWHUXVHRIWKHVHIRUFHV¶557 This was only partly true. As 
Brialmont, other senior figures, and foreign observers continued to note, Belgium still 
lacked a force strong enough to act as an effective deterrent to the conscript armies 
likely to face it. Only the introduction of personal service in its own forces would truly 
allow it to meaningfully carry out its strategic plans. Yet it was not until the European 
crises at the start of the twentieth century that changes to this end were undertaken. 
 
The First Moroccan Crisis of 1905 reawakened Europe to the possibility of a 
future conflict between its main powers. For Belgium, it inspired a move to examine 
the state of its armed forces and fortifications, which had once again been relegated to 
a secondary importance behind the social issues of the day, universal male suffrage and 
electoral reform. A succession of Catholic governments, since 1884, had pursued a 
largely frugal policy towards the army, and reduced its effective strength to a bare 
minimum through a failed scheme of voluntary enlistment since 1902.558 Repeated 
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efforts to introduce conscription had been rejected out of hand by the anti-militaristic 
PDMRULW\ZKLOHWKHDUP\¶VHTXLSment (especially the artillery) and fortresses had once 
again fallen into obsolescence. Military budgets across Europe were being stretched as 
nations attempted to keep pace with one another through the development of their 
navies and the introduction of quick-firing field guns. Although Belgium did not 
partake in the former, reluctant spending on artillery was eventually undertaken, 
leaving little desire to update its fortifications despite the siege of Port Arthur in 1904 
demonstrating that these structures might still play a valuable role in modern warfare.559 
8SRQLQVSHFWLRQ$QWZHUS¶VGDWHGIRUWLILFDWLRQVDSSHDUHGODFNLQJDQGXQOLNHO\WRIulfil 
the role a future war might ask it to play. As such, what little money could be induced 
out of the majority Catholic Chamber of Representatives was put to use on the national 
redoubt, despite such measures proving of limited use without sufficient numbers in the 
field army to support it. 
Notwithstanding continued opposition from the traditional Catholic anti-
militaristic milieus, the second Ministry of Paul de Smet de Naeyer, undertook what 
they believed to be a national obligation to expand the Antwerp fortifications in 1906. 
The initial government project envisioned the construction of 13 forts, four fortins and 
14 intermediary redoubts that would significantly expand the radius of the entrenched 
camp, with a further four forts at Dendermonde, considered as an annexe. Forts 1 to 8 
RI$QWZHUS¶VSURMHFWZHUHWREHXSGDWHGDQGFRQYHUWHGLQWRDFRQWLQXRXVEHOWRI
defences. These constructed, both Antwerp and Dendermonde were to be relieved of 
their old walls.560 This was particularly welcomed by the local population, who despite 
their aversion to military spending, was keen to obtain further territorial concessions 
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WKDW ZRXOG DOORZ DQ LQFUHDVH WR WKH SRUW¶V FRPPHUFLDO FDSDFLW\ ,QGHHG WKH
development of new deep-water quays was seen as essential to once again attracting 
large vessels to Antwerp, which in recent years had taken their trade to the likes of 
Hamburg, Rotterdam and Dunkirk.561 The removal of some older defences would 
provide the space on which to build, but the government was adamant that the largely 
undesirable new fortifications were a necessary corollary. Providing that they were built 
at a sufficient distance from the city, so as to allow for future expansion and to ensure 
that the outlying suburbs were not cut off, this was an acceptable solution for the 
commercial centre.562 
For their largely Catholic and anti-militaristic representatives, it remained a 
difficult prospect to accept. The rhetoric emanating from the party leadership since the 
construction of the Meuse forts had detailed strict limits to military expenditure, and 
this project, they feared, would leave the electorate feeling betrayed. Only after a series 
of modifications to the initial plans, that limited the potential costs and demands on 
manpower, was the Right finally mollified and coerced into dropping its joint 
opposition with the Liberals who had once again seen a political opportunity to exploit. 
These included the decision to declassify the bridgehead at Dendermonde in favour of 
a more lightly-garrisoned strongpoint on the Ruppel; guarantees that the projected 
constructions on the left bank of the Scheldt were to be abandoned; and a demonstration 
that much of the cost was to be compensated for by the sale of land on which the soon-
to-be demolished old fortifications stood. 7KH0LQLVWHURI:DU&RXVHEDQWG¶$ONHPDGH
was accused by some quarters of having capitulated to the qualms of local residents and 
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the anti-militarists in accepting these modifications, but maintained that the decision 
was fully justifiable in military terms.563  
Indeed, the eventual 46,600,000 francs passed by the Chamber of 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV VWLOO DOORZHG IRU D VL]HDEOH UHGHYHORSPHQW RI $QWZHUS¶V GHIHQVLYH
system. It was to receive another ring of 23 forts and fortins at a distance of 15 to 20 
kilometres from the city centre. Once constructed, the perimeter measured an 
DVWRQLVKLQJ  NLORPHWUHV 7KLV ZDV VHFRQG LQ VL]H RQO\ WR 3DULV¶ GHIHQFHV ZKLFK
spanned 125 kilometres in circumference.564 Yet the question remained over who was 
going to man it. Senior officers had clearly hoped that an increase in the capacity of 
$QWZHUS¶VGHIHQFHVZRXOGHQJHQGHUDPRYHWRZDUGVSHUVRQDOVHUYLFH7KHFDPSDLJQ
for its introduction had not weakened since the passing of its most vocal advocate, 
Brialmont, in 1902. If anything its SURSRQHQWV PXFK OLNH WKRVH LQ %ULWDLQ¶V RZQ
National Service League, became increasingly active when faced with the prospect of 
confronting rising European tensions with an inadequate voluntary force.565 
Nevertheless, the government was adamant to retain some favour, at least, with its own 
Party, and argued that an increase to the establishment was unnecessary. Two new 
inundation zones and faith in the reorganised fortress forces saw to that.566 
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The newest dissenting voice was that of Georges Eugène Victor Ducarne, Chief 
of the General Staff from 1905-1910, whose many publications and speeches during 
this period spearheaded the drive for compulsion. He argued that Belgium ought to have 
had an army four times the size of its current establishment if the usual proportion of 
WHQ SHU FHQW RI D QDWLRQ¶V SRSXODWLRQ W\SLFDOO\ MRLQHG WKH FRORXUV DV WKH\ GLG
elsewhere.567 ,Q  KH SXEOLVKHG D VHULHV RI DUWLFOHV HQWLWOHG µ$UH :H 5HDG\"¶
(µ6RPPHV-QRXV3UrWV"¶) in Le Soir, which caused many to take note of the deficiencies 
LQWKHQDWLRQ¶VGHIHQFH568 Certainly, the recruitment debacle had been partly resolved 
by the introduction of the 1909, one-son per family law, but it would not be until May 
1913 that full conscription would see the army attempt to obtain a short-service field 
force of 340,000 men by 1925. However, this ought only to be viewed as a partial 
success, and was clearly done so by foreign observers whose interest in Belgian 
preparedness and strategic policy increased in the decade preceding the outbreak of 
war. 
A succession of French military attachés to Brussels, for example, reported on 
DOPRVW D GDLO\ EDVLV WR WKH 4XD\ G¶2UVD\ RQ DOO DVSHFWV RI %HOJLDQ PLOLWDU\
developments during this period. Captain Louis-Marie-Eugène-Victor Drury, in the 
role from 1909 until 1911, was particularly concerned over the state of the Antwerp 
defences, the supporting field army, and the seemingly Germanophile sympathies of 
senior officers that might imperil France. In relation to Antwerp, he noted in November 
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1910, following a conversation with Lieut.-General Docteur, who was overseeing the 
construction of the new forts, that delays of over a year were to be expected on account 
of indecision over the maritime installations. This had meant that only two forts on the 
lower Scheldt had been started, and completion was not projected before 1913 or 
1914.569 This, along with financial complications, accounted for the difficulties 
encountered in arming the new forts. Indeed, the four Saint-Chammond 240mm pieces 
delivered to Lillo and Berendecht on the right bank of the Scheldt, were only furnished 
with a single round each. 570 More concerning, was the fact that the fortifications in 
which the eight 280mm Krupp guns were due to be mounted remained uncompleted at 
the time of delivery, forcing the German company to keep them in storage until the 
outbreak of war, after which they were, rather ironically, used against the Belgians on 
the Yser.571 
3HUKDSV RQ DFFRXQW RI D ODFN RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW UHVXOWHG IURP %HOJLXP¶V
unpreparedness, foreign observers paid close attention to strategic developments that 
accompanied its fortress redevelopments. Drury reported on the conflicting viewpoints 
that were emanating from all quarters of the officer corps that had a direct impact on 
)UDQFH¶V own preparations. For example, in 1900 Ducarne presented two papers 
FRQFHUQLQJ%HOJLXP¶VLQWHrnational obligations and the strength of the army. He noted 
WKDWLQWKHHYHQWRID*HUPDQLQYDVLRQWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶VUROHFRXOGEHGHILQHGDV
µWDNLQJXSDZDLWLQJSRVLWLRQDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHRQWKHIODQNRIWKH*HUPDQDUP\
FRUSV¶PRYHPHQWVVRDVWR interrupt the march of their columns, force them to halt and 
DZDLWRXUVKRFNRUWREULQJWKHPWRDWWDFNXVLQSRVLWLRQVNQRZQWRXV¶+HFRQWLQXHG
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by stating that it was not just a matter of sitting on the defensive but to attack, in order 
to demonstrate strength and impartiality. This might see the army conduct operations 
DVIDUDV1HXIFKkWHDXRUILYHGD\V¶PDUFKIURPWKH0HXVHLQRUGHUWRVHDUFKRXWWKH
right wing of the enemy. This he upheld in an anonymous article in La Belgique 
Militaire in 1906, where he continued to demonstrate an offensive spirit. He was 
confident that the Belgian army could mobilise and concentrate quicker than its enemies 
and afford it enough time to select the ground upon which to operate.572 
Others, such as General Déjardin, expressed the complete opposite view. He 
argued that venturing as far as Arlon, deep in the province of Luxembourg, was 
imprudent, rather preferring to hold a defensive line on the left bank of the Meuse 
between Liège and Namur.573 There had been vague suggestions of establishing an 
entrenched camp at Libramont to cover this route, or at least to increase the numbers of 
Chasseurs Ardennais to patrol the area.574 However, the general consensus among the 
majority of officers was that the army ought to secure itself behind the Meuse and await 
developments. This would offer it the freedom of action to operate in relative safety, 
await foreign support, or retreat on Antwerp. The latter was seen as the most likely 
outcome albeit few wished to admit it. Among the few dissenting voices was that of the 
VRFLDOLVWOHDGHUePLOH9DQGHYHOGHZKRZDVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJµ7KH%HOJLDQDUP\"%XW
it would look on from Antwerp. It would react like the African natives who watch the 
troops opposing them, but who, at the same time, have an eye on the scrubland in which 
WKH\ZRXOGWKURZWKHPVHOYHVOLNHUDEELWV¶575 This rather summed up what the rest of 
Europe feared. 
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Part of the problem lay in the constantly changing strategic direction emanating 
from the top of the military high command. One notable example epitomised this in 
1910 when General Harry Jungbluth, the then Chief of the General Staff, requested Lt. 
Col. Baron de Ryckel prepare a paper considering alternatives to the strategy of central 
mobilisation, only for it to be completely discarded by his successor in 1912.576 It had 
sought to examine a recent appreciation within the Belgian officer corps of the French 
µFXOWRIWKHRIIHQVLYH¶GRFWULQHIROORZLQJWKHPDQRHXYUHVZKLFKZRXOGVHHWKH
army adopt a much more aggressive approach on the frontiers. However, as with 
'XFDUQH¶VLGHDVDWWKHVWDUWRIWKHFHQWXU\FDXWLRQIURPWKRVHLQLQIOXHQWLDOSRVLWLRQV
stifled their development.577 Naturally, the frequency with which the position of Chief 
of the General Staff changed hands was not just disruptive at the end of JungEOXWK¶V
tenure. In fact, three men held the position between 1910 and 1914, causing the press 
to take note. It questioned the appointment of De Selliers de Moranville, for example, 
because he was within three years of the compulsory age of retirement, and had just 
followed predecessors who themselves had managed just two years apiece. It was, as 
La Chronique QRWHGµLQVSLWHRIWKHSRVW¶VLPSRUWDQFHZHDSSHDUWRFRQVLGHULWKHUH
at home, as merely an honourable end to a careeU¶578 In light of the revered German 
model under the successful leadership of Moltke during the nineteenth century, this 
problem seemed all the more flagrant.   
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The uncertainty within the establishment did nothing to assure the Great Powers 
of Belgian preparedness or even willingness to fight in the event of future war. In 
January 1906, the British had entered into secret staff conversations through their 
military attaché to Brussels, Lieutenant Colonel N.W. Barnardiston, in order to 
ascertain what might be expected of the Belgians in the event of a war against Germany. 
These had been sanctioned under the Balfour Government, but were conducted under 
the direction of Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane when Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman took over office.579 In a series of meetings that ran into February, 
Barnardiston and Ducarne conceived of relatively detailed plans that envisioned a 
British force disembarking at French ports and being transported to support the Belgian 
field army that would have secured a defensive position on the Meuse. Although not 
entirely convinced of its capabilities, the British could be satisfied that such a small 
force could mobilise quickly enough to provide a delaying action, and were confident 
that they would do so. The enthusiasm of Ducarne at securing British support, albeit 
tacit and unbinding, would attest to that. One of the few accounts of these discussions, 
ZULWWHQ DIWHU WKH HYHQW LQ  LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH %HOJLDQ &KLHI RI 6WDII VDLG µWKH
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happiest outcome, the most favourable, can be obtained by a convergent and 
simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, it would be a grave setback 
if this agreement does not materialise. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything 
ZRXOGEHGRQHWRWKLVHQG¶580  
The anxiety demonstrated by the Belgians during these initial conversations is 
representative of their military concerns during this time. Yet these were to be further 
exacerbated when communications ceased when the British decided to explore the 
French option and nurture the entente cordiale7KLVFRXSOHGZLWK(GPXQG0RUHO¶V
aggressive campaign against abuses in the Congo, further alienated the two nations to 
the point where, by 1911, the Belgian General Staff envisaged the possibility of having 
to counter a British invasion in their annual staff ride. Although not suggesting that 
staff rides were entirely representative of genuine strategic considerations, the fact that 
of the thirteen other staff rides between 1897 and 1913 seven had considered a French, 
and six a German, invasion would suggest that, in this case, they were not without 
relevance.581 Indeed, Drury reported back to Paris in the summer of 1910 that a 
combination of the anti-Congo campaign and the accession of Albert I, a supposed 
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Germanophile, had seen German influence in the country noticeably increase. Germany 
had, of course, been among the first to congratulate the Belgians on their annexation of 
the Congo in 1908. A year later, little appeared to have changed, with Drury noting, 
µ7KLV FDPSDLJQ KDV FHUWDLQly, alienated Great Britain from the sympathies of the 
%HOJLDQV¶582  
When the British came to reopen staff conversations with the Belgians in April 
1912, following renewed European tensions after the Agadir Crisis, it was a much 
colder affair. The Germanophile Jungbluth had more reason to be suspicious of British 
motives than his predecessor in 1906. However, the British, through their military 
attaché Lieutenant Colonel Tom Bridges, were determined to extract from Belgium a 
pledge of support in the event of a German invasion. He was asked to discuss many 
things; among them, the feasibility and assistance available for a British landing at 
Oostende, Zeebrugge and Antwerp.583 As the conversations progressed, Bridges 
recounted in his memoirVµ2QRQHRFFDVLRQ,ZDVDVNHGZKDWZRXOGEH*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶V
DWWLWXGH LI *HUPDQ\ LQYDGHG %HOJLXP DQG %HOJLXP GLG QRW DSSHDO IRU KHOS¶
demonstrating the continued suspicions which had been fostered over the previous five 
\HDUV7KHDWWDFKpUHSOLHGWKDWKHµKDGQRDXWKRULW\WRVay but that [he] felt sure that the 
British Government would regard intervention under terms of the Treaty as not only a 
duty but a right. At the same time [he] added, an appeal for help from Belgium would 
enormously strengthen the hand of our Government by rousing the sentiment of the 
FRXQWU\¶584 Furthermore, Bridges revealed that it was generally assumed that the 
Belgian army would be incapable, even if it did fight, to halt a German advance and as 
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such British aid would be required at the decisive point and, importantly, speedily to 
have any serious effect. Indeed British thinking, based on the widely held assumption 
that Belgium would not fight, argued that it was her right, duty and obligation as a 
JXDUDQWRUWRµPRYHLQWR%HOJLXPDQGH[SHO*HUPDQWURRSVIURP%HOJLDQVRLO¶585 This 
ZDV FRPSOHWHO\ XQDFFHSWDEOH WR -XQJEOXWK DV LW XQGHUPLQHG %HOJLXP¶V QHXWUDOLW\
Whether the Belgians required military support or not, it was imperative that the 
decision rested with them. The French government had recognised this fact by 
UHVWULFWLQJ )RFK¶V 3ODQ ;9,, IURP LQFRUSRUDWLQJ D SUH-emptive advance across the 
border, albeit unbeknownst to the Belgians.586  
As such, the military conversations in the decade preceding the outbreak of war 
complicated Belgian planning to the point where neither themselves, nor their potential 
allies, knew how they were likely to proceed in the event of an invasion. Indeed, the 
%ULWLVKUHPDLQHGXQFRQYLQFHGRI%HOJLXP¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRRSSRVHD*HUPDQLQYDVLRQ
until the event itself spurred a call for aid on 4 August. By this point, however, none of 
the pre-war plans for co-operation could be put into action. Instead, the Belgians 
reverted to their long-established mobilisation plans and concentrated their forces in 
the centre of the country in a steadfast demonstration of strict neutrality. This involved 
sending detachments of cavalry to the German and French frontiers to screen the 
movements of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Army Divisions heading towards the predetermined 
points in Flanders, to face a possible British threat, Liège to face the Germans, and 
Namur and Maubeuge/Lille to face the French. Only after irrefutable evidence was 
received confirming the direction from which the invading force was coming, were the 
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non-endangered divisions moved to the threatened sector on the rivers Meuse and Jette 
where they fought in conjunction with the fortresses before retiring behind the walls of 
Antwerp. 
When faced with the German siege artillery that had so easily reduced the 
fortifications on the Meuse, the uncompleted works of Antwerp were similarly fated. 
Even the completed forts of Waelhem and Wavre-St. Catherine, which were expected 
to provide some resistance as examples of wKDWZDVFRQVLGHUHGDµSHUIHFWGHVLJQ¶ZHUH
almost demolished by the 420mm shells.587 The fate of the remaining defences was also 
compromised by the differing views on how best to conduct operations. Whilst under 
the walls of Antwerp, command fell to the posLWLRQ¶V*RYHUQRUZKRVHFRQFHUQVZHUH
primarily to retain contact with the British and French, rather than to conduct operations 
independently of the city. The problem was, as highlighted throughout the fortress 
debate, a want of sufficient manpower to adequately cover the perimeter.588 Ultimately, 
the German guns rendered this point moot, and the authorities were forced to 
contemplate the evacuation of the entrenched camp on 1 October (suspended until 9 
October) in the face of overwhelming force for which neither the army nor the fortress 
was prepared.  
 
The principle of the concentration of forces evolved little over the course of the 
nineteenth century although the means by which it was sustained underwent significant 
changes. From the outset, Belgium struggled to come to terms with the socio-military 
conundrum of assimilating national defence (including fortresses and effective strength 
of the army) with the demands of the localities charged with upholding a contested 
                                                     
587
 Lt.-Gen. E. Galet, Albert King of the Belgians in the Great War (trans. Maj.-Gen. 
Sir E. Swinton, London, Putnam, 1931), pp. 201-210. 
588
 Strachan, To Arms, p. 271. 
 271 
concept of neutrality. The invasion scare of 1848 led to a reassessment of the power of 
international law, which was subsequently buttressed by the entrenched camp and 
national redoubt of Antwerp in 1859. From here, the army and the nation would be able 
to concentrate its strength and oppose an invasion by force, if necessary, whilst awaiting 
succour from a guarantor power. However, developments in European diplomacy and 
military technology soon undermined the foundations upon which this principle was 
established. Further military expenditure was required to salvage it through a 
redevelopment of the Meuse fortifications that would allow an army to operate more 
effectively in the immediate vicinity of what had become the most likely invasion route. 
These constructions produced a controversial political storm that once again 
demonstrated how national questions could be subordinated behind local and party 
interests. Only with further guarantees that the establishment would not be raised in 
conjunction with the fortifications (despite its obvious necessity) was enough cross-
party support garnered to pass these important modifications. Similar events occurred 
two decades later when Antwerp required further redevelopment. By holding the 
government to account over the size of the army in order to pass the credits for its 
fortifications, the electorate and their representatives, largely undermined what the 
army was attempting to achieve. It prompted concern from neighbouring countries and 
stifled the development of a concerted plan of action in the event of a European 
conflagration that seemed all too likely. When it finally came to pass, Belgium reverted 
to its established plans of mobilisation and concentration, merely out of want of a better 
plan that had been refused serious contemplation. The army, in the midst of its belated 
reforms, went to war against a numerically and materially superior enemy without the 
close aid it had desired from its guarantors and behind defences that would prove, very 
quickly, to be unsuited for a modern war.  
 272 
Chapter 6 - The First World War 
 
When the Belgian army mobilised for war on 30 July 1914, few expected it to 
perform with any great distinction. A linguistically, politically and religiously fractured 
country that had allowed its armed forces to fall into a state of unpreparedness during 
the nineteenth century clearly did not have the capabilities of halting the German 
juggernaut. However, it was never meant to. As such, its performance during the 
defensive retreat from the Meuse to the Yser, via Antwerp, had much to commend it 
and demonstrated a surprising unity of action that resembled something nearing 
national pride. Albert I, King of the Belgians, exemplified this by obstinately pursuing 
national objectives to the chagrin of his coalition partners for the duration of hostilities. 
It demonstrated an agency in the self-determination of a sovereign state that has 
systematically been ignored in accounts of the First World War, primarily concerned 
with the participation of the Great Powers. The maintenance of the Belgian army on 
Belgian soil for the duration of the war was of paramount importance in retaining the 
QDWLRQ¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGGLFWDWHGWKHHQVXLQJVLQJXODULW\RILWVH[SHULHQFHFRPSDUHG
to other belligerents. Indeed, given the relative lack of operational activity between 
1RYHPEHU  DQG $SULO  WKH %HOJLDQ DUP\¶V SULPDU\ WDVN ZDV VLPSO\ WR
endure.589 Discipline and morale, became the focus of their attentions as they battled 
against physical and psychological deprivations caused by the occupation of their 
country. Separation from loved ones and news of atrocities heightened the anxiety of 
the average soldier to the point where war-weariness was seemingly inevitable. When 
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combined with unresolved pre-war tensions and a breakdown in officer-man relations, 
it is little wonder that Flamingantism reared its head as the winter of 1917-18 passed 
by with seemingly no end to the war in sight. However, to view the peaceful 
demonstrations as a severe breakdown of discipline or an undermining of the newly 
established unLW\WKDWKDGVHHQERWK)OHPLQJVDQG:DOORRQVDQVZHUWKHQDWLRQ¶VFDOO
would be a mistake. The crisis of the First World War must still be viewed as a unifying 
event, where both Flemish and Walloon concepts of what it meant to be Belgian were 
proudly exhibiWHGLQDELGWRUHDVVHUWWKH.LQJGRP¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDVRQHQDWLRQ7KH
issue at hand was to establish parity between the two identities in the midst of a conflict 
whose length and intensity tested the endurance and social fabric of more nations than 
one. 
 
First World War historians have readily dismissed images of jingoistic fervour 
upon the outbreak of war across Europe.590 Belgium was no different, especially given 
the direct threat posed by a probable invasion. Yet street parties and renditions of the 
Brabançonne, even before hostilities began, heralded what Alex Watson has termed a 
µGHIHQVLYHSDWULRWLVP¶DFURVVWKHQDWLRQWKDWPD\KDYHEHHQPLVFRQVWUXHGDVVRPHWKLQJ
akin to war enthusiasm.591 Jubilant scenes similarly greeted the arrival of the Royal 
Family in Brussels on 4 August, despite news of the German incursion into Belgium. It 
demonstrated an affection for the monarchy as a focal point of unity in the defence of 
the nation. /¶,QGpSHQGHnce Belge UHSRUWHGFKHHULQJFURZGVPXVLFDQGµDGHOLULXPRI
DGPLUDEOHSDWULRWLVPZLWKRXWSUHFHGHQW¶RXWVLGH3DUOLDPHQWDWWKH3ODFHGHOD1DWLRQ
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,QWKH&KDPEHULWVHOIWKH'XFG¶8UVHOD&DWKROLF6HQDWRUIURP0HFKHOHQZKRKDG
appeared in uniform from his local Régiment de Guides, received many congratulations 
IURP KLV SHHUV ZKLOH HQWKXVLDVWLF VKRXWV RI µ9LYH OH 5RL¶ DFFRPSDQLHG WKH
DQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKH.LQJ¶VDUULYDOLQFOXGLQJIURPDOOWKH6RFLDOLVWV592 In his speech, 
King Albert called upon the warring parties to make peace and made clear the absolute 
necessity for courage and unity to form the cornerstones of national defence. He made 
a point of referring independently to both linguistic groups to join the national struggle 
by recalling the heroics of the Flemings during the Battle of the Golden Spurs and the 
Six Hundred Franchimontois for the Walloons.593 In appealing to both populations 
separately from the start, King Albert was acknowledging the disunity that had 
GRPLQDWHGWKHFRXQWU\¶VSUH-war social and military milieus. Yet it also placed him at 
the forefront of national unification, which was to be reinforced over the course of the 
war. 
Estimates concerning the strength of the army upon which he was able to call 
vary but the most often quoted figure of 117,000 regulars, supported by a further 73,000 
fortress troops and auxiliaries (including the Civic Guard and Gendarmerie), saw 
approximately 190,000 men take to the field.594 These were divided into six army 
divisions (DA) numbering between 15,500 and 24,000 men and one cavalry division 
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(DC) with an establishment of 4,000.595 Each division was made up of three or four 
EULJDGHVFRPSRVHGRIWZRLQIDQWU\UHJLPHQWVDFDYDOU\UHJLPHQWDQDUWLOOHU\µJURXS¶
of 12, 75mm guns; and an additional artillery regiment of 36mm, 75mm and 150mm 
guns.596 Yet, despite the seemingly impressive numbers, comparable with the size of 
the British Expeditionary Force, Tom Simoens has suggested that as few as 14,000 men 
FRXOG WUXO\EH FRQVLGHUHG µUHJXODUV¶7KHPDMRULW\ RIPHQZHUH reservists, who had 
spent years away from the army with little meaningful training in the interim, whilst as 
many as 40,000 (28%) recalled conscripts actually failed to report to their depots upon 
mobilisation. Analogous deficits had similarly marred BelgiXP¶VPRELOLVDWLRQGXULQJ
the Franco-Prussian War, although the reality of German boots on home soil did spark 
a spate of volunteerism that saw 18,000 men enlist to offset some of the deficit.597 
Proportionately to its population, this figure reflected the similarly astonishing figure 
of 250,000 men estimated to have volunteered for the German land forces in the 
opening month of the war, despite them employing a system of conscription.598 This 
offered the first indications of a renewed sense of national pride that had all too often 
been absent when faced with the prospect of fulfilling military obligations. 
Fighting began in earnest in the Liège area on 5 August as the German army 
VRXJKW WR EUHDN WKURXJK EHWZHHQ %RQFHOOHV DQG O¶2XUWKH WRZDUGV WKH IRUWUHVV WR
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accomplish the well documented coup de main.599 The Belgian field army had moved 
from its original mobilisation positions facing all borders to the River Gette, North of 
the Meuse fortresses, WRFRXQWHUWKHHQHP\¶VDGYDQFHKing Albert, who had taken on 
the Constitutional role of Commander-in-Chief, established his General Headquarters 
(grand-quartier-général (GQG)) in Leuven and immediately immersed himself in the 
task of directing operations. Despite having been schooled as a soldier from an early 
age, it proved a daunting task for the monarch who felt the need to draw heavily on the 
experience of his advisors. Recognising that his army was ill-equipped to undertake 
successful offensive operations, King Albert initially heeded the prudent counsel of the 
Chief of the General Staff, Antonin de Selliers de Moranville, who wished to remain 
on the strategic defensive behind the river Gette. Whilst the majority of the army did 
so, two divisions, 3DA and 4DA, were kept in the Liège and Namur vicinities 
respectively to offer support to the fortresses. Despite courageous efforts to hold 
ground, 3DA was all but routed by 7 August, as the first German shells hit Liège and 
WKHLQIDQWU\¶VDGYDQFHFXOPLQDWHGLQWKHIDEOHGVXUUHQGHURIWKHFLWDGHOWR/XGHQGRUII¶V
knock on the gates. Local command of the area was placed in the hands of Lieutenant-
General Georges Leman who conducted operations from the outlying forts, while King 
Albert and his staff contemplated saving the remainder of the field army. 
The vindication of de Selliers¶IHDUVRYHUQRWXQLWLQJWKHHQWLUHW\RIWKHILHOG
DUP\RXJKWWRKDYHFRQVROLGDWHGKLVSRVLWLRQDVWKH.LQJ¶VPRVWWUXVWHGDGYLVRU<HW
the intrigue within GQG merely intensified as officers jostled for positions of influence. 
Even the Prime Minister, Charles de Broqueville, complained of being marginalised as 
King $OEHUW¶VFLUFOHRIFRQILGDQWVJUHZPRUHH[FOXVLYHDQGLQVXODU$FFRUGLQJWRKLV
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biographer, Henri Haag, not once was he called to GQG for consultation over 
operational plans in the opening week of hostilities and only learned of their existence 
after the events had occurred.600 This was a particularly concerning issue, given that de 
Broqueville also held the portfolio for Minister of War and was constitutionally bound 
to countersign the orders of the Commander-in-Chief both as a parliamentary safeguard 
as well as protecting the monarch from accusations of wrongdoing. However, a 
combination of a lack of military expertise and the need to run civil affairs from 
Brussels meant that de Broqueville did not join King Albert at GQG from the outset. In 
order to conform with his constitutional duty, a tacit agreement was struck that he 
would agree to countersign any decision by the King through his confidant, de Selliers, 
despite its seeming illegality. This did not remove the burden of responsibility from the 
shoulders of the Minister of War, but rather exposed the deficiencies of a system that 
did not allow for adequate co-operation between himself and the General Staff.601 From 
the outset, therefore, a gulf was established in civil-military relations that proved 
increasingly difficult to bridge and gave free rein to the military authorities to advise 
the King in the conduct of operations without parliamentary restraints for the duration 
of the war. 
Although de Broqueville had somewhat helped foster this unenviable situation, 
he naturally resented being pushed further to the peripheries. De Selliers attempted to 
keep the Premier informed of events but soon found himself a victim of internal 
rivalries too. On 10 August, the Chief of the General Staff was side-lined as Lieut.-
Gens Harry Jungbluth and Baron Louis de Ryckel, as well as Captain Commandant 
Émile Galet, of the Royal Household gained favour. The following day, de Selliers was 
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removed as Chief of the General Staff. Both he and de Broqueville tendered their 
resignations, which were flatly refused, leaving the Premier temporarily blind in 
matters of military operations. This was especially the case when the remaining officers 
with personal affiliations to him turned down his advances in order to secure their own 
positions at GQG under the increasing control of the King.602  
By 13 August the German army began to make some headway against the 
outlying Liège forts, which had refused to surrender. Two 420mm Krupp guns had been 
brought up to the village of Mortier to support the 305mm Skoda pieces to destroy the 
fort of Pontisse with 13 direct hits.603 Fléron fell the next day, whilst Loncin was 
literally lifted from the ground on the 15th, burying 300 of its occupants, when a shell 
pierced the concrete structure and hit the powder magazine. General Leman, who had 
been conducting the defence of the area from Loncin, was injured and taken prisoner. 
Officers from neighbouring forts were invited by the Germans to view the ruins, which 
DFFHOHUDWHGWKHFDSLWXODWLRQRIWKHIRUWVRI)OpPDOOHDQGG¶+ROORJQH604 Resistance was 
finally broken at Liège on 16 August, while to the Southwest, the fortress of Namur, 
supported by 4DA, held out until 24 August when its garrison was forced into a 
disorderly retreat by overwhelming forces.  
Whilst the position at Liège was eventually lost, the battle had exhibited an 
unexpected tenacity among the Belgian defenders despite their inferior numbers and 
materiel. Liège had tied down up to 100,000 German troops, which had allowed the 
rest of the field army to escape, whilst Namur held up 153,000 men that may have been 
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decisive in the Battle of the Frontiers.605 The Meuse fortresses had, in effect, achieved 
their objectives in delaying the German onslaught. However, as Hew Strachan noted, 
despite resisting for 13 days, in reality the delay to the Schlieffen Plan was at most two, 
as the concentration of active corps was not completed until 13 August.606 
Notwithstanding, it must be remembered that the forts had been built primarily as 
strongpoints upon which the army could manoeuvre, not as an impregnable barrier. 
Certainly, they had been provisioned to hold out for longer, but the reality was that the 
unaltered structures of the late 1880s were simply unable to cope with the calibre and 
explosive power of modern heavy artillery. 
Faced with the loss of Liège and a worsening situation, de Broqueville obtained 
an audience with the King to discuss the eventuality of a German breakthrough towards 
the centre of the country and Brussels itself. A working relationship between the two 
was re-established through the reinstatement of de Selliers to his former position, 
providing yet another voice of prudence amidst the German advance on 18 August.607 
Following heavy fighting around Aarschot on 21 August, and with the army in danger 
of encirclement, the decision was taken to fall back on the national redoubt at Antwerp 
where the rest of the Royal Family, the Government and a swarm of refugees had 
already fled. The chaos of war appeared to be in full force as soldiers recorded the 
volume of orders and counter-orders issued as the army was forced to retreat.608 
Approximately 80,000 men reached Antwerp, which itself boasted a garrison of 70,000 
fortress troops. The majority of losses had been sustained by 3DA and 4DA in their 
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attempts to support the fortresses, with many of those who were not casualties or 
prisoners forced to undertake the arduous journey through northern France to Le Havre 
or Cherbourg for embarkation to re-join the main force in Antwerp.609 
Pleas for French and British assistance to move further north were largely 
ignored as Joffre rubbished the reports reaching him of the strength of the German 
forces facing the Belgians.610 The difficulties of fighting in coalition became blatantly 
apparent as the physical gap between the Belgian and allied forces was only outgrown 
by the impassable gulf in aims and expectations. While King Albert saw the primary 
objective of the guarantor powers to eject the invader from Belgian territory, Joffre 
viewed the sub-VWDQGDUG %HOJLDQ DUP\ PHUHO\ DV DQ µDGMXQFW WR D JUDQG DOOLHG
FRQFHSWLRQ RUFKHVWUDWHG E\ KLPVHOI¶611 The apparent gravity of the situation on the 
Marne did see King Albert attempt to relieve some pressure through co-ordinated 
diversionary attacks around Antwerp on 9 and 10 September, which retook Aarschot 
and even reached Leuven. However, the effect of these sorties is somewhat debateable, 
despite forcing the Germans to recall reinforcements being moved to face the allies. 
7KHPDMRULW\ZHUHUHVHUYHGLYLVLRQVDIDFWGXO\JORVVHGRYHUE\%HOJLXP¶VGHILQLWLYH
operational history of the war.612  
*URZLQJ *HUPDQ SUHVVXUH WKURXJK YRQ %HVHOHU¶V UHLQIRUFHPHQWV DQG WKH
moving up of heavy artillery from 27 September, firmly placed the Belgians on the 
                                                     
609
 One example saw the 1st Lancers march for 13 days and 13 nights along with 
disparate elements of 4DA to reach Le Havre before re-joining the army in Antwerp on 
the 6th September. See, Historique du 1er Régiment de Lanciers, p. 10. 
610
 Galet, Albert King of the Belgians, pp, 148-151; Philpott, Anglo-French Relations, 
pp. 19-DQG3KLOSRWWµ%ULWDLQ¶S 
611
 Strachan, First World War, p. 216. 
612
 M. Tasnier & R. Van Overstraeten, /¶$UPpH EHOJH GDQV OD *XHUUH 0RQGLDOH 
(Brussels, 1931), p. 143; De Vos, Première Guerre, pp. 38 & 47-48; and J.E. Edmonds, 
History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium 1914 (Imperial 
War Museum, London, 1933), p. 357. 
 281 
back foot. Having always recognised the capital importance of Antwerp, the British 
Cabinet sanctioned the dispatch of the 7th Division to the relief of Antwerp on 1 October 
providing that the French would do the same. Unwilling to weaken his overall strategy 
of envelopment for what he considered a futile operation, Joffre merely released a 
Territorial Division and a brigade of marine fusiliers, leading to the British decision not 
to risk their own regulars without adequate support.613 Judging it more important to 
facilitate the junction between all armies, the French Territorials were only deployed in 
the Poperinghe area, sending only the marines to the city. Given the decision to 
evacuate the government on 1 and 2 October, the British were more forthcoming in 
their efforts to save the city and its garrison after this point. Through correspondence 
with their military attaché, Sir Francis Villiers, it was learnt that the Belgian field army 
was also to be evacuated, producing an impromptu visit to Antwerp by Winston 
Churchill on 3 October to better grasp the situation and delay any such decision for ten 
days until a Franco-British relief force could be assembled. In the meantime, two Naval 
Brigades were disembarked in Dunkirk, bound for Antwerp, to be interspersed among 
WKH EHOHDJXHUHG %HOJLDQ WURRSV µWR LPSDUW WKH HQFRXUDJHPHQW DQG DVVXUDQFH WKDW
VXFFRXUZDVDWKDQG¶614  
Ultimately, the relief force could not be concentrated in time and heavy fighting 
between 4 and the 8 October forced King AOEHUW¶VKDQG,QFRQVRUWZLWKKLVDGYLVRUVDV
well as the Queen, the position was deemed untenable despite the promised aid. The 
army left that night, heading south towards the Gent-Terneuzen Canal, eventually 
reaching the River Yser on 14 October. Despite leaving the fortress troops behind to 
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cover the retreat, the city was forced to capitulate on 9 October, prompting a mass 
exodus of some 33,000 Belgian troops to flee towards the Netherlands where they were 
interned for the duration of the war.615 It was not a decision taken lightly, but the very 
real threat of being cut off through a German movement further south would have all 
EXWHQGHGWKHDUP\¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHFRQIOLFWDQGLQWXUQWKHFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFH
of an independent Belgium. As King Albert noted in his war diary on 1 January 1915 
when refuting advances made by Sir John French to have the remaining Belgian forces 
DPDOJDPDWHG LQWR WKH %ULWLVK DUP\ µ0\ FRXQWU\ FDQ RQO\ PDNH LWV H[LVWHQFH IHOW
through its Army and it would never understand a change which would be equivalent 
WR VXSSUHVVLQJ WKH ODWWHU¶616 This reflected the attitude and action of a King and a 
country that has all too often been denied its rightful agency. Belgium was not simply 
a geographical location where the war took place; it was a sovereign nation capable of 
playing its own individual role in a conflict that threatened its future. Indeed, Elizabeth 
*UHHQKDOJK¶VDQG:LOOLDP3KLOSRWW¶VFODLPVWKDWLWZDVUHVSHFWLYHO\-RIIUH¶VRU)RFK¶V
influence that persuaded the Belgians to hold the Yser line rather than retreat to Calais 
is a case in point.617 The French merely suggested that the Belgians should reorganise 
in the region of Nieupoort-Furnes-Dixmuide.618 It was unquestionably King $OEHUW¶V
decision, based on his personal appraisal of the situation, which required the 
maintenance of a Belgian force on Belgian soil for purposes of morale and international 
prestige. In a worst-case scenario, King Albert envisaged withdrawing his remaining 
forces to Britain and not to France, but fervently refuted any contemplation of further 
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retreat anyway, warning all divisional commanders that they would be dismissed if they 
abandoned their positions, and all officers and men that fleeing would result in being 
shot, and absence through sickness in court martial.619 
While further stubbornness in the pursuit of national interests punctuated the 
FRDOLWLRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH.LQJIRUWKHUHVWRIWKHZDULWZDVDFOHDUUHPLQGHUWKDW
they were dealing with an active ally and not a submissive appendage. Clear in his own 
PLQGRI%HOJLXP¶VZDUWLPHSROLF\King $OEHUWIUHTXHQWO\FODVKHGZLWKWKH(QWHQWH¶V
strategic and operational planning. Having never signed the September 1914 Pact of 
London that committed the allied nations to concerted action, King Albert was free to 
do as he pleased; though in doing so became increasingly isolated from his allies. In 
pursuing a separate diplomatic and military policy through 1916 and 1917, the Belgians 
were unable to influence discussions at Chantilly and were enraged at proposals for a 
British offensive from Ypres in 1916 across Belgian soil.620 Nevertheless, King Albert 
retained independence of action for the duration of the war, as was his right, and 
continued to exercise it to what he believed was the benefit of his kingdom. 
The ensuing Battle of the Yser was undoubtedly the most important action of 
the war for the ailing Belgian army. From the first German offensive on 18 October 
until the completion of the inundations on the 31st (which effectively ended the conduct 
of major operations between Nieupoort and Ypres for the remainder of the war) the 
tenacity, courage and resources of the now just 75,000 strong Belgian army were 
severely tested. Despite facing mainly reserve and Ersatz Divisions, the weight of 
numbers and the disorganisation of the Belgians saw the Germans cross the Yser at 
Tervate on 21 October. By the 24th, the situation looked even worse, despite French 
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support. The railway line between Dixmude and Nieupoort came under threat and was 
only held onto by the Belgians during a small respite in the fighting when the Germans 
were found to lack reserves. This lull, coupled with the opening of the locks at 
Nieupoort (at the third attempt in as many days) brought an end to the battle that 
claimed 14,000 Belgian casualties and much of its materiel.621 It was a much needed 
reprieve for a force that had become so weary and demoralised by the engagement as 
to genuinely raise concerns within the French high command that contact between their 
troops and Belgian remnants might see the demoralisation spread.622 'HVSLWH)RFK¶V
subsequent attempts to claim the idea to flood the area as his own, his suggestion, 
allegedly made to the Belgians on 25 October, was actually concerned with the Dunkirk 
region and not the Yser. The proposition was made as early as 19 October by the chief 
lockmaster Gerard Dingens, although others such as Captains Commandant Delarmoy 
and Nuyten have similarly been attributed credit. Irrespective of this, it was clearly a 
Belgian decision based on the deteriorating military situation.623 
 The action was decisive in as much as it ensured the continued presence of 
Belgian soldiers on Belgian soil, tied up German units opposite them, and blocked the 
route to Calais. 2QDZLGHUVFDOH WKHGHFLVLRQWRXQOHDVKWKHµVLOHQWFRQTXHURU¶ WKDW
created a lagoon of between 18 and 21 miles in length, between 1¾ and 2½ miles in 
width, and three to four feet deep has even been hailed as one of the major turning 
points of the war as it not only prevented a German breakthrough, but helped establish 
the deadlock on the Western Front by bookending one side of the frontline that ran from 
Switzerland to the sea.624 It was a defensive victory of which the small army could be 
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proud, and one that the King, in his steadfast application to the role of Commander-in-
Chief, could claim as his own. 
Although the Belgian army largely achieved its objective of delaying the 
invading army long enough for help to reach it before collapse, the campaign had hardly 
been without fault. As de Selliers de Moranville recalled in 1915, the preparedness of 
the army to go to war had been severely compromised by the large-scale reorganisation 
of its forces and the glaring deficiencies in its equipment; particularly in heavy 
artillery.625 Not only had the pre-war political wrangling prevented the army from 
obtaining its desired establishment of 340,000 men in time but it had also led to a 
situation whereby men recruited under four different systems were recalled in 1914 to 
form its regiments; the majority of whom with no more than 15 months¶ service. In 
cRPSDULVRQ WR WKH )UHQFK DUP\¶V WKUHH-year-ODZ DQG WKH *HUPDQ DUP\¶V WZR-year 
regular term of service, the Belgian army appeared to lack the requisite training and 
experience. Compounding matters further was the lack of a suitable officer reserve that 
OHIW PDQ\ µGRXEOHG-XS¶ UHJLPHQWV ODFNLQJ LQ TXDOLW\ RIILFHUV626 Indeed, upon the 
outbreak of war, there were only 420 reserve officers available for commission, though 
a steady influx of former Civic Guard officers returning to regular service swelled this 
number to 1,421 by 1917.627 Nevertheless, the quality of officers throughout the army 
was variable, with NCOs often taking on a far greater role than might otherwise have 
been the case. Even at senior levels, the fact that five out of six Divisional Commanders 
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were relieved of their positions before Christmas 1914 demonstrated a general lack of 
ability to cope under the stresses of war. 
Naturally, the pre-war decisions not to invest in heavy artillery or machine guns 
proved debilitating in the opening exchanges. Indeed, the field artillery was comprised 
almost entirely of 75mm rapid-firing guns, split into one group of three batteries (12 
guns) per mixed brigade, or simply one or two groups per Division. As such, a total of 
just 348 guns, of which 12 were attached to the cavalry, represented a ratio of just below 
three guns for each infantry battalion.628 This followed the trend set in France of relying 
on high rates of fire to achieve quick results but was quickly made obsolete by the 
Germans, whose decision in 1908-9 to equip each division in its field army with 18 
105mm howitzers, supplemented by a corps and reserve artillery comprised of 150mm 
and 210mm pieces, was soon vindicated.629 Despite its acclaim as an exceptional piece 
RIHTXLSPHQWWKHPP¶VUHVWULFWHGUDQJHRIDURXQGVL[NLORPHWUHVQHFHVVLWDWHGILYH
5R\DO1DY\FUXLVHUVWRFRYHUWKH%HOJLDQDUP\¶VODFNRIKHDY\DUWLOOHU\GXULQJWKH<VHU
campaign, which consisted of just 12 149mm guns and a single Krupp piece lifted from 
the Antwerp fortress during the evacuation.630 Similarly, a lack of foresight had 
restricted the number of machine guns in service upon the outbreak of war. A mis-
appreciation of their future value had seen the Minister of War, Joseph Hellebaut, order 
just 40 Hotchkiss machine-guns in 1910 to be attached to the mobile defence force of 
Antwerp, whilst 104 Maxims (1911 model) delivered in 1912 were found to be nothing 
short of worthless after rigorous tests uncovered several faults.631 On 1 August 1914, 
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the army had one machine gun company for each mixed brigade, totalling 120 pieces. 
This produced a ratio of just one machine gun per battalion, which proved to be wholly 
insufficient for the war ahead.632 The mere fact that by the 15 August a further 94 
+RWFKNLVV PDFKLQH JXQV KDG EHHQ SXUFKDVHG WR LPSURYH WKH DUP\¶V ILUHSRZHU
demonstrates the belated recognition of their worth and the mistakes made prior to the 
outbreak of war. 
More tellingly, perhaps, was that the Belgian army felt incapable of contributing 
to any major offensives until 1918 while it recovered and re-organised its artillery. 
0DQSRZHUZDVDWDSUHPLXPXQWLODWOHDVWWKHVWDUWRIE\ZKLFKWLPHWKHDUP\¶V
effective strength had recovered to approximately 120,000 men. Calls for volunteers of 
able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 30 in 1914 were followed by a Royal 
Decree in March 1915, which effectively conscripted all 18 to 25-year-olds in 
unoccupied BelgiXP %ULWDLQ DQG )UDQFH WR IRUP WKDW \HDU¶V FRQWLQJHQW ZLWK
exemptions for those married prior to 15 November 1914. This was extended to all 
foreign countries on 6 November 1915 and eventually produced a respectable 18,000 
recruits, not including the constant trickle of returnees and volunteers from occupied 
territory. A general appeal was again made on 21 July 1916 to obtain, within reason, 
the remaining manpower available without disrupting the work of industry or family. 
All Belgian men born between 30 June 1876 and 1 July 1898 were called up to serve 
in the army, factories, or the general interest. Married men born after 30 June 1886 and 
single men born after 30 June 1881 were to go to the army; the others to the auxiliary 
services. It furnished a further 21,000 combatants who began to be incorporated from 
September 1916. Two more laws in May 1917 and February 1918 further scraped the 




barrel and obtained 2,000 and 3,300 men respectively, demonstrating that the 
manpower ceiling was not reached until relatively late in the war.633 
Belgian industry took time to restart production following its relocation to sites 
in Northern France and across the United Kingdom. Even then, the factories in Le 
Havre and Birtley tended to focus on munitions production, forcing the army to acquire 
their desired artillery pieces from their allies. When up and running, Birtley could 
SURGXFHXSWRVKHOOVHDFKZHHNDQGWKHVNLOOHGZRUNHUVIURP%HOJLXP¶VSUH-war 
arms industry in Herstal and Liège, employed in a factory in Birmingham, were able to 
furnish 30,000 rifles and carbines along with other accoutrements in the same period 
E\ZDU¶VHQG634 In the meantime, Captain-Commandant Blaise was placed in charge of 
procuring the required materiel to bring the army back up to strength, working closely 
with both allied Governments and the directors of firms such as Vickers in order to do 
so. The purchasing of 105mm, 120mm and 150mm Schneider guns from the French 
over the course of 1915 allowed a heavy artillery regiment to be created and for a more 
varied distribution of guns across the six Army Divisions.635 Similar advances were 
made to the British Government to obtain 9.2´ DQG´JXQVDVZHOODV´PRUWDUV
although the War Office often deferred the final decision to GHQ in France which was 
more reluctant to see its equipment used by another army.636 To facilitate the procedure 
de Broqueville suggested to Blaise that he remind their allies that the Belgians were 
holding the longest front proportionate to the size of its army and that, if they broke, 
the road to Dunkirk and Calais would be wide open.637 While this was partially true in 
1916, the chances of a major German offensive across the quagmire separating them 
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from the Belgians was minimal, especially given the concentration of reserve 
formations stationed in the sector due to its quiet nature. In the end, British guns were 
delivered to the Belgians with the caveat that the newly created 7th Artillery Regiment 
would support the British in the Ypres sector when required.638 
By 1918 the Belgian army was in a much better state of preparedness in terms 
RILWVHTXLSPHQWDQGH[SHULHQFH,QGHHGLWVDUWLOOHU\FRXOGQRZFRXQWRQGD\V¶ZRUWK
of ammunition whilst a series of successful trench raids in late 1917 had given the 
infantry a sense of confidence in its offensive competency.639 Yet, it was the defence 
of Merckem in April 1918 during the German Spring offensives, which highlighted the 
newly acquired steel of the army, albeit against second rate troops. King Albert still had 
reservations about its offensive capabilities, but politics and prestige over-rode 
SUXGHQFHDVPRPHQWXPVKLIWHGLQWKHDOOLHV¶IDYRXU7KH%HOJLDQDUP\FRXOGQRWEH
seen to sit back and allow the allies to liberate the country for it and then expect to take 
a seat as an equal partner at the peace table.640 Against the advice of WKH .LQJ¶V
FRXQVHOORUVRIIHQVLYHRSHUDWLRQVXQGHU)RFK¶VVWUDWHJLFRYHUYLHZZHUHVDQFWLRQHG)RU
the first time in over four years, King Albert agreed to subordinate himself to his allies 
in return for receiving command of a mixed Anglo-Franco-Belgian army group. The 
Army of Flanders comprised the British II Army, the Belgian Army and seven French 
corps of three divisions each as well as the 2nd Cavalry Corps and some artillery. 
Fearing that both he and his generals were perhaps too unfamiliar with offensive 
operations, King Albert undertook another bold move and a further co-operative 
measure by requesting General Degoutte, who had distinguished himself at the head of 




 Tasnier & Van Overstraeten, /¶$UPpHEHOJH, pp. 259 & 313. 
640
 For more on Belgian war aims see, D. Stevenson, 'Belgium, Luxemburg, and the 
Defence of Western Europe, 1914-1920', The International History Review, vol 4, no. 
4 (1982), pp. 504-522. 
 290 
the French 6th Army, to join his staff.641 It was the first indication of a Belgian desire to 
IDOOLQOLQHZLWKWKH(QWHQWH¶VVWUDWHJLFYLVLRQDQGSHUKDSVF\QLFDOO\RQO\DVDUHVXOWRI
the turning tide. King Albert who had not always agreed with the decision to fight 
towards an uncompromised peace now saw an opportunity and felt that the time was 
right to push his newly combined forces towards a final decision.  
The Belgian contribution to the 1918 offensive amounted to 167,000 men, 1,100 
guns and 100 aircraft.642 On the first day of the offensive (28 September) the nine 
Belgian infantry divisions made an eight-kilometre advance under heavy rains. 
Significant gains were made in the Houlthulst Forest, while the British also achieved 
all their objectives. Albeit drawing to a conclusion, neither side knew that the war was 
to end within six weeks and fighting remained intense. The three-day offensive came 
at a cost of 10,000 casualties with many divisions reduced to 1,000 men. Belgian 
casualty figures of 1,012 officers and 29,056 NCOs and other ranks killed, wounded or 
missing between 28 September and 11 November underscores their commitment to the 
offensives to liberate their country.643 Although King Albert remained reluctant to fight 
to the bitter end for the sake of it, the Belgians felt that they were denied a victorious 
entrance into Brussels by the premature signing of the armistice.644 Gent was due to be 
liberated the following day and Brussels soon after. Nevertheless, the sight of Belgian 
troops participating in the final offensives was of great importance to national pride and 
was a timely reminder to all that they too had endured the war and contributed to its 
ultimately victorious conclusion. 
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In the intervening years from the Yser campaign to the Hundred Days, the war 
changed for the Belgian army from one of fighting to one of recovery and subsequently 
endurance. By the time the army had reached the Yser, morale had sunk to worryingly 
low levels as a succession of military setbacks, weariness and a seemingly endless 




The retreat had placed unprecedented strain on the army as a whole, with many 
services, officers and men struggling to cope with the chaos of war. This accounts for 
the disproportionately high numbers of courts martial cases, which resulted in seven of 
%HOJLXP¶VPLOLWDU\H[Hcutions being carried out before Christmas 1914. Confusion 
during the retreat certainly placed undue pressure on the antiquated military judicial 
system to act quickly, but the idea put forward by the likes of Siegfried Debaeke and 
Jacques Maes that the prosecutors acted arbitrarily and weakly ignores the extenuating 
circumstances and nuances of the situation.646 Certainly, the degree of leniency in the 
opening months of the war was much reduced by the King and the military authorities 
as a whole on account of the necessity to keep the army in the field. However, it was 
not disproportionately harsh compared to other armies. In fact, the French army, too, 
carried out a third of its wartime executions during the same period, underlining the 
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effects that the stresses and chaos experienced during the war of movement could have 
in forcing the hand of the military authorities to keep order in the ranks.647 
 There is some evidence to suggest that the seven executions in 1914, and the 
subsequent three in May and July 1915, were partly motivated by a desire to create a 
deterrent. The well documented words of General De Ceuninck, when commanding 
6DA in 1915, attest to this fact: µ:HDUHDSSURDFKLQJWKHEDGVHDVRQDQGOLIHLQWKH
trenches will be difficult; already certain transgressions of the mind are manifesting 
themselves; it is imperative to curb this evil through a severe example. From this point 
of view, the results obtainHGLQ0D\KDYHEHHQYHU\VDWLVI\LQJ¶648 While the manner of 
the retreat provided opportunities to desert by blending into the fleeing throngs of 
refugees, only a minority attempted to take advantage.649 Indeed, many soldiers often 
found themselves inadvertently cut off from their units for a period of time that saw 
them pass before the military courts. However, to suggest that there was no leniency 
would be a gross misrepresentation. Prosecutors frequently attempted to find 
technicalities that would acquit the accused, while certain officers preferred to deal with 
matters internally without recourse to courts martial.650 Even the King, who was placed 
in a rather awkward position as Head of State and Commander in Chief, granted 
pardons to at least 19 men who had been sentenced to death between November 1914 
and May 1915.651 This demonstrated two things; firstly that the executions before the 
summer of 1915 were not done so arbitrarily, and secondly that the intensity with which 
they were carried out was higher in the opening months of the war as a result of the 
                                                     
647
 Greenhalgh, French Army, p. 62. 
648
 S. Horvat, De Vervolging, p. 381. 
649





 S. Horvat, Vervolging, p. 380. 
 293 
critical nature of the situation that necessitated the firm hand of authority to maintain 
WKHDUP\¶VGLVFLSOLQH 
  With the passing of the immediate threat, however, the decision was taken in 
July 1915 to suspend the implementation of the death penalty for any crime other than 
murder; of which there were just two cases in 1918.652 When it is considered that of the 
365,000 men who passed through the Belgian army during the First World War, only 
220 were sentenced to death, of which 12 were carried out, the coercive element to 
maintain morale was not, as David Englander suggested, disproportionately harsh to its 
French counterparts though perhaps more so to the Germans.653 The Belgian execution 
ratio proportionately to its manpower throughout the war measured 0.0033%, which sat 
between the more lenient German figure of 0.00036% and the severe 0.00741% of the 
French.654 Carrying out just 5.45% of its death sentences passed, actually compares 
rather favourably to the 10.82% of the British, the 32% of the Germans, the 35% of the 
French, and 72.47% of the Italians.655 Even allowing for variations in the size of their 
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army, the Belgian soldier was relatively well protected. If anything, the intensity of 
executions during the 1914 campaign, both as a total of death sentences passed and 
with regard to the size of the army, might have placed Belgian soldiers at greater risk 
than their counterparts in other armies, but over the course of the war as a whole, and 
particularly after mid-1915, the risk of dying by capital punishment was greatly 
reduced. 
 Further studies have also shown that discipline during the First World War was 
FRPSDUDEOHWR WKHDUP\¶VSHDFHWLPHUDWHV ,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWPLOLWDU\FRXUWV
sentenced approximately 2.24% of Belgian soldiers each year, which was substantially 
lower than the 3.6% average witnessed between 1900 and 1913.656 The most common 
crimes tried by courts martial were insubordination and desertion, which combined, 
accounted for 84.4% of cases tried between 1914 and 1919.657 While there are 
difficulties in establishing a precise yearly breakdown by offence, due to the delay in 
bringing some cases to court, it is clear that the substantial increase in sentences for 
insubordination and desertion reflected the general sense of war-weariness from 1916 
onwards that similarly pervaded other armies.658 Notwithstanding, the claim that 
discipline was particularly harsh in the Belgian army based on such figures would be a 
mistake. Many cases were simply dealt with at regimental level and thus did not show 
up in the courts-martial records. This had the effect of somewhat skewing the figures 
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to show a disproportionate number of serious cases of insubordination and desertion 
whereas, in reality, discipline was relatively well maintained.659  
 In his work on the German and British armies, Watson viewed the good 
GLVFLSOLQDU\ UHFRUGV RI ERWK IRUFHV DV µHYLGHQFH RI WKH HIILFDF\ RI WKHLU FRHUFLYH
PHFKDQLVPV¶660 This could equally be said of the Belgians, even during their more 
heavy-handed approach in 1914. More to the point, however, was the link he made 
between good discipline being a reflection of individual resilience, with as few as 
4.58% of German soldiers and 5.70% of British soldiers receiving treatment for 
psychiatric illness during the war.661 Between December 1914 and February 1918, 
some 2,374 Belgian soldiers were admitted to psychiatric institutions in France, 
translating to a comparable 6.5% of all men to pass through the army.662 This would 
suggest that Belgian soldiers were not too dissimilar in this regard, managing to find 
ways to adapt to the intensely dislocating effects of disempowerment and deprivation, 
despite their poor reputation as a fighting force. 
 When it is considered that the vast majority of Belgian soldiers were equally 
forced to contend with the fact that their country was under occupation, the feat is all 
the more impressive. Not only was a there a lack of reliable information coming from 
behind the lines but the Germans refused to allow the operation of a postal service 
between Belgian soldiers and their families. Indeed, the Spanish Government was even 
approached in 1916 to act as an intermediary in the establishment of a correspondence 
network, although it appeared as if the Germans deliberately stalled its progress in order 
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WR µVRZGHVSRQGHQF\¶ LQ WKH%HOJLDQUDQNV663 This was all the more effective when 
rumours were spread about German atrocities and mass deportations of Belgian 
civilians as the sense of helplessness could become unbearable.  
Special measures were taken to keep men as informed as possible about their 
families and local news. Through various sources, lists of births, deaths and marriages 
were collated and circulated on pre-GHVLJQHGUHTXHVWFDUGVWKDWFRXOGVDWLVI\DVROGLHU¶V
desire for news. More than 100,000 letters of thanks were received in two years for this 
initiative, showing that morale was above all sustained by a constant stream of news. 
An exemplar, written by Sergeant Alphonse Dantine on 15 November 1916, stated: 
It was for me a joyous day that one which, through your intermediary, I 
received a little word from our dear country. Therefore, accept our thanks and 
know that the appreciation of the Belgian soldier will be eternal, because the 
good that you bring us is without compare. One word, one word only from 
home, is enough to give us the necessary courage to fulfil our duty, courage 
that might sometimes be missing as a result of such difficult circumstances in 
which we live.664 
The establishment of the Bureau de Correspondence in Le Havre from as early as 
December 1914 facilitated the circulation of correspondence to and from the neutral 
states but not much more. Some men used this to write to pen-pals, known as 
µJRGPRWKHUV¶LQ)UHQFKDQG'XWFKVSHDNLQJFRXQWULHVZLWKWhose from Canada said to 
KDYHRIIHUHGµDSDUWIURPDIHZGROODUVVRPHH[FHOOHQWDGYLFHDQGFRPIRUWLQJZRUGV¶665 
Soldiers wishing to at least try and make contact with home were forced to pay 
independent agents and smugglers whose success was not guaranteed. However, 
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increasingly stringent controls (for censorship purposes) firstly limited men to a 
maximum of three letters of no more than two pages per week (1915) and subsequently 
obliged them to use one of the official GQG or Ministry of War-recognised agencies 
and intermediaries (1917).666  
 Although the lack of news could heighten anxiety, it also proved to be a source 
of great determination. A morale report from the Censure Militaire Belge in Folkestone 
in 1916 suggested that: 
morale remains excellent. Despite dashed hopes, the estrangement, the 
absence of regular news from their families left in the country, the mass 
deportations in operation in Belgium, the failures of the Rumanian troops 
which disconcerts them, in spite of the third winter to endure, Belgian soldiers 
have not for one instant ceased to believe in the possibility of seeing the war 
end in the current state of the military situation. No-one appeals for peace, all 
aspire to fight. They are, despite everything, confident in the final victory. 
FolORZLQJWKHLUIDYRXULWHH[SUHVVLRQ³WKH\ZLOOKROG´:HDOOKDYHDTXLWHFOHDU
impression that a suspension of hostilities in the current state of affairs will 
provoke an explosion of anger and perhaps violence. Each soldier lives only 
for vengeance and this, given the opportunity, will be terrible and ferocious.667  
This reveals one of the single most important factors in understanding how an army on 
the strategic and operational defensive for the best part of four years was able to endure 
a war in which its suffering was exacerbated by the difficulties of the occupation of 
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their homeland. The desire sustained Belgian soldiers, who hoped for nothing more 
than the opportunity to exact revenge.  
Additional news of atrocities only reinforced the desire to see the job through, as 
documented by Sergeant Denis Jacquemin of the 9th Line Infantry Regiment in 
response to news of the burning of Latour and the murder of 70 of its inhabitants:  
Yes, it is for us soldiers, the sons of these unfortunate victims, the best, the 
most efficient of all the stimulants. The reports of the suffering, stoically 
HQGXUHGE\RXUSDUHQWV>«@KDYHWKHHIIHFWRIPDNLQJXVKDWHWRWKHH[WUHPH
WKHFRPPRQHQHP\>«@,WPXVWQRWEHIRUJRWWHQWKDWLWLVWKHODFNRIQHZVRI
those we love that demoralises the soldier and not the privations of war.668 
Whilst Jacquemin may have exaggerated or falsely generalised about materiel 
hardships, the powerful emotions of hatred and resentment aroused by the occupation 
cannot be underestimated. It was the driving force that no other army could count on to 
the same degree. Clearly the French army was motivated by revenge for 1870 and the 
reclaiming of its lost provinces, and the British found a powerful propaganda tool in 
embellishing the threat of invasion, but the realities of the situation confronting Belgian 
troops made fuelling this animosity essential to their success because to have removed 
the hope of retribution would have been akin to sapping their last vestiges of energy 
and desire for the fight.669  
 The other immediate effect of the occupation on the unique war experience of 
Belgian soldiers was their inability to return home on leave. Rest, recuperation and 
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distancing oneself from the front, especially in the company of loved ones, was an 
important factor in sustaining morale as it gave soldiers something to look forward to. 
However, the infrequency could have adverse effects. On average, German soldiers 
were released from the army only once a year, whilst British soldiers could only count 
on ten days leave or, after November 1917, two weeks, every fifteen months.670 The 
Belgian army was not too dissimilar. Each man was theoretically allowed a period of 
ten days leave each year, not including the journey time. The problem was the want of 
anywhere to go. As with British Colonial and Dominion forces, the pressures of facing 
up to how long a non-professional army could be expected to serve, in their case 
overseas, without leave to go home were a pressing concern and perhaps the only 
DQDORJRXVFDVHWRWKH%HOJLDQVROGLHU¶VSOLJKW671 France and Britain offered alternatives 
to the majority of Belgian soldiers whose families were not in the unoccupied portion 
of the country, but financial restrictions on account of the expense of travel proved a 
limiting factor. This was particularly the case in the early years of the war when pay 
was low. Combined with the intensity of the campaign the opportunities of going on 
leave were rare until the army had re-established itself sufficiently and adapted to the 
nature of modern war.   
Figure. 6.1. demonstrates the evolving trend of leave between 1915 and 1917 
that saw increasing numbers of men benefit from a more accessible and equitable 
system. Whereas significant numbers of soldiers were unable to enjoy even a single 
period of leave in 1915, their number reduced as the war progressed. Instead, Belgian 
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troops were increasingly assured one, if not two, separate periods of leave during the 
year to better withstand the pressures of war-weariness. This was made progressively  
Figure. 6.1. Leave of troops, 1915-1917.672 
 
more possible when the meagre pay of just 33 centimes per day (supplemented by a 
further 15, 20 and 40 centimes for private soldiers, corporals and senior NCOs 
respectively) was raised, following the French chevron system, to reward time spent on 
WKHIURQWOLQHVDVZHOODVDµFRPEDWLQGHPQLW\¶EHWZHHQRQHDQGfive francs. Even so, 
some soldiers still struggled to meet the costs, prompting the King to fund up to 300 
soldiers per month to sojourn in rest camps or civilian accommodation behind the 
lines.673 Personal touches like these went a long way to maintaining the affection for 
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the monarchy and its image as the protector of the nation. Despite their best efforts, 
though, some 12,694 men had still not obtained a single period of leave by the end of 
1917 as a result of a combination of circumstances, including the financial strain. 
However, it is worth noting that some were also said to have refused it as a matter of 
principle, preferring to remain in the line.674  
 Money was important to the average soldier to help ease the stresses of trench 
life through the purchasing of small comforts. The scarcity of food, which was brought 
up to the frontline just once in every 24 hours, was the cause of much distress while the 
over-reliance on rice and beans became increasingly monotonous.675 On the rare 
occasion when the Intendance obtained alternatives, such as a consignment of salted 
herring, it was distributed to the men with such frequency that it caused widespread 
nausea. The new 0LQLVWUH G¶,QWHQGDQFH &LYLOH HW 0LOLWDLUH, Émile Vandervelde (the 
leader of the Socialist party and the first socialist to obtain a Cabinet post under the 
wartime coalition), found that upon touring the trenches nine out of ten soldiers would 
UHIHUWRKLPDVWKHµMinistre des harengs salés¶GHVSLWHKLVSURWHVWDWLRQVWKDWWKHIDXOW
lay elsewhere.676 Moreover, the water brought up to the front frequently tasted of 
chlorine that could detrimentally affect the flavour of coffee with the effect of lowering 
morale.677 As a result, Belgian soldiers craved the luxuries only offered by independent 
vendors who, knowing the scarcity of food, charged extortionate prices. From mid-
1915, however, military shops were established to provide men with their desired goods 
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without being fleeced for the privilege. Two officer shops, offering a wider range of 
more lavish products soon followed. The Belgian army even established its own 
brewery after it was found that locally-brewed beer in the unoccupied part of Belgium 
FRQWDLQHGµbacillus coli¶IURPXQ-purified water that was making men sick.678 The effort 
by the military authorities to make supplementary items more accessible and safer is a 
FOHDUUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLULPSRUWDQFHWRVROGLHUV¶SK\VLFDODQGPHQWDOZHOOEHLQJ<HW
despite obtaining relatively successful results, supply could never outweigh demand 
and the cost still proved high for many. 
An alternative source of home comforts came by way of charity and in particular 
the Gifts for Belgian Soldiers initiative. From as early as 16 December 1914 when 
Vandervelde, then Minister of State, wrote an open letter on behalf of the $OOLHV¶5HOLHI
Committee, appeals were made to the British people to donate by subscription money 
and goods to be shipped to the Belgian front. The Times called for as many as one 
PLOOLRQJLIWVLQSDUWLFXODUµSURPLVHVRIDJLIWRIIRRGRQFHDZHHN¶ZHUHwelcomed.679 
(PRWLYH WDOHV RI µWKH KHURHV RI /LqJH¶ VXIIHULQJ WKURXJK ZLQWHU WDOOLHG ZHOO ZLWK
SURSDJDQGLVWUKHWRULFRIµJDOODQWOLWWOH%HOJLXP¶DQGWKHVLJKWRIWKRXVDQGVRIUHIXJHHV
across the country, to produce an empathetic reaction.680 Indeed, by Christmas 1915, 
the Nottinghamshire Fund Committee alone appealed to supporters to surpass their 
1914 total of 6,400 boxes, each containing ½ lb of chocolate and 80 cigarettes.681 
Similarly, a sum of 8,000 francs, from a Gifts for Belgian Soldiers fund recently arrived 
at GQG in August 1915, had the stipulation of being distributed to those with the least 
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personal means to procure the small comforts required to ease their existence.682 These 
small donations had a great moral effect on the individual beneficiaries and the army at 
large, particularly at Christmas when the estrangement from family and friends was at 
its most poignant. Despite not being able to match the American Red Cross offer of 
 WR EH VSHQW ZLWKLQ WKH ILUVW PRQWK LQ RUGHU WR VWULNH µDQ LPPHGLate 
LPSUHVVLRQ>«@WRVKRZWKH%HOJLDQVROGLHUVWKDWWKH86FRPSHWLWLRQZDVDVXVXDOWKH
ELJJHVWLQWKHZRUOG¶LWZDVWKHILUVWLQLWLDWLYHRILWVNLQGDQGEHJXQDWDFULWLFDOPRPHQW
when the army required assistance following the Yser campaign.683   
After the army had re-established itself, and the static nature of the war appeared 
firmly set in, the most prized gifts of all were those of a recreational nature. The sheer 
length of the war lent itself to men adopting a fatalistic attitude which, if not distracted 
from, could produce negative psychological effects leading to a disregard for safety and 
personal well-being.684 With great support from the Queen, books of all sorts were sent 
from neutral countries to fill the shelves of the rolling libraries that toured the front. 
Soldiers were given the opportunity of selecting one book each month that would then 
circulate through the company and subsequently between units. Close to 250,000 were 
sent to the front over the course of the war, the majority of them in French, offering a 
truly impressive range. Vandervelde commented after the war how very Belgian it was 
WRVHHWKDWWKHPRVWSRSXODUERRNVZHUHDFWXDOO\RIDWHFKQLFDOQDWXUHQRWLQJWKDWµ,Q
the trenches, men were already thinking of a career after the war¶685 This was 
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highlighted by the fact that complaints were often lodged when there was a dearth of 
intellectual distraction, particularly in terms of books and discussions.686 
Education had always been an important, though divisive issue, in Belgium and 
great HIIRUWVZHUHPDGHWRLPSURYHWKHDUP\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGUHJLPHQWDOVFKRROLQJ
for illiterates during the war. Many young men felt that they had had their secondary, 
KLJKHURUSURIHVVLRQDOHGXFDWLRQLQWHUUXSWHGWRDQVZHUWKHQDWLRQ¶VFDOOLQDQGKDG
a right to demand a continuation of their tuition whilst under arms.687 In a manner akin 
to that of the nineteenth century, the unwritten social contract of education for military 
service was again drawn upon to keep the relationship between State and individual in 
working order. Initially, a single division offered a range of classes across both the 
humanities and the sciences before it was extended to all divisions following its 
popularity and success. The humanités anciennes were composed of Latin, Greek, 
French, Flemish, English, German, History, Geography, mathematics and natural 
sciences. The humanités modernes were split into two sections: sciences, and 
commercial and industrial studies. The main problem facing the authorities was finding 
qualified personnel to teach them. Such was the importance of the initiative that the 
army was combed for men whose pre-war positions lent themselves to teaching. While 
29 academic doctors, 67 secondary school, and 1,789 primary school teachers were 
found through an examination of the available records, there were many more private 
instructors of which they knew nothing.688 Notwithstanding, the level of education was 
deemed satisfactory enough for the government to declare all degrees and qualifications 
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obtained whilst in the army valid so as to ease the transition back into civilian life post-
war. This was more than could be said of the degrees issued by the newly proclaimed 
)OHPLVK 8QLYHUVLW\ RI *HQW UHRSHQHG RQ  2FWREHU  DV SDUW RI *HUPDQ\¶V
Flamenpolitik policy), which were to be invalidated after the allied victory.689 
More light-hearted, though no less important, was the supply of sporting 
equipment. The Gifts for Belgian Soldiers campaign was particularly prominent in 
providing footballs and boots to the front, recognising the long-standing culture in the 
British army of using physical recreation to boost morale.690 Sport had begun to play a 
larger role in the Belgian army as 1914 approached, with each regiment forming its 
own teams of footballers, gymnasts and runners to compete in military tournaments. 
However, it took some time to convince senior military officials of its value, as many 
believed it would cause unnecessary fatigue and injuries. Some junior officers were 
more forthcoming and attempted to establish sporting initiatives as soon as the war of 
movement had ended. The benefits of having Flemings play alongside Walloons and 
officers alongside their men, all vying to achieve supremacy for their unit, were clear 
for all to see.691 The argument in favour of it was simple; war was a big sporting event 
that had to be won. Much as in peacetime where every effort was made to vanquish 
RQH¶VRSSRQHQWWRWKHEHWWHURIRQH¶VFDXVHZDUWRRZDVSOD\HGE\WKHVDPHSULQFLSOHV
This was exemplified in the sporting trench newspaper, /¶(FKR6SRUWLI, which wrote, 
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µ>W@REHDJRRGVROGLHURQHPXVWEHDJRRGVSRUWVPDQ,WLVDEHDXWLIXOWUXWKZKLFKRXU
VROGLHUV DQG RIILFHUV XQGHUVWDQG¶692 Nevertheless, it took until late 1916 for the 
Minister of War to acknowledge the positive effects that sport might have by finally 
sanctioning the football and cross-country Military Championships to be reinstated at 
the front.693  
King Albert, on the other hand, was a great proponent of such initiatives. He 
personally paid for the purchase of sporting equipment and, along with Queen 
Elisabeth, frequently attended matches to present prizes to the victors. On one occasion, 
these included five specially commissioned Swiss watches made from the metal of a 
Belgian 75mm gun, complete with gold trimmings, inscription and accompanying 
certificate of authenticity. Only 5,000 were made and were generally reserved for men 
who had distinguished themselves on the battlefield.694 They recognised, more than 
others, the unifying effects of team-sports and the benefit such patronage could bring. 
Simultaneously, the added benefits of maintaining physical fitness through blowing off 
steam in the intense environment of the front were difficult to ignore. 
From a strictly military point of view, however, sport was not seen as having 
the martial discipline or effectiveness of routine drill, marches and fatigues. Many 
officers preferred tried and tested methods to keep their men in shape and distracted 
while out of the line. In his Order of the Day for 26 October 1915, for example, General 
Wielemans expressed his desire to see the army sharpen up its attitude towards military 
values, which he felt were severely lacking in comparison to other armies. He intended 
to place renewed emphasis on closed-rank exercises in order to foster a passive 
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obedience to orders, increase the frequency of route marches, and inculcate respect by 
obliging soldiers to always salute officers unless they were in the front line.695 Such 
measures appeared unnecessary to the majority of troops who were still acclimatising 
to a prolonged period of military service. It was the source of much discontent in 
correspondence purely on account of its futility and tiring nature during what were 
supposed to be periods of rest and recuperation.696  
As much as inequality in rations between ordinary soldiers and officers in the 
German army eroded the relationship superiors had with their men, so did unwarranted 
exercises among the Belgians.697 The officer-man relationship, which proved so 
important in the maintenance of British morale, had for a long time been undermined 
in the Belgian military milieu by the perceived social and linguistic issues blocking the 
development of paternalism.698 Yet, contempt was similarly expressed with regard to 
NCOs, whose constant presence alongside the men was disliked on accord of their 
precise, often-unwavering application of the letter of the law. The realist painter, 
Maurice Wagemans (1877-1927), wrote of his experience in the trenches to his friend 
and colleague Emile Claus in 1916, in which he describes the self-importance displayed 
by his superiors: 
I beg your pardon for not having already written to you. It is not, I assure 
you, for want of thought, but I suffer so much here that I would have told you 
but sad things only. It is a difficult apprenticeship, that of a soldier, and I will 
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not hide from you that it requires of me immense courage and will in order to 
HQGXUH+HUHRQHPXVWFRPSOHWHO\IRUJHWRQH¶VEHLQJWKHDEVROXWHVDFULILFHRI
RQH¶V LQGLYLGXDOLW\ EHFDXVH ZH DUH WUHDWHG DV SDULDhs by NCOs drunk with 
vulgarity. They are masters of the house. The commanders, the officers, turn a 
blind eye and seem very indifferent to everything that goes on.699 
He continued by claiming that endless fatigues that saw him up from 05.30 until 18.00 
each GD\ FRPSOHWHG WKHLU PLVHU\ DQG WKDW LW ZDV DOO FRQGXFWHG XQGHU µD UHLJQ RI
WHUURU¶700  
Moreover, soldiers returning to Belgian lines from German prisoner of war 
(POW) camps were similarly shocked by the reception they received. Upon reaching 
the Belgian camp of Auvours in Northern France, one man, who escaped from Germany 
at the fourth attempt, wrote:  
I am happy to have got out, despite on the other hand regretting it at times. 
We think, when we are there, that we will be well received here by our 
compatriots; but no, it is rare to even get a hello, especially by the commanders, 
who tell us that we have to return to the front, which will be dangerous for us, 
as the Boches have our photographs and all the necessary information. If we 
were to be recaptured, wHZRXOGEHSODFHGXSDJDLQVWWKHZDOO>«@<HVLQWKH
camps over there, they told us that escapees were not well received in the 
Belgian army; I did not want to believe it, but now I am certain.701 
The frequency with which such reports reached de Broqueville was alarming to say the 
least. Not only did it have negative effects on the morale of those men who had made 
the arduous journey across occupied territories to do their duty, but equally gave further 
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credence to the activist propaganda being disseminated in German camps. Some of 
them, such as Göttingen, were purposefully turned into politicising institutions where 
German sympathisers were gathered and imbued with Flamenpolitik to be disseminated 
among their comrades.702 The fear that the Germans might deliberately release Belgian 
activists to re-join the army was a worrying thought and not entirely unfounded. Their 
effect may have been limited, but in conjunction with German placards raised above 
the parapets bearing pictures of Belgian deserters with their families, it was no wonder 
that the authorities feared some Flemish soldiers might begin to question who exactly 
had their best interests at heart.703 
The Flemish question during the First World War has long been a source of 
historiographical debate. From the initial claims made by Raf Verhulst in 1917 that 
80% of Belgian casualties in the war were Flemish, the idea that they were deliberately 
sacrificed by Walloon officers has become ingrained in the public consciousness. The 
proportion of Flemish soldiers in the army has proven difficult to accurately establish. 
Hans Keymulen and Luc De Vos have suggested that the split was roughly 69/31 in 
favour of the Flemish over the course of the war, with increasing parity in the technical 
arms.704 Sophie de Schaepdrijver estimated it at around 65/35, while later figures by De 
Vos and Holmes intimated that there were as few as 59% Flemings in 1914; only 
marginally higher than their share of the population.705 These figures appear well 
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founded, despite the minor variables, as the recruitment processes in place in the fifteen 
years preceding 1914 would have lent itself to a mildly higher proportion of Flemings 
joining through replacement and voluntary means. Similarly, the increase to 
approximately 65% of Flemings should come as no surprise. It must be remembered 
that the entirety of Wallonia was occupied from September 1914 until the armistice. 
The only unoccupied spit of land defended by the Belgians was in Flanders, offering a 
small pool of manpower of almost exclusively Flemish speakers from which to draw. 
7KLVLVFRUURERUDWHGE\+HQUL%HUQDUG¶VILJXUHVWKDWVKRZWKHSURSRUWLRQRI)OHPLVK
soldiers rising from 53% in 1914 to 63% by 1918.706 
The promulgation of the idea that disproportionately high Flemish casualties 
were sustained has quite naturally proved a contentious point and a battleground for 
post-war separatist claims. Attempts by the likes of F.E. Stevens and Luc Schepens to 
revise the 80% myth have only further obfuscated the debate through inconsistent and 
fundamHQWDOO\ IODZHG PHWKRGRORJ\ 7KH IRUPHU¶V VDPSOH ZDV FRQVWUXFWHG VROHO\
around one regiment that was predominantly recruited in Brussels, while the latter 
based his findings on the records of ten cemeteries in Flanders that failed to take into 
account the most costly battles in Antwerp and Liège or the fact that many Walloon 
soldiers were exhumed after the war and reburied locally.707 6FKHSHQV¶HVWLPDWLRQWKDW
approximately 67.94% of casualties were Flemish still appeared a gross over-estimation 
to Keymulen and De Vos whose methodological integrity steered them towards a 
suggestion of no more than 59.28%.708 The idea that the Flemish-dominated infantry 
were used as cannon-fodder was dispelled by their extrapolation of data from the 
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official casualties list published by the Moniteur Belge. They argued that the army as a 
whole, without taking into account the place of death, saw a casualty rate of 64.31% 
Flemish and 35.69% Walloon. Alternatively, a more precise calculation based on the 
fighting army alone whose deaths were recorded in Belgium, France or Britain, 
demonstrated that only 54.9% were Flemish, 26.6% Walloon and 9.9% bilingual. 
Furthermore, their figures for 1915-KLJKOLJKWHGWKHµ)OHPLVKLVDWLRQ¶RIWKH<VHU
army by contending that 68.81% of men who died in Flanders were of Flemish origin 
compared to 31.19% Walloon.709 This may well have given the impression that an 
above-average number of Flemings were being killed during the war but in reality the 
ratio was in line with their proportion of the army. 
How the Flemish question impacted on the effectiveness and workings of the 
army during the war itself is a different matter altogether. For decades there had been 
an assumption that Flemish soldiers had been discriminated against by their Walloon 
superiors on account of the language barrier. These injustices had been recognised and 
were in the process of being modified by an equality of language law due to come into 
effect in 1917. As with many other aspects of Belgian military organisation, the 
outbreak of war interrupted the process and seemingly created an unsavoury situation 
whereby command and control would be compromised by misunderstanding and 
continued officer-man friction. Yet recent scholarship has shown that this was not at all 
the case and certainly did not lead to the same problems of desertion and ineffectiveness 
as seen with Czech or Ruthene troops in the Austro-Hungarian army.710 Through life in 
the trenches and time spent in French rest camps and hospitals, Flemish soldiers picked 
up a rudimentary understanding of the language. Indeed, French military expressions 
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formed a veritable lingua franca of the army.711 Moreover, the majority of NCOs, who 
often adopted leadership roles during combat, were bilingual and would repeat the order 
in both French and )OHPLVKWRDYRLGFRQIXVLRQ2QO\RQHH[DPSOHLQ+RUYDW¶VVWXG\
of courts-PDUWLDOUHFRUGVUHYHDOHGD)OHPLVKVROGLHU¶VFODLPWRQRWKDYHXQGHUVWRRGWKH
orders given to him in French.712 
Of course, this is not to say that there was no desire among Flemish soldiers to 
be commanded in their own language. It has been suggested that demands were made 
to this end from as early as December 1915.713 However, these were sporadic and 
individualistic in nature and as such engendered little reaction. More concerted efforts 
in 1917 involving organised campaigns with Flemish slogans repeated throughout the 
army were much more powerful. Censors found increasing references to linguistic 
matters in private correspondence, while open letters expressing grievances appeared 
with greater frequency.714 One such letter, addressed to the King on 11 July 1917, asked 
for the establishment of separate Flemish and Walloon armies alongside a Flemish 
government seated in Flanders.715 These demands uncomfortably resembled processes 
being undertaken in occupied Belgium, which saw the administrative separation of the 
country take place on 21 March 1917 and the recognition of the Raad van Vlanderen 
(The Flemish Council) by the Germans on 15 February 1918. Yet the military 
authorities had to be particularly sensitive to the difference between loyal Flamingants 
campaigning for Flemish rights within a unified Belgium and Germanophile activists 
                                                     
711
 De Schaepdrijver, Groote Oorlog, p. 183. 
712
 Horvat, Vervolging, p. 55. 
713
 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
714
 MRA, CDH ± 118 Fonds GQG II Section, Report on the morale of troops for the 
period 25 July 1917 ± 25 August 1917. 
715
 Horvat, Vervolging, p. 58. For a full transcription see, T. Hermans (et.al.) (ed.), The 
Flemish Movement: A Documentary History 1780-1990, (Athlone Press Ltd, London, 
1992), pp. 227-237. 
 313 
seeking post-war political separation. This was of the highest importance to the 
government who were eager to ensure that no such confusion was made through the 
press or idle talk.716 It was important to note that some leading Flamingant intellectuals 
had refused to collaborate in occupied Belgium, demonstrating a loyalty to the concept 
of a wider Belgian identity and reinforcing the notion that not all activists ought to be 
tarnished with the same brush.717 To highlight this fact, intellectuals such as Camille de 
Bruyns, Paul Frédériquem and Louis Franck could all be found in German prisons 
having branded themselves anti-DNWLYLVWVZLWKDµN¶WRGLVFULPLQDWHEHWZHHQWKHLUSUH-
war ideals and that of the pan-Germanism that was now in force in occupied territory.718 
On 4 August 1917, Armand De Ceuninck was appointed the new Minister of 
War to curb the unrest in the army. He instituted a series of measures to ensure that 
officers were appointed from both regions. De Ceuninck himself spoke good Flemish 
and used it in speeches to the troops. By 15 September 1917, De Ceuninck 
acknowledged the right of Flemish soldiers to demand that their superiors spoke 
Flemish, and encouraged all officers to learn the language. However, he also warned 
that the army could now no longer tolerate a political agenda. Propagandists were 
treated as accomplices of the German oppressor and dealt with accordingly through 
being distanced from the front by imprisonment or labour intensive work with the 
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disciplinary companies.719 Notwithstanding, change was slow as officers failed or 
refused to adapt. Much like the pre-war attempts to foster closer links with their men, 
officers were at a loss as to which Flemish to learn. Even Flemish intellectuals struggled 
with their fellow Flemings in the ranks, whose regional dialects were so diverse and 
different from the standardised language as to make communication impossible. As 
such, many rest camps and hospitals retained everything in French or adopted English 
as an operative language.720 
In some cases, there was even a Walloon backlash. Many rankers were 
frustrated at the attention given to the Flamingants and angered at the prospect of being 
forced to learn Flemish; a language considered useless outside of Flanders.721 In a 
conflict that largely saw Flemings and Walloons set aside their differences and regional 
affiliations for the good of the nation, the agitation in 1917 and 1918 was a timely 
reminder that local identities remained paramount in the understanding of 
µ%HOJLDQQHVV¶7UHQFKQHZVSDSHUVZHUHDJRRGH[DPSOHRIWKLV7KH\DSSHDUWRKDYH
been specifically designed to nurture and reinforce the much-cherished connection 
between the individual and his locality by targeting readers from a given area. For 
example, the Amons nos autes newspaper printed stories about Liège and deeds of 
various Liègeois in the army in order to enable men to reconnect with their roots and 
their comrades spread across the various regiments. More importantly, in the context 
of the linguistic question, it even ran writing competitions in the Walloon dialect as 
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opposed to French to show the Liègeois DWWDFKPHQWWRµla pettite patrie¶722 Having been 
established in October 1915, the newspaper reported in just its sixteenth issue on 15 
May 1916 that it had surpassed 2,000 subscriptions; boldly claiming to have become 
the leading newspaper for the majority of the Liègeois in the army.723  
Each locality could boast their own publication, though more general trench 
newspapers, appealing to a wider audience through bilingual editions were also 
available. In many cases military chaplains were heavily involved on the editorial 
boards ensuring a highbrow approach reflected in some officer-edited French or 
officially-sanctioned German examples but noticeably distinct from the troop-led smut 
RIWHQIRXQGLQUDQNHUV¶SXEOLFDWLRQV724 This saw a heavy influence of religious content, 
which before the war may have caused annoyance among some. However, belief in 
divine provenance had risen substantially in the army since 1914, requiring an 
H[SDQVLRQLQWKHQXPEHURIPLOLWDU\FKDSODLQVIURPWRDJUDQGWRWDORIE\ZDU¶V
end.725 This even included 11 Protestant chaplains, under the direction of Pierre 
Blommaert, supporting the needs of a minority 3,000 men in the Belgian army.726 
Although it is difficult to quantify the number of men who practised their faith during 
the war or for what purpose, it is highly likely that faith helped even those with the most 
minimal convictions to endure the war. As in other armies, the importance of carrying 
objects believed to possess supernatural powers of safety and deliverance, be it bibles, 
amulets or even letters and pictures from hoPHµUHWXUQHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSHUVRQDO
fate to the individual, negating the damaging feelings of disempowerment arising from 
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WKH IURQW¶VREMHFWLYHXQFRQWUROODELOLW\¶727 By carrying these items or praying during 
combat, soldiers felt that their fate lay in their own hands; that, should they forget, death 
or dismemberment was a likely outcome of their own doing. As such, the value of 
chaplains at the centre of the battalion was critical for the Belgian army. By 
accompanying men into battle and being an ever present in their lives, they assumed a 
JUHDWPRUDOSUHVWLJHWKDWKHOSHGPDNHWKHPDµSUHFLRXVDX[LOLDU\WRDXWKRULW\¶728 
The respect they commanded from the men through their presence and aid in 
recreational activities also placed chaplains at the forefront of Flemish activism. 
Suspicions concerning their involvement (which included stretcher-bearers) were 
particularly rife given their ability to hold seemingly innocent congregations of 
attentive audiences; the majority of which were composed of Flemish Catholics.729 J.R. 
Leconte argued that these were false accusations made in the post-war years based 
exclusively on information garnered from Le XXe Siècle, which had performed an 
uninterrupted campaign against the influence of chaplains since 1916 and should 
therefore be disregarded.730 While it certainly cannot be claimed that all chaplains were 
DFWLYLVWV WKH OLNHVRI&\ULHO9HUVFKDYH¶V DXWKRUVKLS DQGGLVWULEXWLRQRI WKH Flemish 
1DWLRQDOLVW¶V&DWHFKLVPin March 1918 was a clear indication of direct involvement. In 
a question and answer format, this pamphlet set out radical aims for the Flemish people 
to take back what the Belgian political system had denied them.731 Official reports, too, 
placed intellectuals and educated men (among which chaplains could be counted) at the 
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centre of the agitation.732 King Albert, himself, recognised this fact when he wrote, 
µ7KLVPRYHPHQWLVVXSSRUWHGE\DSURSDJDQGDV\VWHPDWLFDOO\RUJDQLVHGE\QXPHURXV
LQWHOOHFWXDOV¶733 Similarly, reports from soldiers on leave claimed that chaplains were 
without question the greatest proponents of Flamingantism, circulating the trenches 
VD\LQJµ6SHHNYODDPVFK¶VSHDN)OHPLVKLQDQDJJUHVVLYHPDQQHU734 Their influence 
in the writing and distribution of seditious material was of paramount importance in 
changing the nature and scale of the agitation from local disturbances to an army-wide 
campaign. 
The impact of reading material was particularly feared for its ability to question 
the reasons for which the Entente Powers were fighting. Articles concerning Ireland in 
Ons Vaderland, published in Calais, and De Belgische Standaard, published in De 
Panne, provided two such examples. Without directly comparing Ireland and Flanders, 
they analysed and explained the nationalist insurrection, the opposition of the Catholic 
clergy to conscription, and the significance of the Sinn Fein movement. Eight articles 
on the subject appeared in De Belgische Standaard between 8 and 22 May, and two in 
Ons Vaderland in their issues of 17-18 May and 23 May 1918. The authors signed off 
2¶)ODQGHUVLQWKHformer and Patrick Fleming in the latter to further make their point.735 
A few weeks previously Ons Vaderland ZURWH DQ DUWLFOH HQWLWOHG µLa Belgique par-
dessus tout¶DVVHUWLQJWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWµWKHQDWLRQILUVWDQGIRUHPRVW¶ZDVDERYH
all, false and constituted heresy as, for a Catholic, God and religion trumped all.736 At 
a time when the French socialists were preaching the nation above all else, Belgian 
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soldiers were being told to forsake the nation in favour of divinity. It is little wonder, 
therefore, that chaplains were seen as stoking the agitation that not only threatened to 
XQGHUPLQH WKH DUP\¶V GLVFLSOLQH EXW DOVR WKH YHU\ IDEULF RI %HOJLDQ XQLW\ DQG
nationalism. 
The culmination of the Flemish movement came in March 1918 when a series 
RIµVWULNHV¶DV'DYLG(QJODQGHUWHUPHGWKHPVDZFR-ordinated demonstrations by the 
now 5,000 strong Front Party (Flemish activists) members.737 They were non-violent 
in nature but powerful in conveying sentiment. Groups of 100 to 400 men would gather 
for no more than half an hour during the night displaying Flemish slogans in an act of 
solidarity.738 Technically speaking their actions could not be classified as mutiny as no 
orders were directly disobeyed. The men involved would readily disperse to re-join 
their units and continue the fight, which set them slightly apart from some of the French 
cases in 1917 where demands had to be met before those involved agreed to take up 
arms.739 Nevertheless, there were fears that matters might escalate, particularly given 
the indecision that appeared to reign in the Cabinet concerning the best method of 
dealing with the situation. King Albert was particularly concerned, writing at some 
length:  
the Flemish question in the army has already been on numerous occasions 
the order of the day and despite its laborious deliberations, the Government has 
QRWEHHQDEOHWRDJUHHRQZKDWFRXUVHWRWDNH>«@,QWKHIDFHRIUHFUXGHVFHQW
propaganda and the manifestations in favour of Flemish, there is reason to fear 
that discipline might one day be compromised. The duty of the Chief of the 
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General Staff and the military authorities is to maintain, at all costs, discipline 
in the army. The duties of the Government are of a higher order, they consist 
of researching the causes of the movement and to determine what can be done 
in the way of appeasement and harmony. It is important that the sovereignty is 
QR ORQJHU GLYLGHG RQ WKH )OHPLVK TXHVWLRQ LQ WKH DUP\ >«@ 7KHUH DUH
reciprocal concessions to be made. If not, if you leave things to go on, a 
situation might arise that necessitates an inexorable repression to re-establish 
order. Would you be unanimous in the current state of affairs to support and 
DSSURYHLW">«@,QV\VWHPDWLFDOO\NHHSLQJVLOHQWRYHUWKHDVSLUDWLRQVRIWKRVH
Flemings who are even with us, who spill their blood in the trenches, limiting 
themselves to good-willed protests; do you not think that they would wish us 
WR XQGHUVWDQG E\ RXUVHOYHV >«@ ULJKWO\ RU ZURQJO\ WKDW RQO\ DJLWDWLRQ FDQ
modify what is perceived as our indecision if not our hostility?740 
The government had intended, as best as possible, to stay clear of making firm 
commitments to Flemish legislation up to this point. They had believed that whatever 
agitation there was in the army, was purely isolated and not in danger of such a 
conflagration. When they were finally faced with mass-unrest WKH&DELQHW¶VLPPHGLDWH
reaction was one of repression, but as suggested above, the King was not convinced 
that this was the solution.741 If anything, the Flemish soldiers campaigning for their 
rights within the framework of liberal Belgium had a point. 
 Part of the problem was that there was a fundamental misunderstanding over 
the motives and aims of the movement. This was partly on account of the different 
degrees of activism present within it. The more restrained portions sought no more than 
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a realignment of Flemish alongside French within an independent Belgium, whilst the 
radicals questioned the concept of Belgium as an entity in itself.742 The King even 
received demands from both Flemings and a few Walloons to have the army split along 
those lines into two separate institutions. Naturally, King Albert unequivocally refused 
to entertain any such suggestion, commenting:  
I declare that I cannot assume, as Commander in Chief, the responsibility 
of such a reform in the face of the enemy. No-one can say what may happen 
but I have the feeling, if not the certainty, that the Walloons would not submit 
passively. The officers, notably, would be profoundly troubled and I cannot 
answer for their attitude nor for their acts. I will also highlight that we would 
not have, and would be far from having, the necessary cadres. One does not 
improvise on campaign at a critical moment like today such profound and 
radical modifications.743  
This was not only prudent militarily but also demonstrated a strength of character that 
came to define King $OEHUW¶VFRPPDQGDQGUHLJQGXULQJWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DU(YHUWKH
pragmatist, it made little sense to ignore the frustrations being aired by his troops and 
subjects, and even less sense to act against the best interests of the nation. After all, the 
army still needed to hold its portion of the line in the face of the German Spring 
offensives to have any say at the peace table should victory be achieved.  
 Indeed, the intensity of the war in the Spring of 1918 perhaps helped contain 
the situation for the Belgians, whilst the subsequent re-establishment of the war of 
movement during the Hundred Days, which saw the Belgian army take to the offensive 
to liberate their country, proved to be the perfect tonic to raise the eroding morale. It 
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demonstrates the ephemeral nature of the agitation, which although based upon real 
desires and pre-war social anxieties, never sought to undermine the ability of the army 
to perform its primary role of asserting its continued existence and independence. In 
this sense, there is a certain truth in the assertion made by Aloys Van de Vyvere, the 
Minister of Finance, in July 1918 when opposing a counter-propaganda idea by 
Hymans to cRPEDWWKH)OHPLVKPRYHPHQW+HVWDWHGµ0U+\PDQV¶SURSDJDQGDZRXOG
be complete if it were true that there were neither Flemings, nor Walloons, that there 
were only Belgians. Undoubtedly, it must be that there are only Belgians, but these 
Belgians ± with the exception of a small minority who would be wrong to assume they 
were more complete Belgians than others ± wish, as is their right, to remain Flemings 
DQG :DOORRQV¶744 It reveals an intimate appreciation of the Belgian connection to 
nationalism through regional roots. Whilst there were those who could claim to be 
Belgian without recourse to further qualification, there were others who adopted a 
Flemish concept of Belgian identity and others a Walloon concept. Perhaps, this could 
be localised even further. Ultimately, however, the majority of soldiers who went to 
war had a shared identity from two different sources that manifestly expressed itself in 
the dogged defence of their country under the most trying of circumstances. The 
Flemish movement, simply put, was one expression trying to attain parity with the 
other, only boiling over when war-weariness caught up with the Belgians as it had 
already done with the majority of other belligerent nations. Indeed, it has even been 
shown that Flemish nationalism in the post-war years needed an origin to validate its 
interwar agenda, which was to be belatedly found in the troubles of 1918 despite their 
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relatively limited aims.745 Even the erection of the Flemish Tower in Diksmuide in 1930 
reflected post-war sentiments more than wartime divisions; its significance to memory 
and symbolic relevance only being heightened when it was suspiciously blown up in 
1946.746  
  
 The First World War brought to an end what really was a long nineteenth 
century for Belgium. The many social and political tensions that had dominated the 
civilian milieu and overflowed into its military counterpart were exposed as German 
boots crossed the border on 4 August 1914. The army itself was in a poor state. Its 
organisation was in turmoil following a series of changes that saw men from four 
separate recruiting systems called up to defend the nation. The majority were reservists 
with little meaningful military experience to draw on, whilst the equipment at their 
disposal was similarly unprepared for the nature of modern warfare. Notwithstanding 
the odds stacked against them, the Belgian army succeeded in many respects in 
fulfilling LWVUROHDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VREOLJDWLRQVE\VWRLFDOO\FRPPLWWLQJLWVHOIWRDFRVWO\
defensive action from the Meuse to the Yser. Anglophone historiography has generally 
viewed Belgium as simply the geographical location where part of the First World War 
took place. However, the steadfast and pragmatic decision-making of King Albert, 
which was often misconstrued as stubborn incompetence, demonstrated the agency and 
role of a nation that was fully intent on making its presence felt. Indeed, it was 
paramount; for in the tenacity of the army on the Yser for four years the continued 
existence of Belgium endured. Although help was at hand, the importance of the 1914 
campaign, that saw the Belgian army retain a portion of its territory under its own 
                                                     
745
 B. De Wever, Greep naar de macht. Vlaams-nationalisme en Nieuwe Orde. Het 
VNV 1933-1945 (Uitgeverij Lannoo, Tielt, 1994), p. 28. 
746
 I.F.W. Beckett, The Great War, 1914-1918 (Pearson, Harlow, 2007), p. 613. 
 323 
sovereignty, was essential in providing its men and its occupied civilians with the 
fortitude to sustain themselves amidst the most trying of circumstances. 
 The ability to endure the war was as much a top-down conundrum as it was an 
individual effort. Disciplinary measures to keep an ailing army in the field were a 
necessary response to the crisis of 1914; during which time seven of the 12 Belgian 
military executions took place. Following the establishment of static warfare and the 
passing of the immediate danger, the army realised that the coercive methods were of 
secondary importance in the maintenance of morale and swiftly altered their approach 
to include more supportive measures. The military authorities began a slow process of 
refitting the army and providing it with as many comforts as were made available to 
them. Yet despite this, recourse to charity in providing materials for recreation was 
equally important. Education and sport played a huge role in creating positive 
distractions for a largely citizen force that had always felt detached from its army. The 
unifying effects of sport and better prospects in a post-war world through qualifications 
(both heavily supported directly by the Monarchy) had a great impact on the lives of 
the individuals who were able to benefit.  
Yet discord threatened to undermine the supportive mechanisms put in place. 
The Flemish movement, which gathered pace as of the winter of 1917-18 and the 
accompanying war-weariness, was a potentially catastrophic development that might 
KDYHHQGHG%HOJLXP¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHZDUDQGE\H[WHQVLRQLWVFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFH
as an independent sovereign state. However, its motivations and aims were far less 
radical than its post-war incarnation. The majority of Flemings still believed themselves 
to be Belgian, despite their deep-rooted affection for their respective localities and 
traditions. Indeed, they were no different to their Walloon counterparts in this respect. 
Their grievance was more with the lack of appreciation from some quarters that a 
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Flemish interpretation of Belgian identity could have parity with a Walloon one, despite 
the dominance of the French language in the country. To a degree, the demonstrations 
were a reaffirmation of the fact that they did consider themselves Belgian and were 
SUHSDUHGWRILJKWDORQJVLGHWKH:DOORRQVWRULGWKHLUFRXQWU\RIWKHLQYDGHUWKHµRWKHU¶
with whom they certainly had nothing in common. In this sense, the words of Hew 
6WUDFKDQ WKDW µDV %HOJLXP ORVW LWV WHUULWRU\ LW IRXQG DQ LGHQWLW\¶ SURYH SDUWLFXODUO\
perceptive.747 
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Throughout the period under consideration it is evident that the Belgian army 
failed in its task as a tool of nation building in a linguistically, culturally and politically 
fractured society. The ramifications of decades¶ worth of social debates that emanated 
from competing identifications with the country and its political institutions 
significantly undermined the military capabilities of the army, charged primarily with 
the task of protecting independence and upholding neutrality. Yet in many ways it 
reflected the society from which it was drawn. The deep-rooted anti-militarism that 
came to define public and political reactions to the army were very much in evidence 
through the relegation of military issues behind those of a social nature. Chief among 
these was that of language, which came increasingly to define local identities within 
society as well as the army itself. In a country whose revolution in 1830 had spawned 
from predominantly economic considerations, such splintering towards parochialisms 
is not unsurprising.748 It reinforced the dichotomy between centre and periphery in a 
rapidly industrialising country. The effect was an echoing of anti-militarism from both 
the Catholic and Liberal parties, which sought to maintain favour with the small, but 
powerful, electorate through reducing the military burden. Political interference of this 
QDWXUHFRQVLVWHQWO\SODJXHGWKHDUP\¶VDWWHPSWVWRLQVWLWXWHPXFK-needed reforms and 
resulted in a militarily ineffective force taking the field in 1914. However, while it 
might have been expected to collapse in the face of overwhelming force, the army and 
the nation found a resolve to endure the trials of a modern war for which they were not 
SUHSDUHG:KHQIDFHGZLWKµWKHRWKHU¶DJDLQVWZKLFKWRGHILQHLWVHOI%HOJLXP¶V parallel 
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identities converged within a wider concept of the nation that allowed it to set aside its 
pre-war divisions to fight towards a common end. 
Even at the top of the military establishment, defining a military identity proved 
troublesome. The officer corps began its search for professionalization by incorporating 
high-ranking French and Polish officers to fill the void left by returning Belgian officers 
whose careers had been stunted whilst in Dutch service. While it certainly became more 
Belgian as the nineteenth century progressed, issues of language, religion and politics 
threatened to undermine the martial spirit inculcated by the increasingly influential 
École Militaire. Political interference in these matters bore much of the responsibility. 
Pro-French legislation, for example, ensured that a disproportionate number of French-
speaking officers persisted throughout the century. Flemish-speakers retained a 
presence, but became increasingly bilingual in pursuit of professional opportunities. 
This reflected a wider social trend in Flanders among the lower-middle classes 
competing for managerial positions, which helped ignite the resolve of the Flamingant 
PRYHPHQW¶VTXHVWIRUOLQJXLVWLFSDULW\E\WKHWXUQRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\749  
However, concerns over career progression among all officers grew as 
promotion rates slowed. Lengthening seniority lists coupled with corruption and 
patronage caused disillusionment among conscientious and ambitious officers. 
Suggestions that the officer corps had become insular were somewhat justified in this 
respect, though claims of exclusivity emanating from a military class were clearly wide 
of the mark. The healthy number of commissions granted to NCOs, which reflected a 
continuation of the revolutionary spirit of equal opportunity, bore testament to that. 
Nevertheless, disenchantment with the system prompted many ambitious officers to 
sell out to the commercial opportunities in the Congo from the 1880s. This left the 




officer corps with a limited number of career officers at its disposal and revealed, above 
anything else, the slow unravelling of professionalism that had been so highly prized in 
WKHDUP\¶VIRUPDWLYH\HDUV 
Political interference in the recruitment of the rank and file was even more 
pronounced than in the officer corps. The obvious failings of the ballot system that 
allowed the wealthier sections of society to escape the military charge undermined the 
DUP\¶VGXDOUROHRIQDWLRQDOGHIHQFHDQGDVDQLQVWUXPHQWRIXQLILFDWLRQ,QSODFHRIWKH
desired intelligent class of recruits, the substitutes and replacements furnished by them, 
proved detrimental to discipline and efficiency. Moreover, the ballot ensured that the 
army was not a true reflection of society in terms of its social composition. Politically, 
however, neither Catholics nor Liberals could afford to endorse the calls for personal 
and obligatory service emanating from senior officers, for fear of estranging the small 
electorate who were the main beneficiaries of replacement. Indeed, a succession of 
Catholic ministries from 1884 onwards were elected on promises of reducing the 
military burden. This included reducing time spent under arms as well as fiscal 
frugality. It was a further demonstration of the power of local over national interests.  
In place of the short-service conscription along the Prussian model, anti-
militaristic pressure succeeded in convincing the government to waive the advice of the 
1901 Commission and to implement voluntary recruitment instead. It supposedly 
adhered to the national principles of the liberty of vocations, although it proved beyond 
contestation the deep-rooted aversion to a life under arms. Skeletal units between 1902 
and 1909, coupled with a change in the Catholic Party leadership, saw the first step 
towards achieving full-blown conscription. A more national army was established 
through the abolition of replacement, as the one son per family law was introduced as 
a stepping-stone towards a more capable military force. In 1913 this was extended to 
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full general service that sought to raise the wartime establishment from 100,000 to 
340,000 men by 1925. Yet, as a corollary to the disaffected wings of the Catholic 
3DUW\¶V)OHPLVK UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV UHJLRQDO UHFUXLWPHQW VXSSODQWHG WKHQDWLRQDO V\VWHP
that had hoped to create a melting pot from which to extract a collective unity.750 It 
demonstrated the failure of the army to break the strong regional bonds of the 
individuals through what had been a largely defective system of recruitment. 
Beyond the system itself, the unwritten social contract between communities 
and the State was deemed to be a one-sided affair. The youth of the nation was 
compelled to serve in the interests of defending a neutrality that was seemingly 
unthreatened, whilst receiving little physical, moral or educational support in return. 
7KH µVFKRRO RI WKH QDWLRQ¶ SXUSRUWHG WR WUDQVIRUP WKH RIWHQ LOOLWHUDWH SLRXV DQG
backward peasant into a productive contributor to society whilst under arms. However, 
appalling conditions, corruptive elements in the barracks, and a disproportionately 
harsh disciplinary regime created fissures between the army and society. This was 
particularly the case in rural Flanders where families believed that Catholic values were 
being systematically undermined through interaction with Liberal and latterly socialist 
Walloons. It reinforced the already prevalent anti-militarism in these parts and explains 
why the Catholic Party came to defy the army on military issues for the majority of the 
nineteenth century. 
The failure to adequately put in place traditional supports for its recruits over 
successive generations was reflected in the recalcitrance of many young men 
unaccustomed to the discipline of military life. The fact that many Flemish soldiers 
were tried by courts martial over the period in question returned the army to the 
Chamber of Representatives as a crucible for social debates. At the centre of this were 





education. The Liberal position echoed the sentiment that Flanders, its language, 
FXVWRPVDQGEHOLHIVKDGEHHQ OHIWEHKLQGE\:DOORQLD¶V LQGXVWULDOLVDWLRQGXULQJ WKH
1840s. Certainly literacy rates were poor in Belgium, but it was difficult to draw a direct 
correlation between Clerical schooling and indiscipline. Indeed, many Flemish 
representatives intimated that linguistic discrimination from the French-dominated 
officer corps could explain such figures. What could not be explained was the use of 
corporal punishment in Belgium after the rest of Europe had moved towards a more 
humanitarian concept of rehabilitation. Brutalities, often directed against the 
uneducated Fleming, contributed to the perpetuation of anti-militarism and regional 
affiliations within society. Far from improving the youth entUXVWHGWRLWWKHµVFKRRORI
WKH QDWLRQ¶ VXFFHHGHG ODUJHO\ LQ DOLHQDWLQJ WKRVH ZKR ZHUH XQDEOH WR EHQG WR LWV
methods. 
Whereas the bourgeoisie was able to leave the burden and harsh realities of 
military service to the lower classes, they could not so easily escape their public duties 
in the Civic Guard. While exhibiting flashes of pride in the exclusivity of their corps 
and its role as the guardians of the Revolution, they were no more drawn to the idea of 
militarism in this form than in the army proper. Certainly, the organisational failings 
did not help foster a martial spirit, with professionalism often marginalised by abuses 
during the quinquennial election of officers. Nevertheless, its performance alongside 
the more experienced Gendarmerie during the 1848 crisis suggested that it could play 
a role in the maintenance of internal order. This would prove to be the zenith of its 
existence, however, as prolonged periods of peace, a reorganisation that limited 
participation to a few urban centres around the country, and a lack of finance from the 
 330 
authorities who did not trust it to fulfil the role of a reserve force, sent the Civic Guard 
into decline. 
The effects were clearly noted during the 1886 workers¶ riots, in which 
inexperience and indiscipline saw the &LYLF*XDUG¶V WUDGLWLRQDO UROHDVDQDLG WR WKH
civil power usurped by the increasingly important and ever-growing Gendarmerie. The 
IDLWK VKRZQ LQ WKH ODWWHU¶V DELOLW\ DV WKH SULPDU\ 6WDWH EXOZDUN DJDLQVW WKH VRFLDO
upheaval of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was testament to its 
professionalism, organisation, and apolitical nature. It was held in stark contrast to the 
Civic Guard, who in its urban composition had been subjected to Liberal, and in some 
cases Socialist, ideals that placed it DWRGGVZLWKWKH&DWKROLF*RYHUQPHQW¶VDWWLWXGH
towards civil unrest. While the bourgeoisie ought to have provided the surest safeguard 
against the rise of socialism, shared beliefs in the extension of the franchise and anti-
clericalism left the authoULWLHVXQVXUHRI WKH&LYLF*XDUG¶V UHOLDELOLW\$VZLWKRWKHU
aspects of the army, the auxiliary forces demonstrated the centrality of political 
affiliations and the influence of the urban/rural divide in the problematic development 
of the military establishment. 
 Amidst the lengthy deliberations over the composition, organisation and 
capabilities of the armed forces, civil-military debates equally had to contend with the 
issue of fortifications. The expenditure involved in the construction and renovation of 
the national redoubt at Antwerp (1859 and 1906) as well as Liège and Namur (1887) 
significantly compromised military reform. In order to appease a disaffected electorate, 
governments (particularly the Catholic Ministries from 1884 onwards) were forced into 
assurances that the annual contingent would not be raised, despite its obvious necessity. 
The Meetingers of Antwerp were particularly prominent in holding the government to 
account and demonstrated, again, the designs of local and commercial interests over 
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national safety. This was mirrored around the country and created the conditions for 
party-politics to intervene. The Liberals were the guiltiest in this respect after losing 
power in the mid-1880s. Their attempts to rally local support in Liège and Namur 
against new constructions in 1887 in order to sow seeds of discontent within the 
Catholic ranks, was all the more galling given their support of the project whilst in 
power themselves. The situation was to repeat itself in 1906 with the redevelopment of 
Antwerp, and revealed the ugly nature of political interference in matters that ought to 
have left entirely to the military authorities.  
 Ostensibly the debates revolved around the strategic questions of how to 
assimilate the army and its fortifications into a system that would best answer 
%HOJLXP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV WR GHIHQG LWV QHXWUDOLW\ 7KH JHRJUDSK\ RI WKH
country and the capabilities of the army lent Antwerp to being the centre of any future 
strategy. Under the direction of Brialmont, Antwerp, with its polygonal forts, was 
designed to act as the final bastion for the nation in the event of a direct invasion. Along 
with bridgeheads on the Meuse, it created a central point of mobilisation that would 
allow a concentration of forces at the decisive point to delay an enemy whilst aid from 
a guarantor power arrived. This decision, taken in 1859, was to endure until 1914 
despite alterations to technology and European geo-politics somewhat outpacing its 
principles. Indeed, developments in artillery and explosives limited the effectiveness of 
both Antwerp and the Meuse forts at various junctures throughout the nineteenth and 
HDUO\ WZHQWLHWKFHQWXULHVZKLOVW3UXVVLD¶VDFTXLVLWLRQRI$OVDFH-Lorraine in 1870-71 
reduced the probability of an invasion towards Antwerp. Notwithstanding, 
fortifications had proven useful in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and perpetuated 
the idea that they might be the decisive point upon which the field army could lean in 
the defence of the nation. In spite of evolutions in strategic thought in the decade 
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preceding the outbreak of war, Belgium remained wedded to its 1859 principles simply 
out of deference to the effort and finances invested in them. Although it is impossible 
to prove whether this was the correct choice, the realities of the invasion in August 
1914 demonstrated that neither the fortifications nor the field army were adequately 
prepared for a modern war. 
 Operationally, the Belgian army performed better than many had expected 
JLYHQWKHFRXQWU\¶VSUH-war civil-military issues. Initially, its defence on the Meuse, 
which delayed the German advance by 13 days, was viewed as a minor triumph despite 
the obvious deficiencies of the fortifications when faced with modern heavy artillery. 
Subsequently, its tenacity during the retreat to Antwerp, but particularly on the Yser, 
encapsulated a newfound unity of action that resembled something akin to nationalism. 
7KH DUP\¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH RSHUDWLRQDO WKHDWUH ZDV OLPLWHG DV D UHVXOW RI ORVVHV
sustained in these opening encRXQWHUVPXFKWRWKHDQQR\DQFHRI%HOJLXP¶VDOOLHV.LQJ
Albert, acutely aware of the capabilities of his depleted force refused to bow to British 
and French pressures to prematurely risk his army, which had become the embodiment 
of independence while the nation was under occupation. In doing so, he restored an 
agency to Belgian participation that was dismissed at the time and has subsequently 
been removed from the historiography. Rightly or wrongly, the Belgian army only 
retook the offensive during the Hundred Days to liberate its territory and to secure its 
own position at the peace table at which it hoped to play an active role to secure 
territorial gains.751 
 For the majority of the war, however, the Belgian army was simply forced to 
endure as it recovered from its 1914 exertions. Discipline and morale were of primary 
importance in this respect. Although it might be contended that the rate of executions 





before Christmas of 1914 was disproportionately high, this was purely a result of the 
chaos of war during a period of crisis that required the strong hand of authority to keep 
the army in the field. From the summer of 1915, it was recognised that the rebuilding 
process required a more supportive system to maintain morale among an army whose 
deprivations exceeded those of most belligerents. Material acquisitions, in the form of 
food and clothing were as well received as recreational literature, sporting competitions 
and leave. Yet, the physical separation from loved-ones proved difficult to distance 
from the minds of the citizen soldier, which caused anxieties to surface when the war-
weariness during the winter of 1917-18 took hold. Flamingantism, encouraged by 
German propaganda, emerged as a result and threatened to undermine the unity 
displayed since the outbreak of war. Yet, as before the war, Flemish demands were 
more concerned with attaining parity within a wider concept of a Belgian nation. This 
was exemplified by the fact that the majority of soldiers involved in the March 1918 
µVWULNHV¶ZLOOLQJO\UHWurned to action to complete the job of ridding the country of the 
invader. In this respect, the convergence of multiple identifications with the Belgian 
nation becomes evident. When faced ZLWKµWKHRWKHU¶DJDLQVWZKLFKWRGHILQHLWVHOIWKH
Belgian army was able to use the ordeal of war as a milieu to belatedly draw the nation 
together.  
 In many ways the war proved to be a watershed for Belgium and its army as it 
emerged from neutrality to secure a more active role in the new world. This resulted in 
an alliance with France and the freedom to develop its military establishment without 
international constraints. Conscription saw the army grow to an unprecedented 600,000 
men by the mid-1930s, but a combination of economic depression following the Great 
War and DQDYHUVLRQWRQHZµRIIHQVLYH¶WHFKQRORJLHV, VXFKDVWKHWDQNOHIWWKHDUP\¶V
re-equipment short of the mark. Faith in fortifications, however, saw the construction 
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of Eban-Emael near the Dutch/German border that would infamously be taken by a 
coup de main in 1940.752 Yet, the First World War was nothing but a momentary respite 
in a continuum of the nineteenth century civil-military milieu. The Flemish question in 
the army took on greater significance as Flamingantism mutated into a volatile 
separatist movement. Regional recruitment on linguistic grounds in 1923, and the 
introduction of Flemish as an official language of command in the army in 1928, had 
been too long coming. It revealed much wider fissures in society and translated into a 
demoralised army and officer corps that had still not fully recovered from the travails 
of the Great War. As such, the army lacked even greater homogeneity than it had in 
1914, and for a second time in a generation was confronted with a German invasion for 
which it was unprepared.753 Unlike the First World War, however, the nation lacked the 
strong hand of leadership that had seen King Albert conceal the civil-military issues of 
the nineteenth century. Under the direction of his son, Leopold III, the army of May 
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Appendix 2 ± List of politicians in office 1830-1918. 
Year Prime Minister Political Party Minister of War 
 
28 Sep 1830 ± 
4 Nov 1830 




André Jolly  
(1830) 
$OEHUW*REOHWG¶$OYLHOOD 
(1830 ± 1831) 
5 Nov 1830 ± 
26 Feb 1831 
Sylvain Van de 
Weyer 
Liberal-social $OEHUW*REOHWG¶$OYLHOOD 
(1830 ± 1831) 
27 Feb 1831 ± 




(1830 ± 1831) 
24 Mar 1831 ± 
23 Jul 1831 
Joseph Lebeau Liberal &RQVWDQWLQ'¶+DQH-
Steenhuyse 
(1831) 
Charles de Brouckere 
(1831) 
Amédée De Failly 
(1831) 
24 Jul 1831 ± 
19 Oct 1832 
Félix de 
Muelenaere 





Charles de Brouckere 
(1831 - 1832) 
Félix de Mérode 
(1832) 
Louis Evain 
(1832 ± 1836) 
20 Oct 1832 ± 
3 Aug 1834 
Charles Rogier Liberal Louis Evain 
(1832 ± 1836) 
4 Aug 1834 ± 
17 Apr 1840 
Barthélémy de 
Theux de Meylandt 
Catholic Louis Evain 
(1832 ± 1836) 
Jean-Pierre Willmar 
(1836 ± 1840) 
18 Apr 1840 ± 
12 Apr 1841 
Joseph Lebeau Liberal Gérard Buzen 
(1840 ± 1842) 
13 Apr 1841 ± 
29 Jul 1845 
Jean-Baptiste 
Nothomb 
Liberal Gérard Buzen 
(1840 ± 1842) 
Henri de Liem 




(1843 ± 1846) 
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30 Jul 1845 ± 
30 Mar 1846 
Sylvain Van de 
Weyer 
Liberal Pierre Dupont 
(1843 ± 1846) 
-XOHVG¶$QHWKDQ 
(1846) 
31 Mar 1846 ± 
11 Aug 1847 
Barthélémy de 
Theux de Meylandt 
Catholic Albert Prisse 
(1846 ± 1847) 
12 Aug 1847 ± 
30 Oct 1852 
Charles Rogier Liberal Pierre Emmanuel Félix 
Chazal 
(1847 ± 1849) 
Charles Rogier 
(1849 ± 1850) 
Mathieu Brialmont 
(1850 ± 1851) 
Victor Anoul 
(1851 ± 1855) 
31 Oct 1852 ± 
29 Mar 1855 
Henri de Brouckère Liberal Victor Anoul 
(1851 ± 1855) 
30 Mar 1855 ± 
8 Nov 1857 
Pierre De Decker Catholic Léonard Greindl 
(1855 ± 1857) 
9 Nov 1857 ±  
2 Jan 1868 
Charles Rogier Liberal Édouard Berten 
(1857 ± 1859) 
Pierre Emmanuel Félix 
Chazal 
(1859 ± 1866) 
Auguste Goethals 
(1866 ± 1868) 
3 Jan 1868 ±  
1 Jul 1870 
Walthère Frère-
Orban 
Liberal Bruno Renard 
(1868 ± 1870) 
2 Jul 1870 ±  
6 Dec 1871 
-XOHVG¶$QHWKDQ Catholic Henri Guillaume 
(1870 ± 1873) 
7 Dec 1871 ± 
20 Aug 1874 
Barthélémy de 
Theux de Meylandt 
Catholic Henri Guillaume 
(1870 ± 1873) 
Séraphin Thiebault 
(1873 ± 1878) 
21 Aug 1874 ± 
18 Jun 1878 
Jules Malou Catholic Séraphin Thiebault 
(1873 ± 1878) 
19 Jun 1878 ± 
15 Jun 1884 
Walthère Frère-
Orban 
Liberal Bruno Renard 
(1878 ± 1879) 
Jean-Baptiste Liagre 
(1879 ± 1880) 
Guillaume Gratry 
(1880 ± 1884) 
16 Jun 1884 ± 
25 Oct 1884 
Jules Malou Catholic Charles Pontus 
(1884 ± 1893) 
26 Oct 1884 ± 
25 Mar 1894 
Auguste Beernaert Catholic Charles Pontus 
(1884 ± 1893) 
Jacques-Joseph Brassine 
(1893 ± 1896) 
26 Mar 1894 ± 
24 Feb 1896 
Jules de Burlet Catholic Jacques-Joseph Brassine 
(1893 ± 1896) 
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25 Feb 1896 ± 
23 Jan 1899 
Paul de Smet de 
Naeyer 
Catholic Jacques-Joseph Brassine 
(1893 ± 1896) 
Jules Vandenpeereboom 
(1896 ± 1899) 
24 Jan 1899 ± 
4 Aug 1899 
Jules 
Vandenpeereboom 
Catholic Jules Vandenpeereboom 
(1896 ± 1899) 
5 Aug 1899 ±  
1 May 1907 
Paul de Smet de 
Naeyer 
Catholic Alexandre Cousebandt 
G¶$ONHPDGH 
(1899 ± 1907) 
2 May 1907 ±  
8 Jan 1908 
Jules de Trooz Catholic Joseph Hellebaut 
(1907 ± 1912) 
9 Jan 1908 ± 
16 Jun 1911 
François Schollaert Catholic Joseph Hellebaut 
(1907 ± 1912) 
17 Jun 1911 - 
31 May 1918 
Charles de 
Broqueville 
Catholic Joseph Hellebaut (1907 ± 
1912) 
Charles de Broqueville  
(1912 ± 1917) 
Victor Michel 
(1912) 
Charles de Broqueville  
(1912 ± 1917) 
Armand De Ceuninck  
(1917 ± 1918) 
1 Jun 1918 ± 
20 Nov 1918 
Gérard Cooreman Catholic Armand De Ceuninck 



















$UFKLYHVG¶eWDWGX5R\DXPH± Algemeen Rijksarchief 
- Baron Charles de Broqueville Papers 
- Jules Malou Papers 
- Jean-Baptiste Nothomb Papers 
- Charles Rogier Papers 
- Schollaert-Helleputte Papers 
- Léon Van der Elst Papers 
 
$UFKLYHVG¶eWDWG¶$UORQ± Rijksarchief Aarlon 
- 030/3 ± Civic Guard Province of Luxembourg 
 
$UFKLYHVG¶eWDWGH&RXUWUDL± Rijksarchief Kortrijk 
- 301/13 - Gemeentearchief Deerlijk 
 
Archives Royale ± Royal Archives 
Archives du Cabinet du Roi ± Règne de Léopold II  
- 2132 ± Correspondence with Ministers of War  
- 2133 ± Correspondence with Ministers of War  
- 2137 ± Correspondence with Ministers of War 
- 2182 ± Personal Service 
 
Fonds A.E -  
- 35 ± .LQJ$OEHUW¶V&RUUHVSRQGHQFH 
 
In Flanders Fields Research Centre 
- MI 7375, Diary of a Squadron-Commandant 1st Lancers 
 
Musée Royal GHO¶$UPpH 
'RVVLHUVHW0DWULFXOHVG¶2IILFLHUV± Officer Service Records 
- Officer Files ± 2545; 2586; 2587; 2596; 3999 
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- Officer Matriculation Sheets  - boxes 1 ± 52. 
 
Fonds 1ère Division Armée ± 1st Army Division Archives 
- 228 ± Daily Reports 8 August 1915 
- 309 ± Daily Reports 26 October 1915 
- 1351 ± Daily Reports 27 July 1918  
 
Fonds Belgische Militaire Aanwezigheid in het Buitenlaand (1826-1955) ± 
Archives of Belgian Military Abroad (1826-1955) 
- Algeria IV/2 ± Miscellaneous Report. 
- Algeria IV/3 ± Miscellaneous Reports. 
- Congo XV 43-55 ± Governor-General of the Congo Correspondence. 
- Portugal ± II/69 ± Miscellaneous Reports. 
 
Fonds Burgerwacht 
- 98/A-zn - Brussels Civic Guard  
- 288 ± Financial Management Civic Guard 
- 289 ± Miscellaneous Civic Guard 
 
Fonds CDH ±  
- CDH 118 - Fonds GQG II Section. 
- EX CDH 3768 - Cabinet Minutes 1918. 
- EX CDH 4362 ± General Staff Reports 1918. 
 
Fonds Chazal ± Chazal Archives 
- F-18. Chazal Papers ± Correspondence with Brialmont 
 
Fonds Fortifications ± Fortification Archives 
- 73/3 - Antwerp 
 
Fonds Moscou ± Moscow Archives 
- 818 ± École Militaire Correspondence 1886-1892. 
- 852 ± Notes on British Army, 1906-1914. 
- 4113 ± École de Guerre: Lessons 1874. 
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- 5029 ± Antwerp Fortifications 1906 
 
Fonds Personalia I (1914-1918) ± Personnel Archives (1914-1918) 
- 2 ± René Deckers 
- 13 ± René Lefèvre 
 
Fonds de Santé ± Medical Service Archives 
- 10/1 ± Inspector General of the Medical Service Reports 
- 10/6 ± Inspector General of the Medical Service Reports 
 
Trench Newspapers 
- MRA, At-14-XI-4 Boxes 1-5 
Amon nos autes 
/¶(FKR6SRUWLI 
Les bonnes nouvelles/Het goede nieuws 
 
Plenum.be ± Online Records of Parliamentary Debates 
- Chamber of Representatives Debates 
 
Unionisme.be ± Online Records of Parliamentary Debates 
- Chamber of Representatives Debates 
 
Departmental Papers, National Archives, Kew 
War Office: 
- WO 33 - War Office: Reports, Memoranda and Papers 
- WO 106 - War office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military 
Intelligence, and Predecessors: Correspondence and Papers 
 
Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes 
- 7 N1156 ± Military Attaché Reports 
- 7 N1156 ± Military Attaché Reports  





- Administration de la Garde Civique et de la Milice: Inspections générales de 
1911 SXEOLpSDUOH0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU*X\RW)UqUHVeGLWHXUV 
- Archives de Médecine Militaire Tome II (1848). 
- La Belgique Militaire. 
- Biographie Nationale (Tom 29), (Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et 
des Beaux-Arts). 
- Bulletin Belge des sciences militaires (1928). 
- Journal Militaire Officiel. 
- Le Moniteur Belge. 
- Recuil Administratif. 
- /H 6HQWLQHOOH EHOJH 5HYXH G¶DFWXDOLWp PLOLWDLUHV HW SROLWLTXHV HW UHFXLO GH
VFLHQFHG¶DUWHWG¶KLVWRLUHFRPHPSRUDLQH, no. 14, (1865). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (15 Octobre 1846) 
Publié par le MinistrHGHO¶,QWpULHXU (Th. Lesigne, Brussels, 1849). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
3XEOLpSDUOH0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU (Th. Lesigne, Brussels, 1861). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
3XEOLpSDUOH0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU (Th. Lesigne, Brussels, 1870). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
 3XEOLp SDU OH 0LQLVWUH GH O¶,QWpULHXU (Tomes I & II) (Th. Lesigne, 
Brussels, 1884). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
3XEOLpSDUOH0LQLVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU (Tomes I & II) (A. Lesigne, Brussels, 
1893). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
1900) Publié par le Ministre de O¶,QWpULHXU (Tomes I & II) (A. Lesigne, Brussels, 
1903). 
- Statistique de la Belgique: Population Recensement Général (31 Décembre 
3XEOLpSDU OH0LQLVWUHGH O¶,QWpULHXU (Tomes I-IV) (M. Weissenbruch, 
Brussels, 1916). 
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- Statistique Générale de la Belgique: Exposé de la Situation du Royaume 
3pULRGH 'pFHQQDOH GH  j  3XEOLp SDU OH 0LQLVWUH GH O¶,QWpULHXU
(Tome II), (Th. Lesigne, Brussels, 1865). 
- Statistique Générale de la Belgique: Exposé de la Situation du Royaume de 
1861 à 1875 Publié par le MiniVWUHGHO¶,QWpULHXU(Tomes I & II) (Th. Lesigne, 
Brussels, 1878). 
- Statistique Générale de la Belgiqe: Exposé de la Situation du Royaume de 1876 
à 1900 Rédigé sous la Direction de la Commission Centrale de Statistique 
(Tomes I & II), (Becquart-Arien, Brussels, 1907). 
- Verbal Proceeds of the 1852 Commission instated by the Royal Decree of 14 
October 1851 to examine Military Establishment of the Country, 1852. 
- Commission set up to examine if the current organisation of the army responds 
to the necessities of national defence in 1866 
- Verbal Proceeds of the Instituted by Royal Decree of 18 April 1871 to study the 




- Den Denderbode 
- De Flamingant 
- De Poperinghenaar 
- De Volksstem 
- Gazette de Charleroi 
- Gazette de Liège 
- Het Lan van Aelst 
- Indépendence Belge 
- Journal de Bruxelles 
- Journal de Charleroi 
- Journal de Gand 
- -RXUQDOG¶<SUHV 
- La Cronique 
- La Lutte ± De Strijd 
- La Meuse 
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- La Vedette 
- /¶$YHQLUGH/X[HPERXUJ 
- Le Bien Public 
- /H&RXULHUGHO¶eVFDXW 
- Le Messager de Gand 
- Le Petit Messager 
- Le Peuple 
- Le Progres 
- Le Propagateur 
- Le Soir 
- /¶2SLQLRQ 
- The Times 
- XXème Siécle 
 
 
Memoirs, Diaries and Contemporary Publications 
 
- Albert I, The War Diaries of Albert I King of the Belgians: Published from the 
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